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Abstract 
 
During the initial phase of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, which spread globally (Bauer 
2012; Kamin and DeMarco 2012; Prorokowski 2013) and hence affected the world’s economy 
(Döhrn et al. 2009), Germany’s gross domestic product decreased significantly by 5.1% in 2009 
(Destatis 2013). Beside the GDP’s decrease, this global recession was associated with a 
significant decline of Germany’s private equity and venture capital market (EVCA 2013), and a 
declining innovation activity in Germany’s economy during 2008 and 2009 (Rammer et al. 
2014).  
 
The aim of the present study was to examine Germany’s economic, innovation and public 
funding policy, and Germany’s private equity and venture capital market during the so-called 
post-crisis phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012. This topic was chosen due to the importance of 
innovation for economic growth (Schumpeter 1985; Schumpeter 1987), to examine the linkage 
between economic, innovation and public funding policy, and to supplement the earlier work of 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010).  
 
In accordance with Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995), the present 
examination based on a skeletal theory and a set of five presumptions regarding the 
developments during the post-crisis phase. These presumptions were developed in order to 
examine the German economic, innovation and public funding policy, and, furthermore, 
Germany’s private equity and venture capital market. The first presumption argued that the 
government improved the most important research subsidies and the public funding programmes 
on the federal level for the support of small and medium-sized enterprises, innovation projects, 
enterprise founding and for private equity and venture capital investments. The second 
presumption argued that private equity and venture capital investors changed their investment 
strategy and investment behaviour during the post-crisis phase. The third presumption argued 
that the financial crisis affected the investment process of equity investors on the level of the 
deal flow, the deal screening, the negotiation and contracting, the monitoring and mentoring of 
portfolio companies and also on the level of investor’s exit. The final presumptions argued that 
the so-called Alternative Fund Manager Directive affected the processes of deal-selection, deal 
screening and monitoring and that the implementation of the so-called Basel III accord affected 
the selection of industry branches during the process of deal-selection. 
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Qualitative and quantitative data were collected from a purposive selection of publications and a 
purposive selection of early-stage, public and semi-public investors in Germany. A focus of this 
research examination was on the so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften, which 
operate in each federal state of Germany as a kind of self-helping institution for small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The analyses were carried out by means of qualitative content 
analyses and descriptive statistics. This procedure not only ensured research variety and 
flexibility but, moreover, allowed for comparison analyses. Two validation studies were carried 
out, one on the level of the entire sample and one on the level of the so-called Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften, to invite participants to comment on the most important survey 
results.  
 
This examination contributes to the knowledge base as the study showed that the financial crisis 
caused a significantly increasing number of public funding political instruments. The 
examination also showed that the financial crisis did not lead to overall changes in investors' 
investment behaviour and investment strategy during the post-crisis phase. Moreover, the results 
showed that neither the transformation of the Alternative Investment Fund Manager directive nor 
the implementation of Basel III caused the expected effects. In addition, the results underlined 
that the management team is still held to be the most important aspect during the decision 
making process, with a stronger emphasis in that respect, and that the additional components of 
the investment process did not show untypical changes due to financial crisis related impacts. 
Moreover, the results underlined the differences between public and semi-public investors in 
comparison with the remaining market members in Germany’s private equity and venture capital 
market. The results also underlined the exceptional role of the so-called Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften in Germany’s private equity and venture capital market. Finally, the 
results showed that the so-called Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Germany’s most important 
public funding provider, still took an important role in the financing of small and medium-sized 
enterprises on the one hand and the financing of equity investments on the other hand.  
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DD   Due diligence 
 
Destatis  Federal Agency of Statistics in Germany 
 
Diff   Difference 
 
Dipl.-Bw.  Diplom-Betriebswirt 
 
DIW   German Institute for Economic Research/Berlin 
 
EAF   European Angels Fund 
 
EBS   Edinburgh Business School 
 
EC   European Commission 
 
ECB   European Central Bank 
 
EEAG  European Economic Advisory Group 
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EFH   Europäische Fernhochschule Hamburg 
 
EIB   European Investment Bank 
 
EIF   European Investment Fund 
 
EKD   Germany’s Protestant Church  
 
EP   European Parliament 
 
EPO   European Patent Office 
 
ERP   European Recovery Programme 
 
EU   European Union 
 
e. V.   Registered association in Germany 
 
EVCA  European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
 
F&E   Research & development 
 
FH   University of Applied Sciences 
 
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany 
 
GDERD  Gross Domestic Expenditures on Research and Development 
 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
 
GmbH  Limited liability company in Germany 
 
Helaba  Hessian federal state bank 
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HR   Human resources 
 
HSG   University of St. Gallen 
 
HTGF  High-Tech Gründerfund 
 
HTS   Hightech-Strategy 
 
ICT   Information and communication technology 
 
IFD   Private Equity Initiative in Germany 
 
ifm   Institute for Small Business Research/University Mannheim 
 
IfM   Institute for Small Business Research/Bonn 
    
IKT   Information and communication technology 
 
infas   Institute for Applied Social Sciences 
 
IPO   Initial public offering 
 
IT   Information technology 
 
KAGB  Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch 
 
KfW   Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
 
KG   Limited commercial partnership in Germany 
 
KMU  Small and medium-sized enterprise 
 
LoI   Letter of intent 
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M&A  Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
M&S  Marketing & Sales 
 
MAC  Material-adverse-change-clauses 
 
Max   Maximum 
 
MBGs  Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
 
MBI   Management-buy-in 
 
MBO  Management-buy-out 
 
Media  Media and entertainment 
 
MEUR  Million euro 
 
Min   Minimum 
 
Mio   Million 
 
MIS   Management information system 
 
NAV   Net asset value 
 
NS   No specification 
 
ODD   Operational due diligence  
 
PE   Private Equity 
 
PLC   Public limited company 
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PPP   Public private partnership 
 
PSI   Public and strategic investors  
 
R&D   Research and development 
 
RC   Residual category 
 
RWI   Institute for Economic Research/Essen 
 
RWTH  Technical University Aachen 
 
SH   Schleswig-Holstein 
 
SME   Small and medium-sized enterprise 
 
SPV   Special purpose vehicle 
 
TEA   Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity 
 
Telco  Telecommunication 
 
TEUR  Thousand euro  
 
TUM  Technical University Munich 
 
VC   Venture Capital 
 
VDB   Association of German Guarantee Banks/Berlin 
 
VOEB  Association of German Public Banks/Berlin 
 
WACC  Weighted-Average-Cost-of-Capital 
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WHU  Otto Beisheim School of Management/Vallendar 
 
ZEW   Center for European Economic Research/Mannheim 
 
ZIM   Central innovation programme for SMEs  
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Chapter 1 The introduction 
 
In summer 2008, Lehmann brothers and the biggest insurance company in the United States went 
into receivership. This introduced the beginning of the first financial crisis in the present century 
(Schulmeister 2009). This financial crisis spread globally and affected the financial sector and 
the real economy due to economies interdependence (Baur 2012; Kamin and DeMarco 2012; 
Prorokowski 2013). The decreasing economic activity and the contraction of the finance sector 
required extensive public measures for their recovery. The financial crisis finally caused an 
increasing public indebtedness, state debt crises and a currency crisis in Europe (Döhrn et al. 
2009; Döhrn et al. 2012b; Destatis 2013). These circumstances are the basis of the present thesis 
which is concerned with Germany’s economic, innovation and public funding policy and 
Germany’s private equity and venture capital market during the so-called post-crisis phase of 
2010, 2011 and 2012.  
 
In the run-up of the financial crisis, Germany’s economy developed rather successfully around 
the millennium turn, followed from a zero growth between 2002 and 2005, and a strong increase 
each in 2006 and 2007. Finally, Germany’s economy decreased significantly by 5.1% in 2009 
(Destatis 2013). During this decade, the development of Germany’s private equity and venture 
capital market was examined by Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) for the period of 1999 to 2001, 
Achleitner et al. (2006) for the period of 2002 to 2004 and Achleitner et al. (2010) for the period 
of the financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. Initially, Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) argue 
that Germany’s rather small private equity and venture capital market would be in a phase of 
development and would also suffer from gaps in early-stage, turnaround and smaller volume 
investments. At that time, the private equity and venture capital market was substantially 
subsidised by means of public co- and refinancing measures and also characterised from a larger 
number of support-oriented investors (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003). In the subsequent 
periods, Germany’s private equity and venture capital market consolidated due to the crash of 
Germany’s technological stock market segment, the so-called Neue Markt in 2002 (Ehren 2013), 
and also due to economy’s decline. These circumstances initiated a shift in Germany’s private 
equity and venture capital market from early-stage to later-stage investments in order to achieve 
competitive advantages. This development was accompanied with an increasing number of 
larger investment funds which were focused on larger investments in bigger-sized enterprises. 
Nevertheless, Germany’s private equity and venture capital market was still in a phase of 
development with a remarkable proportion of smaller investment funds. In addition, the German 
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private equity and venture capital market still missed the demanded proportions for early-stage 
and smaller volume investments (Achleitner et al. 2006). Achleitner’s subsequent examination 
(Achleitner et al. 2010) shows a further shift in later-stage investments and also underlines the 
relevance of public funding for the entire private equity and venture capital market. Moreover, 
Achleitner’s research results (Achleitner et al. 2010) show that the private equity and venture 
capital market still suffered from funding gaps for early-stage but also for expansion related and 
for turnaround investments. Beside the decline of the entire private equity and venture capital 
market in Germany during the financial crisis (EVCA 2013), Achleitner et al. (2010) also 
mention an increasing hands-on mentality of investors, decreasing return expectations and an 
increasing number of failed contract negotiations due to crisis' impacts. These long-term 
developments since the millennium turn were accompanied with a declining number of 
shareholders (Fey 2014), a declining number of initial public offerings (Statista 2015) and a 
weak entrepreneurial (Metzger 2016) and innovation activity in Germany (Rammer et al. 2010; 
Rammer et al. 2014; Rammer et al. 2016).  
 
In order to counteract possible financing constraints for technology-based enterprise financing 
and founding, the German government launched the so-called ERP-Startfund and the so-called 
High-Tech Gründerfund in 2005 (Achleitner et al. 2006; Renz 2014a). Furthermore, the German 
government felt compelled to develop a nationwide innovation strategy in order to boost the 
innovation activity and the technology transfer in Germany. This so-called Hightech-Strategy 
was launched in 2006 (BMBF 2010). Already at the time of the millennium turn but in particular 
during the initial crisis phase, the decreasing innovation efforts, the modest technology-transfer 
(Rammer et al. 2014) and the gap in equity financing (EVCA 2013) became visible. During the 
initial phase of the financial crisis, the German government launched several conjuncture 
programmes in order to stabilise Germany’s economy and to recapitalise the German finance 
sector (Sachverständigenrat 2008; Heilemann and Wappler 2010). These crisis' measures, inter 
alia, resulted in increasing budgets for the most important research subsidies on the federal level 
and for the funding programmes of Germany’s most prominent public funding provider, the so-
called Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (BMWi 2010; KfW 2010). Moreover, the German 
government either prolonged the investment period of public equity investment funds or 
increased their fund volume. In addition, the government relaunched the national innovation 
strategy (BMWi 2010). 
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These developments in the economy and the equity market in Germany raised the question 
regarding the further development of Germany’s private equity and venture capital market on the 
one hand and the further progress of Germany’s public funding policy during the so-called post-
crisis phase of 2010 to 2012 on the other hand. Therefore, the aim of the present thesis was to 
examine the developments of Germany’s economic, innovation and public funding policy, and 
the developments in Germany’s PE and VC market during 2010, 2011 and 2012. This research 
aim was associated with three research objectives. The first objective was to examine Germany’s 
economic and innovation policy during 2010, 2011 and 2012. The second objective was to 
examine the progress of public funding on the federal level for the financing of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, innovation projects, enterprise founding and equity investments. The 
third objective was to examine the German private equity and venture capital market on the level 
of market members investment strategy, investment behaviour and investment process.  
 
These research aims and objectives were associated with five different presumptions as a kind of 
skeletal theory rather than a set of detailed hypotheses. This procedure of skeletal theorising in 
research examinations complies with Laughlin’s approach of so-called middle-range thinking 
(Laughlin 1995). This research approach, which follows the Habermasian path of German 
critical theory, is based on the middle way of initial theorising and research methodology 
specification in research examinations. Rather than being to narrowed in its basic orientation, 
this approach, due to its middle way focus, allows for flexibility during the research progress and 
skeletal theory’s possible enrichment and complementation. In that context, the first presumption 
of the present thesis argued that the financial crisis might have prompted the government to 
adjust the economic, the innovation and hence the public funding policy. In order to support 
small and medium-sized enterprises, innovation, enterprise founding and the technology transfer, 
the government should have improved and extended the public funding programmes on the 
federal level. This should apply for the most prominent research subsidies ZIM and KMU-
innovativ, and the funding programmes of the so-called Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau for the 
financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, innovation projects, enterprise founding and 
equity investments. The second presumption argued along an increasing risk awareness of 
private equity and venture capital firms due to crisis' impacts. This increasing risk awareness 
should have prompted private equity and venture capital firms to change their investment 
strategy and their investment behaviour during the post-crisis phase. The third presumption is 
associated with the so-called investment process of private equity and venture capital investors, 
which in the core is composed of the deal flow for the acquisition of investments, the deal 
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screening for the review of business proposals, the contract negotiation of investments, the 
monitoring and mentoring of portfolio companies, and finally investor’s exit (Engelmann and 
Heitzer 2001; Nathusius 2001; Feldmann 2007). Earlier research in that respect shows that the 
variables along these components changed their weight in accordance with the economic 
circumstances (Schneider 2003; Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010; Hummel 2011b). Thus, it was supposed that as a consequence of the 
financial crisis, some of these variables should have changed their significance during the post-
crisis phase too. Presumption number four is concerned with the so-called Alternative 
Investment Fund Manager directive, which was adopted by the European Parliament as a 
consequence of the financial crisis. In that context, it was supposed that directive’s 
transformation should have affected private equity and venture capital firms' processes of deal 
selection, deal screening and the monitoring of the portfolio companies. The final presumption 
supposed that the implementation of the higher minimum capital standards for banks, so-called 
Basel III, should have affected private equity and venture capital firms' selection of industry 
branches due to different industry branch related default probabilities. 
 
Overall, the present thesis followed an objective-analytical and empirical research strategy 
(Grochla 1976) for theory building (Chmielewicz 1979) and was phenomenological in character. 
In order to ensure variety during the research progress and skeletal theory’s possible enrichment 
in accordance with Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995), this 
examination based on quantitative and qualitative data sources and research methods. The first 
part of the analysis based on a purposive selection of publications from Germany’s department 
for economic affairs, Germany’s department for research and education and from the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. These publications were selected in order to analyse the German 
economic and innovation policy, and the progress of public funding on the federal level. This 
part of the examination was associated with qualitative content analyses. The second part of the 
analysis based on a structured survey to examine the investment behaviour, the investment 
strategy and the investment process of private equity and venture capital firms during 2010, 2011 
and 2012. This survey based on a purposive selection of early-stage, of public and of semi-public 
investors in Germany. The survey results were analysed by means of descriptive statistics to 
describe the developments in Germany’s private equity and venture capital market during 2010, 
2011 and 2012. The sample frame composition and the descriptive analysis allowed for direct 
comparisons with earlier research studies on the one hand and comparison analyses between the 
group of early-stage investors and the group of public and semi-public investors on the other 
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hand. In order to expand the survey results, the third part of the examination based on a 
purposive selection of publications from Germany’s association of private equity and venture 
capital firms. Two validation studies were finally carried out in order to validate the research 
results regarding the investment process, the directive for Alternative-Investment-Fund-
Managers and Basel III. Such a research design seemed suitable to receive a comprehensive 
perspective regarding developments in the chosen research areas. 
  
This research examination took a neo-institutional theoretical perspective in order to describe the 
private equity and venture capital market, the investment process and the issue of public funding. 
Earlier researchers already argued that the application of a neo-classical theoretical framework 
would not be appropriate in order to describe the private equity and venture capital market in 
general (Brinkrolf 2002; Reißig-Thust 2003; Röper 2004; Pankotsch 2005; Manchot 2010) or the 
financing of small and medium-sized enterprises and of innovation projects in particular 
(Niederöcker 2001).  
  
This topic was chosen due to the importance of innovation for economic growth (Schumpeter 
1985; Schumpeter 1987), to examine the linkage between economic, innovation and public 
funding policy, and to supplement the earlier work of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), 
Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). Even though this research study is limited to 
descriptive results, this examination surely contributes to the existing knowledge base regarding 
the developments in Germany’s private equity and venture capital market due to the focus on 
early-stage, public and semi-public investors.  
 
The dissertation is divided into eight different chapters. The second chapter is initially concerned 
with financial crisis related developments, the economical relevance of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, innovation related particularities in Germany, and finally the financing of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and of innovations. The third chapter is then focused on financial 
theories and on the theoretical framework for the present thesis. The literature review in chapter 
four details the development of the private equity and venture capital market in Europe and 
Germany and presents the literature regarding the investment process and public funding. This 
chapter leads to a basic theory, a research question, the aim and the objectives of the present 
study. Chapter five is concerned with the different types of research methodologies and the 
research methodology of the present research study. The results and conclusions are presented in 
chapter six. Chapter seven is concerned with the discussion of the study outcomes and the final 
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chapter eight with the limitations of the present study and the recommendations for further 
research. The subsequent table one summarises the structure of the present thesis. 
 
The thesis structure 
  
Chapter  Content 
  
I Introduction. 
II Financial crisis, SME and innovation related aspects. 
III Financial theories and thesis framework. 
IV Literature review, basic theory, aim and objectives. 
V Research methodology of the present thesis.  
VI Results and conclusions. 
VII Discussion of results. 
VIII Limitations and recommendations for further research. 
 
Table 1 The thesis structure (own development) 
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Chapter 2 The present financial crisis  
 
This chapter initially discusses the issue of the financial crisis with regard to the emergence, the 
progress and possible crisis' causes. Subsequently, the chapter presents the economic 
consequences of the financial crisis and the development of the economy during the post-crisis 
phase. This chapter finalises with the issue of the SMEs in Germany’s economy, their research 
contribution and financing aspects regarding SME and innovations. 
 
2.1  Basic assumptions regarding the financial crisis 
 
The latest financial crisis, which was stimulated by fiscal policies and financial sector’s 
deregulation, is still ongoing. In the run-up of the crisis, private banks expanded their credit 
volumes and bundled their credit portfolios in the so-called Asset-Backed-Securities. These ABS 
were sold as supposedly safe investments to private and institutional investors. The subsequent 
development of the financial market in the United States was described by an ongoing 
deregulation and weak credit-lending standards (Stocker 2009). Banks expanded their credit 
portfolios by accepting higher credit default probabilities of their debtors. Due to economy’s 
positive development in the US, the credit standing of the so-called sub-prime market 
participants improved (Hoffmann and Köhler 2010). The subsequent economic development 
required the increase of the base rate by the US Federal Reserve Board in order to avoid 
economy’s overheating. In the following periods share and house prices fell significantly and 
banks had difficulties in refinancing their credit portfolios. In summer 2008, Lehman Brothers 
and the biggest US insurance company went into receivership (Schulmeister 2009). This 
development resulted in the present financial crisis, which encompasses several single elements: 
 
 a real estate crisis in the US;  
 a global bank and economy crisis; 
 state debt crises (Brunetti 2011).  
  
Nevertheless, the present crisis is not a century specific phenomenon and the causes behind are 
not finally discussed. In that respect, Schularick (2011) analysed the differences between past 
crises and the current financial crisis and mentions altogether 71 different crises between 1870 
and 2009. Regarding the similarities of these crises, he summarises that market and loan 
expansions were followed by bank crises and supplements that conjuncture downturns, as a 
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result of these crises, required central banks' interventions. This development increased the 
indebtedness of public households. Due to similarities in their development, Schularick (2011) 
finally concludes that wholesale financing, shadow banks, global imbalances and credit-financed 
speculation are the main causes of the latest financial crisis.  
 
Another perspective regarding crisis' causes is based on Kamppeter’s (2013) analysis, which 
starts with the end of World War II. He is focused on the time before and after the agreement of 
Bretton-Woods and argues that the end of this institutional framework introduced an era of debt, 
finance and real estate crises. The post agreement phase was associated with capital market’s 
liberalisation, the expansion of credit volumes and the growing indebtedness of the private and 
of the public households. His argumentation has two sides. On the one hand, he refers to 
uncontrolled capital flows which resulted in high-frequent stock trading and huge market 
volumes. On the other hand, he refers to the development of real estate markets as a driver and 
an accelerator of crises. He points out that real estate markets are associated with the risk of 
unstable price developments. Therefore, he stresses the importance of institutional frameworks to 
hamper uncontrolled capital flows and to avoid speculation. Out of his point of view, the 
agreement of Bretton-Woods was such a suitable monitoring framework. With respect to the 
present financial crisis, Kamppeter (2013) also mentions the fixed currency system between the 
US and China as a possible reason. He points out that the economy in the US requires Chinese 
investments in US public bonds to refinance exports and to avoid US Dollar’s devaluation. 
Instead of closing the gap between real investments and savings, the capital import has been 
spent for private consumption in the US. Van Treeck (2012) refers to the possibility of income 
inequality in the light of Rajan’s (2010) findings. Rajan (2010) criticises that politicians would 
support debt financed consumption which, in the case of the US economy, means that private 
households kept their consumption stable during a period of income stagnation. By reducing 
their savings and by increasing their indebtedness, private households try to follow the 
consumption ability of the higher income groups.  
 
Beside these institutional and economic argumentations, Bartmann (2011) refers to the particular 
responsibility of business data processing. He points out that most of the financial innovations 
are based on complex mathematical models. These models are transformed into specific 
technology systems for risk management or valuation purposes. Due to the lack of historical 
data, systems are unable to calculate future developments seriously and managers simply follow 
the results of the calculation. Furthermore, he concludes that managers simply follow the 
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calculations from the data systems without understanding their functionality. This reasoning 
underlines the thoughts of Kamppeter (2013) who also mentions that information technology 
systems are initiating herds behaviour, market volatility and high-frequent stock trading.  
 
Thus, it seems difficult to determine one particular occurrence behind the present crisis rather 
than a chain of both institutional and economic weaknesses and relationships.  
 
2.2  Ethical remarks regarding the financial crisis 
 
Münch (2012) supplements the initial remarks in section 2.1 in relation to an ethical perspective. 
His argumentation is based on a dilemma in which market participants are captured. This double 
mill causes sub-ideal results. He argues in the light of the so-called prisoner dilemma which, as 
part of the game theory, tries to analyse several behavioural options and the importance of 
institutional frameworks. With respect to the current crisis, Münch (2012) concludes that the 
main reason behind its emergence is the interdependence between politics and financial 
institutions. He argues that the ongoing violation of European Union’s contracts is a typical 
double mill, which will lead to an ongoing development of the financial crisis.    
 
An additional ethical orientation by considering bible contents and metaphors is adopted by the 
EKD (2009). The German Protestant Church describes the current crisis along the development 
of a wall crack. In the beginning, the crack is invisible but it increases steadily and finally results 
in the wall’s collapse. This development is associated with society’s disorientation and the lack 
of confidence, which out of the church’s point of view is the ethical fundament that holds the 
wall together (Huber 2009). The EKD (2009) refers to four different responsibility levels. The 
first is the responsibility of political institutions regarding capital market’s deregulation. The 
second is the responsibility of the finance and the private industry sector which are focused on 
short-term profits. The third one is individuals' behaviour by asserting their interests without 
considering possible consequences and finally, the overall quick money mentality.  
 
Obviously, different institutions, their interconnection and market participants behaviour 
supported the silent emergence of the present crisis and not only a particular event in isolation. 
Therefore, a basic understanding of the current crisis requires a comprehensive view which 
should lead to the assumption that the best possible contract framework and ethical fundament is 
ineffective as long as participants do not behave accordingly. One of the most important 
 35 
problems behind this crisis is that basic effects spread around the globe and were not limited to a 
specific country or region.    
 
2.3 Contagion channels of the financial crisis 
 
Regarding possible contagion channels, Kamin and DeMarco (2012) call into question that direct 
financial linkages are as important as previously assumed. According to their research results, 
they found no evidence that direct linkages due to foreign investments in US mortgage backed 
securities and the foreign dependence on US Dollar funding are important factors behind the 
transmission of the crisis. Their conclusions are based on the quite small amount of ABS 
depreciation in comparison to the overall losses during the crisis. Therefore, they finally 
conclude that indirect channels should be responsible for the propagation of the crisis and refer 
to:  
 
 financial institutions liquidity demand;  
 herds behaviour due to similar business practices and models; 
 financial institutions risk aversion.  
 
These indirect channels resulted in the retreat from lending on the one hand and a decline in ABS 
sales on the other hand. Nevertheless, the degree of market integration enabled shock 
transmissions from one market into foreign markets, which was supported by weak institutional 
frameworks. Prorokowski (2013), who analysed contagion propagation in Europe, refers to the 
capital market on the one hand, and direct bank credit linkages on the other hand as contagion 
channels. He concludes that institutional equity sales in one market caused the decline of 
portfolio values from other market participants. Beside this interconnection of capital markets, 
he, furthermore, points out that the acquisition of eastern European banks by western European 
institutions resulted in direct bank credit channels. These direct channels are also responsible for 
the contagion of the financial crisis in Europe.  
 
These researchers are focused on the contagion within the financial system but leave out the link 
between the financial sector and the real economy. Baur (2012) in that respect concludes that no 
country or industry sector could escape from the crisis' effects. Interestingly enough, he mentions 
that developed country firms have been more exposed to the global financial system than 
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enterprises in emerging markets and calculates that impacts caused by the global financial 
system were strongest in France, Italy, Switzerland, the UK and the US.  
 
2.4  The economical consequences of the financial crisis 
 
Economic effects of the financial crisis resulted in the decline of world’s production output, 
falling raw material prices and a global recession. Protectionism in some countries accelerated 
the effect of decreasing trade activities and the decline in production’s output (Döhrn et al. 
2009). This development was associated with base rate reductions of the most important central 
banks. In the run-up of the financial crisis, institutional investors bought ABS in order to 
improve their profits (Hoffmann and Köhler 2010). During the further progress, savings, 
cooperative and in particular Germany’s so-called Landesbanken realised significant losses due 
to such investments (Dietrich and Vollmer 2012). Therefore, after Lehman brothers' receivership 
in 2008, several rescue programmes were introduced to avoid bank sector’s collapse. The 
German government agreed on rescue programmes in the amount of approx. 480 billion euros. 
Depending on audit results, distressed banks received guarantees, were allowed to transform 
risky assets or were recapitalised by silent equity investments of the state (Sachverständigenrat 
2008). Interestingly enough, local savings and cooperative banks were less affected by the crisis 
since they have separated their investment bank activities. Thus, the major proportion of public 
guarantees and support in Germany refers to public or semi-public banks (Dietrich and Vollmer 
2012). 
 
Nevertheless, Germany’s economy seemed somewhat unaffected for the time being. Germany’s 
GDP increased by 3.3% in 2007 and still by 1.1% in 2008 but subsequently declined 
significantly by 5.1% in 2009 (Destatis 2013). On the other hand, Germany’s unemployment rate 
remained rather stable and resulted in 9% for 2007, in 7.8% for 2008 and in 8.1% for 2009 
(Bundesagentur 2013). This disproportional development could be explained by the increasing 
number of short-time workers from approx. 101,000 in 2008 to 1.14 million in 2009 
(Bundesagentur 2012) as a consequence of the governmental measures.  
 
Leading industrialised countries followed a course of expansive monetary and fiscal policies 
since fall 2008, and introduced extensive conjuncture programmes (Döhrn et al. 2009). 
Heilemann and Wappler (2010) mention two conjuncture programmes in Germany which were 
introduced at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. These programmes combined fiscal 
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policy measures by increasing public investments on the one hand and the reduction of income 
taxes on the other hand. The main focus of the so-called conjuncture programme I in the amount 
of 11.6 billion euros was employment policy related. The conjuncture programme II in the 
amount of 45.9 billion euros referred to the reduction of taxes and social insurance contributions 
beside additional public investments. Finally, fiscal measures resulted in adjustments in the tax 
and social insurance system beside the reduction of public subsidies. These initiatives were 
supplemented by the so-called Wirtschaftsfonds Deutschland in the amount of approx. 115 
billion euros to stabilise Germany’s economy too. These governmental measures resulted in 
GDP contributions by approx. 0.5% each for 2009 and 2010 (Heilemann and Wappler 2010). 
 
2.5  Economy’s development during the post-crisis phase 
 
Due to the extensive and joint stabilisation efforts, the world’s economy developed positively 
during the last months of 2010. Beside the disproportional positive development in the emerging 
markets, the expansion in the industrialised economies proceeded comparatively in a moderate 
way (Döhrn et al. 2011). Beside the intensification of Europe’s state debt crisis, the world’s 
economy cooled down in 2011 again (Döhrn et al. 2012a). The ongoing state debt and bank 
crisis in Europe caused a decline in cross-boarder financing. Therefore, the ECB introduced 
several rescue programmes, beside a cash injection into Europe’s bank system, each in the 
amount of 1,000 billion euros at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 (Sachverständigenrat 
2012).  
 
Due to narrow trade relationships and intensive capital flows, world’s economy was also 
negatively affected by the state debt crisis in Europe. This effect has been accompanied with the 
depreciation of the euro on the one hand (Döhrn et al. 2012b) and a loss of confidence in rescue 
measures of EU member states on the other hand (Döhrn et al. 2012c). In 2012, the world’s weak 
economic development caused further consolidation efforts, resulted in unstable Euro zone 
prognosis and led to the end of the conjuncture programmes. On the other hand, the ECB 
continued the expansive monetary policy in order to stabilise the economy and the bank system. 
Nevertheless, due to the large investments of private banks in government bonds of distressed 
countries, the weak state solvencies were transferred to the bank system (Sachverständigenrat 
2012). During the post-crisis phase, Germany’s economy increased by 3.6% in 2010, by 3% in 
2011 and by 0.7% in 2012 (Destatis 2013).  
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Nevertheless, beside the questions regarding bank systems stability and economies development, 
public concerns were also associated with the small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany. 
The majority of enterprises in Germany are small and medium-sized (Söllner 2011) and the 
subsequent sections are initially focused on their economic relevance, their innovation 
contribution and financing aspects.    
 
2.6  The small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany 
 
2.6.1  The significance of small and medium-sized enterprises 
 
According to the SME classification of the European Commission (see table two in appendix B), 
approx. 99% of Germany’s enterprises are small and medium-sized. In addition, approx. 61% of 
Germany’s employees were employed in the sector of the SMEs in 2009, whose employment 
contribution developed positively in 2008 compared to 2007 (Söllner 2011). Beside this progress 
during the initial phase of the financial crisis, May-Strobl and Haunschild (2013), moreover, 
found out that SMEs realised a net employment increase by 14%, whereas bigger-sized 
enterprises realised net employment losses of approx. 1% between 2001 and 2009. Nevertheless, 
SMEs amount of job losses was twice as much in comparison to bigger-sized enterprises during 
the same period. It was concluded that SMEs compensated these job losses by expansion on the 
one hand and enterprise founding on the other hand. Hence, this development confirms the so-
called SME hypothesis which argues that SMEs employment contribution would be bigger than 
the employment contribution of bigger-sized enterprises (May-Strobl and Haunschild 2013). 
Furthermore, the economic importance of SMEs is also explained due to their contribution in the 
qualification and innovation process. In Germany, SMEs contribution in the enterprise-based 
qualification system is rather large as the majority of trainees are qualified in enterprises with 
less than 500 employees. In addition, SMEs realise significant investments in fixed assets and 
their proportion on economy’s gross value added resulted in approx. 50% in 2009 (Söllner 
2011). SMEs are also important in the value chain of bigger-sized enterprises and prevent supply 
shortages in less structured regions due to their nationwide representation. However, research 
data show that the research and development contribution of SMEs is rather weak and hence 
their innovation potential is not completely exhausted (Hummel 2011a).  
 
In that respect, SMEs are not only regarded as important in the innovation process but also for 
the diffusion of innovations in the economy. Schumpeter (1985) argues that the production 
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process in economies would always be moving towards the boarders of efficiency. The 
efficiency boarders are further moving due to the implementation of improved factor 
combinations by innovative entrepreneurs. With regard to the further development of economies, 
Schumpeter (1985) distinguishes between ordinary and innovative entrepreneurs, and between 
the economic circle and the innovation system. According to his clarifications, only the 
innovative entrepreneurs in the innovation system are regarded as important for the further 
development of the economy. He argues that only this type of entrepreneur would be responsible 
for the transformation of improved factor combinations and thus for the reorganisation of the 
economy (Schumpeter 1985). Schumpeter points out that it is this implementation of factor 
combinations and the diffusion of innovations which causes the conjuncture cycles. The ordinary 
entrepreneur, however, would simply produce goods and services in accordance with the 
market’s demand. The economy moves in equilibrium until additional financial resources for 
new factor combinations are provided. This capital provision initiates economy’s further 
development. Innovative entrepreneurs will realise significant pioneer profits if the factor 
combination and the transformation in new markets are successful. The process of factor 
transformation in the markets require additional capital. This additional capital proportion causes 
increasing prices due to the additional demand. The innovative entrepreneurs enter into the 
market, eliminate market barriers and initially step beside the ordinary entrepreneurs. In order to 
participate in the pioneer profits, further entrepreneurs are entering into the market by simply 
following the basic ideas of the pioneer entrepreneurs. This crowded entering of market 
followers further lowers the market barriers for subsequent entrepreneurs. Further entrepreneurs 
are entering into the market as long as it is possible to realise sufficient profits with the new 
products and services. This progress is associated with the diffusion of the innovation in the 
entire economy due to the crowd of market followers. Thus, the additional demand initiates a 
period of economic upturn which affects additional industry sectors and finally the whole 
economy. Both the increasing price level in the economy and the new products lead to 
decreasing profits of the ordinary entrepreneurs. This process is associated with the 
reorganisation of the whole economy due to the more efficient use of factor resources. The 
further development of the economy is hampered at that point where it becomes difficult to 
realise sufficient profits due to the crowd of market followers. On the other hand, the innovative 
entrepreneurs are able to repay their credits which initiates a period of credit deflation. The 
overall economic development slows down with lower price levels, decreasing demand and 
increasing unemployment. These unstable circumstances make it rather difficult to assess future 
developments and hence the entrepreneurial activity in the economy is declining too. The 
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economy tries to find an equilibrium again at which innovative entrepreneurs begin to implement 
new factor combinations again (Schumpeter 1987).  
 
The central point behind Schumpeter’s theory is the importance of the entrepreneur in the 
economy. The neo-classical theory on the other hand contradicts this importance of 
entrepreneurial activity and argues that economic growth is stimulated by an increasing capital 
stock. In the context of the current economic policies in industrialised economies, this capital 
stock increase is associated with additional expenses for education, research and infrastructure. 
Neoclassical assumptions argue that this increase would result in additional knowledge and that 
the transformation of knowledge would be based on routines. Schumpeter however remarks that 
it would not be possible to transform knowledge without entrepreneurial activity and thus 
contradicts the assumption of automatic knowledge transformation. He reasons that without 
innovative entrepreneurs, the economy would stand still without any growth perspectives (Röpke 
and Stiller 2006). Röpke and Stiller (2006) remark that the assumptions of Schumpeter 
nowadays are supported by the disintegration of societies. They argue that both the economy and 
the scientific area are operating separately. Hence, this disintegration of sub-systems also 
contradicts the possibility of knowledge transformation by routines, which is also difficult due to 
the complex scientific knowledge. Therefore, Röpke and Stiller (2006) stress the importance of 
innovative entrepreneurs for the successful transformation of knowledge.    
 
Regarding the implementation and diffusion of innovation, SMEs benefit from short 
communication processes, motivated employees and management teams, and from their overall 
flat hierarchies. However, weak financial and personnel resources, the lack of project planning, 
project supervision and a weak market orientation hamper the innovation process in SMEs. The 
most important issue in that respect is the gap of financial resources. Under normal 
circumstances, innovation projects are associated with large costs, long-lasting investment 
periods and realisation risks. These particularities explain the gap of financial resources and 
SMEs avoidance of ongoing research and development. In most cases, SMEs are focused on one 
project rather than on several projects which increases the research risk significantly. In addition, 
SMEs are disadvantaged in hiring qualified staff and, moreover, suffer from increased 
fluctuation (Dömötör 2011). These reasons result in obvious differences in the innovation 
contribution of SMEs and bigger-sized enterprises which is clarified in the subsequent section. 
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2.6.2  Innovation specific developments in Germany 
 
In order to assess the economic contribution of innovations, the literature distinguishes between 
several indicators and nomenclatures. Enterprises are classified as innovation active in the case 
they conduct research and development but without necessarily resulting in the introduction of 
new products, services or processes. Enterprises are also classified as so-called innovators in the 
case they launch or introduce: 
 
 a new or improved product, service or process; 
 a marketing method; 
 an organisation method. 
 
Enterprises which just modify existing products, services or processes are classified as so-called 
moderniser. Furthermore, the literature distinguishes between the so-called input, throughput and 
output indicators. The expenses for research and development are the most important input 
measure. Innovation efforts could result in the registration of patents or any other kind of 
proprietary rights, internal research routines and the employment of scientific staff. These 
variables are regarded as possible outcomes of innovation activities even though their 
registration is very difficult and does not show the final research success. Basically, these 
variables are neither regarded as necessary nor sufficient conditions for successful product 
launches. This means that not every patent is necessarily resulting in a product launch and not 
every product launch is based on a registered patent. Therefore, these variables are classified as 
the so-called throughput indicators. They do not allow for conclusions regarding enterprises' 
innovation intensity on the one hand or the innovation success on the other hand (Maaß and 
Führmann 2012). The final success of R&D is expressed by the revenue proportion of new or 
significantly improved products and services. The success of process innovations on the other 
hand is expressed by their contribution in the reduction of costs per unit. In the case that process 
innovations are introduced for quality improvements of products and services, their success is 
expressed by their contribution in additional revenues (Rammer et al. 2014).    
 
The literature review shows that the innovation statistics have obvious limitations. Even though 
several research institutions in Germany are concerned with innovation research, an all- 
encompassing basic statistic is completely missing. Most of the research studies are limited to 
particular industry branches and enterprise sizes, and thus their results are not representative for 
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the entire economy. In addition, the research studies are based on self-assessments of the 
participating enterprises and hence on their knowledge regarding the application of innovation 
definitions. This supports the assumption that the statistics might be biased (Maaß and Führmann 
2012).  
 
In order to realise a basic understanding regarding the innovation ability of Germany’s economy, 
the subsequent clarifications are based on the research study from Rammer et al. (2014). This 
longitudinal examination is carried out on behalf of Germany’s department for education and 
research. The results are representative for the population of enterprises with more than five 
employees in selected industry branches. The study distinguishes between the so-called research-
intensive industry with the chemical, the pharmaceutical, the electronics, the mechanical 
engineering and the automotive industry. Furthermore, the additional industries are in the fields 
of energy and water utility, mining and recycling. On the other hand, the study distinguishes 
between knowledge-based services from publishers, the film industry, IT companies, public 
relation agencies, tax, and the legal and management consulting firms. Finally, the study 
considers basic services from wholesalers, logistic firms, employment agencies and security 
companies. The agriculture, the fishing, the forestry, the construction industry, the retail, the 
educational service, the health care, the culture and the public sector are not considered in the 
examination. Nevertheless, the study delivers a comprehensive time series analysis regarding 
research and development in Germany’s most important industry sectors (Rammer et al. 2014).  
 
The subsequent table three shows that there are significant differences in the research and 
development activity of enterprises in Germany. The classification as continuously research 
active requires research and development divisions in the enterprise or at least R&D staff 
resources in order to ensure permanent research. Research data show that the proportion of 
continuously research active entrepreneurs is increasing in relation to the company size. This 
proportion is overall bigger in the industry than in the service sector and biggest on the level of 
industry firms with more than 1,000 employees.  
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The research and development activity in 2012 
 
Number of employees Continuously Occasionally 
   
Industry sector   
5 – 49 12% 13% 
50 – 249 33% 16% 
250 – 999 61% 12% 
1,000 < 83% 5% 
   
Service sector   
5 – 49 7% 7% 
50 – 249 10% 6% 
250 – 999 16% 9% 
1,000 < 37% 7% 
   
Total 11% 9% 
 
Table 3 The research and development activity in 2012; extrapolations for the population of enterprises in 
Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 15) 
 
This research strategy is associated with comparatively smaller innovation expenditures of the 
SMEs for current and fixed assets, and for internal and external research and development. The 
proportion of expenditures is rising on the level of the bigger-sized enterprises (see subsequent 
table four) as does their proportion on continuously research (see table three). In addition, 
bigger-sized enterprises enter more often into research cooperation, both in the industry and in 
the service sector (see table five). Research cooperation is regarded as stimulating in the research 
process. Cooperating partners benefit from scale effects so that research efforts could finally be 
expanded (Dömötör 2011). This explains, inter alia, why public research funding is focused on 
the intensification of research cooperation, in particular on the level of the SMEs. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail in section 4.5.  
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The innovation expenditures' proportion on revenues in 2012
1)
 
 
Number of employees Industry sector Service sector 
   
5 – 49 2.4% 1.0% 
50 – 249 2.2% 0.8% 
250 – 999 2.1% 0.7% 
1,000 < 6.2% 1.7% 
  
Total 2.7% 
 
1) Including expenses for current and fixed assets, internal and external R&D. 
Table 4 The innovation expenditures' proportion on revenues in 2012; extrapolations for the population of 
enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 16) 
 
The research and development cooperation in 2012 
 
Number of employees Industry sector Service sector 
   
5 – 49 18% 13% 
50 – 249 34% 21% 
250 – 999 57% 25% 
1,000 < 88% 62% 
  
Total 18% 
 
Table 5 The research and development cooperation in 2012; extrapolations for the population of 
enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 19) 
 
The statistic in the subsequent table six initially shows the proportion of innovation active 
enterprises in Germany. Innovation activities in that respect refer to every type of research effort 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012, irrespective of whether this effort was resulting in a product or 
process innovation. The information regarding the proportion of product innovators considers 
product innovations in the type of product inventions, product imitations and product 
improvements. This shows the rather comprehensive application of the term innovation. Process 
innovations are process implementations, either new or improved within the enterprise itself in 
order to reduce the costs per unit or for quality improvements of products and services. 
Innovations are considered in the statistic, in the case that an enterprise has introduced a product 
or process innovation at least at one occasion during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Table six shows that 
the proportion of innovation active enterprises and the proportion of product and process 
innovators is significantly increasing in relation to the company size. The proportions of the 
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bigger-sized enterprises differ significantly from the proportions of the smallest enterprises. 
Rammer et al. (2014) calculate a proportion of 51% innovation active enterprises and a 
proportion of approx. 38% product and process innovators in Germany for 2012. The application 
of continuously research, the scope of research cooperation and the amount of R&D expenses of 
the bigger-sized enterprises is associated with their larger proportions on both product and 
process innovations. This research strategy is also resulting in their significantly larger 
innovation success. This success proportion is increasing in relation to the company size with the 
exception of the service sector in which the smallest enterprises are obviously very successful. 
Nevertheless, the more detailed interpretation shows that from the total revenue proportions of 
12.6% only 2.9% are associated with market innovations and approx. 9.8% with imitations. This 
means that approx. 78% of these revenue proportions are associated with product imitations. The 
revenue proportions of imitations are the biggest on the level of enterprises with five to 49 
employees and both in the industry and the service sector (see table seven and Rammer et al. 
2014, p. 17).  
 
The innovation statistics for the industry and service sector in 2012 
 
Number of employees Innovation activities Product innovators Process innovators 
    
Industry sector    
5 – 49 53% 34% 22% 
50 – 249 72% 50% 39% 
250 – 999 83% 68% 57% 
1,000 < 95% 87% 83% 
    
Service sector    
5 – 49 46% 25% 18% 
50 – 249 47% 27% 27% 
250 – 999 62% 35% 44% 
1,000 < 79% 61% 68% 
    
Total 51% 30% 22% 
 
Table 6 The innovation statistics for the industry and service sector in 2012; extrapolations for the 
population of enterprises in Germany with more than five employees  
(derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 14) 
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The innovation success in the industry and service sector in 2012 
 
Number of employees Product innovations Process innovations 
 Revenue proportions Proportion on cost Revenue proportion of 
 reductions quality improvements 
Industry sector    
5 – 49 7.5% 1.1% 1.1% 
50 – 249 9.2% 1.8% 1.4% 
250 – 999 10.7% 2.8% 1.4% 
1,000 < 27.4% 4.8% 2.4% 
    
Service sector    
5 – 49 6.0% 1.9% 0.9% 
50 – 249 4.7% 1.1% 0.8% 
250 – 999 3.8% 3.2% 0.7% 
1,000 < 9.6% 4.4% 2.6% 
    
Total 12.6% 3.3% 1.7% 
 
Table 7 The innovation success in the industry and service sector in 2012; extrapolations for the 
population of enterprises in Germany with more than five employees  
(derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 17) 
 
Moreover, the subsequent table eight shows that the gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development increased without any interruption since the millennium turn. This applies for the 
absolute values and relative to Germany’s GDP. The more detailed view, however, shows that 
the increase was not as large in the first half of the decade in comparison to the second half. In 
that respect, the GDERD increased by approx. 7% and thus by approx. 3.7 billion euros between 
2001 and 2005, whereas these expenditures increased by approx. 19% and thus by approx. 11.1 
billion euros between 2006 and 2010.  
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The gross domestic expenditures on research and development
1)
 
 
Year Total GDERD in BEUR GDERD proportion on GDP 
  
 
2000 50.83 2.40% 
2001 52.24 2.40% 
2002 53.55 2.43% 
2003 54.73 2.47% 
2004 55.10 2.43% 
2005 55.93 2.43% 
2006 58.97 2.47% 
2007 61.50 2.45% 
2008 66.59 2.60% 
2009 67.08 2.73% 
2010 70.01 2.72% 
2011 75.57 2.80% 
2012 79.11 2.88% 
 
1) Including expenditures from public and private organisations, and the private economy. 
Table 8 The gross domestic expenditures on research and development (derived from table 1.1.1 on 
www.datenportal.bmbf.de, accessed August 2015) 
 
Despite these obvious efforts to boost the innovation activity in Germany’s economy, Rammer et 
al. (2014) calculate a decreasing proportion of product and process innovators from 47% in 2008 
to 38% in 2012. This proportion of product and process innovators was largest in the IT, the 
telecommunication, the chemical, the pharmaceutical and the mechanical engineering sectors 
with proportions of each at least 70% in 2012. Moreover, approx. 44% of the enterprises 
implemented a marketing and/or organisation innovation in 2012. These so-called non-
technological innovations are considered in the international innovation statistics since 2005. 
This kind of innovations are marketing and organisation procedures which are implemented by 
the respective enterprise for the first time. Rammer et al. (2014) mention that the proportions of 
marketing and organisation innovators decreased significantly between 2010 and 2012. In 2012, 
the amount of research expenses in the selected industry branches resulted in approx. 137.3 
billion euros. A proportion of approx. 64% belongs to the chemical, the pharmaceutical, the 
electronics, the automotive and the mechanical engineering sectors. The expenses in these 
industry branches increased significantly between 2008 and 2012, but remained stable in the 
other industry sectors of the study. On the other hand, the statistic shows that approx. 105 billion 
euros and thus a proportion of 76% of the expenses refer to enterprises with more than 500 
employees in 2012. Approx. 24.2 billion euros and thus a proportion of approx. 18% refer to 
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enterprises with less than 250 employees and the remaining proportion of 6% refer to enterprises 
between 250 and 499 employees. According to a company-size based perspective, the research 
expenses were decreasing on every enterprise-size level during the initial phase of the crisis. 
Subsequently, the research expenses were increasing from approx. 80 billion euros in 2010 to 
105 billion euros in 2012. Thus, the expenses increased by approx. 31% on the level of the 
bigger-sized enterprises with more than 500 employees. On the other hand, the expenses 
remained quite stable each on the level of the enterprises with less than 500 and less than 250 
employees (Rammer et al. 2014).  
 
Beside the decline of the product, process, marketing and organisation innovators in Germany 
between 2008 and 2012, the revenue proportions of product innovations, which include 
innovations, improvements and imitations, decreased in every industry branch of the study 
during the initial phase of the crisis too. This proportion recovered in 2010 and 2011, but fell 
back again in 2012. The same development applies for the proportion of revenue increases due to 
quality improvements. The contribution of process innovations for the reduction of costs per unit 
ran volatile but overall tended to decrease during 2008 and 2012 with the exception of the basic 
service sector. On that level, these proportions slightly increased (Rammer et al. 2014).     
 
Thus, the innovation activity in Germany’s economy seemed to be hampered and the further 
development somewhat one-sided. The assumption of routines in order to transform knowledge 
into economical success might apply for particular industry branches and enterprise sizes but not 
for the entire economy. The past development shows that the pure increase of the capital stock in 
order to produce additional knowledge did not automatically result in an improved knowledge 
transfer nor in an increase of success proportions. Consequently, the application of the 
neoclassical assumptions is limited. This supports Schumpeter’s conclusions (see section 2.6.1) 
that the transformation of knowledge requires entrepreneurial activity, not only by innovative 
entrepreneurs in the innovation system, but also from the existing enterprises in the economic 
circle. According to the research findings of Rammer et al. (2014), this means that in particular 
SMEs have to intensify their research efforts.    
 
If only 11% of enterprises with more than five employees in the selected industry sectors carry 
out research and development continuously and approx. 9% of the enterprises occasionally, the 
vast majority of enterprises would not be research active at all. This applies in particular for 
SMEs in the industry sector with less than 250 employees and the service sector with less than 
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1,000 employees (see table three). In addition, the research data show that the majority of 
product innovators are concentrated in specific industry branches and employment classes. 
Approx. 94% of the research expenses refer to enterprises with more than 500 employees, which 
increased these amounts during 2010 to 2012 significantly. This means that the research 
contribution is overall concentrated and thus the innovation potential of the economy is not 
completely exhausted. This applies in particular regarding the specific type of innovation. In that 
respect, data show that the majority of revenues in the context of the transformation of 
innovations were based on product imitations. This underlines the earlier assumption of Welsch 
(2005) who argues that the innovation activity in Germany would be associated with the 
improvement of products and processes rather than the development of radical innovations. 
Therefore, Germany would belong to the group of fast followers with a high productivity and a 
successful diffusion of new applications in the important industry sectors. On the other hand, 
Welsch (2005) points out that Germany obviously would not be able to develop new markets and 
industry sectors. In that context, the structural change into high-technology areas would be too 
slow (Welsch 2005).  
 
Schumpeter (1987) argues that the entrepreneur requires either credit or equity in order to 
implement new factor resources. Banks are operating between the owners of factor resources and 
the entrepreneurs. By receiving credits from banks, the innovative entrepreneur is able to buy the 
required resources for the further combination and their market introduction. This explains the 
central meaning of the capital and the credit market which are concerned with the redirection of 
factor resources into new applications. The process of economic growth does not only require 
factor resources but, moreover, enterprise founding and innovative entrepreneurs. In that respect, 
Röpke and Stiller (2006) argue that capital requires the connection to innovation and new 
knowledge requires the implementation in new factor combinations. Hence, if these requirements 
are not fulfilled, both the capital flow and the development of new knowledge would be 
meaningless. Therefore, the subsequent section is concerned with the application of financing 
measures for SME and innovation financing. In that respect, the clarifications are focused on 
public funding, capital market financing, equity financing and bank financing. 
 
2.6.3  Small and medium-sized enterprises and innovation financing 
 
Hummel (2011a), who was research active with regard to SME and innovation financing in 
Germany, argues that the modest technology transfer is due to a lack of applied research projects 
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and of cooperation between enterprises and research institutions. Nevertheless, he concludes that 
the gap in financing capital is the most important obstacle in the technology transfer. His 
research results show that self-financing by capital gains is the most important type of financing 
for SMEs in Germany. Even though placed on subsequent ranks, bank credits and overdrafts, 
supplier credits, depreciation and leasing are of importance too. This applies in particular on the 
level of enterprises between 50 and 249 employees which achieve revenues between ten to 50 
million euros per year. Public funding, guarantees, factoring, private equity and capital market 
financing play a minor or absolutely no role in the financing of SMEs. Nevertheless, these results 
could not be regarded as representative for the population of SMEs in Germany due to the rather 
weak response rate of 1.4%. Overall, they show a basic direction regarding the financing of 
SMEs in Germany.  
 
On the level of innovation financing, Hummel (2011a) distinguishes between project sizes up to 
50,000 euros, 50,000 and 200,000 euros and above 200,000 euros in SMEs with no more than 
249 employees. In that respect, self-financing is the most important financing channel too which 
applies for every project size. Bank credits, bank overdrafts and supplier credits are also 
important but, nevertheless, are on the subsequent ranks. The application of public funding is 
rather unimportant for projects up to 50,000 euros but, nevertheless, increases in relation to the 
project size. Public funding takes the second rank behind self-financing of projects above 
200,000 euros. On the level of that project size leasing is also important, which could be 
explained due to investments in fixed assets for innovation projects. Capital market and 
mezzanine financing do not play any role in the financing of innovation projects (Hummel 
2011a). However, this conclusion should be regarded with care as initially specified and might 
be a consequence of the particular research questions and project sizes.  
 
Nevertheless, the results underline the obvious dependence of SMEs on self- and bank-financing. 
In particular, SMEs dependence on bank financing (ECB 2010; Destatis 2011; Hummel 2011a) 
should be regarded as critical for the further development of the economy. SMEs are 
disadvantaged by banks due the lack of securities, controlling and reporting instruments 
(Stefanovic 2009). Hummel’s (2011a) research results confirm that the lack of securities and, 
moreover, the costs of bank financing are the most important obstacles for SME financing 
purposes. These issues are the most important on the level of enterprises up to 49 employees 
with less than ten million euros on revenues. 
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These circumstances should have intensified due to the contraction of the bank sector during the 
financial crisis (see section 2.4) and the modification of the minimum capital requirements for 
banks (BIS 2010). Thus, in order to receive bank credits for innovation or general financing 
purposes, SMEs have to expand their equity basis too. This underlines the assumption that 
alternative financing channels should be of future relevance for SME and for innovation 
financing purposes. 
    
With regard to capital market financing, Hummel (2011a) refers to equity financing by shares or 
debt financing by corporate bonds. He argues that the application of these financing measures on 
the level of SMEs and innovation projects is limited. Hummel (2011a) remarks that an initial 
public offering in order to issue enterprise shares on the stock market is associated with 
transaction costs during the IPO and subsequently due to publication obligations and shareholder 
meetings. Corporate bonds on the other hand would be associated with large transaction costs 
too, and would also require minimum transaction volumes and positive ratings of the debtor. Due 
to these particularities, the application of capital market financing is surely limited for SMEs. 
Past developments of the capital market in Germany support the assumption that this financing 
channel is overall limited. This applies not only for SME and enterprise financing in general but 
in particular for the financing of innovative enterprises. In that context, the number of IPOs in 
Germany decreased from 142 to eight between 2000 and 2012 after standstills each in 2003, 
2008 and 2009 (Statista 2015). This progress was associated by a declining number of 
shareholders in Germany from approx. 6.2 million in 2000 to 3.6 million in 2008. This number 
recovered and resulted in approx. 4.5 million shareholders in 2012 (Fey 2014). The development 
underlines the decreasing relevance of the capital market in Germany at least in the past decade, 
which, inter alia, explains the dependence of Germany’s economy on the bank sector. With 
regard to the further development of the capital market in Germany, Blättchen (2015) points out 
that the German Stock Exchange is comparatively overregulated. He points out that this would 
apply in particular for this market segment which is regarded as SME friendly. Blättchen (2015) 
argues that this overregulation of the stock market would narrow its financing contribution, in 
particular for the financing of technology enterprises. In that respect, he argues that from the 
future on, investments from private shareholders would be limited. Possible market limitations 
would also be caused as nowadays private investors would be completely excluded during IPOs. 
On the other hand, the German Stock Exchange launched a so-called venture network for 
innovative enterprises (Blättchen 2015). This initiative was established in 2015, as a platform for 
capital seeking enterprises in the expansion or the pre-IPO phase (Deutsche Börse 2015). Thus, 
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these past and recent developments show that the potential of the capital market in Germany is 
not completely exhausted and limited due to additional regulations.  
 
In accordance with the research results of Hummel (2011a), the application of PE and VC for 
SME and innovation financing is also limited. Based on an investor perspective, Hummel 
(2011a) argues that PE and VC investors are rather selective, are focused on particular types of 
enterprise sizes or industry branches, and, moreover, are investing in different life cycles. In 
addition, these investors have clear return expectations. Hence, these limitations make an overall 
application in the field of smaller enterprises difficult. On the other hand, Hummel’s (2011a) 
research results show that the loss of autonomy represents the most important reason for SMEs 
to deny the application of PE and VC. The more detailed interpretation of Hummel’s (2011a) 
results show that smaller enterprises up to 49 employees and ten million euros on revenues, 
simply have difficulties in receiving equity financing. The insignificance of equity financing in 
Germany is also underlined by the rather small volume of the German PE and VC market. 
Average calculations, which are based on the annual investments of domestic PE and VC firms 
in 2010, 2011 and 2012, show that investors in the UK realised approx. 18.8 billion euros on 
equity investments per year, investors in France approx. 6.8 billion euros per year and German 
PE and VC firms approx. 4.8 billion euros per year (EVCA 2013). In relation to these average 
calculations for 2010, 2011 and 2012, the German PE and VC market represents only approx. 
26% of UK’s market investment volume. More detailed calculations in that respect are 
introduced in section 4.1. The comparatively smaller PE and VC market in Germany could also 
be an explanation for the large proportion of public support in the German PE and VC market. 
This applies not only for early-stage but also for later-stage investments of PE and VC firms 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). These issues are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter four.    
 
With regard to public funding for innovation purposes, the research results show that their 
importance is increasing in relation to the project size. Public funding takes the second place 
after self-financing on the level of projects above 200,000 euros. Even though the sample 
members complain due to long-lasting processing procedures, they appreciate the cost advantage 
of public funding. On the other hand, public funding is of minor importance for SME financing 
in general (Hummel 2011a). A more detailed interpretation regarding public subsidies from the 
federal level for innovation projects is shown by the research results from Belitz et al. (2012). 
Their research show that the amounts of research grants for SMEs which are issued by federal 
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departments more than doubled between 2005 and 2010. In that respect, these research grants 
without the contribution of the defence department increased by approx. 17.6% from 2005 to 
2007, and by approx. 57.9% from 2008 to 2010 (Belitz et al. 2012). Furthermore, they agree with 
the research findings of Hummel (2011a) that self-financing would be the most important source 
for SMEs regarding the financing of innovation projects. They calculate that approx. 69% of the 
R&D expenses are self-financed by cash-flows or reserves, approx. 25% by public subsidies and 
approx. 6% by both private and public bank loans. Nevertheless, it should be considered that 
these results are limited to those enterprises which received public subsidies from the German 
economic department and the department for education and research between 2005 and 2010. 
Thus, these results are not representative for the entire economy. 
 
These basic clarifications regarding SME and innovation financing in Germany show that there 
is a large dependence of SMEs on their self-financing capacity and on bank financing. 
Schumpeter (1985 and 1987) argues that enterprise financing is important, not only for the 
implementation of factor combinations but also for the diffusion of innovations. Therefore, 
financing constraints could be regarded as rather critical for the further development of the 
economy.  
 
Nevertheless, the successful transformation of technologies and the reorganisation of the 
economy also require entrepreneurial activity. Research data show that the relation of enterprise 
foundings and liquidations ran from an annual surplus of 54,000 in 2005 to an annual loss of 
24,000 in 2012. This information is derived from enterprises which are either registered in the 
trade register or employ at least one employee. Enterprise foundings in the agriculture sector, 
freelancing and sideline foundations are not considered. This significant decline is accompanied 
with a decreasing number of sideline foundations, which decreased from a surplus over 
liquidations from 131,000 in 2005 to 84,000 in 2012 (IfM 2014). On the other hand, the number 
of freelancers increased by 130% between 1994 and 2014 (Welter 2015). Welter (2015) argues 
that the founding behaviour has changed due to the technological possibilities and society’s 
development. This means that nowadays enterprise founding in its simplest way would just 
require knowledge, networks and internet access. She (Welter 2015) concludes that the barriers 
for enterprise founding would be lower than in former times and enterprise founding in general 
would be more project oriented. Thus, the relevance of financing capital on the one hand and 
specific requirements regarding the entrepreneur on the other hand would have stepped aside. 
Even though Germany obviously suffers from a decreasing proportion of commercial enterprise 
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founding, Welter (2015) concludes that the present enterprise foundings would fulfil their 
economic role. Enterprise foundings would not only stimulate competition and thus would 
initiate the further development of the economy but would also prompt the bigger-sized 
enterprises to carry out ongoing research and development.  
 
This is surely a simplification of reality by considering the R&D activity in Germany between 
2008 and 2012. Welter (2015) qualifies the contribution of the freelancers in the economy and 
points out that the proportion of freelancers which permanently work without any employees 
increased by 83% between 1992 and 2012. Thus, it could be assumed that freelancing is more of 
an employment alternative due to economy’s development in Germany after the millennium turn. 
The value added of this increasing number of freelancers is surely too small in order to 
compensate for the gap of commercial company foundings. In economic terms, it could be 
concluded that there is not only a decreasing entrepreneurial activity, which is associated with an 
increasing number of freelancers, but that Germany also suffers from a decreasing innovation 
success (see section 2.6.2) and a capital gap for SME and innovation financing (see section 
2.6.3). 
 
2.7  Chapter summary 
 
The basic clarifications regarding the financial crisis have shown that typical financial crises 
have an overall similar pattern. The different research studies and commentaries regarding the 
present financial crisis refer to different crisis' causes but underline the assumption that neither 
an isolated blaming of specific countries, regions nor of specific institutions seems appropriate. 
Hence, a basic understanding of the present financial crisis requires a more sophisticated 
perspective which supports the assumption that the strong connection of societies, economies 
and financial institutions in the whole world might be the reason for the current crisis. The 
different expectations and strategies of societies sub-systems, countries and market protagonists 
contributed to the emergence of the financial crisis. The further progress has also been supported 
by a lack of effective cooperation and monitoring authorities. Consequently, the crisis spread 
around the world and finally reached the real economy. No country or industry branch could 
escape from the effects of the crisis which resulted in the substantial economic decline (see 
sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). 
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Furthermore, the literature showed that the latest financial crisis resulted in a bank crisis, a global 
recession and state debt crises. Worldwide economic programmes were launched to stabilise 
both the financial system and the economy (see section 2.4). Germany’s banking sector and 
economy, even though quite robust in the beginning of the crisis, could not permanently escape 
from crisis' impacts. The ongoing progress of the crisis in Europe required additional measures 
from the ECB to stabilise the entire Euro zone on the one hand and the euro on the other hand. 
After a short period of recovery in 2010 and 2011, Germany’s economy fell back in 2012 again 
(see section 2.5).  
 
The literature has also shown that approx. 99% of Germany’s enterprises are small and medium-
sized in accordance with the classification system of the European Commission. This type of 
enterprise size is not only regarded as important for employment and qualification but, moreover, 
for the diffusion of innovation in the entire economy (see section 2.6.1). 
 
With regard to innovation specific developments in Germany, the statistics show that the 
innovation activity, the expenses for research and development, and the research cooperation is 
increasing in relation to the company size. This development is not only resulting in 
comparatively larger proportions of product and process innovations on the level of the bigger-
sized enterprises but also in a considerably larger innovation success. This applies both for 
product and for process innovations. The study of Rammer et al. (2014) supports the assumption 
that the innovation activity is concentrated on specific industry branches and enterprise sizes. 
This research study from Rammer et al. (2014) shows that the major proportion of research 
expenses is associated with specific sectors on the one hand and enterprises with more than 500 
employees on the other hand. This assumption is supported as the research expenses on the level 
of enterprises with more than 500 employees increased during 2010, 2011 and 2012, whereas the 
smaller employment classes kept this proportion stable. Even though the gross domestic 
expenditures on research and development increased by approx. 19% between 2008 and 2012, it 
was obviously not possible to stimulate the economy in that respect. This is shown by the 
decreasing proportion of innovators on the one hand and the decreasing success proportions of 
innovations on the other hand (see section 2.6.2).  
 
Furthermore, research data show that self-financing is the most important financing resource for 
SMEs. This applies both for general and for innovation financing purposes. Nevertheless, SMEs 
are also dependent on bank credits and overdrafts. The application of specific financing 
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measures, such as mezzanine capital, leasing or depreciation is of comparatively smaller 
relevance. Public funding is rarely considered for SME financing purposes. With regard to 
innovation financing, the importance of public funding increases in relation to the project size. 
Capital market financing is of virtually no importance for SME and innovation financing due to 
size requirements. Equity investments from PE and VC firms are rarely considered due to 
investors' requirements and entrepreneurs' reservations but might also be a consequence of 
market limitations in Germany. In the field of public research subsidies, research data show that 
public institutions were increasing the expenses for research grants significantly between 2005 
and 2010. These developments were accompanied with a decreasing proportion of enterprise 
foundings between 2005 and 2012. Even though the proportion of freelancers in Germany’s 
economy increased until 2014, it is concluded that Germany suffers from a gap in entrepreneurial 
activity, a capital gap for both SME and innovation financing, and also from a weak technology 
transfer (see section 2.6.3).  
 
The present thesis is focused on the development of the German PE and VC market in the field 
of SME and early-stage financing, and public funding on federal level for SME and innovation 
financing, start-up financing and equity investments. In order to describe these examination 
areas, the subsequent chapter is concerned with the development of an appropriate theoretical 
perspective for the thesis.  
 
 57 
Chapter 3 The financial theories  
 
As a first step, the chapter is focused on the differences between the neo-classical and the neo-
institutional financial theory. In the subsequent sections, the theoretical perspective of the 
present examination is derived from earlier examinations of doctoral researchers. The first 
section starts with the historical development of financial theoretical argumentations.    
 
3.1  The historical development of the financial theories 
 
The traditional financial theory is focused on the production process. Financing fulfils a support 
function to enable the production process (Rudolph 2006). The amount of investment capital 
depends on the demand in the production process. The theory considers enterprises as social 
organisations in order to produce goods and services according to the economic principle. Hence, 
enterprises are concerned with satisfying the needs of both private households and enterprises 
without wasting resources. In the following periods, the economic theory left the path of 
demand-oriented goods production. Production processes were optimised in order to realise 
competitive advantages by mass production. This phase of industrialisation was accompanied 
with the origin of large banks, which ensured the future economic development. Nevertheless, 
the earlier orientation on goods flow, as the basis for financing decisions, was still valid. In the 
subsequent periods, market saturation due to mass production required both the optimisation of 
the production and the financing process. Hence, the overall economic development during the 
periods after the past war laid the basis for the modern financial orientation. Since then, 
investment decisions are realised from a profit point of view (Schmidt and Terberger 1997). The 
traditional financial orientation denies the issue of profit maximisation. The modern orientation, 
on the contrary, considers enterprises as institutions to maximise profits from entrepreneurs and 
investors (Rudolph 2006). This financial orientation is concerned with two different theories, the 
neo-classical theory on the one hand and the neo-institutional theory on the other hand. Both 
theoretical orientations are clarified in greater detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
3.1.1  The neo-classical financial theory 
 
The neo-classical financial theory is based on the assumptions of both complete and perfect 
capital markets. Capital markets are perfect under the following assumptions: 
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 equal interest rates for savings and credits; 
 non-limited capital consumption for every market participant; 
 free capital market access; 
 no taxes and transaction-costs; 
 equal information level of market participants; 
 every type of cash-flow is divisible, tradable and assessable (Rudolph 2006). 
 
On the other hand, capital markets are imperfect if transaction-costs result in differences between 
sales and purchase prices. In incomplete capital markets on the other hand, the tradability of 
specific financing measures is not possible and thus such markets suffer from financing gaps. 
Nevertheless, capital markets only address and solve divergent financial preferences. Non-
financial preferences of market participants are not considered and could not be solved (Schmidt 
and Terberger 1997). 
 
3.1.2  The neo-institutional financial theory 
 
The theory denies the assumption of perfect and complete capital markets. Market protagonists 
behave rationally and follow subjective aims in order to maximise their profits (Rudolph 2006). 
Difficulties in the market are caused by information asymmetries between market participants. 
Therefore, suitable institutions are required to handle these information asymmetries. These 
institutions are associated with transaction costs. Depending on their specific amount, some 
transactions are not carried out. In that case, capital markets are classified as incomplete. 
Therefore, the neo-institutional theory is concerned with the analysis of organisations or 
institutional frameworks, regarding their suitability to settle information risks (Schmidt and 
Terberger 1997). The analysis is focused on suitable contracts, incentive measures and 
institutions (Rudolph 2006). Even though the neo-institutional theory denies the existence of 
both perfect and complete capital markets, the theory tries to come closer to perfect conditions 
by developing most suitable institutional frameworks (Schmidt and Terberger 1997). 
 
The neo-institutional theory is associated with the following theoretical orientations: 
 
 the theory of property-rights; 
 the principal agent theory; 
 the issue of information asymmetry; 
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 the issue of transaction-costs; 
 the contract theory (Schefczyk 2004). 
 
The examination process of the neo-institutional theory is focused on first best solutions without 
transaction-costs. Second best solutions, as a result of transaction-costs, could be improved by 
effective institutional frameworks. Therefore, the analysis process of the theory is not solely 
concerned with direct relationships but also considers financial intermediaries in order to receive 
virtually first best solutions. Even though different in their approach, each perspective is 
concerned with institutional frameworks to handle risks and to avoid or to reduce transaction-
costs (Schmidt and Terberger 1997).  
 
The subsequent section clarifies the particularities of each approach. 
 
3.1.3  The components of the neo-institutional financial theory 
 
The theory of property-rights is focused on the analysis of rights on goods and services. In that 
respect, contract rights refer to the use, the earnings, the modification or the disposal of goods 
and services (Rudolph 2006). According to the property-rights theory, the contract serves as the 
institution to allocate particular rights and obligations of each contract partner (Schmidt and 
Terberger 1997). As the value of goods and services is also determined by property-rights, the 
theory analysis contract’s efficiency (Rudolph 2006). Inefficiencies are caused by the 
distribution of property-rights between contract partners. With regard to the analysis of contracts, 
different constellations of property-rights are compared on the basis of their individual 
transaction-costs (Schefczyk 2004). 
 
The principal-agent theory, on the other hand, is focused on the relationship between the 
principal and the agent. Under the assumption of different information levels between contract 
partners, relationships are uncertain. In that context, investors are always exposed to the risk that 
agents are focused on the maximisation of their own profits rather than on firm’s interests. The 
principal-agent theory is therefore focused on the analysis of risks due to information asymmetry 
and recommends suitable contract designs (Brunner and Kehrle 2012).  
 
Information asymmetry is associated with the particularities of: 
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 adverse selection; 
 moral hazard; 
 hold up (Brunner and Kehrle 2012). 
 
In the case of adverse selection, the agent benefits from an information advantage (Rudolph 
2006). The principal is unable to assess the real quality of a good or service on the market 
(Schmidt and Terberger 1997). The issue of adverse selection is based on Akerlof’s (1970) 
lemons theory regarding the used car market. He argues that good car qualities would withdraw 
from the market as potential customers, due to the information gap, are unable to assess the real 
quality of a car. Consequently, their bid prices are based on average quality assumptions and do 
not reflect the full value of a specific car. Due to different price expectations, the vendors of 
high-quality cars are withdrawing from the market. Thus, the customers are exposed to the risk 
of negative selection due to the remaining poor quality cars (Rudolph 2006). The issue of moral 
hazard, on the other hand, describes the principal’s uncertainty regarding the agent’s behaviour 
in the post-contract phase (Brunner and Kehrle 2012). This uncertainty refers to the reduction of 
agent’s work performance or consumption on the job (Rudolph 2006). The issue of hold up is a 
further phenomenon in the post-investment phase. In that respect, there is always the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour of the contract partners due to contract gaps. Hold up describes a 
situation in which one contract partner could threaten with a contract termination in the case that 
contract conditions are not improved. This risk is most relevant in the case of very specific 
investments whose alternative use is impossible (Brunner and Kehrle 2012).  
 
With regard to the PE and VC market, PE and VC firms are also exposed to these risks of 
adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up. In order to address these risks, Klier et al. (2009) 
point out that deep industry knowledge is suitable to reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information. They argue that well informed investors are able to create a situation of both 
empathy and trust more easily. In addition, the reputation as an informed investor supports the 
process of deal origination in networks. Furthermore, Klier et al. (2009) argue that informed 
investors are able to understand the business and strategy of their portfolio companies more 
efficiently. Therefore, Klier et al. (2009) point out that agency costs could be reduced due to the 
focus on particular industry lines. Agency difficulties in PE and VC markets are typically 
associated with the misjudgement of agent’s qualification and motivation, consumption on the 
job and entrepreneur’s exaggeration regarding the enterprise’s future development (Schefczyk 
2004). As the principal-agent theory is focused on moral hazard (Schmidt and Terberger 1997), 
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the theory supports the development of incentive measures to reduce agency costs (Rudolph 
2006). Moon (2006) stresses the development of incentive plans as a key part in the investment 
process of PE and VC firms. This is required as necessary in order to align the interests between 
shareholders and the management team. Additional incentives could be paid in the case of 
extraordinary performance of the management team. Incentives are regarded as essential for an 
effective corporate governance of the portfolio company. In addition, the management team 
could be obliged to invest own funds. In that case, the management team directly participates on 
value creation or value losses, beside the performance-based linkage of their own income (Klier 
et al. 2009).  
  
The transaction-cost theory is based on the work of Coase (1937) and focused on the advantages 
of internal in comparison to external production. Under the assumption that external production 
generates additional costs, these additional expenses could be compensated by the advantage of 
internal production. Further developed by Williamson (1975) into a contract theory, the 
transaction-cost theory distinguishes between ex ante and ex post transaction-costs. Ex ante costs 
are depending on the negotiation of contracts. Post-investment costs on the other hand, are 
caused by monitoring and the renegotiation of contracts. The basic assumptions of this theory are 
concerned with limited rationality and opportunistic behaviour. As contract partners are unable 
to assess every possible consequence, contracts are incomplete. Therefore, contracting parties 
could take advantage of contract’s incompleteness. Additional transaction-costs arise in the case 
of legal enforcement and the renegotiation of contracts. In order to reduce such additional 
expenses, the theory is focused on the analysis of suitable institutions and contracts (Brunner and 
Kehrle 2012). The amount of transaction-costs is dependent on the uncertainty, the frequency 
and the specificity of transactions. The degree of these determinants is addressed by different 
types of institutional arrangements and contracts. A major concern is the issue of investment 
specificity. This means that there is always a risk of sunk costs due to specific investments as an 
alternative use would not compensate possible losses. In financial relationships, the so-called 
theory of incomplete contracts is concerned with possible risks due to specific investments and 
the renegotiation of contracts (Rudolph 2006). Schefczyk (2004) remarks that VC and PE related 
contracts are incomplete contracts. This type of investment requires renegotiation and 
monitoring, and thus produces transaction costs. The application of the neo-institutional financial 
theory is also described in appendix I (see figure eight).  
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The theory application is discussed in the subsequent sections. Therefore, earlier doctoral 
researchers are initially evaluated which finally results in the development of the theoretical 
framework of the present thesis. 
 
3.2  The application of financial theories in private equity research  
 
The majority of reviewed researchers deny the suitability of the neo-classical financial theory to 
describe and hence to understand PE and VC. On the contrary, researchers refer to the 
application of the neo-institutional financial theory as the appropriate theoretical foundation 
(Niederöcker 2001; Brinkrolf 2002; Reißig-Thust 2003; Röper 2004; Pankotsch 2005; Manchot 
2010). Depending on their research focus, some researchers consider additional theories 
(Pfaffenholz 2004; Röper 2004; Pankotsch 2005; Kranz 2008). 
 
Niederöcker (2001), who was research active in the field of SME and innovation financing, 
points out that the neo-classical approach is unsuitable to describe and to explain the PE and VC 
market. She argues that the assumptions of perfect and complete capital markets do not apply in 
particular in the case of SME financing. She points out that the following particularities of SMEs 
would contradict the assumptions of the neo-classical financial theory. First, the limitations of 
capital markets regarding the tradability of specific shares and, moreover, financial markets' 
entrance barriers. Second, the increased search and information costs due to the lack of 
comparable data for firm valuation purposes. Third, the degree of insolvency risk and finally, the 
amount of transaction-costs in comparison to bigger-sized companies. Niederöcker (2001) argues 
that SMEs do not have enough market power. SMEs are unable to reduce costs of capital funding 
by economies of scale due to their smaller capital demand and the small extent of repetition. 
Therefore, she concludes that the neo-classical financial theory is not applicable. Niederöcker 
(2001) also points out that the extent of financing measures in the field of SMEs is overall 
limited. Hence, the particularities of SME financing (see section 2.6.3) contradict the 
assumptions of perfect and complete capital markets (see section 3.1.1).  
 
Röper (2004), who was research active in the field of corporate venture capital, also denies the 
suitability of the neo-classical theory. He points out that the degree of information asymmetry 
between entrepreneurs and investors in the venture capital market is associated with increased 
search and information costs. The degree of information asymmetry depends on the type of 
innovation on the one hand and the lack of past company data on the other hand. The difference 
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in the information level between market participants contradicts the assumptions of the neo-
classical financial theory. Beside transaction-costs prior to the investment decision, VC 
investments are concerned with additional costs for monitoring and mentoring. Even though 
Röper (2004) points out that the particular investment risk could be partly compensated by 
additional in-depth information. He argues that VC markets are highly illiquid markets which 
hamper the tradability of investments due to technological and entrepreneurial risks. In that 
respect, he refers to the issue of the so-called living dead investments. According to Röper’s 
(2004) point of view, it is rather difficult to estimate both future cash-flows on the level of each 
investment and the whole investment portfolio. Despite the fact that it would be possible to 
calculate cash-flow probabilities, there is always the problem of results moment and variance. He 
clarifies that approx. 30% of the portfolio is associated both with the so-called winning and 
living dead investments, whereas the remaining 40% is associated with the so-called losing 
investments. This means that at the end of the fund’s period, approx. 50% of the portfolio’s value 
is realised by approx. 7% of the investments. This underlines the particularity of VC investments 
which are associated with increased insolvency risks on the one hand and different risk and 
return expectations from entrepreneurs and investors on the other hand. Therefore, Röper (2004) 
concludes that the assumptions of the neo-classical theory are overall not met by VC markets.  
 
With regard to innovation financing, Niederöcker (2001) refers to the following specific 
investment risks. The first one is the problem of forecasting. The second one is the stop or go 
decision regarding product’s development and the final one is the uncertain capital demand. She 
points out that the specific investment risk is dependent on the technological knowledge of the 
founders and their management capability. Therefore, she concludes that capital markets in the 
field of innovation financing are comparatively imperfect.  
 
Reißig-Thust (2003) analyses the difficulties in the relationship between VC firms and start-up 
companies. She examines the difficulties in every step of the investment process which are 
caused by information asymmetry and different objectives of investors and entrepreneurs. 
Reißig-Thust (2003) overall agrees with the assumptions of Niederöcker (2001) and Röper 
(2004) with respect to VC financing. In particular, she points out that the neo-classical financial 
theory denies the existence of suitable financial intermediaries. Finally, Reißig-Thust (2003) 
considers the neo-institutional theory and mentions the importance of the principal-agent theory. 
She argues that difficulties before and after contract signing are best described and analysed by 
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the principal-agent theory. In that respect, she finally remarks that the configuration of the 
investment process is suitable to solve the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
  
According to Röper (2004), the so-called procedural-justice theory plays a significant role in the 
field of VC financing too. The theory is focused on the management of information flows and 
assumes that timely and accurate information creates positive relationships. Therefore, Röper 
(2004) points out that the theory is relevant to understand the issue of trust between investors and 
entrepreneurs. He argues that a positive and trustful relationship depends on a consistent 
information flow. As a result, a trustful relationship is able to reduce uncertainty and finally, 
monitoring costs.  
 
With regard to the phenomenon of the PE market, Manchot (2010), inter alia, refers to the 
resource-based view. He argues that the resource-based view is suitable to reinforce the 
understanding of PE firms as suitable financial intermediaries. The resource-based view argues 
that the combination of particular tangible and intangible resources is resulting in competitive 
advantages. These advantages are resulting in above average returns. The resource-based view is, 
therefore, focused on the analysis of the individual competitive advantage due to specific 
resources. Manchot (2010) argues that PE investors provide both specific knowledge and 
financial resources to improve and to develop the business of the portfolio company. He 
examines the PE firm and the portfolio company as one unit which would be able to realise 
additional competitive advantages. However, Manchot (2010) qualifies these remarks and states 
that the competitive advantage depends on the degree of mutual supplement. 
 
Overall, the initial review shows that the theoretical considerations in doctoral research moves in 
one direction and, basically, deny the suitability of the neo-classical theory. This applies both for 
the issue of PE and VC markets and for innovation and SME financing.  
 
The subsequent section deals with the final deduction of the theoretical underpinning of the 
present examination.  
 
3.3  Financial theory’s application in the present examination 
 
Every reviewed researcher denies the applicability of the neo-classical financial theory in terms 
of describing PE, VC, SME and innovation financing. The researchers base their theoretical 
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underpinning on the assumptions of the neo-institutional financial theory. In some cases, as in 
the case of Röper (2004) and Manchot (2010), additional theories are considered. The present 
thesis is concerned with the PE and VC market in Germany during the post-crisis phase, with the 
investment process of PE and VC investors and public funding measures. In the context of that 
examination focus, the purposive sample is composed of PE and VC firms in the field of early-
stage and smaller volume financing, CVC firms, public-owned investors and finally, the so-
called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften.  
 
In terms of describing and explaining the PE and VC market, the application of the neo-classical 
financial theory is surely unsuitable. The assumptions of this theory are model theory and 
completely miss reality. In particular, the negation of transaction-costs, insolvency costs and 
taxes is completely unrealistic. If the overall assumptions of the neo-classical theory would be 
valid, financial intermediaries such as banks would be superfluous. 
 
With respect to the degree of market’s imperfectness on the level of SMEs, Niederöcker’s (2001) 
assumptions are comprehensible. She refers to the degree of both information asymmetry and 
transaction-costs which are more pronounced on the level of SMEs than on bigger-sized 
enterprises. Furthermore, she points out that the valuation process on the level of SMEs is rather 
difficult for investors due to the lack of comparable data from the stock market. Therefore, SME 
valuation requires particular procedures in order to compensate for this information gap. In 
addition, SMEs are exposed to specific risks due to their focus on local markets, the smaller 
number of shareholders, customers and suppliers. Finally, risks occur due to owner’s influence 
on the one hand and forecasting and accounting limitations on the other hand. These issues are 
clarified in greater detail in section 4.4.4. These particularities impede SMEs to be refinanced by 
banks and over the capital market. Niederöcker (2001), furthermore, concludes an increased 
level of information asymmetry in the field of innovation financing. Hence, the degree of 
information asymmetry and financing limitations in these areas are resulting in additional 
transaction-costs.  
 
In that respect, the German PE and VC market not only shifted away from seed, start-up and 
expansion financing but also from smaller and middle-sized investments between 1999 and 2009 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). This 
development strengthens the gap, in particular, in seed and start-up investments and thus the 
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degree of market’s imperfectness. Moreover, market participants are partly public subsidised 
(see section 4.3) which is also a clear sign for the incompleteness of the capital market. 
 
Furthermore, Hummel (2011a) points out that the economic risk of innovation directly influences 
the access to both equity and credit financing channels even though their number is increasing in 
relation to the progress of product development. Nevertheless, banks overall negate venture 
capital investments due to the: 
 
 difficult assessment of risks and chances; 
 missing company data and securities; 
 complexity of transactions; 
 uncertain exit options (Rudolph 2006). 
 
Röper (2004) clarifies that banks possibilities for equity-financing are limited and, furthermore, 
mentions that banks are unable to assess innovations. In addition, he argues that the lack of 
guarantees and the increased default probabilities in the case of innovation financing would 
result in prohibitive financing conditions.  
 
Obviously, banks are neither willing nor being able to close the gap in the demand of financing 
capital. This assessment should in particular apply for the period of the initial crisis phase. As 
pointed out in section 2.4, the bank sector’s requirement of public support and its rebuilding, 
beside the introduction of Basel III, should result in future financing constraints. This applies in 
particular in the field of early-stage, SME and innovation financing. Therefore, the applicability 
of the neo-classical financial theory at this point must be denied in the field of SME and early-
stage financing, and in the light of the financial crisis in particular. 
 
3.3.1  Theory’s application on private equity and venture capital markets 
 
With regard to the present thesis, the neo-institutional theory is considered as the appropriate 
theoretical underpinning. As clarified in section 3.1.2, the neo-institutional financial theory is 
concerned with following perspectives:  
 
 the principal-agent theory; 
 the property-rights theory; 
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 the contract theory; 
 the information asymmetry;  
 the transaction-cost theory. 
 
Initially, these perspectives are applied on the level of the PE and VC market. In that respect, the 
existence of PE and VC firms is best explained and described by the issues of information 
asymmetry and transaction-costs. Investments in the field of early-stage and SMEs are associated 
with particular investment risks. These risks arise due to different levels of information. In order 
to handle these risks, for instance in the field of SME and innovation financing, different types of 
investors apply different investment strategies. These strategies, for instance hands-on or hands-
off (see section 4.4.6), are resulting in different amounts of transaction-costs. With regard to the 
German market, the public-owned investors and the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
could be regarded as the strongest type of financial intermediaries. Even though not public-
owned, the MBGs are operating as the so-called self-helping institutions to stabilise the equity 
basis of SMEs (see section 4.2). Therefore, they are not only focused on profit maximisation but 
also on closing financing gaps. This strategy is associated with larger investment proportions on 
the one hand (see table 17 in appendix D) and above-average loss proportions (see section 4.4.7) 
on the other hand. Hence, this investment strategy as self-helping institutions is associated with 
additional transaction-costs. 
    
Nevertheless, neither banks nor the different types of PE investors are obviously willing to 
compensate every gap in SME and early-stage financing. In that respect, the proportions of seed, 
start-up and expansion financing, and also the proportions of both smaller and middle-sized 
investments were decreasing in Germany’s PE and VC market between 1999 and 2009 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). Even though 
investors have knowledge in several financing areas, they partly deny specific investments or 
claim for public support (see section 4.3 and table 14). If specific investments would not be 
subsidised, markets would fail due to the withdrawal of market participants or increased return 
expectations. Even though intensive in-depth screening could reduce the degree of information 
asymmetry in early-stage and SME financing, additional reviews would increase the transaction-
costs. In that case, possible returns would neither compensate the specific investment risk on the 
one hand, nor the additional transaction-costs on the other hand.  
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In accordance with the present thesis, the issues of information asymmetry and transaction-costs 
are regarded as suitable in order to understand the existence of financial intermediaries in 
general, the existence of PE and VC markets in particular, and the issue of public funding 
measures.  
 
The subsequent section is concerned with the application of the neo-institutional theory on the 
level of the investment process. 
 
3.3.2  Theory’s application regarding the investment process 
 
On the basis of the neo-institutional theory, PE and VC firms are concerned with investment 
risks due to information asymmetries. As pointed out in section 3.1.3, the risks of adverse 
selection, moral hazard and hold up are caused by information asymmetries between investors 
and entrepreneurs. Explicit mechanisms of screening, contract negotiation, monitoring and 
mentoring, beside incentive measures are suitable to address the risks of information asymmetry. 
These explicit measures are associated with transaction-costs. Implicit mechanisms of trust and 
trust building measures are suitable to reduce the scope of the explicit mechanisms and thus 
transaction-costs (see section 3.1.3). 
  
The present research programme is focused on the description of the explicit mechanisms along 
the investment process of PE and VC investors. On the basis of different investment approaches 
which are applied by business angels and venture capitalists, Engelmann and Heitzer (2001) 
conclude that the investment process is a suitable framework for successful investments in 
incomplete markets. They refer to the basic composition of the investment process and mention 
the phase of capital acquisition, deal flow, screening and selecting, negotiation, monitoring and 
mentoring, and the exit. The current examination is focused on the core investment process (see 
figure seven in appendix H) and is not concerned with the phases of capital acquisition and of 
investors repayment. 
 
With regard to the present thesis, the transaction-cost theory is regarded as suitable to describe 
and to explain the process step of the deal flow. As pointed out in section 4.4.1, investors receive 
a large amount of business proposals. The handling of these proposals is associated with cost-
intensive manpower. Therefore, the different deal sources support the process of deal acquisition 
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and are able to reduce transaction-costs. Nevertheless, the contribution margin depends on the 
particular deal source, which in some cases is associated with the payment of fees. 
 
The principal-agent theory, the transaction-cost theory and the issue of information asymmetry 
are suitable to describe and to explain the process steps of the initial and the detailed screening. 
Due to different information levels between entrepreneurs and investors, this process step is 
necessary to reduce the risks of adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up. Depending on the 
extent of screening measures, transaction-costs vary and explain the difference in the scope of 
initial and detailed screenings. 
 
Every perspective under the neo-institutional theory is regarded as suitable to describe and to 
explain the process of negotiation and contracting. Investors try to handle their investment risk 
by the negotiation of suitable contracts even though contracts could not be regarded as all- 
encompassing in order to qualify the risks of moral hazard and hold up. Therefore, depending on 
future developments, contracts require renegotiation which is associated with additional 
transaction-costs. In dependence on the results of the negotiation, possible contract structures 
differ and finally, influence the value of the investment (see sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5).  
 
The phase of monitoring and mentoring is best described and explained by the principal-agent 
theory, the property-rights theory, the transaction-cost theory and the issue of information 
asymmetry. In order to balance the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, 
the investor requires information regarding portfolio company’s development. The scope of 
monitoring and mentoring depends on the particular investment of the investor, the contract 
content and the performance of the portfolio company (see section 4.4.6). Both monitoring and 
mentoring are associated with different amounts of transaction-costs which depend on the 
respective investment strategy and the condition of the portfolio company. 
 
Finally, the different exit channels could be best described and explained by both the transaction-
cost and the property-rights theory. By choosing the appropriate exit channel, investors try to 
achieve maximum returns. IPOs are the most preferred exit route due to possible capital gains. 
Trade sales are less preferred and associated with smaller transaction costs. Property-rights on 
the other hand, could determine the final exit channel in advance. This is, inter alia, the case in 
terms of silent investments which require the repayment after the investment period (see section 
4.4.7). 
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The subsequent table nine summarises the application of the particular theoretical perspective 
with regard to the PE and VC market, public funding and the investment process chain. 
 
The theoretical framework of the present thesis 
 
Research 
area 
Theories Principal 
Agent 
Property 
Rights 
Contract 
theory 
Information 
asymmetry 
Transaction 
Cost 
      
PE and VC market    X X 
      
Public funding    X X 
      
Deal flow     X 
      
Deal screening X   X X 
      
Negotiation/Contracting X X X X X 
      
Monitoring/Mentoring X X  X X 
      
Exit  X   X 
 
Table 9 The theoretical framework of the present thesis (own development) 
 
3.4  Chapter summary 
  
The research subjects of the present examination could be examined and described out of several 
theoretical perspectives. The earlier financial orientation is production flow oriented. The 
subsequent periods of industrialisation were then focused on the optimisation of production and 
financing processes. The latest financial orientation is associated with both the neo-classical and 
the neo-institutional theory (see section 3.1). The neo-classical theory is based on the assumption 
of perfect and complete capital markets which would ensure every type of financing (see section 
3.1.1). The neo-institutional theory on the other hand negates the existence of complete and 
perfect capital markets. In accordance with the neo-institutional theory, difficulties in the market 
are caused by information asymmetries between market participants. These asymmetries are 
associated with the risk of adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up. In order to handle 
investment risks, every institutional framework is associated with transaction-costs. Therefore, 
the neo-institutional theory is focused on the examination of institutional frameworks regarding 
their suitability to reduce information risks and transaction-costs (see section 3.1.2).  
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The neo-classical theory is unsuitable to describe PE and VC markets in general and venture 
capital markets in particular. Both markets emerged due to capital markets' incompleteness and 
imperfectness. Therefore, the present thesis considers the neo-institutional theory as the suitable 
framework to describe the PE and VC market, the investment process and public funding 
measures. The MBGs and public-owned investor are regarded as the strongest form of financial 
intermediaries. Both the public investors and the MBGs are concerned with closing market gaps 
due to their status as self-helping institutions. Nevertheless, PE and VC firms obviously do not 
compensate every financing gap even though the market benefits from a large proportion of 
public funding (see section 4.3).  
 
Hence, the present thesis is based on a neo-institutional perspective in order to understand the 
developments of the PE and VC market, the changes along the investment process and the 
application of public funding. 
 72 
Chapter 4 Private equity markets in the light of the financial crisis 
 
Initially, this chapter describes the progress of the PE and VC market out of a European and a 
German perspective. This part of the chapter is finalised by the detailed description of both long-
term developments and particularities in Germany’s PE and VC market. In addition, the chapter 
is concerned with the description and explanation of each phase step along the investment 
process of PE and VC investors. This is required in order to understand the sequence of events 
and to receive an overview regarding the variables within each process step. Finally, the chapter 
is concerned with the progress of public funding measures on the federal level. These subjects, 
namely the PE and VC market, the investment process and public funding are regarded from a 
neo-institutional perspective. The second part of the chapter then summarises the main literature 
review outcomes, specifies the literature gap and derives a basic theory. The whole chapter is 
finalised by the introduction of the research aim and objectives.    
 
4.1  The development of the private equity market in Europe and Germany 
 
This section initially compares the developments of the entire PE and VC market in Europe with 
the developments in Germany during the initial and the post-crisis phase. These developments 
and market proportions are, furthermore, detailed in a country related perspective. Finally, this 
section presents particularities of Germany’s equity market and market members' concerns 
regarding current developments. 
 
The European private equity and venture capital market developed successfully in the run up of 
the financial crisis due to: 
 
 low interest rates; 
 increasing stock market values; 
 banks' and investors' readiness to provide investment capital. 
 
At the forefront of this development, valuation multiples, debt/earning ratios and large debt 
financed transactions increased significantly (Corsetti 2009). In the subsequent phase of the 
financial crisis, the amount of new funds dropped significantly from approx. 79.6 billion euros in 
2007 to approx. 23.6 billion euros in 2012. The amount of total investments of approx. 69.8 
billion euros in 2007 declined to approx. 36.5 billion euros in 2012, even though interrupted for a 
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short period of recovery both in 2010 and 2011. Divestments decreased from approx. 26.5 billion 
euros in 2007 to 14 billion euros in 2008 and were then followed by a significant recovery in 
2011 in the amount of approx. 30.3 billion euros. Divestments finally declined in 2012, and 
resulted in the amount of approx. 21.6 billion euros. The proportion of total losses from total 
divestments increased from approx. 2.7% in 2007 to 35.2% in 2009, and finally decreased to 
8.7% in 2012. The amount of VC investments approx. halved between 2007 and 2012 (EVCA 
2013). A detailed overview regarding the development of the market in Europe is presented in 
table ten (see appendix G.1). 
 
In Germany, the amount of raised funds dropped by 59% from approx. 4.5 billion euros in 2007 
to approx. 1.9 billion euros in 2012. This decrease was interrupted by a significant increase by 
172% from 1.2 billion euros in 2010 to 3.3 billion euros in 2011 (EVCA 2013). Hence, 
Germany’s PE market developed in relation to the substantial economic recovery in 2010, which 
was associated with GDP’s increase by 4.2% (Destatis 2013). Total investments in the PE and 
VC market dropped by 38% from approx. 10.5 billion euros in 2007 to 6.5 billion euros in 2012. 
Divestments dropped significantly from approx. four billion euros in 2007 to 1.9 billion euros in 
2009. The amount of divestments increased significantly in 2010 and 2011, but finally declined 
again and resulted in 3.4 billion euros in 2012. The proportion of total losses from total 
divestments increased from 3.3% in 2007 to remarkable 46.1% in 2009, and finally declined to 
12.5% in 2012. With regard to venture capital investments, their amount declined from approx. 
817 million euros in 2007 to approx. 549 million euros in 2012 (EVCA 2013). A detailed 
overview regarding the market’s development in Germany is presented in table 11 (see appendix 
G.2).  
 
With regard to a country related perspective, data show that the German PE and VC market is 
comparatively small (see also section 2.6.3). This applies for the entire PE and VC market on the 
one hand but also for the venture capital market in a separated perspective on the other hand. In 
that respect, data show that the UK’s PE and VC market was at least and round about twice as 
big as the German PE and VC market between 2007 and 2012. This difference is getting clearer 
in comparison to the national gross domestic products. Even though Germany’s GDP outweighs 
the GDPs from the UK and France, the proportion of Germany’s PE and VC investments from 
the national GDP is comparatively small. This is not only the case on the level of the entire 
equity investments but also, more detailed, on the level of the venture capital investments too 
(see subsequent tables 12 and 13).   
 74 
The private equity and venture capital markets in Europe 
 
Country 
 
PE/VC investments 
in BEUR
1)
 
VC investments 
in MEUR
1)
 
Proportion of VC 
 
Year 2007    
United Kingdom 20.03 1,502 7.5% 
France 12.15 1,025 8.4% 
Germany 10.45 817 7.8% 
    
Year 2010    
United Kingdom 12.72 771 6.1% 
France 6.65 751 11.3% 
Germany 4.90 729 14.9% 
    
Year 2012    
United Kingdom 10.03 658 6.6% 
France 5.28 566 10.7% 
Germany 6.63 567 8.6% 
 
1) Market statistics (including the investments of investors from outside Europe). 
Table 12 The private equity and venture capital markets in Europe (derived from InvestEurope 2016) 
 
The private equity and venture capital proportions from national GDPs 
 
Country 
 
GDP in BEUR 
 
Proportion of PE/VC 
investments
1)
 
Proportion of VC 
investments
1) 
 
 
Year 2007    
United Kingdom 2,167 0.92% 0.069% 
France 1,946 0.62% 0.053% 
Germany 2,513 0.42% 0.033% 
    
Year 2010    
United Kingdom 1,812 0.70% 0.043% 
France 1,998 0.33% 0.038% 
Germany 2,580 0.19% 0.028% 
    
Year 2012    
United Kingdom 2,055 0.47% 0.032% 
France 2,087 0.25% 0.027% 
Germany 2,755 0.24% 0.021% 
 
1) Market statistics (including the investments of investors from outside Europe). 
Table 13 The private equity and venture capital proportions from national GDPs (derived from 
InvestEurope 2016) 
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Beside these long-term and country related developments, the German PE and VC market was 
described from an additional particularity and, moreover, was concerned with several subjects 
which dominated the market internal debate. These issues are presented in the subsequent 
section. 
 
4.2  Germany’s private equity and venture capital market  
 
Germany’s private equity market is organised in the German Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association e. V. (BVK) in Berlin. At the end of 2012, the association represented 187 private 
equity and venture capital firms. In addition, estimations show that further 40 to 50 PE and VC 
firms were operating outside a BVK membership (BVK 2013b). A particular type of PE firm in 
Germany is represented by the so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften. In total, 15 
MBGs are operating in Germany and each MBG is located in one federal state of Germany. 
Berlin and Brandenburg are represented by one MBG. These investors are focused on the 
stabilisation of SMEs equity basis rather than on the maximisation of their own profits. The 
MBGs are refinanced by the accumulation of capital gains and by public loans. In addition, the 
MBGs receive public guarantees for parts of their investments. Shareholders are banks, 
chambers of commerce and economic federations in the federal state of the respective MBG. 
Their investment amount per deal is comparatively small and varies between 0.1 and 2.5 million 
euros (Henrich and Selbherr 2009). Even though the MBGs differ from the overall PE and VC 
market due to their particular business purpose as self-helping institutions, they are full members 
of the BVK. As well as the entire market, the MBGs could not escape from financial crisis' 
impacts either. Their total investment volume dropped from approx. 176 million euros in 2007 to 
approx. 138 million euros in 2009 followed by a slight recovery to reach 142 million euros in 
2010 (BVK 2011b). Their loss proportions are comparatively large and resulted in approx. 38% 
for 2008 (BVK 2009a), approx. 53% in 2009 (BVK 2010b), and approx. 40% in 2010 (BVK 
2011b). During the initial phase of the financial crisis, their investments varied between 100,000 
and 500,000 euros per deal. During this timeframe, approx. 75% of the MBGs expected 
investment returns up to 10% and in their majority invested as sole investors (Achleitner et al. 
2010). In 2010, MBGs were most active in Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Schleswig-
Holstein (BVK 2011b). Due to liquidity constraints of SMEs in Germany, the MBGs extended 
their business operations, launched additional funds and intensified the cooperation with banks. 
Overall, the core competence of the MBGs is the financing of smaller enterprises by mezzanine 
investments (Selbherr and Steffen 2010).    
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During the examination timeframe, a major concern in the German private equity market was 
associated with the so-called AIFM-directive which was adopted by the European parliament in 
2010. This directive set standards for minimum capital requirements, and for valuation and 
reporting standards for fund managers of alternative investments. This legal framework was 
implemented as a consequence of the financial crisis in order to regulate and to supervise 
investment funds outside the bank and the insurance sector (BVK 2011a). The AIFM-directive 
had to be transformed into a national law until July 2013 and therefore was discussed in every 
working group of the BVK (BVK 2012a). An additional concern in Germany’s PE and VC 
market was associated with a VC law that was adopted to improve the financing conditions for 
start-ups. This law, which was adopted in 2008, was stopped by the European Commission due 
to competitive concerns (BVK 2011a). 
 
4.3  Research on Germany’s private equity market 
 
This section describes the long-term developments in Germany’s PE and VC market and is based 
on research results from Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and 
Achleitner et al. (2010). These cross-sectional research projects are each based on BVK 
memberships at research moment and achieved remarkable response rates of approx. 50% each. 
Hence, these examinations deliver a comprehensive overview regarding the changes in the 
German PE and VC market since the millennium turn. 
 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) are focused on market’s development in Germany between 
1999 and 2001. During this period, Germany’s GDP increased by 1.9% in 1999, by 3.1% in 
2000, and by 1.5% in 2001. Compared to GDP’s average development between 1960 and 2012 
by 2.4% (Destatis 2013), the average increase of 2.2% during this research timeframe of 1999 to 
2001 could be regarded as a normal economic development. According to research findings from 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), the majority of investments were realised for seed and start-up 
financing with a market share of approx. 43% followed from expansion financing with a 
proportion of 38%. Moreover, the majority of deals were realised in the industry, the IT, the 
telecommunication, the media and the life science sector. Approx. 35% of the investments were 
smaller than 750,000 euros and 53% of the investments were smaller than 1.5 million euros per 
deal. Medium-sized investments between 1.5 and five million euros per deal resulted in a 
proportion of approx. 31% (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003). According to their research results, 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) argue that the German PE and VC market would be in an early 
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step of development due to a large number of support-oriented investors and a weak 
specialisation in the entire market. By dividing the market structure in support and profit-
oriented investors, Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), moreover, mention that the support-
oriented investors would be rather concerned with smaller investments in the later stages of 
enterprises' life cycle. In addition, support-oriented investors would also realise a larger 
investment proportion in relation to investment requests. Profit-oriented investors on the other 
hand would be focused on larger buy-out transactions or on early-stage investments. Their 
investment proportion in relation to investment requests is smaller, whereas their return 
expectations are larger in comparison to the support-oriented investors. With regard to potential 
market gaps, survey respondents indicated gaps in the financing of early-stage but also in the 
financing of turnaround investments. Moreover, the survey respondents indicated that the market 
would suffer from financing gaps in smaller volume investments up to 750 TEUR per deal. This 
assessment of the respondents regarding the financing gap in early-stage investments might be a 
consequence of the disproportionately successful development of the so-called Neue Markt, the 
technology stock market segment in Germany, which was associated with a bulk of both 
investment and divestment possibilities. Due to the significantly larger number of investment 
requests for early-stage investments, market members obviously have seen demand for 
additional early-stage financing resources.  
 
Achleitner et al. (2006) examined the subsequent period between 2002 and 2004. This period 
was associated with GDP’s average increase by 0.3% (Destatis 2013). According to Achleitner’s 
et al. (2006) research findings, investments for seed and start-up financing resulted in a market 
share of approx. 34%. This is a significant decrease in comparison to the initial research results 
of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) who calculated a proportion of 43% in that respect. 
Expansion financing on the other hand slightly increased up to a share of 39%. The industry, the 
IT, the telecommunication, the media and the life science sector were still the most preferred 
investment areas. Achleitner et al. (2006), furthermore, point out that approx. 45% of the 
investments were smaller than 750,000 euros and 59% of the investments were smaller than 1.5 
million euros per deal. This is a significant increase in comparison to the earlier research in both 
values. On the other hand, the proportion of medium-sized investments between 1.5 and five 
million euros per deal decreased significantly and resulted in a proportion of approx. 21% 
(Achleitner et al. 2006). In the context of these research results, Achleitner et al. (2006) argue 
that the PE and VC market has shifted away from early-stage into later-stage investments as a 
consequence of the new market breakdown. This change was associated with increasing deal 
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sizes on the level of later-stage investments and increasing turnover requirements regarding the 
target firms. This underlines the assumption that the PE and VC market avoids investments in 
early lifecycles of enterprises during unstable economic developments. Interestingly enough, this 
reorientation also resulted in an increase of smaller investment amounts, obviously as an attempt 
of risk diversification. Achleitner et al. (2006), moreover, conclude a specialisation trend in the 
market to achieve competitive advantages and distinguish between more experienced and bigger-
sized investors on the one hand and smaller and less experienced early-stage investors on the 
other hand. In that context, they argue that approx. one third of the market participants 
meanwhile would have at least ten years of investment experience. This increasing market 
maturity would also be underlined by an increasing market competition as a significant 
proportion of deals were finally realised by a competitor. This assumption would apply at least 
for the later-stage investors so that the consolidation process on the level of the early-stage 
investors would not have been finalised (Achleitner et al. 2006). As in the initial study of 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), the survey respondents indicated that the market would still 
suffer from financing gaps in early-stage investments. Moreover, survey respondents still 
indicated a financing gap of smaller investments up to 750 TEUR per deal.  
 
Achleitner’s et al. (2010) latest research is focused on the development of the PE and VC market 
in the initial phase of the financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. During this timeframe, 
Germany’s GDP decreased on average by 0.2% due to the significant decline of 5.1% in 2009 
(Destatis 2013). During the research timeframe, the proportion of early-stage investments in the 
field of seed and start-up financing and the proportion of expansion financing resulted in 31% 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). On the other hand, the proportion of management-buy-outs and 
management-buy-ins more than doubled in their market share from 13% in the initial research 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003) to 27% in the initial phase of the crisis (Achleitner et al. 2010). 
The market was still dominated from later-stage investors with a decline in the proportion of 
universal PE and VC firms. The IT, the telco, the media and life science, and the industry sector 
were still the dominating industry branches. At research moment in 2010, approx. 56% of the 
survey participants expected minimum investment returns of at least 20%, which is a decrease in 
comparison to the initial study of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) but a significant increase in 
comparison to the study of Achleitner et al. (2006). In that respect, 61% of the respondents in the 
initial study expected minimum returns of at least 20% (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003) in 
comparison to 49% of the survey respondents in the study of Achleitner et al. (2006). Even 
though a more detailed comparison analysis should be regarded with care due to different 
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investment return classes in the final study of Achleitner et al. (2010), the entire results support 
the careful assumption that there seemed to be a significant decrease in the proportion of PE and 
VC firms which expected minimum returns of at least 28% and 30% respectively between 1999 
and 2009 (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the results showed that approx. 46% of the investments were smaller than 1.5 million 
euros per deal (Achleitner et al. 2010), which stands for a significant decline in comparison to 
the earlier research results (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006). The 
proportion of medium-sized investments between 1.5 and five million euros per deal remained 
quite stable and resulted in approx. 20% (Achleitner et al. 2010). On the other hand, investments 
above 50 million euros per deal increased in their market share from approx. 5% in the initial 
research phase (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003) to 14% in the initial phase of the financial crisis 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). In that context, Achleitner et al. (2010) conclude that the trend of 
professionalisation was still proceeding as further universal investors would have followed the 
path of later-stage investments. This development was accompanied with increasing fund 
volumes and hence a declining number of smaller investment funds in the market. According to 
the assessments of the survey respondents, the market suffered from investment gaps in start-up, 
expansion and turnaround financing. The financial crisis in particular not only caused a 
significant increase of total losses but also an increasing mentoring effort in the market. In 
addition, research results from Achleitner et al. (2010) show that approx. one third of the deals 
were not realised as contract parties were not able to agree on specific contract rights. In that 
respect, they conclude that as a consequence of the financial crisis, investors obviously had 
difficulties to agree on important contract clauses. 
 
Regarding investor’s specific financing focus, which is derived from the proportion on the total 
financing volume, the examinations of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) 
and Achleitner et al. (2010) show following developments. The corporate venture capital firms 
and the independent PE and VC firms and thus the group of profit-oriented and more strategic 
investors, were focused on expansion financing, start-up financing and on MBO and MBI 
investments between 1999 and 2009. The more detailed view shows that within this group, the 
proportion of start-up financing decreased significantly, while the proportion of MBO and MBI 
investments approx. doubled between 1999 and 2009. The public and the semi-public investors 
were focused on expansion and on start-up financing too. Their proportion of MBO and MBI 
financing decreased, while their proportion of seed financing increased significantly between 
1999 and 2009. Interestingly enough, this group of investors provided turnaround financing at 
 80 
least between 1999 until 2001, but since then were virtually not involved in restructuring related 
investments. The so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften also focused on 
expansion financing but with a two times bigger proportion in comparison to the entire market. 
Between 1999 and 2009, the MBGs not only increased their MBO and MBI investments but 
reduced their start-up financing significantly and, moreover, left the path of seed financing quite 
completely (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010).  
 
In order to close market gaps and to settle market inefficiencies in the PE and VC market, 
different types of public support measures are provided from different public institutions. Public 
support is provided on the federal states level, on the federal level and on the level of the 
European Union. Public support is realised by direct co-investments in the portfolio company, by 
co-investments in the investment fund or by refinancing the specific investment (Achleitner et al. 
2010). The subsequent table 14 shows that between 1999 and 2009, public funding overall 
played an important role in Germany’s PE and VC market. The statistics show that approx. one 
quarter of early-stage investors' investment volume was publicly supported, whereas this 
proportion was comparatively smaller on the level of the later-stage investments. This is surely a 
sign of the significantly larger investment risk on the level of early-stage financing. Research 
results in that context also show that programmes which were issued by the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau were most often considered and that programmes from the EU only played a 
secondary role (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010).    
 
The public funding proportions in Germany’s equity market 
 
Proportion/Timeframe  1999 – 2001 2002 – 2004 2007 – 2009 
        
Proportion of investors who applied  
   
for any type of public support 72% 63% 36% 
(without public investors) 
   
    
Public funding proportion from investment amounts:  
   
Early-stage investments 28% 24% 27% 
Later-stage investments 10% 5% 14% 
    
Most important public funding provider KfW KfW KfW 
 
Table 14 The public funding proportions in Germany’s equity market  
(derived from Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010) 
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In addition, the studies of Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010) show that PE and 
VC investors syndicated their investments. In that respect, research results show that the 
syndication proportion of the early-stage investors was significantly larger in comparison to 
later-stage investors' syndication proportion as well as the syndication proportion of the profit-
oriented and the more strategic investors in comparison to the public and the semi-public 
investors. In comparison to the entire market, the MBGs realised the smallest syndication 
proportion each in 2005 and 2010 (Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). The 
syndication behaviour of the market participants is presented in the subsequent table 15 and the 
entire market developments between 1999 and 2009 are summarised in table 16 (see appendix 
G.3).  
 
The syndication proportion in the German PE and VC market 
 
Syndication proportion in 2005 
Type of 
investor 
 
 
Total 
market 
 
 
Early-stage 
 
 
Later-stage 
 
 
 
Independent/ 
CVC 
 
 
Public/ 
semi-public 
 
 
MBGs 
 
 Not syndicated 37% 16% 52% 32% 48% 68% 
Syndicated 63% 84% 48% 68% 52% 32% 
Total 
proportion 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Syndication proportion in 2010 
Not syndicated 46% 22% 62% 41% 50% 72% 
Syndicated 54% 78% 38% 59% 50% 28% 
Total 
proportion 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 15 The syndication proportion in the German PE and VC market 
(derived from Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010) 
 
Beside these market related developments, the subsequent sections are concerned with equity 
investors' investment process. At first, the subsequent section describes the composition of an 
investment process. The further sections are then concerned with the detailed description of each 
process step. 
 
4.4  The literature regarding private equity firm’s investment process    
 
The investment process is the institutional framework of PE and VC firms to arrange and to 
handle their investments. Even though the configuration of the process might differ due to the 
particular type of investor (Engelmann and Heitzer 2001), the basic composition of the process 
chain could be divided into five different phases. The so-called deal flow introduces the process 
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chain and refers to the acquisition of projects. The second phase is associated with the analysis of 
investment proposals. After positive evaluations, the subsequent phase refers to the negotiation 
of contracts. In the case of successful negotiations, the phase of monitoring describes the 
supervision of the investment during the investment period. After a limited period, the 
investment is sold during the exit phase (Feldmann et al. 2007). In terms of a deeper 
understanding, several types of investment process clarifications are subsequently introduced. 
 
Nathusius (2001) distinguishes eight different process steps. According to his clarifications, the 
initial step of deal sourcing is followed by the process of deal screening. This deal screening is 
further divided into a rough analysis of business proposals and a detailed due diligence. 
Depending on audit results, the subsequent phase is focused on composing an investment 
proposal for the investment committee of the PE or VC firm. The investment proposal is 
discussed by the investment committee and the investment is realised after successful 
negotiations. The following phases refer to controlling and mentoring on the one hand and the 
final divestment on the other hand. Matz (2002) refers to eight distinct process steps too but 
initially considers the foundation of the PE firm and the acquisition of investment capital. 
Subsequently, he introduces the core process chain and refers to the acquisition, the screening 
and the valuation of deals, the negotiation of contracts, the monitoring and the mentoring, and 
the divestment phase. This core investment process is followed by the reinvestment of capital 
gains or investors' repayment. On the contrary, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) detail the process 
chain into five sequential steps. They refer to deal origination, deal screening, evaluation of 
business proposals, deal structuring for negotiation purposes and post investment activities. The 
latter activities are concerned with controlling, mentoring and investor’s exit. An investment 
process is enclosed in appendix H.  
  
The average duration from the initial contact to the final investment decision ranges between 
three and six months (Nathusius 2001; Thum et al. 2008; Hummel 2011b). Hummel (2011b) in 
that respect points out that the proportion of PE and VC firms which require more than six month 
for the investment decision, decreased from approx. 16% in 2004 to 6% in 2007. In addition, 
both the minimum and the maximum investment durations declined. Until 2001, investment 
durations varied between 16 and 204 months, in comparison to seven and 169 months in 2011. 
The total investment duration of PE investors in Germany on average is 4.8 years according to a 
long-term analysis between 1986 and 2011. During the initial phase of the crisis between 2007 
and 2009, the average investment period increased significantly due the declining number of 
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exits until 2009 (BVK 2012b). These developments could be regarded as an indicator for the 
professionalisation of the overall market in Germany due to an increasing competition. 
 
The present research is focused on the so-called key investment process and thus on the deal 
flow, the deal screening, the negotiation of contracts, the monitoring and mentoring of 
investments, and investor’s exit. In that respect, the literature base does not distinguish between 
different types of investment process chain configurations depending on the type of equity 
investor. The subsequent sections are focused on the different chain steps in order to clarify their 
basic configuration. This procedure is also required to determine the variables for the 
questionnaire along the investment process.  
 
4.4.1  The literature regarding the deal flow    
 
According to research results from Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), investors received on 
average approx. 490 investment proposals in 2011. This amount decreased to 268 proposals in 
2004 (Achleitner et al. 2006) and approx. 220 proposals in 2009 (Achleitner et al. 2010). PE 
investors' network, banks and direct inquiries were the most important deal sources between 
2002 and 2004 (Achleitner et al. 2006). Private equity firms network was still the most important 
source in the initial phase of the financial crisis, followed by direct requests and banks 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). Interestingly enough, business plan competitions and syndications are of 
minor importance in the examinations of 2004, 2007 and 2009 (Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010). Between 2001 and 2009, the majority of business proposals were 
addressed to early-stage investors, which is surely a sign of the ongoing demand for venture 
capital in Germany (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 
2010). 
 
This progress in the amount of investment requests reflects the development of the PE and VC 
market in Germany since the millennium turn. Between 2000 and 2003, the PE and VC market 
in Germany decreased significantly which is shown by the decrease of investments on the one 
hand and the number of PE and VC firms on the other hand (Achleitner et al. 2006). Germany’s 
GDP on the other hand decreased from an increase of 3.1% in 2000 to a decline by 0.4% in 
2003. This development was followed from increases by 1.2% in 2004 and by 3.7% in 2006 
(Destatis 2013). The bulk of business proposals in 2001 surely has been a consequence of the 
extraordinary development of Germany’s PE and VC market, rather than a consequence of 
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economic circumstances. The awareness regarding the potential of internet-based business 
models, the introduction of the euro and the millennium turn caused a bulk of potential business 
proposals. Start-up ideas have been quite easily absorbed by investors due to the positive 
development of the PE and VC market on the one hand and stock market’s positive trend on the 
other hand. This enabled investors to rather easily selling their portfolio companies both quickly 
and successfully over the capital market. As one investor in the research from Kollmann and 
Kuckertz (2004, p. 20) states: “The idea has to have a valuable technological nucleus, which is 
understandable, fixes a concrete problem and opens up business opportunities”. This supports the 
assumption that the market, due to the technological orientation, was simply overloaded from 
more or less communicable investment ideas.  
 
The business proposals go through the process of deal screening which is clarified in the 
subsequent section. 
 
4.4.2  The literature regarding the deal screening 
 
Equity investors in Germany received approx. 490 business proposals in 2001 (Zimmermann and 
Fischer 2003), approx. 268 proposals in 2004 (Achleitner et al. 2006) and approx. 220 proposals 
during the initial phase of the financial crisis (Achleitner et al. 2010). Early-stage investors are 
far above these average amounts and received approx. 550 proposals in 2001, 324 proposals in 
2004 and 335 proposals per year during the initial phase of the financial crisis (Achleitner et al. 
2010). Due to the overall large number of investment proposals, the initial evaluation of business 
plans is a time-limited process. Approx. 20% of the respondents in the research study of Reißig-
Thust (2003) reported an initial screening period between ten and 20 minutes per business plan, 
whereas approx. 13% of the respondents reported a period between 20 and 30 minutes. Finally, 
53% of the respondents reported an initial screening period of 30 minutes. These screening 
durations are rather small in relation to the content of a standard business plan. In the normal 
case a business plan contains an executive summary and more detailed sections regarding 
research and development, procurement and production, market and product, marketing and 
sales, management team, organisation, patents and proprietary rights. Finally, a business plan 
contains a financial statement and a forecast (Stahl 2003).  
 
The literature review shows that different types of investors have different weightings regarding 
the importance of each review field. Vater (2002) was research active regarding the initial and 
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the detailed screening of equity investors in Germany. According to his research results, the 
financial forecast, the management team, the product and the market, and past financial 
statements are regarded as the most important review fields during the initial screening. These 
results apply for the entire market but the more detailed interpretation shows that venture capital 
investors are also focused on exit possibilities. Interestingly enough, this issue is regarded as the 
most important point in the initial screening of venture capital investors (Vater 2002). Tyebjee 
and Bruno (1984), in earlier times research active regarding VCs investment focus, mention that 
the majority of their sample members simply check the size of the investment, the market and the 
technology, the financing stage and, in some minor cases, also the geographic location. Overall, 
the further review of the literature base leads to the assumption that investors are clearly focused 
on product’s differentiation, market’s attractiveness and the cash potential of their investment 
(Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Brettel 2002; Kollmann and Kuckertz 2004). In addition, the literature 
base shows that the management team is surely one of the most important issues in the 
investment decision process of investors (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Brettel 2002; Vater 2002; 
Kollmann and Kuckertz 2004; Mason and Stark 2004). In that respect, Franke et al. (2004) detail 
the management team criteria in the initial screening phase and refer to: 
 
 the importance of market knowledge; 
 the type and level of team qualification; 
 the team coherence and earlier human resource responsibilities. 
 
Brettel (2002) with regard to the German VC market mentions the relevance of market 
knowledge too, but, furthermore, refers to team spirit, risk orientation, resilience and integrity as 
important decision factors too. Moreover, the management team should have different skills in 
different areas which must be complementary in the respective team (Brettel 2002; Kollmann 
and Kuckertz 2004). Beside these rather similar assessments of management team’s importance, 
Petty and Gruber (2011), interestingly enough, argue that the management team is not as 
important as overall indicated. They mention that there is still the possibility of replacement prior 
or during the investment period in a majority of cases. This conclusion is based on the analysis 
of 3,631 deal proposals and finally 35 investments during a period of 11 years. This interesting 
research study, even though limited to one European-based venture capital firm, moreover, sees 
influences in the decision making due to economic circumstances. Petty and Gruber (2011) 
clarify that economic upturns are associated both with an increase of funds volume and an 
increasing number of incoming business proposals. This situation results in an increasing number 
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of proposal rejections on the one hand and an increase in the relevance of product and service 
related issues on the other hand. With regard to such economical influences, Kollmann and 
Kuckertz (2004) analysed changes in the decision making process during the millennium turn. 
Even though their research findings are based on a purposive selection of ten technological 
oriented VC firms in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, their research results disclose changes 
in the initial screening process. They argue that investors are focused on such products which are 
able to realise sufficient returns in different markets. Thus, innovative products which are limited 
on market niches are not considered for investments as a consequence of the economic decline 
during the millennium turn. 
 
At the end of the initial screening, approx. 80% of the proposals are rejected (Nathusius 2001; 
Franke et al. 2004). In Germany, approx. 20% of the proposals in 2001, approx. 16% in 2004, 
and approx. 21% per year during the initial phase of the financial crisis were considered for a 
detailed analysis (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). 
That means that the proportion of due diligences between 2001, and the initial phase of the 
financial crisis more than halved in relation to the decreasing number of business proposals. The 
due diligence proportions also vary according to the specific type of investor. Results for the 
initial phase of the crisis show that early-stage investors considered approx. 15% of the incoming 
proposals for a detailed analysis, whereas the MBGs considered approx. 55% (Achleitner et al. 
2010). These results for the MBGs are also far above in comparison to the average proportion of 
21% (Achleitner et al. 2010) in the entire market. The ratio of the MBGs in that respect should 
be interpreted with care as the MBGs prefer silent investments on the one hand and are investing 
in comparatively smaller investment amounts on the other hand. It should not be concluded that 
their due diligence procedures are comparable to these of the remaining market members.  
 
4.4.3  The literature regarding the detailed analysis 
 
The detailed analysis, the so-called due diligence (Nathusius 2001), is carried out in order to 
balance information asymmetries between investors and entrepreneurs. Beside the economic 
importance of the due diligence, information is also required to structure the contract and for 
investor’s guarantee rights. Even though investors in Germany are not legally obliged, the 
implementation of a due diligence is recommended due to warranty principles (Berens et al. 
2002). 
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The research results from Reißig-Thust (2003) show that approx. 67% of the venture capital 
firms in her sample require more than three man-days, approx. 14% between two and three man-
days, and approx. 5% one man-day for the detailed analysis. During these periods, the investors 
according to Natusch (2002) are focused on following review fields: 
 
 human resources; 
 product market; 
 technology; 
 finance; 
 tax and legal; 
 organisation and IT. 
 
Human characteristics and capabilities are also reviewed by the so-called psychological due 
diligence which summarises the issues of both HR and cultural aspects. Even though it is 
somewhat difficult to quantify soft facts directly, they indirectly influence the financial results of 
an enterprise (Koch 2011). With regard to financial crisis related effects, Frohn and Arvizu 
(2012) mention an increasing importance of firm’s operations. They remark that due to market’s 
instability, additional in-depth information is required for an investment decision. Frohn and 
Arvizu (2012) refer to shortcomings in the traditional due diligence process and criticise its 
narrow perspective. Therefore, the so-called operational due diligence is focused on the analysis 
of processes, core competences, the identification of risks, synergies and additional value 
drivers. A final objective of the ODD is the validation of the basic due diligence results and the 
determination of improvement measures for the investment period.  
 
Since start-up companies in the normal case have no or only limited production resources or 
organisational structures, due diligences on the level of start-ups are different in comparison to 
established enterprises. Beside the issues of the management, the product and the technology, the 
customer base and the market, this type of due diligence is, moreover, concerned with detailed 
reviews regarding calculations and estimations behind the business model. This means that the 
business idea must be scalable in order to assess the growth perspective (Brandis and Kawohl 
2003). 
 
Nevertheless, Vater (2002), according to his research findings for venture capital firms in 
Germany, refers to the management team as the most important review area during the detailed 
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analysis. Further important review fields are the product and the market, exit possibilities, future 
cash-flows and the issue of research and development. Röper (2004), who was research active 
regarding CVCs in the US, Germany and Switzerland, agrees with the research results from 
Vater (2002) regarding the importance of the management team. In that respect, Röper (2004) 
underlines the relevance of management team’s strategic orientation, product and market 
knowledge, and finally, management team’s qualification. Achleitner et al. (2006), according to 
their research results for the German PE and VC market, mention that the management team, the 
financial forecast, and the product and service related issues are the most important review 
fields. Thus far, they agree with the research results from Vater (2002) and Röper (2004).  
 
Even though the importance of review fields differ due to the specific research focus, it could be 
concluded that equity investors in general are focused on the product, the market and the 
financial aspects. In addition, the literature base shows that the management team, its 
qualification and personality is both very important in the initial and the detailed analysis 
process.  
 
The results of the due diligence regarding financial aspects and the product market could be 
directly considered for firm valuation purposes, both in the earnings value and the discounted 
cash-flow method. In the case that the firm value is based on the multipliers method, the results 
of the due diligence are considered for surcharges or reductions to adjust the results of the 
valuation (Natusch 2002). As the literature regarding the due diligence was reviewed in the 
context of firm valuation procedures, the subsequent section briefly summarises the main 
findings regarding the development of firm valuation. 
 
4.4.4  The financial crisis and enterprise valuation in Germany 
 
Enterprise values are dependent on different parameters and objectives, which applies in 
particular in the case of SMEs. A rough orientation distinguishes between monetary objectives, 
which refer to enterprise’s capability in generating profits, strategic objectives and finally, meta-
economic objectives. The latter are focused on the issues of power, independence and safety, 
each on the level of enterprise owners and investors. It is rather difficult for investors to assess 
and to quantify these particular aspects on the level of the entrepreneur. Nevertheless, meta-
economic aspects could not be disregarded as they influence the enterprise value too (Behringer 
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2009). In addition, SMEs are associated with following particularities which influence the 
enterprise value both positively and negatively: 
 
 the flexibility of the company structure; 
 the number of shareholders, customers and suppliers; 
 the influence of the enterprise owner; 
 the limited capital market access; 
 the lack of strategic plans; 
 the limitation in accounting; 
 the risk of expertise loss; 
 a local market focus. 
 
Therefore, a preceding firm analysis on the level of SMEs is concerned with restructuring levers, 
firm’s financial structure and the separation of non-operating from operating assets (Helbling 
2002a).    
 
Irrespective of this integrated valuation process, PE and VC firms in Germany apply standard 
valuation procedures. According to Hoffelner’s (2010) research results, the multipliers, the 
discounted cash-flow and the earnings value method are the most popular methods of company 
valuation in Germany. PE firms have neither changed their practices nor intend to do so due to 
financial crisis related impacts. This is despite the fact that the crisis could have affected single 
determinants in the valuation process and, finally, the company value (Zwirner and Reinholdt 
2009b).  
 
According to Zwirner and Reinholdt (2009a), impacts on the level of the earnings value method 
and the discounted cash-flow method could be realised on the level of the base rate, the market 
risk premium and the beta-factor. 
 
In order to determine the beta-factors, the development of the target firm is compared with the 
development of a reference group. Therefore, the correlation between the entire stock market and 
sector related stocks is calculated (Jonas 2009). Depending on these results, industry branch 
related beta-factors increase or decrease and finally influence the enterprise values. Zwirner and 
Reinholdt (2009b) initially assumed that beta-factors vary more intensively due to crisis' impacts 
as they did before. Due to crisis' effects, sector-specific beta-factors were substantially 
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influenced and lead to different valuation results. For example, the beta-factors in the financial 
sector increased significantly due to the decline of the stock market on the one hand and the 
decrease of bank stocks on the other hand. On the contrary, beta-factors in the 
telecommunication sector decreased even though telecommunication stocks remained stable. 
Improved business models or strategies could have had a positive effect, as in the case of the 
bank sector, but are unconsidered due to beta-factors which are based on historical data (Jonas 
2009). Therefore, it seems reasonable to adjust these factors accordingly by separate calculations 
(Zwirner and Reinholdt 2009a) or by ignoring significant influence parameters from the past 
(Jonas 2009).  
 
The terminal value reflects the assumption of future developments and inflation, and could also 
be negatively affected by the crisis' impacts (Zwirner and Reinholdt 2009a).  
 
Enterprise values in 2007 compared to 2011 would have increased substantially if base rates 
would have decreased under the assumptions of equal risk premiums, beta-factors and company 
earnings. This positive development in enterprise values is explained by the decrease of equity 
costs in the capital-asset-pricing-model. The increase of enterprise values in this timeframe could 
not be confirmed by stock market based multipliers. On the contrary, if calculations would have 
solely been based on multipliers, enterprise values would have decreased. It is therefore 
recommended to put both the CAPM and the weighted-average-cost-of-capital into perspective 
due to difficulties in risk premium and beta-factor calculations (Janos and Tracia 2012). Beside 
CAPM’s adjustment, transaction multipliers could be applied to settle the influence of monetary 
policy measures (Janos and Tracia 2012). However, it should be avoided to replace standard 
procedures by the multipliers approach due to their orientation on past developments (Jonas 
2009). 
 
In the case of PE and VC investments, enterprise values are finally adjusted by marketability, 
control premiums and minority discounts. In addition, enterprise values are dependent on exit 
options (Natusch 2002).  
 
This section shortly attempts to explain the overall complex issue of firm valuation, both for 
investments in SMEs and bigger-sized enterprises. Moreover, this section shows that standard 
procedures lose their reliability in the case of extraordinary circumstances such as the financial 
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crisis. Therefore, valuation results have limited validity and only serve as an approximation for 
negotiation purposes. The issue of negotiation is clarified in the subsequent section.  
 
4.4.5  The literature regarding negotiation and contracting 
 
Negotiations are based on the investment proposal and are concerned with the purchase price, the 
investment amount, the type of financial instrument, guarantees and both investor and 
shareholder rights (Schefczyk 2004). Depending on the negotiation results, the full purchase 
price is paid within one financing round (Simon 2009) or in instalments according to milestone 
agreements (Schefczyk 2004). In order to avoid investor’s share dilution during subsequent 
capital measures, contracts also consider the so-called anti-dilution protections. In particular 
cases, shareholders are obliged and/or entitled to sell their shares for equal conditions in the case 
of investor’s exit. A particular agreement refers to the competition prohibition of the 
management team or the founder (Schneider 2003). Finally, contract clauses could be associated 
with the liquidation of the enterprise and investor’s right to prompt an IPO. A so-called 
liquidation preference refers to the preferred repayment of the investor (Simon 2009). This 
specification is not final and depends on the circumstances and negotiations.  
 
Negotiations are most concerned with warranties. Investors do not only rely on audit results but 
require guarantees of the enterprise owners regarding the completeness and correctness of 
information (Thum et al. 2008). Guarantees could refer to every due diligence review and 
investors could claim for compensations in the case of infringements. However, trivial cases 
could be excluded from warranty obligations (Picot 2008b). In addition, guarantees are limited 
due to the consideration of the so-called disclaimers which exclude specific liability cases. 
Guarantees are one of the most important reasons for both breaking-off negotiations and 
litigations (Thum et al. 2008).  
 
In relation to an economic point of view, Schneider (2003) concludes a minor importance of 
contract clauses due to the scope of exit possibilities during the millennium turn. He further 
mentions a significant tightening of contract structures during the subsequent downturn. 
Kollmann and Kuckertz (2004) agree with the findings from Schneider (2003). They mention a 
particular awareness of investors regarding liquidation preferences on the one hand, beside an 
increasing complexity of deal structures on the other hand. According to their conclusions, 
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venture capitalists try to compensate the increasing uncertainty during market’s decline. A 
similar development is also observed during the financial crisis (Meyding and Grau 2012). 
 
Negative developments of the enterprise after contract signing could be compensated by the so-
called material-adverse-change-clauses. In 2008, such contract clauses were considered in 21% 
of the cases. This proportion decreased to 16% each in 2010 and 2011 (Meyding and Grau 
2012). Taking into consideration that Germany’s GDP decreased by 0.23% between 2007 and 
2009 and increased by 4.2% in 2010 and 3% in 2011 (Destatis 2013), contract designs obviously 
react in relation to economic conditions. Interestingly enough, investors obviously try to 
compensate for the aftermath of the financial crisis by the prolongation of warranty periods. This 
could be a sign that both PE and VC investors are rather unsure regarding future economic 
developments which would directly affect their portfolio companies.  
 
According to Hummel’s (2011b) research results, approx. 5% of the investment proposals in 
2004 and 5% on average for the period between 2007 and 2008 were finally considered for 
investments. These results almost correspond with the research findings from both Zimmermann 
and Fischer (2003) and Achleitner et al. (2006 and 2010) who refer to investment proportions of 
approx. 6% each for the research periods of 2001, 2004 and 2007 until 2009. However, these 
relative proportions are associated with the decline in the number of investments due to the 
significant decrease in the number of business proposals. Nevertheless, this total market view is 
not valid for every type of investor. In the case of the MBGs, the increase of the investment 
proportion from 23% to 29% between 2001 and 2009 partly compensates for the decrease in the 
number of investment proposals. Thus, their number of final investments remained quite stable. 
Overall, the investment proportion of the MBGs is comparatively large and fits into the large 
proportion of business proposals which are considered in the analysis process (see table 17 in 
appendix D). This might be a consequence of their business model as self-helping institutions 
(see section 4.2).  
 
The second part of the investment process, the so-called post-investment phase, is clarified in the 
subsequent sections. 
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4.4.6  The literature regarding monitoring and mentoring 
 
This phase is both concerned with the monitoring and the mentoring of the portfolio companies. 
In typical cases, monitoring and mentoring is realised by investor’s board representation and 
associated with financial information on a regular basis (Mitchel et al. 1995; Nathusius 2001). 
According to research results for the VC market in the UK, Mitchel et al. (1995) mention that 
core financial statements include the balance sheet, the profit and loss and, furthermore, the cash-
flow statement. Approx. 25% of the survey respondents expect an additional performance 
summary. The majority of these sample members receive the reporting package on a monthly 
basis (Mitchel et al. 1995). Brinkrolf (2002), who was research active regarding VC firms' 
management support in Germany, agrees with the results from Mitchel et al. (1995). He reports 
that 81% of the survey respondents expect a monthly reporting package and only 7% on a 
quarterly basis. Hummel (2011b), who examined the German PE and VC market, inter alia, 
during 2006 and 2009, mentions that approx. 75% of the survey respondents expect monthly 
reporting packages. Thus, he agrees with the research results of Mitchel et al. (1995) and of 
Brinkrolf (2002). In that context, board representation obviously plays a significant role in the 
interaction between investors and entrepreneurs. Kranz (2008), who examined the management 
support of PE and VC firms in Europe, reports that almost every survey respondent is 
represented in the board of the portfolio company. Moreover, the survey respondents have 
informal contacts or participate in management meetings. Moon (2006) argues that PE investors 
are represented in the board in order to interact with the executives in a close relationship and an 
open discussion level. This strong link between investors and portfolio companies is also 
required to intervene immediately in the case that the portfolio company does not perform 
accordingly (Brinkrolf 2002).  
 
With regard to typical mentoring areas of venture capital firms, Brinkrolf (2002) refers to 
strategy, finance, organisation and operation, networking and cooperation, and finally human 
resources. The literature base shows that market members are most concerned and involved in 
financial monitoring and strategy development. This applies both for VC firms and for universal 
PE investors and regardless of the examination perspective. The examinations in that respect are 
either based on an investor or an entrepreneurial perspective (Brinkrolf 2002; Pankotsch 2005; 
Sobczak 2007; Wexlberger 2011). Furthermore, Klier et al. (2009) supplement that investors 
would be also focused on selling non-core assets and on the optimisation of the working capital.  
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Nevertheless, the degree of involvement in the PE and VC market varies even though the market 
members are overall strongly connected to their portfolio. In that respect, Brinkrolf (2002) 
distinguishes six different influence intensities from no involvement, information related 
requests, the consultation of portfolio companies, decision making, full decision making, up to 
the full management responsibility. With regard to the support extent, results in the literature 
base are not consistent. It is overall rather difficult to determine reliable support durations of 
equity investors, which obviously differ according to different examination perspectives. In that 
respect, Röper (2004) calculates an average support duration of 26 hours on the level of lead 
investors and 14 hours on the level of co-investors per month. According to his survey, these 
periods compromise support regarding strategic planning and networking, the role as a confident 
and mentor, and additional activities regarding operations, product development and crisis 
management. On the other hand, Brinkrolf (2002) calculates an average support duration of 
approx. 16 hours on the level of lead investors per month. These different results could also be 
dependent on the different examination perspectives of the research studies, either investor or 
enterprise-owner based. In addition, Wexlberger (2011) calculates an average support duration of 
approx. 29 hours per month on the level of CVC firms, approx. 22 hours per month for 
independent investors and approx. 13 hours for public investors. These different results show 
that it is rather difficult to determine a reliable average support duration in the market. These 
durations are obviously not only differing according to the particular examination perspective 
but, moreover, are dependent on the particular type of investor. Overall, these results should be 
considered in relation to the specific sample and perspective. Thus, they are not valid for the 
entire PE and VC market. 
  
In terms of a simplification, the market is divided into hands-on and hands-off investors. In that 
respect, the research results of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003) show that approx. 50% of the 
survey respondents support their portfolio companies hands-on between 1999 and 2001. A more 
detailed view shows that approx. 58% of the independent investors are supporting hands-on 
beside a proportion of 10% in the case of the MBGs. Interestingly enough, 65% of early-stage 
investors are actively involved beside a proportion of 35% in the case of later-stage investors 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003). Early-stage investors obviously try to minimise the 
comparatively large default risk by an intensified support. Achleitner et al. (2006) report a 
similar involvement between 2002 and 2004, followed by an increasing number of actively 
involved investors between 2007 and 2009 (Achleitner et al. 2010). Hummel (2011b) 
supplements these research results and refers to the remarkable development in the case of the 
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MBGs. Their support effort increased significantly from approx. five hours in 2004 to 19 hours 
in 2009. This development was accompanied with both an increasing number of personal 
contacts and an increasing awareness regarding portfolio companies strategy. Even though back-
financed by public institutions, MBGs obviously reacted according to their dramatic loss 
proportions of 38% in 2008 (BVK 2009a) and 53% in 2009 (BVK 2010b).  
 
The investment period of equity investors is finalised by the so-called exit. By selling the equity 
share, the PE investor tries to realise sufficient profits (Thum et al. 2008). This issue is presented 
in the subsequent section. 
 
4.4.7  The literature regarding the exit phase  
 
Possible exit channels for PE and VC investors are associated with: 
 
 trade sales; 
 secondary buy-outs; 
 initial public offerings; 
 buy-backs; 
 liquidations (Thum et al. 2008); 
 repayments of silent investments (BVK 2009a; BVK 2010b). 
 
According to research findings, initial public offerings are the most preferred exit channel 
followed by trade sales, secondary purchases and share buy-backs. Even though exit strategies 
from PE firms slightly differ due to different business strategies, the most important objective is 
the maximisation of profits (Pfaffenholz 2004; Röper 2004). The success of an IPO depends on 
capital market’s condition on the one hand (Thum et al. 2008) and portfolio company’s past 
performance on the other hand (Schefczyk 2004). Trade sales are less dependent on 
environmental fluctuations and associated with smaller transaction-costs, whereas secondary 
purchases benefit from short transaction periods (Thum et al. 2008). Share buy-backs are least 
preferred by PE firms due to possible financial constraints on the level of the earlier shareholders 
(Schefczyk 2004). In separation from the entire market, the MBGs are most concerned with the 
repayment of their silent investments due to their specific business model (BVK 2009a; BVK 
2010b).  
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Irrespective of the specific economic conditions, the German PE and VC market overall suffers 
from total losses. However, research data show that the loss proportions increase in the case of 
unstable economic circumstances. Achleitner et al. (2006) calculate that the proportion of total 
losses in relation to divestments are 40% in 2004. In the subsequent research, Achleitner et al. 
(2010) calculate a proportion of 24% in 2007, and a significant increase to 41% in 2009. During 
these periods, the GDP increased by 1.2% in 2004, by 3.3% in 2007 but declined by 5.1% in 
2009 (Destatis 2013). The MBGs and early-stage investors realised the largest loss proportions 
in any of these periods (Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). IPOs are surely of minor 
importance due to the limited capital market activity in Germany (see section 2.6.3). During 
2005 until 2008, the number of IPOs dropped from 13 to two. In the subsequent phase between 
2009 and 2011, the number of IPOs recovered from one to 12 IPOs but finally fell back to eight 
IPOs in 2012 again (Statista 2015). 
 
At that point, the literature review with regard to the investment process is finalised and the 
subsequent sections are focused on innovation policy and public funding. 
 
4.5  The innovation policy and public funding 
 
4.5.1  The innovation political developments in Germany 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are regarded as very important for innovation, employment 
and thus for economic growth. In that respect, SMEs had a significant stabilisation effect on 
employment in Germany in 2008 and 2009 (see section 2.6.1). Nevertheless, SMEs seemed to be 
disadvantaged in the field of bank and innovation financing (see section 2.6.3). Market failure in 
that respect is, inter alia, caused by negative spill-over effects on the level of SMEs. The 
uncontrolled diffusion of knowledge is resulting in additional earnings on the level of enterprises 
which do not bear the initial or any research costs. This applies in particular in cases in which 
new knowledge is not or could not be copyrighted. Furthermore, SMEs suffer from financing 
gaps for research and development due to information asymmetries. In addition, SMEs do not 
have enough market power in order to penetrate markets effectively with innovative products or 
services. Finally, SMEs do not benefit from comparable large research budgets and resources as 
bigger-sized enterprises. Consequently, their research contribution and success is rather weak 
(see also section 2.6.2).  
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Even though public funding might also be considered out of an economic point of view, public 
funding in the context of the present thesis is considered in relation to innovation policy. Public 
innovation policy is every strategy and measure that influence innovation processes in the 
economy and the society. Innovation political measures are associated with three different levers 
in order to influence innovation processes. This could be a direct involvement which is, inter 
alia, concerned with competition and trade legislation or proprietary rights. In addition, 
innovation policy might be concerned with input measures through direct R&D financing, risk 
capital or tax reliefs. An output-oriented strategy of innovation policy would be associated with 
employment policy, growth policy or regional policy in order to ensure economy’s stability and 
growth. Political measures in that respect could be implemented on European, federal and 
regional state levels (Welsch 2005).  
 
Innovation policy basically distinguishes between two main concepts, a market-based innovation 
policy on the one hand and an intervention-based policy on the other hand. A market-based 
innovation policy classifies innovation as an independent and uncontrollable variable which 
develops freely according to market mechanisms. Hence, innovation processes are dependent on 
market decisions according to profit and loss probabilities. The concept of intervention-based 
policy, on the contrary, follows the path of direct public influence to align the innovation 
processes along specific subjects. This might also be associated with the direct support of 
specific industry branches in order to accelerate the structural change in the entire economy. 
Nevertheless, there is consensus regarding the subsidisation of basic research due to market 
failure (Welsch 2005). 
 
The initial literature review shows that the German government adjusted the innovation political 
measures after the millennium change. Due to the economic downturn, the government was 
concerned with the technology transfer, early-stage financing and enterprise founding. Public 
concerns resulted in different measures which were bundled in Germany’s so-called Hightech-
Strategy from 2006. In addition, innovation political measures were aligned with future demand 
areas which were regarded as economically relevant. Due to the significant increase of world’s 
population, world’s energy demand and the effects of global warming, the German government 
classified climate and energy, health and nutrition, mobility and safety, and communication as 
the most important research areas. As a result, the public funding policy was also aligned with 
these research priorities, which were also embedded in the HTS from 2006 (BMBF 2010). In the 
context of the earlier innovation policy in Germany, which was surely concerned with either an 
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involvement related or a more market-based innovation policy during 1973 until 1982 and 1983 
until 1997, the millennium turn obviously introduced a more integrated approach of innovation 
policy (Welsch 2005). This seemed to be required not only in order to address short-term 
developments but also to improve the economy’s competitiveness due to an increasing 
globalisation.  
 
Due to gaps in early-stage financing (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010) and the difficulties with the technology transfer, the German government 
provides several public funding programmes on the federal level. These programmes are issued 
from different federal state departments, the so-called Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and the so-
called Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank. The KfW and the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank are 
public-owned banks but, nevertheless, are refinanced over the capital market. They cooperate 
with the private bank sector in a neutral manner. Therefore, only parts of their services are 
directly available and the majority of public credits are exclusively provided over private banks. 
The private bank sector fulfils a leading-through function for the public credits (VOEB 2013). 
The public credit conditions are comparatively cheap, as public investment banks benefit from 
their state guarantee. In some cases, public loans are further reduced by capital gains of the 
public investment banks or are directly subsidised by the government (VOEB 2014).  
 
Funding areas of the KfW and the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank are: 
 
 small and medium-sized enterprises; 
 agriculture and infrastructure development; 
 living space and urban development; 
 environmentalism (VOEB 2013). 
 
The present thesis is focused on the KfW as the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank is solely busy 
with the agriculture sector. The KfW is organised in three independent divisions which are 
focused on supporting enterprises, public institutions or private households. KfW business 
activities which are not regarded as competitive-neutral in accordance with EU law (see 
appendix M) are bundled in a daughter company. A second daughter company of the KfW is 
busy with the financing of developing countries (Asmussen 2008). The financing measures of 
the KfW regarding small and medium-sized enterprises are bundled in the business area of the 
so-called KfW-Mittelstandsbank. This part of the KfW is concerned with the financing of: 
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 enterprise founding; 
 SME investments; 
 innovation and environmentalism projects (KfW 2010). 
 
Financing measures within these areas differ regarding their duration and conditions.  
 
In addition, the KfW issued three different equity-financing programmes at the time of the 
financial crisis. These equity-financing programmes were provided to support technology-based 
enterprises, start-ups and SMEs by co-financing the investments of PE and VC firms. In that 
respect, the KfW was investing on equal conditions of the lead investor. It was also possible that 
PE and VC investors refinance their equity investments with specific KfW programmes (KfW 
2010; KfW 2010a).  
 
In addition, the innovation policy of the government is also concerned with the funding of 
individual research projects, research cooperation and networks. The focus of the funding 
programmes are SMEs and applied research projects (Belitz et al. 2012). The most important 
research subsidy is the so-called ZIM (see glossary), which is the central innovation programme 
for SMEs. This research subsidy is issued by Germany’s federal department for economic affairs 
and energy. The second programme, the so-called KMU-innovativ (see glossary), is issued by 
the German department of education and research. This research subsidy is much more narrowed 
in its application due to the focus on specific research areas (BMBF 2010; Belitz et al. 2012).    
 
4.5.2  The public funding related developments in Germany 
 
Even though the German government introduced a debt rule in 2009, public expenses for 
research and development were excluded from these consolidation measures (BMWi 2010). This 
underlines the public concerns regarding Germany’s future economic performance. According to 
the European Lisbon strategy, which is, inter alia, concerned with an increase of gross domestic 
expenditures for research and development in Europe up to 3%, the German government agreed 
on additional expenses for education and research in the amount of approx. 12 billion euros until 
2013. Germany’s government intended to increase the expenses for education and research, not 
to be confused with research and development, up to 10% of the GDP. These measures, beside 
the further improvement of Germany’s scientific system and its internationalisation, are also part 
of the HTS (BMBF 2010). 
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The initial literature review also shows that the government intensified both research funding and 
equity-financing measures during the initial phase of the financial crisis. The government in that 
respect spent additional 900 million euros for the programme ZIM and increased the equity 
financing funds of the KfW in the amount of additional 220 million euros. Furthermore, the 
government prolonged High-Tech Gründerfund’s (see glossary) investment period and modified 
the earlier HTS from 2006 (BMWi 2010). Moreover, the KfW received additional governmental 
funding for both SME and innovation financing purposes (KfW 2010). The additional funds for 
research support were part of the conjuncture programmes in order to prevent adjustments in the 
research budgets of the enterprises (Belitz et al. 2012). Earlier experiences during economic 
downturns, as during the oil crisis and the world economic crisis of 1973 and 1974, have shown 
that enterprises reduced their research budgets to save their profitability (Welsch 2005).  
 
In order to receive a detailed overview of KfW’s business activity in the field of equity 
financing, SME and innovation financing, and in order to separate financial crisis related 
measures, the annual support reports of the KfW are reclassified. This reclassification of the 
annual support report 2009 (KfW 2010a) results in following categories: 
 
 enterprise founding and SME financing; 
 equity-financing programmes; 
 innovation financing; 
 financial crisis related measures (KfW 2010). 
 
This initial analysis of the KfW report for 2009 (KfW 2010a) shows that the demand on KfW 
credits decreased due to the significant economic decline. Therefore, the KfW launched a new 
programme, the so-called KfW-Sonderprogramm, to boost SME investments on the one hand 
and to support the credit provision of private banks on the other hand (KfW 2010). Without these 
additional measures, the business volume of the KfW would have declined from approx. 11.4 
billion euros in 2008 to approx. 8.8 billion euros in 2009. In addition, the volume of KfW’s 
equity programmes decreased in accordance with the development of the entire PE and VC 
market in Germany (see section 4.2). The subsequent table 18 details the financing amounts of 
the KfW in the selected areas. 
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The financing volumes of the KfW 
 
Year 2008 2009 
Funding area MEUR MEUR 
   
Enterprise founding and SME financing 10,212 7,400 
Innovation financing 888 1,220 
Equity financing 261 201 
Subtotal 11,361 8,821 
Financial crisis related measures 0 7,948 
   
Total 11,361 16,769 
 
Table 18 The financing volumes of the KfW (derived from KfW 2010a) 
 
With regard to the further development of the research subsidies ZIM and KMU-innovativ, the 
initial analysis shows that the volume of disbursed subsidies for the programme ZIM increased 
from approx. four million euros in 2008 to 155 million euros in 2009. This significant increase 
was caused by additional funding measures from the conjuncture programmes (see sections 2.4). 
Obviously, as an attempt to stimulate the research and development contribution of the smaller 
enterprises in Germany (see table three in section 2.6.2). The more technology-focused 
programme KMU-innovativ on the other hand increased from approx. eight million euros in 
2008 to approx. 45 million euros in 2009 (Rammer et al. 2011). The different amounts underline 
the more narrowed application of the programme KMU-innovativ with its focus on cutting-edge 
research (BMBF 2010; Belitz et al. 2012). 
 
This section regarding public funding finalises the literature review which is subsequently 
summarised in order to develop a basic theory.    
 
4.6   The literature synthesis, the literature gap and the basic theory 
 
4.6.1  The literature synthesis 
 
The literature synthesis summarises the main findings from the literature review. The literature 
review of the present thesis is concerned with following areas: 
 
 conjuncture crises and the financial crisis; 
 economic development during the financial crisis; 
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 economic contribution of small and medium-sized enterprises; 
 innovation related developments in Germany; 
 innovation and SME financing in Germany; 
 Germany’s PE and VC market; 
 investment process of equity investors; 
 Germany’s innovation policy; 
 public funding and public subsidies on the federal level. 
 
Initially, the literature review showed that the US sub-prime crisis led to a global bank and 
economy crisis, and finally to state debt crises. There are obvious similarities in the present crisis 
and earlier financial crises which were associated with market and loan expansions, bank crises 
and conjuncture downturns. These earlier crises required both central banks' and governments' 
intervention which finally resulted in an increasing public indebtedness. A remarkable aspect is 
associated with the agreement of Bretton-Woods. It is supposed that the agreement’s end would 
have been responsible for the subsequent eras of debt, financial and real estate crises (see section 
2.1). 
 
Due to similar business models in the finance sector and its strong interconnection, the US sub-
prime crisis spread globally (see section 2.3). Worldwide impacts in the financial system resulted 
in economic downturns which required large conjuncture programmes. The extent of 
stabilisation measures caused state debt crises on the one hand and a currency crisis in Europe on 
the other hand. Even though Germany’s economy initially developed in a rather stable way in 
2007 and 2008, the GDP decreased significantly by 5.1% in 2009 (see section 2.4). In the so-
called post-crisis phase, the world’s economy recovered in 2010 but declined in 2011 again. In 
Europe, the ECB continued the expansive monetary policy in order to stabilise both the bank 
system and the economy (see section 2.5).  
 
With regard to Germany’s economic structure, the literature review showed that approx. 99% of 
enterprises are small and medium-sized according to the classification system of the EC (see 
table two in appendix B). This enterprise size is very important for the economy’s development 
due to employment and qualification contributions but also for research and development and for 
the diffusion of innovations. In that respect, SMEs benefit from short communication processes, 
motivated staff and flat hierarchies. On the other hand, SMEs innovation contribution is 
hampered due to difficulties in employing qualified staff, their weak market orientation and the 
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limitation of financial resources. Nevertheless, economic growth does not only require 
innovation but in particular innovative entrepreneurs for the technology transfer (see section 
2.6.1). Statistics show that both the number of fulltime and sideline foundations in Germany 
decreased significantly between 2005 and 2012 (IfM 2014). Even though the number of 
freelancers increased by approx. 130% between 1994 and 2014 (Welter 2015), it seems 
questionable if this type of founding, which should be rather regarded as an alternative to regular 
employment, would have compensated for the decreasing proportions of standard enterprise 
foundings.  
 
In addition, research data show that the proportion of innovators in Germany, which were 
concerned with product, process, marketing and organisation innovations, decreased 
significantly between 2008 and 2012. Estimations for 2012 show that approx. 51% of enterprises 
in Germany were research active but only 38% were product and process innovators. Moreover, 
data show that the research and development activity of enterprises is significantly increasing in 
relation to the enterprise size. This innovation behaviour is resulting in a significantly larger 
proportion of both product and process innovators on the level of enterprises with more than 
1,000 employees. These developments were accompanied with decreasing revenue proportions 
of innovations between 2008 and 2012, even though shortly interrupted by periods of recovery 
each in 2010 and 2011. Beside this progress, data interpretations result in the assumption that the 
research contribution and success of Germany’s economy is dependent on specific industry 
branches and enterprise sizes. The contribution of SMEs up to 249 employees is obviously very 
small, not completely exhausted and hence expandable. This applies in particular for SMEs 
which employ between five and 49 employees (see section 2.6.2). 
 
The literature review has also shown that SMEs are disadvantaged in bank financing both for 
general and for innovation related purposes. This disadvantage should have been intensified due 
to the modification of the minimum capital requirements for banks, which were implemented in 
2013 (BIS 2010). Therefore, SMEs basically prefer self-financing. Nevertheless, the literature 
underlines that SMEs are dependent on bank financing too due to the limitations of alternative 
financing channels, for instance capital market or equity financing. In that respect, it is very 
difficult for SMEs to be refinanced over the capital market, not only due to size requirements, 
but also due to the declining capital market activity since the millennium turn. Time series show 
that both the number of IPOs and the number of shareholders decreased between the millennium 
turn and the year 2012 (see section 2.6.3). 
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With regard to the development of Germany’s PE and VC market, data has shown that both 
private equity and venture capital investments decreased significantly between 2007 and 2009. 
During the post-crisis phase, the investment amounts increased from approx. 4.9 billion euros in 
2010 to 6.5 billion euros in 2012. Venture capital investments recovered and resulted in approx. 
729 million euros in 2010 but finally declined to approx. 549 million euros in 2012. These 
investment amounts were accompanied by decreasing fund raising volumes between 2007 and 
2012 (EVCA 2013). In that context, data also showed that the German PE and VC market is 
comparatively small. This applies not only with regard to the nominal investment amounts in a 
country related perspective but also with regard to the proportion of equity investments from the 
national GDPs (see section 4.1).  
 
In addition, the literature review showed that the German PE and VC market was incrementally 
winning on market maturity between 1999 and 2009. This assumption is derived from an 
increasing specialisation trend on the one hand and an increasing investment experience during 
this decade on the other hand. Due to significantly changing economic conditions after the 
millennium turn, investors had to change their strategy and began to focus on later-stage 
investments. In addition, the market was also described from an increasing proportion of bigger 
investment funds. The withdraw from early-stage and expansion related investments was 
accompanied with increasing investment amounts on the one hand and an increasing competition 
on the level of later-stage investments on the other hand. In order to close market gaps, the 
literature review showed that the market was substantially subsidised by means of public 
funding. This proportion of public support is significantly larger on the level of early-stage 
investments than on the level of later-stage investments (see table 14 in section 4.3). During the 
initial phase of the crisis, the market suffered from an increasing proportion of total losses which 
caused an increasing hands-on mentality of PE and VC investors. At the same time, market 
participants were prompted to reduce their return expectations. During the initial crisis phase, a 
major proportion of deals were not realised as negotiation parties were not able to agree on 
specific rights or enterprise values (see section 4.3). A major concern in the German PE and VC 
market was associated with the so-called AIFM-directive, which was adopted by the European 
parliament as a consequence of the financial crisis. This directive was transformed into a national 
law in Germany in 2013 in order to establish a legislation framework for investment activities 
outside the financial sector. Furthermore, market members in Germany were concerned due to 
the rejection of a German law initiative by the European Commission. This legislation was 
focused on the improvement of start-up financing conditions in Germany (see section 4.2). 
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The literature has, moreover, shown that one particular aspect in Germany’s PE and VC market 
is associated with the so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften. This type of 
investor is focused on silent investments in small and medium-sized enterprises. Due to their 
business purpose as a self-helping institution for SMEs, they are less profit-oriented and have 
smaller return expectations. In comparison to the entire market, MBG’s investment and loss 
proportions are significantly larger (see sections 4.2 and 4.4.7). Even though rather restrained 
investors, MBGs influence regarding portfolio companies' operations and strategy increased 
significantly between 2007 and 2009, as did their entire mentoring effort (Hummel 2011b).       
 
In order to minimise the risks of adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up (see section 3.1.3), 
PE and VC firms are investing along an investment process. This process chain represents the 
institutional framework of equity investors. The literature review refers to the chain components 
of the so-called deal flow, the deal screening, the negotiation and contracting, the monitoring and 
mentoring, and the exit. These phases might be defined as the core investment process of PE and 
VC firms (see section 4.4 and figure seven in appendix H). 
 
With regard to the deal flow, networks, banks and direct requests were the most important deal 
sources between 1999 and 2009. In that respect, the literature showed that the bulk of investment 
requests declined significantly after the millennium turn and since then remained rather stable 
(see section 4.4.1). The initial screening of these business proposals is focused on the quality of 
the management team, the product and the market, and the financial aspects. Approx. 80% of the 
proposals are rejected after this initial check. The remaining 20% go through the process of 
detailed screening, the so-called due diligence (see section 4.4.2). Detailed screenings are 
focused on the management team, the product and the market but in particular on financial 
aspects (see section 4.4.3). Furthermore, the literature showed that the multipliers, the discounted 
cash-flow and the earnings value method are the most preferred valuation procedures of equity 
investors in Germany. Research results in that respect show that investors do not intend to 
exchange these valuation procedures even though specific determinants of the approaches might 
have been negatively affected from crisis' impacts (see section 4.4.4). 
 
The phase of negotiation, which is concerned with the final investment decision and contract 
signing, is directly affected by the economic circumstances. The literature review showed that in 
the case of conjuncture downturns, the complexity of contracts increases. This increasing 
complexity might be associated with an increasing uncertainty and investors' attempt to 
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compensate for the higher default possibility. Nevertheless, the complexity of the contracts 
immediately normalises during the economy’s recovery (see section 4.4.5).  
 
Even though the number of investment requests declined between 2001 and 2009, the final 
investment proportion of 6% remained stable during the same period. This applies for an entire 
market perspective. The detailed examination showed that the investment proportion of later-
stage investors is significantly larger in comparison to early-stage investors (see table 17 in 
appendix D).    
 
During the post-investment phase, PE firms are most frequently busy with strategy’s 
development and financial monitoring. Moreover, the results of the literature review have shown 
that the majority of investors are represented in the supervisory boards of their portfolio 
companies. Long-term analyses show that the market in Germany is dominated by hands-on 
investors. Nevertheless, every type of investor, irrespective of being hands-on or hands-off, is 
increasing the support of the portfolio in the case of particular circumstances or portfolio 
company’s underperformance. Furthermore, the literature review showed that mentoring efforts 
overall increased during the initial phase of the financial crisis. This applies both for the entire 
market and for the MBGs (see section 4.4.6). 
 
With regard to exit channels, the literature refers to trade sales, secondary buy-outs, initial public 
offerings, buy-backs, total losses and the repayment of silent investments. IPOs are the most 
preferred exit channel due to possible capital gains. Buy-backs are the least preferred exit 
channel due to possible financial constraints of the earlier shareholders. Overall, the PE and VC 
market suffers from total losses, which significantly increased during the initial phase of the 
financial crisis (see section 4.4.7). 
  
Beside the application of an investment process to limit the investment risk, the German market 
also benefits from public funding measures. Public funding programmes for equity investments 
are, inter alia, provided from the KfW. This state-owned bank also provides public financing 
measures for SME investments, for innovation projects and for enterprise founding (see section 
4.5.1). These public funding measures are provided in order to settle market imbalances and to 
stimulate the economy. During the initial phase of the financial crisis, the KfW received 
additional governmental funding for both SME and innovation supporting purposes (see section 
4.5.2).  
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With regard to Germany’s innovation policy, the developments after the millennium turn 
prompted the government to align the national innovation strategy on economical relevant areas. 
The public funding measures were aligned on these priority fields too, and the national 
innovation strategy was summarised in the so-called Hightech-Strategy 2010. This strategy was 
launched in 2006. In that respect, the government obviously applied a more strategic and 
integrative approach of innovation policy. Nevertheless, the basic political orientation of the 
government was still associated with an intervention-based innovation policy rather than a 
market-based orientation (see section 4.5.1).  
 
Although the German government followed a course of strict household consolidation as a 
consequence of the increasing public indebtedness, the government agreed on additional 
expenses for education and research. Moreover, the most important research subsidies on the 
federal level, the so-called ZIM and KMU-innovativ, were modified during the initial phase of 
the crisis. In that respect, the German government spent additional 900 million euros on the 
programme ZIM and expanded its application on bigger-sized enterprises. Hence, the amounts of 
disbursed research grants increased significantly during the initial phase of the financial crisis. In 
addition, the government increased the expenses for the equity financing programmes of the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and prolonged the investment period of the so-called High-Tech 
Gründerfund (see section 4.5.2). Moreover, the government relaunched and modified Germany’s 
national innovation strategy in 2010 (BMBF 2010). These initial results in the run-up and during 
the financial crisis are the foundation of the present research study. 
 
4.6.2   The literature gap 
 
Basically, the present thesis is concerned with the German economic, innovation and public 
funding policy. This includes the public financing measures for SME investments, innovation 
projects, enterprise founding and equity investments on the one hand and public research 
subsidies on the federal level on the other hand. Moreover, this thesis is concerned with the 
development of the German PE and VC market with a focus on early-stage, public and semi-
public investors. The examination timeframe of the present thesis is the post-crisis phase of 
2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
The present research builds on the cross-sectional studies of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), 
Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). These descriptive analyses, which were 
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carried out on behalf of the KfW, are concerned with the progress of the German PE and VC 
market since the millennium turn. It was confirmed by the KfW during the research proposal 
stage that no further examination regarding the German PE and VC market was carried out on 
their behalf at research moment. Beside these researchers, the desk of Professor Hummel at the 
University of Potsdam was also research active regarding Germany’s PE and VC market 
between 2001 and 2009. In contrast to the research studies of the KfW, Hummel examined the 
German PE and VC market from year to year. The latest outcome of this research programme 
resulted in a summary and comparison of the research results from 2008 and 2009, and thus for 
the initial period of the financial crisis (Hummel 2011b). This final analysis supplements the 
latest research study from Achleitner et al. (2010) regarding developments of Germany’s PE and 
VC market during the initial phase of the crisis. It was confirmed by the responsible researcher at 
the University of Potsdam that this longitudinal examination was not continued. In that respect, 
there was no overlap regarding the present research.  
 
In addition, the literature review showed that several researchers were research active with 
regard to the investment process. The majority of reviewed researchers were focused on one 
specific process step rather than on the whole investment process. Hence, the results of the 
literature review support the assumption that no researcher was focused on the changes along the 
whole investment process for the time being. This conclusion applied at least for the research 
timeframe and in accordance with the present sample frame.  
 
Since public funding measures are tax financed, the literature review showed that several 
economic research institutes are busy with the issue of public financing. For instance, the Centre 
for European Economic Research in Mannheim regarding the evaluation of the programme 
KMU-innovativ (Rammer et al. 2011) or the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin 
regarding innovation funding in Germany (Belitz et al. 2012). Therefore, it could not be ruled 
out that researchers were examining the public funding policy in the present examination fields.  
 
Nevertheless, it was confirmed that the basic studies of the present thesis were not continued for 
the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. In that respect, it could finally be concluded that there was a 
literature gap for the timeframe 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
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4.6.3   The basic theory 
 
This section shortly summarises the literature review synthesis (see section 4.6.1) in order to 
develop a basic theory. 
 
The liberalisation of the financial market and the expansion of the money supply were 
accompanied with the development of innovative financial products. In order to improve their 
earnings, financial intermediaries all over the world invested excessively in these financial 
products. The over indebtedness of private borrowers finally resulted in an increasing 
depreciation of banks' credit portfolios which were refinanced with innovative financial 
products. The further progress caused the collapse of leading financial institutions and of the 
world’s financial system. The recapitalisation of the bank system was accompanied by 
conjuncture downturns which required additional public stabilisation measures. The extent of 
public investments and the expansive monetary policy finally caused state debt crises on the one 
hand and a currency crisis in Europe on the other hand. As a consequence of the financial crisis, 
the AIFM-directive was implemented to supervise the managers of alternative investment funds. 
In the initial proposal, this directive required a minimum stock on the equity of fund managers, 
the implementation of a risk management system in the fund holding and the application of most 
current audit systems. In addition, the earlier minimum capital requirements for banks, the so-
called Basel II accord, was replaced by the so-called Basel III accord.    
 
The literature showed that 99% of enterprises in Germany are small and medium-sized. This type 
of enterprise-size is regarded as very important for employment, qualification and innovation. 
However, statistics show that the proportion of SMEs in permanent research, their expenditures 
for research and development, and their innovation output is comparatively small. In relation to 
their proportion on economy’s enterprise stock, the research contribution of SMEs is regarded as 
expandable. Even though the gross domestic expenditures for research and development were 
steadily increasing between 2000 and 2012, the proportion of product, process, marketing and 
organisation innovators in Germany was decreasing between 2008 and 2012. This progress was 
accompanied with both decreasing revenue proportions of innovations during 2008 and 2012, 
and a decreasing proportion of enterprise foundings between 2005 and 2012. 
 
The literature, furthermore, showed that SMEs are both dependent on self and on bank financing 
but seemed to be disadvantaged by banks due to several reasons. This applies in particular in the 
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case of innovation financing and enterprise foundings. The introduction of Basel III should 
reinforce that disadvantage as banks lending practices should be further strengthened. Possible 
financial constraints might partly be compensated by alternative financing channels. In that 
respect, several public institutions on the federal level provide different public funding 
programmes for SME investments, innovation projects, enterprise foundings or for equity 
investments. In addition, federal level institutions provide several research subsidies. Research 
data so far show that the government increased the expenses for the most important research 
programmes during the initial phase of the financial crisis. In addition, the biggest public-owned 
bank on the federal level, the KfW, launched a specific investment programme to stimulate the 
investment activity of SMEs. The government, moreover, increased the fund volume of KfW’s 
equity financing fund, prolonged the investment period of the High-Tech Gründerfund and 
relaunched the earlier Hightech-Strategy from 2006 in 2010. An alternative financing channel for 
SMEs, innovation and start-up financing is represented by the PE and VC market. The German 
PE and VC market is described from an increasing proportion of later-stage and large-size 
investments since the millennium turn. As a consequence, market participants argue that 
Germany’s PE and VC market would suffer from market gaps in early-stage and smaller volume 
investments. In order to settle market imbalances in that respect, the PE and VC market is 
supported by means of public funding measures. This applies in particular for early-stage 
investments in order to settle the larger investment risks.  
 
Moreover, the literature review showed that the different types of PE and VC investors follow 
different investment strategies and also apply different investment behaviours. On the level of 
their investment strategy this is, inter alia, associated with the financing purpose, the type of 
equity investment and the selected industry branches. On the level of their investment behaviour 
this is, inter alia, associated with their application of public funding, their investment proportion 
and their number of portfolio companies. 
 
Finally, the literature review showed that PE and VC investors are operating along an investment 
process. This process chain is composed of the deal flow, the deal screening, the contract 
negotiation, the monitoring and mentoring, and finally the exit. Each of these phases are 
composed of different components which react and hence change their significance in relation to 
the economic circumstances.  
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These results of the literature review defined following problem areas in Germany’s economy. 
At first, this is associated with a declining entrepreneurial activity (see section 2.6.3). Moreover, 
this is associated not only with a one-sided innovation contribution but also with a declining 
innovation activity and success (see section 2.6.2). In addition, this is a declining capital market 
activity and funding limitations for SMEs, innovation and in particular for early-stage financing 
(see section 2.6.3). Finally, this is a comparatively small PE and VC market in Germany (see 
section 2.6.3 and section 4.1).  
 
These areas, rather than being a consequence of a particular event seemed to be the result of 
long-term developments and should not be appraised in isolation. In order to ensure an 
interlinked view, this research examination applies a more flexible procedure and is therefore 
based on Laughlin’s approach of so-called middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995). This research 
approach, which is neither based on a too open nor a too detailed theory and research 
methodology, follows the middle way in theorising and methodology specification (Laughlin 
1995 and section 5.3). As a result, and in accordance with the literature review outcomes, this 
research examination is not based on a set of detailed hypotheses but rather based on a skeletal 
theory. This skeletal theory might or might not be enriched as a result of the research process. 
With regard to the present research study, this skeletal theory is associated with the following 
presumptions.  
 
First, under the assumption that technical progress requires the investment in knowledge and this 
investment proportion would be too small under an economic point of view, then market failure 
requires public support (Welsch 2005). If technical progress and patents alone would be 
insufficient for economic growth in accordance with Schumpeter’s theory, which would also 
require innovative entrepreneurs (Schumpeter 1985; Schumpeter 1987), and if the technology 
transfer in that respect is weak, then public support is required too. As a result, the German 
government should have adjusted the economic, the innovation and hence the public funding 
policy in order to support SMEs, innovation, enterprise founding and the technology transfer.  
 
Second, under the assumption that the financial crisis has caused an increasing risk awareness of 
PE and VC investors, investors might have changed their investment strategy and investment 
behaviour during the post-crisis phase. With regard to their investment strategy, PE and VC 
firms might have, inter alia, changed their strategy regarding the financing purpose, the 
particular type of equity investment and their selection of specific industry branches in order to 
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counteract crisis' impacts and to reduce their investment risk. With regard to the investment 
behaviour, PE and VC firms might have increased the application of public funding, might have 
increased their syndication proportion and finally might have decreased their investment 
proportion. The overall effects on the level of PE and VC investors' investment behaviour should 
have also affected the total fund volumes, the total investment volumes, the number of 
investments and the number of portfolio companies.    
 
Third, if the indicators along the components of the investment process change their respective 
importance in the context of economic circumstances, components might have changed their 
specific weight during the post-crisis phase too. This should in particular apply on the level of 
the decision making process and an increasing emphasis on the management team, an increasing 
proportion of failed contract negotiations due to specific contract rights, a change on the level of 
mentoring areas importance and an increasing mentoring extent during the post-crisis phase. 
 
Fourth, as the AIFM-directive requires alternative investment fund managers to save a minimum 
stock on capital, to implement a risk management system and to utilise most current audit 
systems, then AIFM-directive’s implementation might have effects on PE and VC investors' deal 
selection, deal screening and monitoring too. 
 
The final presumption argues that PE and VC investors might tend to prefer or avoid investments 
in specific industry branches due to the implementation of Basel III. 
 
These presumptions form a skeletal theory in accordance with Laughlin’s approach of middle-
range thinking (Laughlin 1995). The presumptions are embedded in a research question and an 
aim and objectives which are presented in the subsequent section. The examination perspective 
was not finally fixed in order to allow for theory’s possible enrichment (Laughlin 1995).  
 
4.6.4  The research question, the aim and the objectives 
 
The research question of the present examination is: 
 
How did Germany’s equity market and public funding policy develop during the post-crisis 
phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012? 
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The aim of the present examination is: 
 
To examine the developments of Germany’s economic, innovation and public funding policy, 
and the development in Germany’s PE and VC market during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
The objectives of the present examination are: 
 
1. To examine Germany’s economic and innovation policy during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
2. To examine the progress of public funding on the federal level for SME investments, 
innovation projects, enterprise founding and equity investments. 
 
3. To examine the German PE and VC market on the level of early-stage, public and 
semi-public investors, and: 
 
a) on the level of investors investment strategy, derived from: 
 the financing purpose; 
 the type of equity investment; 
 the investment classes; 
 the industry branches; 
 
b) on the level of investors investment behaviour, derived from: 
 the application of public funding; 
 the proportion of syndicated investments; 
 the investment proportion; 
 the total fund volume; 
 the total investment volume; 
 the number of investments; 
 the number of portfolio companies; 
 
c) on the level of investors investment process, derived from: 
 the proportion of deal sources; 
 the relevance of business plan components; 
 the relevance of due diligence components; 
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 the proportion of break-off reasons; 
 the relevance of monitoring components; 
 the extent of mentoring; 
 the proportions of exit channels; 
 the effects of Basel III and of the AIFM-directive. 
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Chapter 5 The research methodology  
 
This chapter initially presents the research methodologies which were already applied in the 
underlying research area and, moreover, discusses the pros and cons of research methods. In a 
further step, this chapter is concerned with the clarification of the entire research strategy and 
subsequently presents the quantitative and qualitative examination procedures of the study. This 
encompasses the presentation of the respective sample frames. The chapter is finalised by 
detailing the validation study procedure and the summary of the research process along a 
timeframe. The clarifications regarding the research methodology are embedded in further 
detailed specifications regarding research paradigms (see appendix J.1), qualitative and 
quantitative research (see appendix J.2) and triangulation (see appendix J.3). 
 
5.1  Applied research methodologies in the present research area 
 
The present research programme builds on the research studies of Zimmermann and Fischer 
(2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). These examinations were carried 
out on behalf of the KfW to analyse the development of Germany’s PE and VC market between 
1999 and 2001 (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003), between 2002 and 2004 (Achleitner et al. 
2006) and between 2007 and 2009 (Achleitner et al. 2010). Due to the type of sample frame and 
the remarkable response rates of approx. 50% in each case, the results could be regarded as 
representative for the entire PE and VC market in Germany. The first study of Zimmermann and 
Fischer (2003) considers comparable data from UK’s PE and VC market for comparison 
purposes. Due to the subsequent studies of Achleitner et al. in 2006 and 2010, it is possible to 
describe the development of the German PE and VC market within one decade. Market reactions 
could be evaluated during an economic downturn after the millennium turn, a period of 
stagnation between 2002 and 2004, and finally a conjuncture downturn between 2007 and 2009 
(Destatis 2013). These studies are based on comprehensive structured questionnaires. Hummel 
(2011b) applies a similar quantitative research design in order to examine the German PE and 
VC market cross-sectional between 2001 and 2009. Due to the annual implementation of 
Hummel’s (2011b) studies, it is possible to compare the development of Germany’s PE and VC 
market from year to year. Even though the content of Hummel’s (2011b) questionnaire differs 
from the KfW studies in some aspects (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010), Hummel’s (2011b) examination is suitable for validation and expansion 
purposes. Although exclusively descriptive, each one of these studies is extraordinary 
 116 
meaningful. The application of descriptive analysis methods preserved the meaningfulness and 
seems appropriate in relation to the research objectives. Furthermore, Hummel (2011a) was 
research active regarding innovation and SME financing in Germany. This research examination 
is also based on a structured questionnaire and concerned with the descriptive analysis of SMEs 
innovation efforts, financing instruments and financing constraints. These examinations are very 
good examples regarding the suitability of structured questionnaires to examine larger 
populations.  
 
On the other hand, several doctoral researchers carried out examinations regarding the 
relationship of PE investors and their portfolio companies (Brinkrolf 2002; Reißig-Thust 2003; 
Pankotsch 2005; Kranz 2008; Wexlberger 2011). Thus, their research is much more focused on 
detailed developments and relationships. Brinkrolf’s (2002) research stands for a systematical 
analysis of investor’s mentoring measures on the one hand and their profit contribution on the 
other hand. Therefore, several hypotheses were derived from literature review results and expert 
interviews. Data was collected on the level of the portfolio companies by structured 
questionnaires. Responses were then analysed by means of descriptive statistics and correlation 
analyses. The results were finally validated by expert interviews. Reißig-Thust (2003) analysed 
the relationship between VC firms and start-up companies during every phase of the investment 
process. Therefore, several research hypotheses were derived from a comprehensive literature 
review. Quantitative data was collected by structured questionnaires on the level of the VC 
firms. The data was analysed quantitatively to determine the performance contribution of each 
process step and the whole investment process. The application of descriptive and multivariate 
correlation analyses in this research programme (Reißig-Thust 2003) resulted in meaningful and 
comprehensive research outcomes. Pankotsch (2005) developed a quite similar research design 
but was concerned with the examination of investors' support strategies. Therefore, he analysed 
data from the investors regarding their portfolios. In order to determine the best possible support 
strategy in relation to investment returns, several hypotheses were tested by means of 
multivariate statistical analyses (Pankotsch 2005). These cross-sectional studies analysed both 
primary and in some cases secondary data. The researchers based their data collection process on 
samples of typical cases and sometimes on dyadic sample structures for comparison purposes. 
The majority of sample frames were derived from BVK memberships. Each researcher followed 
a strong quantitative orientation and analysed data by means of descriptive, correlation and 
multivariate analyses. Nevertheless, and as a result of their research experience, Brinkrolf (2002) 
and Reißig-Thust (2003) point out that it would be quite difficult to draw serious conclusions 
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from causal analyses which are based on small sample sizes. Pankotsch (2005), according to his 
research experience, supplements that cross-sectional research has limitations and would be 
unsuitable to describe developments. Therefore, he recommends the implementation of 
longitudinal research studies. Reißig-Thust (2003) additionally remarks that it would be difficult 
to address research questions in greater detail by the exclusive application of quantitative 
methods. Hence, she recommends the application of qualitative research designs for exploration 
purposes. Interestingly enough, none of these researchers applied any kind of text analysis, text 
interpretation, or any kind of narrative or semi-structured interview during the main study 
(Brinkrolf 2002; Vater 2002; Reißig-Thust 2003; Pankotsch 2005; Kranz 2008; Wexlberger 
2011). In some rare cases, interviews during the main study were carried out to replace surveys 
and to collect quantitative data (Brinkrolf 2002; Vater 2002; Hoffelner 2010). 
 
On the other hand, literature review results showed that several researchers carried out case study 
based qualitative examinations (Kollmann and Kuckertz 2004; Petty and Gruber 2011; Leece et 
al. 2012). In that respect, Kollmann and Kuckertz (2004) were research active with regard to the 
decision making process of VC firms. These researchers based their examination on semi-
structured interviews which were carried out both on the level of the investors and the portfolio 
companies. Kollmann and Kuckertz (2004, p. 51) argue: “It is hardly feasible to cover the whole 
complexity of a venture capitalists decision making with merely quantitative methods”. This 
assumption was confirmed during the present thesis, as one sample member denied to participate 
due to the application of a structured questionnaire. This sample member pointed out that it 
would not be possible to capture the investment behaviour, the investment strategy and the 
decision making process of PE and VC investors on the basis of structured questionnaires. This 
sample member argued: 
  
“It’s simply a quite complicated subject and driven by very individual motivations and 
environmental conditions”. 
  
The interview results from Kollmann and Kuckertz (2004) were taped and afterwards 
transcribed. This research study delivered new insights regarding the investment decision 
process of VC firms as a result of the economic downturn after the millennium change. Petty and 
Gruber (2011) on the other hand criticise the limitations of both post-hoc research and 
experiments. They point out that post-hoc research might have its limitations due to recall biases, 
whereas experiments are oversimplifying the process of investment decisions. In addition, they 
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criticise the application of cross-sectional research studies which overall result in rather similar 
research findings. Petty and Gruber (2011, p. 174) argue that: “For example, respondents tend to 
report criteria which are believed to be desirable and also tend to overstate the number of criteria 
actually considered in the evaluation process”. This assumption is underlined by research 
findings from Brettel (2002), who also analysed the decision making process of venture 
capitalists. Brettel’s (2002) research resulted in 103 different decision criteria which are regarded 
as important in the decision making process. According to their considerations, Petty and Gruber 
(2011) carried out a longitudinal study which is based on the lifecycle of two funds from one 
European investor. This examination is concerned with a period of 11 years. In terms of 
examining the criteria at the moment of decision making, Petty and Gruber (2011) examined 
archival data from 3,631 deal proposals and 35 investments. The archival data was analysed by 
means of qualitative text interpretation to address the research question. This research 
programme, even though based on one investor, resulted in both interesting findings and 
conclusions for practice. The case study from Leece et al. (2012) on the other hand is concerned 
with the investment decision making process and the key characteristics of the post-investment 
phase. Leece et al. (2012) argue that the choice of a case study seems appropriate in order to 
receive a holistic picture. This case study is based on unstructured interviews both on the level of 
the investor and their portfolio companies. In order to support the interpretation of the results, 
secondary data from published reports, internal investment records of the investor and 
comparable data were also processed (Leece et al. 2012). The data interpretation in that research 
study is solely qualitative. Although small in sample size and focused on a particular region, 
these case studies clearly show that alternative procedures are suitable to deliver new and deeper 
insights. 
 
In the context of research methodologies, Suman et al. (2012) mention the dominance of 
empirical-quantitative data on the one hand and a gap in multi-method approaches, survey-based, 
action and case study research on the other hand. They also see the risk of meaningless data 
sources and point out that the majority of research is based on secondary data. Obviously, Suman 
et al. (2012, p. 37) see some misdirection when they state that: “If academicians today do not 
expand their approaches to research, managers will continue to perceive them as irrelevant 
academicians who address fictitious problems and are not interested in the real world”. 
Therefore, they recommend the enlargement of research methodologies in order to contribute for 
both research and practice.  
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As a result, it is surely not advisable to prefer or to disregard a particular procedure. The 
application of a research approach should be critically selected in the context of the specific 
research subject and the research aim. Nevertheless, it is surely difficult to receive an all-
encompassing description of reality by the implementation of unstructured questionnaires or 
interviews. In that case, extensive surveys are required which are best practised by the 
application of structured questionnaires, for instance the ones applied by Hummel (2011a) and 
Hummel (2011b), Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), and Achleitner et al. (2006 and 2010). On 
the other hand, such a research design with an exclusively quantitative analysis might narrow the 
research perspective where thorough and detailed understanding is required (see also appendix 
J.1). Hence, case study research, which in the normal case is associated with smaller sample 
sizes, surely contributes to the knowledge base due to the in-depth orientation.  
 
5.2  The pros and cons of research methods 
 
This section is not concerned with every possible research method and limited to the most 
common ones in the present research area. 
 
One possible data collection method is represented by the so-called narrative interviews. Even 
though this type of interview might follow a rough guideline, they normally develop quite freely. 
A narrative interview is sub-divided in two distinct phases, the main narration on the one hand 
and the subsequent questioning by the interviewer on the other hand. This method is suitable to 
explore a particular area of interest in greater detail but is also associated with several 
particularities. First, the interviewee must be willing to report his subjective experiences, 
opinions and interpretations. This requires adequate conversation circumstances and active 
listening of the interviewer. Second, individual responses must be accepted to avoid biases, 
debates or justifications. Third, the interviewer must follow specific procedures to ensure an 
ongoing narration without interruptions. The results must be further transcribed in the case that 
the interview is recorded. This process of transcription is associated with the risk of 
incompleteness and unintelligibility. Hence, in some cases, the validation of the transcriptions is 
required by further transcriptions of the initial records (Kempf 2008). Overall, interviews are 
associated with the risk of biases due to interviewer’s influence, are time intensive and require 
the linguistic competence of the interviewer and the interviewee (Häder 2010). In terms of 
exploring the research area in greater detail, narrative interviews were carried out successfully by 
Grethe (2010), Manchot (2010) and Wahrenberger (2011). In some cases, structured interviews 
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were carried out in order to collect quantitative data during the main study (Brinkrolf 2002; 
Vater 2002; Hoffelner 2010). Brinkrolf (2002) and Vater (2002) were very successful and 
achieved impressing response rates of approx. 88% in each case.  
 
Written surveys on the other hand ensure anonymity and the responses could be regarded as 
unbiased due to interviewer’s absence. Nevertheless, there is the risk of non-responses and 
possible biases due to the uncontrolled survey situation (Häder 2010). Hummel’s (2011a) 
research is an example of a large scale research programme that suffers from non-responses. This 
examination resulted in a small response rate of 1.4%. In addition, intuitive responses could not 
be processed or are limited to open categories in the questionnaire. Overall, questionnaires must 
be self-explanatory, as direct requests are impossible or difficult to receive (Häder 2010). 
  
Text analysis on the other hand is defined as a scientific approach to collect and to analyse the 
content of texts, pictures, movies and records. This approach both analysis manifest and deferred 
facts in communication processes and could be quantitative or qualitative in character (Häder 
2010 and appendices J.1 and J.2). Kempf (2008) distinguishes between: 
 
 text interpretation; 
 qualitative text analysis; 
 quantitative text analysis. 
 
Text interpretations and qualitative text analyses are usually based on smaller sample sizes, 
whereas quantitative text analyses are based on larger sample sizes. The analysis process of text 
interpretation is quite dynamic and open, whereas in the case of qualitative and quantitative text 
analyses, processes are descriptive and less flexible (Kempf 2008). Text analyses and 
interpretations require the analysis of texts along the categories of interest. These categories are 
derived from a research question or, in the case of an open question, by the inductive exploration 
of the text material. The difficulty in the development and application of categories along the 
text material is associated with their objectivity. In some cases, the research subject or term is 
evidently given in the text, whereas in other cases the detailed interpretation of the text material 
is required. Due to the risk of hidden information in the material, it is possible that the content is 
not completely analysed along the categories. In the case of quantitative text analyses, categories 
are connected with scales to determine frequencies of text contents and/or to evaluate the 
intensity of messages. Categories which are associated with several meanings should be clarified 
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in greater detail by the so-called indicators. These indicators require detailed explanation which 
should be based on several examples. Both the categories and the indicators are finally coded 
along the text material by encoders (Früh 2007).  
 
This type of method is quite cheap, does not require the cooperation with third persons as in the 
case of interviews or surveys, and is repeatable as often as required. Furthermore, text analyses 
are suitable for longitudinal examinations of past developments. On the other hand, text analyses 
require thorough categorisation and encoding to guarantee objectivity, reliability and validity 
(Häder 2010).  
    
Every type of research approach and method is associated with pros and cons. Clarifications 
show that qualitative research on the one hand is more concerned with a subjective perception 
and interpretation of reality, whereas quantitative research is associated with a positivist and 
rather objective perspective of reality. In that case, the reality is captured by standardised 
methods, whereas qualitative research approaches are rather open and more flexible. Mixed-
method approaches on the other hand are suitable to cope with the barriers of quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Kuß 2010; see also appendices J.1, J.2 and J.3).  
 
The subsequent section builds on the initial clarifications in section 5.1 and 5.2, and is concerned 
with the development of a research strategy for the underlying research study. 
 
5.3  Basic clarifications regarding the research methodology 
 
The aim of the present examination was to examine the economic policy, the innovation policy, 
the public funding policy, and the PE and VC market in Germany during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
This research focus was associated with the following research objectives. First, the examination 
of Germany’s economic and innovation policy. Second, the examination of public funding on the 
federal level. This encompassed research subsidies and public funding measures for SME 
financing, innovation projects, enterprise founding and equity investments. Third, the 
examination of Germany’s PE and VC market with regard to investor’s investment strategy, 
investment behaviour and investment process (see section 4.6.4).  
 
These research objectives required a deeper analysis which could not have been achieved by an 
isolated application of a merely quantitative or qualitative research design. Hence, it seemed 
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appropriate to combine both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to examine 
the research subjects in their interconnection. This applied in particular with regard to the issue 
of public funding. On this examination level, a purely quantitative research strategy seemed 
inappropriate to analyse the progress of public funding in relation to the economic and 
innovation policy on the federal level. Hence, flexibility and openness regarding a suitable 
research strategy was required to penetrate the different but interrelated subjects.    
 
In that respect, Ulrich (1981) remarks that an appropriate research strategy would be influenced 
and dependent on social systems complexity. Quantitative research methods would be unsuitable 
to capture the complexity of social systems. Ulrich (1981) argues that it would not be possible to 
examine social systems by solely individual methodologies which would contradict the 
complexity of phenomenon. Hence, he criticises Popper’s critical rationalism as a narrowed 
paradigm that simply reduces sciences by physical assumptions (see also appendix J.1). Grochla 
(1976) in that respect argues that applied sciences should not exclude particular methods and 
recommends the application of combined research approaches (see also appendix J.3). 
Chmielewicz (1979) supplements that researchers should be focused on methodological 
approaches which enable them to realise new knowledge. He (Chmielewicz 1979, p. 88) 
criticises that: “…, rather than resulting in discoveries, pure logic and deduction have an 
inhibitory effect”. In that respect, Chmielewicz (1979) distinguishes four different research aims: 
 
 term development; 
 theory development; 
 pragmatic and normative research. 
 
The term development is concerned with the description of reality, whereas theory development 
is concerned with cause and effect relationships. Pragmatic sciences are transforming theoretical 
results into decision making models for practice. Finally, normative sciences are concerned with 
the development of rational models. 
 
Furthermore, Laughlin (1995) in the context of research regarding accounting systems argues 
that every kind of empirical research would have limitations. Hence, neither completely 
subjective nor solely objective research approaches would be able to generate a complete picture 
of reality. As a consequence of the each one-sided application of research methodologies in 
accounting research, recommendations for practice were only rarely considered by practitioners. 
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These circumstances out of Laughlin’s (1995) point of view would call for the application of a 
more flexible research approach. In terms of selecting an appropriate research procedure, 
Laughlin (1995) argues along the detail of theory and methodological development on the one 
hand and the requirement of changing the status quo on the other hand. The application of a 
detailed theory might be possible in research examinations of well-researched areas in which 
generalisations are possible. On the opposite of low theorising, the examination is based on 
researcher’s perceptions and hence generalisations would not be possible. Both of these extremes 
would be either associated with a detailed research methodology and a largely irrelevant 
researcher or a low level of methodology development with a permanently involved researcher. 
Moreover, these different possibilities of both theory and methodology in research examinations 
would be associated with either the final requirement of changing the status quo or its acceptance 
(Laughlin 1995).  
 
Laughlin’s (1995) approach of so-called middle-range thinking, rather than being focused, is 
positioned within these extremes and hence takes a medium position in theory and methodology 
and also regarding the change requirement. This specific approach is based on the assumption 
that generalisations about reality would be possible but not guaranteed to exist. Therefore, this 
approach of middle-range thinking is based on a skeletal initial theory which might be both 
complemented and enriched during the research progress. In order to ensure theory’s possible 
enrichment, the selection of an appropriate research methodology is also rather skeletal and 
associated with a medium position too. This procedure allows for flexibility and adjustments 
during the research process in which the researcher is always involved. By focusing on the 
middle-point, this approach tries to preserve the strength of each of the one-sided paradigms in 
order to avoid their respective weaknesses. According to Laughlin (1995), this medium position 
would be best addressed by German critical theory. However, Laughlin (1995) makes clear that 
parts of German critical theory’s representatives would follow a rather Marxist orientation with 
clear theoretical assumptions and propositions for change. Therefore, middle-range thinking 
according to Laughlin (1995) follows the Habermasian path of German critical theory, which is 
less politically motivated and also associated with a rather strategic orientation of the change 
requirement. Middle-range thinking is open for accepting the existing status quo on the one hand 
but also for a change in the case that this is required on the other hand (Laughlin 1995). This 
procedure was initially applied with regard to the development of a rather skeletal theory which 
is expressed by a set of presumptions rather than a set of detailed hypotheses (see section 4.6.3). 
Moreover, this approach of so-called middle-range thinking forms the basis of the research 
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methodology for the present thesis. Such a proceeding seemed advisable in order to reduce the 
research risk as a consequence of a one-sided research approach (see section 5.2).  
 
5.4  The research strategy of the present study 
 
In order to address the research question, the research aim and the research objectives (see 
section 4.6.4), the first part of the research examination is based on a qualitative content analysis. 
This was initially required to examine the economic and innovation policy on the federal level 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012 (see section 4.6.4, objective one). Subsequently, the progress of 
public funding on the federal level was analysed in the context of this initial research 
perspective. In that respect, every funding programme of the KfW which was associated with 
SME financing, innovation financing, enterprise founding or equity investments was analysed 
regarding its specific progress. This included the analysis of programme launches in the 
respective fields or their ending. In addition, the research subsidies ZIM and KMU-innovativ 
from the BMWi and the BMBF were also reviewed regarding their progress. The subject of 
public funding was finalised by examining additional programmes for start-up and for equity 
financing on the federal level which were launched during the post-crisis phase (see section 
4.6.4, objective two). The third examination level is based on a quantitative survey in order to 
analyse the investment strategy, the investment behaviour and the investment process of PE and 
VC firms. This also encompassed the application of public funding measures in the PE and VC 
market (see section 4.6.4, objective three). In order to expand the examination results, a final 
qualitative content analysis was based on a purposive selection of BVK publications. This part of 
the analysis focused on the investment process, the AIFM-directive and Basel III. The 
examination results were finally verified by a validation study in the German PE and VC market. 
The research strategy of the present examination is presented in the subsequent figure one. 
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Figure 1 The research strategy (own development) 
 
This research strategy with the combination of both qualitative and quantitative elements was 
regarded as suitable to collect a comprehensive amount of data and to comprehend long-term 
developments. Even though this research programme was rather structured and detailed, which 
partly contradicted Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995), both the 
qualitative and the quantitative parts allowed for flexibility in terms of further insights. Finally, 
this procedure was surely suitable to preserve the variety and the flexibility during the research 
programme, and in order to allow for skeletal theory’s further enrichment. 
 
The subsequent sections initially refer to the quantitative part of the examination and describe 
the process of questionnaire’s development, the sample frame and the analysis procedure. The 
second part of the chapter is then concerned with the qualitative section and the validation study. 
This subject order supports the understanding of the results presentation which starts with the 
qualitative research results. 
 
5.5  The quantitative part of the examination 
 
5.5.1  The development of the questionnaire 
 
As hereinbefore, the examination of market members investment behaviour, investment strategy 
and investment process based on a structured questionnaire. This procedure seemed appropriate 
due to time and financial constraints, and the positive experiences of earlier researchers (see 
section 5.1).  
Research method: Examination areas: 
Text analysis I Economic and innovation policy. 
Text analysis II Public funding on federal level. 
Text analysis III Investment process, AIFM-directive, Basel III. 
 
Structured survey Investment behaviour, strategy and process, 
    AIFM-directive, Basel III. 
 
Validation study Investment process, AIFM-directive, Basel III. 
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With regard to the development of a questionnaire, it is essential to be fully aware of the research 
field and the research problem as a result of the literature review. The initial development of the 
research framework is then concerned with transforming the research subjects into measurable 
variables. The variables are derived from the literature review (Alemann 1984) and are 
connected with indicators for quantitative and qualitative evaluation purposes. Scales and indices 
are introduced to assess the specific characteristic of each indicator (Raithel 2008). It is 
recommended to base this transformation process on finalised examinations in order to guarantee 
both research continuity and comparability (Alemann 1984).  
 
Most of the doctoral researchers who were evaluated during the literature review proceeded 
accordingly. They prepared a research framework which is based on finalised examinations, 
literature review results and interview results. Such a research framework lay the basis for the 
development of the final questionnaire (Brinkrolf 2002; Matz 2002; Pfaffenholz 2004; Espel 
2006; Kuckertz 2006; Sobczak 2007; Grethe 2010). With regard to the preparation of a 
questionnaire for the present thesis, this research study follows the recommendation of Alemann 
(1984) and builds on the finalised research studies of: 
 
 Zimmermann and Fischer (2003); 
 Achleitner et al. (2006); 
 Achleitner et al. (2010). 
 
These researchers examined the German PE and VC market on behalf of the KfW (see section 
4.3) regarding the market structure, the investment strategy of market participants, market gaps 
and the application of public funding. The initial examination is focused on the timeframe of 
1999 to 2001 in order to structure the market in a first attempt (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003). 
The second study, which was carried out by Achleitner et al. (2006), builds on the initial study 
from Zimmermann and Fischer (2003). The latest study, which was carried out by Achleitner et 
al. (2010) too, builds on the previous study (Achleitner et al. 2006) and is concerned with 
market’s development between 2007 and 2009. The context of the questions in each 
questionnaire partly differs from study to study. Nevertheless, the basic structure of these 
questionnaires could be summarised under five main categories: 
 
 sample members characteristics; 
 investment strategy and investment process; 
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 changes in the investment strategy; 
 gaps in the German PE and VC market; 
 application of public funding. 
 
The content of the basic studies (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010) is summarised each in table 19, 20 and 21 (see appendices E.1, E.2, E.3). 
These summaries are derived from the study content, as the questionnaires of these research 
studies are not published. These research examinations are descriptive and quite comprehensive 
in order to describe the developments in Germany’s PE and VC market. The researchers either 
apply closed questions with open categories for the indication of specific values, a selection of 
answer categories or specific size classes. In order to capture developments during the research 
timeframes, the researchers apply three-point scales. On the other hand, six-point scales are 
applied to determine the significance of specific examination variables. This procedure allows 
for a comprehensive and detailed description of Germany’s PE and VC market.  
 
In order to ensure research continuity and comparability as recommended by Alemann (1984) 
and to benefit from earlier research experiences, the questionnaire of the present thesis was 
derived from these studies and adjusted with regard to business plan screening, the due diligence, 
and monitoring and mentoring. Finally, the questionnaire of the present thesis is also concerned 
with the implementations of Basel III and the AIFM-directive. This questionnaire was designed 
in order to evaluate developments in the German PE and VC market with a focus on early-stage 
investors, public investors and the MBGs during 2010, 2011 and 2012. The questionnaire is 
divided in four different categories: 
 
 respondents' characteristics and investment behaviour; 
 respondents' investment strategy and investment process; 
 Basel III and the AIFM transformation law.  
 
The design of the questionnaire considers following recommendations. First, the questionnaire is 
structured from the general to the particular (Kirchhoff 2008). Second, closed questions are 
associated with a comprehensible number of answer categories. Third, semi-closed questions are 
introduced with an additional open category (Porst 2009). Fourth, events are captured backwards 
with the recent event first (Mummendey 2008). Porst (2009) recommends the use of five or 
seven-point scales. Kirchhoff (2008) also recommends five-point scales due to their neutral 
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middle point and two different steps on every scale side. The application of vertical scales was 
avoided as respondents tend to answer in the first third of the scale (Mummendey 2008). 
 
Initially, the ownership structure of respondents refers to a classification in independent firms, 
corporate venture capital firms, the MBGs and public investors. This procedure allowed for 
separate calculations on the level of the MBGs and public investors. Overall, values were 
requested in million euros or in per cent indications each for 2010, 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, 
tick-box responses are associated with a selection of answer categories or size classes. 
Developments during the examination timeframe are registered by three-point scales to 
determine changes or no change. The significance of business plan components at survey’s 
moment is registered along a five-point scale for assessments between less important and very 
important. The selection of variables is based on the literature of the present thesis and represents 
the composition of a basic business plan (see section 4.4.2). In order to determine changes along 
the business plan variables during the post-crisis phase, each business plan variable is assessed 
along a three-point scale. The same procedure refers to the components of the due diligence (see 
section 4.4.3) and the issue of monitoring and mentoring (see section 4.4.6). With regard to 
monitoring and mentoring, it was supposed that the detailed specification regarding the extent of 
involvement on the level of each component should be rather difficult and would be less 
meaningfulness. Therefore, the extent of monitoring and mentoring during the post-crisis phase 
is based on an overall assessment rather than a detailed specification. The questionnaire of the 
present examination is enclosed in appendix F.1. 
  
Even though structured surveys are associated with the risk of non-response, they benefit from 
low costs due to the possibility of online processing and their suitability for the examination of 
larger populations. Furthermore, surveys guarantee anonymity which is of importance in the 
present research area. Finally, sample members are quite flexible with regard to the processing of 
the questionnaire (Häder 2010). According to the candidate’s point of view, these advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages. Nevertheless, it seemed advisable to carry out a pilot study for 
several reasons. First, to check the technical feasibility of the data collection process and second, 
to check the comprehensibility of the questions (Alemann 1984). This pretest was carried out 
during the literature review in September and October 2013. Pilot study members confirmed 
their participation during the research proposal stage. The pilot study was carried out on the level 
of the MBGs in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein, as one pretest member finally denied to 
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participate. The pilot study of the present research verified the questionnaire, which was issued 
in both paper-based and online format. The pilot study members received per e-mail: 
 
 the letter of invitation with university headings; 
 the questionnaire instructions; 
 the questionnaire;  
 the feedback form. 
 
The feedback form referred to the assessment of the invitation letter, the instructions and the 
questionnaire. Sending the questionnaire by e-mail seemed appropriate due to time constraints. 
The pilot study members were asked to send their feedback online or paper-based until 18 
October 2013. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test the online version externally as this pilot 
study member finally denied to participate. The paper-based feedbacks from the MBG Hesse and 
the MBG Schleswig-Holstein were transformed manually into the online system. This process 
worked problem-free. Entry codes for questionnaire’s online processing were not applied in 
order to guarantee as much anonymity as possible. The pilot study members confirmed the 
following: 
 
 the invitation letter is comprehensive and meaningful; 
 the instructions are comprehensive and meaningful; 
 the questionnaire is logically structured;  
 the questions are comprehensive; 
 the scope of answer categories is sufficient. 
 
The processing of the questionnaire took approx. 30 minutes and was still in the range of the 
reviewed examinations which required between 15 minutes (Kaufmann 2009; Grethe 2010) and 
30 minutes (Reißig-Thust 2003; Kuckertz 2006). The pilot study members processed the 
questionnaires completely and did not recommend any changes with regard to the extent, the 
content and the wording. The application of the English language did not seem to be an issue. 
The pretest results confirmed the basic assumption that some of the variables along the 
investment process changed their significance during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Hence, the scales 
and indicators of the present questionnaire were regarded as suitable to depict developments in 
the PE and VC market. The questionnaire was accepted without amendments for the main study.  
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The main study was carried out immediately after the pilot study in order to reduce the risk of 
post-hoc recall biases. The main study was implemented between October 2013 and April 2014. 
In that respect, it was not supposed to achieve a similar response rate as in the case of the basic 
studies. These examinations each achieved impressing response proportions of approx. 50% 
(Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). Due to the 
overload of survey-based research and the risk of non-response, the candidate supposed a 
response rate of approx. 25%. Response rates of the reviewed research studies vary between 9% 
(Kuckertz 2006) and 88% (Brinkrolf 2002; Vater 2002). Nevertheless, initial contacts with 
market members during the research proposal stage showed that the participation in very long 
surveys is overall denied. This explains the extent of the present questionnaire, which differs 
from the basic studies due to candidate’s concerns regarding non-responses.  
 
5.5.2  The sample frame of the survey 
 
The present research study is concerned with Germany’s PE and VC market during the post-
crisis phase between 2010 and 2012. The focus of this dissertation is on early-stage and on 
smaller volume financing, as these areas due to their declining proportions since the millennium 
change were regarded as incomplete and support-worthy (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; 
Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). In addition, this thesis is also concerned with 
public funding initiatives for equity financing purposes (see section 4.6.4) and therefore a 
research focus is also on the public and on the semi-public investors.  
 
Initial reviews showed that detailed directories neither for the entire market nor regarding 
venture capitalists and public investors were available. Moreover, these reviews showed that a 
clear differentiation of venture capitalists which are exclusively concerned with early-stage 
financing in comparison to the entire market seems difficult. In the majority of cases, 
independent investors are concerned with early-stage investments and also with additional types 
of financing, for example expansion financing in order to compensate the higher default risk of 
early-stage investments. As a consequence, distortions with regard to the selection of venture 
capitalists were taken into account. The group of public and of semi-public investors on the other 
hand are concerned with rather every type of financing purpose due to their status as supporters. 
Therefore, the separation of public investors which are solely concerned with seed and start-up 
financing from the remaining public investors was neither reasonable nor desirable in order to 
avoid a too detailed picture of their investment behaviour, investment strategy and investment 
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process. Hence, this sample selection considered independent and corporate venture capitalists in 
the field of early-stage financing on the one hand and public and semi-public investors on the 
other hand. Semi-public investors in that respect are investors whose shareholder background is 
not necessarily composed of public authorities alone but regardless of their shareholders do not 
exclusively follow the aim of profit maximization. This applies for example for the so-called 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften which classify themselves as a self-helping 
institution for small and medium-sized enterprises (see section 4.2) or for public-private 
partnerships as in the case of the High-Tech Gründerfund in Bonn. In order to receive a 
comprehensive picture of these investors which were investment active in Germany during the 
post-crisis phase, the sample frame was based on a purposive selection.  
 
With regard to public and semi-public investors, initial reviews showed that the public 
investment activities are realised on the federal level, the federal states level and on the local 
district level. The federal level in Germany coordinates the PE and VC investments on the level 
of the state-owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, which does not directly participate in 
Germany’s equity market but rather supports the entire market with several types of co- and 
refinancing measures (see section 4.5.1). As a consequence, the KfW has neither a specific 
internal division nor a daughter company for direct equity investment purposes. Nevertheless, 
the KfW is a co-investor of the so-called High-Tech Gründerfund (see glossary), which was 
launched after the millennium change to stimulate seed and start-up investments in Germany. 
The HTGF is part of the sample frame. The second state-owned bank on the federal level, the so-
called Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, which is overall busy with agriculture investments (see 
section 4.5.1), is not involved in any kind of equity investments in Germany. With regard to the 
federal states level in Germany, the review showed that PE and VC investments are carried out 
and organised within the public investment bank (see glossary) sector too. In some cases, the 
public investment banks bundle their equity business in daughter companies, in some cases 
commission independent firms with the fund management or coordinate their equity investments 
over the respective MBG. In other cases, they coordinate their equity business over savings bank 
daughter companies in their respective homeland area. Moreover, public PE and VC investments 
on the federal states level are also realised over the so-called Landesbanken (see glossary). The 
review in that respect showed that four of the eight so-called Landesbanken were not involved in 
PE and VC investments at the moment of the sample selection in 2013. The remaining four 
federal state banks coordinate their equity investments in daughter companies, commission third 
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parties with the fund management or cooperate with the savings bank sector in their respective 
homeland area.  
 
Basically, the selection of sample members was based on the membership data base of 
Germany’s PE and VC association in Berlin. At the end of 2012, 187 PE and VC firms were full 
members of the BVK which supposed that additional 40 to 50 investors would be operating 
outside a BVK membership (see section 4.2). Therefore, additional directories were considered 
in order to receive a quite comprehensive picture of the market in accordance with the selection 
criteria. This was in particular required regarding venture capitalists in Germany. Hence, the 
directories of the Venture Capital Club in Munich, the chamber of commerce in Hamburg, the 
Munich Network e. V. as well as the directories on Gründungskatalog.de and Kontaktmakler.de 
were reviewed in greater detail. With regard to the public investors, the review considered every 
homepage of the public investment banks and of the federal state banks, the so-called 
Landesbanken. Detailed information regarding the PE and VC business on the level of the 
savings banks in Germany on the other hand could not be obtained from Germany’s savings 
bank association. This part of the sample selection was therefore based on a directory in the 
dissertation of Kammlott (2004). This directory was reviewed in greater detail regarding its 
completeness and finally updated. The review showed that a major proportion of savings banks 
equity business was exclusively concerned with mezzanine financing. Savings banks divisions or 
savings bank daughter companies which were solely concerned with mezzanine financing or 
whose investment activities were comparatively small were not considered in the sample frame. 
On the other hand, the cooperative bank sector coordinates the PE and VC business over two 
daughter companies, which operate nationwide. One of these cooperative bank daughters was 
solely concerned with mezzanine financing and therefore not considered in the sample frame 
either. The 16 so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften (see section 4.2) were 
considered in their entirety. The latter type of investor, the savings bank sector and the 
cooperative bank sector were classified as semi-public investors. In that context, it is specified 
that the cooperative bank sector is not solely concerned with profit realisation but also with the 
support of their cooperative members and small and medium-sized enterprises. Irrespective of 
their completely different shareholder structure, they follow comparatively similar objectives as 
the savings banks and are also regionally focused (see glossary). Thus, the cooperative bank 
sector in that research study was regarded as semi-public which corresponds with earlier research 
studies for example Achleitner et al. (2008). 
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PE and VC investors which were not investment active during 2010 to 2012, and hence were 
either concerned with the management of their portfolio, or which were founded after 2012, or 
whose investment activities were comparatively small, were not considered in the sample frame. 
Moreover, equity investors which were solely concerned with mezzanine financing were not 
considered either.  
 
This selection procedure finally resulted in the purposive selection of both independent and 
corporate venture capitalists in the field of early-stage financing on the one hand and public and 
semi-public investors on the other hand. Hence, this sample frame composition depicted the 
market in the incomplete segment of early-stage financing on the one hand but at the same time 
considered public and semi-public investors' involvement on the other hand. Even though the 
selection process was carried out in greater detail and in several runs, it could not be ensured that 
this sample frame was a full representation of early-stage and of public investors in Germany. 
Therefore, this sample frame did not allow for inferences regarding the entire PE and VC market 
nor regarding early-stage or public investors.  
 
The sample frame is detailed in the subsequent table 22 and an overview of the sample members 
is enclosed in appendix L.1 (see table 23).  
 
The sample frame classification 
   
  Type of investor Number Proportion 
     
Independent investor 39 37% 
Corporate Venture Capitalist 8 7% 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 15 14% 
Savings/Cooperative/Public bank daughter 39 36% 
Public investor 6 6% 
  
 
Total sample 107 100% 
 
Table 22 The sample frame classification (own development) 
 
Regardless of the purposive sample selection and the overrepresentation of the public and semi-
public investors in the sample frame, this sample frame composition seemed suitable to describe 
market developments in the areas of early-stage financing and of public equity investors. 
Moreover, this sample frame composition allowed for separate and detailed descriptions 
regarding the so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften and for comparison analyses 
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between the group of public and semi-public investors on the one hand and the more strategic 
and profit-oriented investors on the other hand.  
 
Overall, this sample frame represented 57% of the BVK members in 2012 and 46% of the 
estimated market in Germany respectively. The number of public and semi-public investors on 
the other hand represented a proportion of 32% from the BVK memberships in 2012 and a 
proportion of 26% from the estimated market in Germany respectively. These proportions 
seemed to represent the vast majority of both public and of semi-public investors in Germany, at 
least on the federal level and on the federal states level. In comparison, Schilder (2006), who was 
earlier research active with regard to public investors in Germany too, classified 45 investors 
from 187 BVK members as public investors in 2005. This represented a proportion of 24% from 
the entire BVK memberships. 
 
5.5.3  The data analysis of the survey results 
 
At this point it is repeated that the present study builds on the cross-sectional studies of 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010), who were 
concerned with the descriptive analysis of developments in Germany’s PE and VC market 
between 1999 and 2009 (see section 4.3). In that context, the present study also considers the 
descriptive research study of Hummel (2011b) regarding the developments in Germany’s PE and 
VC market during the initial crisis phase of 2008 and 2009. In order to analyse the German PE 
and VC market during the post-crisis phase with regard to market members' investment strategy, 
investment behaviour and the changes along the investment process, the questionnaire of the 
present thesis (see appendix F.1) is based on and derived from the studies of Zimmermann and 
Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010) (see table 19 in appendix 
E.1; see table 20 in appendix E.2; see table 21 in appendix E.3). These studies were analysed by 
means of descriptive statistics. The present study was analysed by means of descriptive statistics 
too in order to ensure research continuity and comparability in accordance with the 
recommendations of Alemann (1984).  
  
The investment strategy of investors in the present research study is derived from the financing 
purpose, the type of equity investment, the investment classes and the consideration of industry 
branches (see section 4.6.4 objective 3 a). For analysis purposes, frequencies and proportions 
were calculated on the level of the financing purpose, the type of equity investment, the 
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investment classes, the progress of investment classes and the consideration of industry 
branches. 
 
The investment behaviour of market members is derived from the application of public funding, 
the proportion of syndication in relation to the number of investments, the investment proportion 
in relation to received business plans, the total fund volume, the total investment volume, the 
number of investments and the number of portfolio companies (see section 4.6.4 objective 3 b). 
In that respect, the application of public funding is associated with the calculation of frequencies 
and proportions, whereas the investment proportion in relation to received business plans is 
associated with the calculation of means, medians and deviations. With regard to the total fund 
volume, the total investment volume, the number of investments, the number of portfolio 
companies and the proportion of syndicated investments, each the minimum and maximum 
values, the ranges, the medians, the means and the deviations were calculated.  
 
Finally, changes along the investment process during the post-crisis phase were analysed along 
the deal sources, the deal screening, the phase of negotiation and contracting, and the post-
investment phase with portfolio company’s monitoring and mentoring, and investor’s exit (see 
section 4.6.4 objective 3 c). The analysis regarding the development of deal sources is associated 
with the calculation of ranks. The assessment regarding the relevance of business plan, due 
diligence and mentoring components, which are each captured on a five-point scale, is associated 
with the calculation of means, deviations and ranks. Survey responses regarding business plans' 
and due diligence components' relevance during the post-crisis phase are captured along a three-
point scale in order to determine whether components' relevance increased, remained unchanged 
or decreased. Survey responses regarding the monitoring and mentoring extent during the post-
crisis phase are captured along a three-point scale too in order to determine whether the degree 
of investors involvement increased, remained unchanged or decreased. The proportion of break-
off reasons and of exit channels are associated with the calculation of means, medians and 
deviations. In addition, possible effects both of the Basel III implementation and the 
transformation of the AIFM-directive are associated with the calculation of proportions and 
frequencies. The results are presented in tabular form and are interpreted accordingly. This 
analysis procedure seemed appropriate in order to ensure research continuity and comparability 
in accordance with the recommendations of Alemann (1984) and with respect to the basic studies 
of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). These 
research studies and the study of Hummel (2011b) are completely descriptive in character. 
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The subsequent sections detail the qualitative part of the analysis and at first present the basic 
analysis procedure of the qualitative text analysis. 
 
5.6  The qualitative part of the examination 
 
According to the research objectives (see section 4.6.4), the qualitative part of the examination 
was required in order to analyse: 
 
 Germany’s economic and innovation political strategy; 
 the progress of public funding on the federal level; 
 the investment process, the AIFM-directive and Basel III. 
 
This part of the examination is based on a purposive selection of publications which were 
analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. In that respect, Mayring (2010) points out that 
qualitative content analyses are rather flexible in their application and are aligned on the specific 
research topic. Mayring (2010) refers to following basic procedure of a qualitative content 
analysis (see subsequent table 24).  
 
The basic procedure of the content analysis 
 
No. Process step and clarification 
  
1. 
Selection of the material base: 
Presentation of the sample frame. 
2. 
Material description:  
Author, intention, target group. 
3. 
Classification of the text material:  
Interview protocols, books, articles, etc. 
4. 
Clarification of the basic analysis objective:  
E. g. description of a specific subject, emotional condition of the author, effects on reader. 
5. 
Theoretical justified questions regarding the text content:  
Research question or subject that has to be addressed by the content analysis. 
6. 
Specification of the text analysis method: 
Summary, explication, structuring.  
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7. 
Development and clarification of the category system:  
Categories refer to sections, sentences or phrases. 
8. 
Code unit and context unit: 
Definition of the smallest and the biggest analysis pieces. 
9. 
Analysis of the text material: 
Application of the category system and its refinement. 
10. 
Results summary: 
Interpretation along the research question. 
11. 
Model goodness: 
Reliability and validity check. 
 
Table 24 The basic procedure of the content analysis (derived from Mayring 2010, p. 60) 
 
Basically, Mayring (2010) distinguishes between text summary, text explication and text 
structuring. These analysis procedures are applied in isolation or in combination. Summaries are 
the reduction of text material by the exclusion, the selection, the integration and generalisation of 
specific text phrases. This summary process is moving from a more individual and detailed 
perspective to a finally more generalised summary of text phrases on higher abstraction levels. 
On the other hand, the so-called inductive summaries are the exploratory development of 
categories by open coding along a specific research question. The text material is analysed up to 
a point at which an exhaustive number of categories seemed to be developed. These categories 
are subsequently applied on the whole text material and have to be adjusted during the further 
analysis process (Mayring 2010). Beside the inductive analysis of the text material, category 
systems are also derived from existing theories. Overall, category systems are open to 
adjustments during the analysis process in case they are not exhaustive or applicable (Kempf 
2008). Explication on the other hand is the explanation of incomprehensible text phrases. In that 
case, unclear text phrases are explained by simple encyclopedia-based explanations, by their text 
environment or by additional text material. The final type of content analysis according to 
Mayring (2010) is structuring. He distinguishes between text structuring according to linguistic, 
thematic or semantic criteria. Moreover, Mayring (2010) distinguishes between structuring in 
relation to specific cases or typical dimensions, and structuring along the assessment on scales. 
 
These clarifications regarding content analyses are not conclusive but are regarded as suitable to 
describe the content analysis process of the present thesis. Hence, the subsequent sections 
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regarding the sample selection and the final analysis process are clarified in the context of the 
basic process model of Mayring (2010). 
 
5.6.1  The sample frames of the content analysis 
 
The subsequent clarifications are based on the basic procedure of the content analysis and 
therefore are initially concerned with points one to five (see table 24 in section 5.6).  
 
The examination areas of the present thesis were examined out of a neo-institutional theoretical 
perspective. The existence of the PE and VC market and the issue of public funding were 
embedded in this theoretical framework (see sections 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and table nine in section 
3.3.2). A basic theory, a research question and a research aim and research objectives were 
derived from the developments in Germany’s economy, Germany’s PE and VC market and from 
the application of public funding measures (see sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4). The research aim and 
objectives encompass the following research subjects which were also addressed by a purposive 
selection of publications.  
 
The subsequent table 25 details the respective research subject and the relevant publication base. 
 
The research subjects and the literature base 
 
Research subject Literature base 
  
1. Germany’s economic and innovation policy. BMWi reports; 
BMBF reports. 
2. Research subsidies KMU-innovativ and ZIM; public funding 
measures for SME investments, innovation projects, enterprise 
founding and equity investments on the federal level. 
 
KfW reports; 
KfW support reports; 
BMWi/BMBF reports. 
3. Additional insights regarding the investment process, the AIFM-
directive and Basel III. 
BVK publications. 
 
Table 25 The research subjects and the literature base (own development) 
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With regard to the German economic policy, the German government is obliged to submit an 
annual economic report. This report is published by the federal department for economic and 
energy. The present analysis is based on the federal reports of 2011, 2012 and 2013 (BMWi 
2011; BMWi 2012; BMWi 2013). These reports are sub-divided in two different chapters and an 
additional appendix. In the first parts of the reports, the German government comments on the 
economic development and economic political measures during the previous year. In addition, 
the government presents the future economic policy and annotates the opinion results from 
German’s council of economic experts. In part two of the economic reports, the government 
estimates the future economic development of the current year. This part two also presents a 
comparison of the governmental forecast for the previous year and the final economic outcome. 
The appendices of the reports each list legislation, legislative projects and initiatives of 
Germany’s government in the current year. These reports, which were completely available 
online, were required to examine the progress of Germany’s economic and public funding policy 
on the federal level.  
 
The subsequent table 26 details the structure and the content of the present economic reports. 
 
The content of the economic reports 
 
Title BMWi report 2011 BMWi report 2012 BMWi report 2013 
    
Publisher BMWi Berlin BMWi Berlin BMWi Berlin 
Publishing date January 2011 January 2012 January 2013 
Number of pages 98 101 114 
Content of part I 
Annual economic 
report 2010/2011 
Annual economic 
report 2011/2012 
Annual economic 
report 2012/2013 
Content of part II 
Governmental 
prediction for 2011 
Governmental 
prediction for 2012 
Governmental 
prediction for 2013 
Appendix 
Governmental 
measures: 104 
Governmental 
measures: 117 
Governmental 
measures: 132 
 
Table 26 The content of the economic reports (BMWi 2011; BMWi 2012; BMWi 2013) 
 
With regard to innovation policy, the federal department for education and research publishes a 
comprehensive research and innovation report every two years. The analysis is based on the 
content of the research reports 2012 (BMBF 2012) and 2014 (BMBF 2014), which refer to the 
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timeframe of the post-crisis phase from 2010 to 2012. The reports are each sub-divided into three 
chapters. The first chapter describes the research and innovation policy of Germany’s 
government. This encompasses specific research, innovation and educational political measures 
on the national and international level. The second chapter of the reports describes the structure 
of the German research system and details the research and innovation policy each on the federal 
and federal states level. In addition, this chapter details the international research cooperation 
and presents data regarding research resources, publications, patents and the economic 
contribution of innovations in Germany. This second chapter also details public subsidies and 
public funding measures for research and development, for enterprise founding and innovation 
advisory. These reports were required to examine the progress of Germany’s innovation policy 
and public funding on the federal level. The reports were completely available online too.  
 
The subsequent table 27 presents the structure and the content of the underlying research reports. 
 
The content of the research reports 
 
Title Research report 2012 Research report 2014 
   
Publisher BMBF Berlin/Bonn BMBF Berlin/Bonn 
Publishing date 2012 2014 
Number of pages 656 722 
Content of part I Research and innovation political objectives and measures. 
Content of part II Structure, resources and support measures of the German innovation system. 
Sections A. Structure of the German research and innovation system. 
 B. Research and innovation policy of the federal government. 
 C. Research and innovation policy in the federal states. 
 D. International research cooperation. 
 E. Facts and figures regarding the German research and innovation system. 
Content of part III Appendix: Overview of research institutions in Germany. 
 
Table 27 The content of the research reports (BMBF 2012; BMBF 2014) 
 
The analysis on the level of the KfW is based on the KfW reports of 2010, 2011 and 2012 (KfW 
2011; KfW 2012; KfW 2013), and the KfW support reports of 2010, 2011 and 2012 (KfW 
2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a). The annual reports of the KfW are sub-divided along business 
units. The category funding in Germany is associated with different business units. The first one 
is the so-called KfW-Mittelstandsbank which is focused on the financing of SMEs. The second 
one is the so-called KfW-Privatkundenbank which is focused on the financing of private 
households. The third one is the so-called KfW-Kommunalbank which is concerned with the 
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financing of local districts. The final business unit is the division of capital market securitisation. 
The present analysis is focused on the business unit of the KfW-Mittelstandsbank which 
provides funding programmes for SMEs, innovation projects, enterprise founding, equity 
investments and environmentalism projects.  
 
The subsequent table 28 details the structure and the content of the KfW annual reports for 2010, 
2011 and 2012. 
 
The content of the KfW annual reports 
 
Title KfW annual reports 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Publisher KfW Frankfurt/Main KfW Frankfurt/Main KfW Frankfurt/Main 
Publishing date 2011 2012 2013 
Number of pages 136 127 126 
Content Key figures. 
 Letter of the board of directors. 
 Funding in Germany: 
 Business unit KfW Mittelstandsbank; 
 Business unit KfW Privatkundenbank; 
 Business unit KfW Kommunalbank. 
 Securitisation. 
 Sales. 
 Export and project financing. 
 Funding in developing countries. 
 Capital markets. 
 Additional business services (only in report 2010). 
 Staff resources. 
 Financial statement. 
 Corporate governance. 
 
Table 28 The content of the KfW annual reports (KfW 2011; KfW 2012; KfW 2013) 
 
The support reports of the KfW (KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a) supplement the analysis 
of the annual reports (KfW 2011; KfW 2012; KfW 2013). The support reports present the 
information of the annual reports in greater detail, contain time series comparisons and detail the 
volume of the funding programmes down to the federal state and local district area. The initial 
analysis in section 4.5.2 showed that the analysis of the KfW programmes requires a detailed 
examination, as the programmes partly overlap and sometimes are discontinued or reintegrated 
in other programmes. This makes it difficult to analyse the progress of the programmes 
according to strict programme structures.  
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The subsequent table 29 details the structure and the content of the KfW support reports. 
 
The content of the KfW support reports 
 
Title KfW support reports 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Publisher KfW Frankfurt/Main KfW Frankfurt/Main KfW Frankfurt/Main 
Publishing date 2011 2012 2013 
Number of pages 694 676 705 
Basic content KfW funding volume on programme level. 
 Detailed reports on federal state’s level. 
 Detailed reports on local district’s level. 
 Specification regarding the calculation method. 
 
Table 29 The content of the KfW support reports (KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a) 
 
These reports were required to examine the progress of public funding programmes for 
enterprise financing, innovation financing, enterprise founding and equity financing on the KfW 
level. The reports were completely available online.  
 
The sample frame for the third part of the text analysis is based on a purposive selection of 
publications from the BVK which were published during 2010, 2011 and 2012. This procedure 
was required to expand the results along the subjects investment process, AIFM-directive and 
Basel III. This included publications which were available online on BVK’s homepage and were 
listed under the following headings: 
 
 annual reports in the section BVK; 
 market information for investors in the section facts and figures; 
 press releases in the section press releases; 
 private equity letters in the section publications. 
 
The BVK publications were initially reviewed regarding their meaningfulness for the present 
research. This procedure finally resulted in a purposive selection of publications which are listed 
in table 30 (see appendix L.2). This publication base was analysed with different content analysis 
procedures. These procedures are described in greater detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
 143 
5.6.2  The process of the content analysis 
 
The subsequent clarifications refer to points six to 11 (see table 24 in section 5.6) in the basic 
content analysis model of Mayring (2010). At first, the subsequent section is concerned with the 
content analysis process of the annual economic reports. The following sections then describe 
the analysis processes of the research reports, the KfW annual reports and finally of the BVK 
publications.    
 
5.6.3  The analysis of the annual economic reports 
 
The analysis of the annual economic reports was required in order to examine Germany’s 
economic and innovation policy during 2010, 2011 and 2012. This also encompassed every type 
of public funding initiative on the federal level for SME investments, innovation projects, 
enterprise founding, equity financing and, furthermore, the research subsidies ZIM and KMU-
innovativ (see table 25 in section 5.6.1). 
  
In order to understand this part of the analysis, several theoretical aspects must be considered. 
The issue of the PE and VC market has already been embedded in a neo-institutional 
perspective, which was also regarded as suitable to describe and to explain the issue of public 
funding (see section 3.3). Economic policy and innovation policy are treated separately and 
therefore the unquestioned application of a neo-institutional theoretical framework seemed 
inappropriate. In order to describe and to explain the economic and innovation policy, and in 
order to operationalise the analysis process, an alternative theoretical framework was required. In 
that regard, the subsequent paragraphs are concerned with theoretical clarifications of both 
economic and innovation policy, and the development of a theoretical foundation. This section 
finally details the application of the theoretical framework of the present examination.  
 
In order to comprehend the specific subjects of economic policy, this initially requires the 
differentiation between a theory of economic policy and an economic theory. The latter is 
focused on the description of the economy and is the basis for the theory of economic policy. 
The theory of economic policy in the majority of directions tries to infer normative 
recommendations about a desired state. Hence, the theoretical part of economic policy, which is 
focused on the current economic political status quo, transforms the theoretical results into 
recommendations for practice. On the other hand, economic political theorisation is also 
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concerned with the description of the current state in order to infer future behaviours of decision 
makers (Neck and Schneider 2013). The present thesis is neither concerned with the assessment 
of the current political measures, the inference of normative recommendations nor with future 
projections. This thesis is solely concerned with the description of economic policy during the 
financial crisis. The procedure in that respect resulted in the inference of Germany’s political 
strategy in relation to existing economic political theories. Therefore, both a suitable analysis 
framework and a category system were required in order to select economic political measures 
and to derive the final strategy of the government. This basic framework was aligned on the 
specific subjects of economic policy (Neck and Schneider 2013). 
 
Economic policy by definition is every measure in order to structure, to navigate and to organise 
an economy (Wildmann 2012). In terms of a functional structure, economic policy is concerned 
with governance measures and thus regulatory policy, process policy and structural policy (Neck 
and Schneider 2013). Regulatory policy by definition establishes the framework for economies 
and in free market economies, regulatory policy is always concerned with competition policy. 
Process policy on the other hand is the direct application of specific measures to align the 
economy on growth. Finally, structural policy is concerned with the support of specific sectors or 
regions (Wildmann 2012). 
 
This basic structure is surely to broad in order to derive a specific type of economic policy, 
which is considered as multi-paradigmatic sciences with different theoretical orientations (Neck 
and Schneider 2013). Neck and Schneider (2013, p. 50) in that context point out that it would be 
overall difficult to structure economic policy, not only with regard to its functions, but also with 
regard to its instruments and objectives.  
 
A less abstract but more detailed dimension according to Wildmann (2012) is focused on the 
following subjects: 
 
 conjuncture policy; 
 distribution policy; 
 employment policy; 
 environmental policy; 
 foreign trade policy; 
 finance policy; 
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 monetary policy; 
 social policy. 
 
Even though this categorisation system suffers from overlaps too, it seemed suitable as a 
foundation for an analysis framework. The subjects of employment policy, foreign trade policy, 
distribution policy, environmental policy and social policy were excluded in the present 
examination even though some of their aspects overlap with regard to conjuncture policy. The 
remaining subjects of monetary, conjuncture and finance policy were applied on the examination 
material. This means that laws, law initiatives or other campaigns and promotions on the federal 
level which came into force or were proposed during the post-crisis phase were analysed in 
accordance with monetary, conjuncture and finance policy in Germany. This examination was 
focused on the most important political initiatives which required the subjective differentiation 
from the less important political initiatives. 
 
Regarding the institutional level, economic political decision making is realised by public and 
hence state institutions. In accordance with Germany’s federal system, political decision making 
is realised by the governments, the parliaments and the courts, each on the federal level, the 
federal states level and the local district level. This perspective on public institutions 
encompasses every public organisation which supports the political decision making process or 
which is directly responsible for political decision making. The public decision making process 
is supported by private organisations such as employer’s associations or unions. Moreover, 
public subsidised economic research institutions participate in the decision making process. 
Nevertheless, they are not classified as authorised public decision makers (Wildmann 2012). The 
present examination is solely focused on the federal level of public decision making. This 
perspective encompasses the supranational level (Wildmann 2012) and in that respect the 
European level.  
 
The subsequent figure two summarises this basic analysis framework regarding the economic 
policy in Germany. 
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Figure 2 The basic analysis framework (own development) 
 
This framework (see figure two) is not derived from a specific theoretical perspective but rather 
from the subjects of economic policy. Hence, this part of the examination was not carried out in 
relation to a specific theoretical lens, for example Keynesianism, Monetarism or the Neoclassic. 
This part of the examination rather went the opposite direction in order to determine the specific 
type of economic theory behind the economic policy during the financial crisis.  
 
The innovation political strategy on the other hand was examined according to Schumpeter’s 
conjuncture theory, which argues that both invention and innovation would be required for 
further economical progress (Wildmann 2012 and section 2.6.1). Therefore, the issue of 
innovation policy was examined in the context of economic policy during the financial crisis. As 
the specification of the innovation policy is mainly derived from the research reports, the 
description of innovation political concepts is realised in the subsequent section 5.6.4. 
 
Due to the focus on the central elements of Germany’s economic and innovation policy, an 
exploratory summary or the inductive category development according to Mayring (2010) 
seemed inappropriate. Therefore, the material was analysed according to rather open 
examination areas which were derived from the framework in figure two. Text phrases which 
addressed the respective examination area were finally summarised according to each 
examination field. This procedure is defined as a structured content analysis according to 
Mayring (2010).  
1. Examination perspective: 
 a) political decision making in Europe; 
 b) political decision making in Germany. 
2. Analysis areas:  
 a) monetary policy; 
 b) conjuncture and growth policy; 
 c) finance policy. 
3. Governmental measures: 
 a) laws; 
 b) law initiatives; 
 c) promotions. 
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The analysis of the economic reports was focused on their summary section in part one and on 
the appendix of each report. The summary of the reports describes the past economic 
development, presents the governmental forecast, the past legislation and the future intentions of 
the government. Part one of the reports is sub-divided into several sections which are for 
instance concerned with economic, competition or financial political measures. These sections 
are structured along consecutively numbered paragraphs which are each focused on a particular 
sub-issue along the main topics. Part one of the economic reports includes additional 
clarifications with regard to specific incidents, legislations or other initiatives both on the 
European and German level. These clarifications, beside additional statistical indications, are 
integrated in colour-coded boxes. Part two of the reports, which presents the economic forecast 
of the government, was not part of the present analysis. The appendices of the economic reports 
each schedule legislative initiatives, the legislation of the underlying year and other promotions 
or deed polls on the federal level (BMWi 2011; BMWi 2012; BMWi 2013).  
 
With regard to the development of a category system, it was avoided to apply a narrowed 
classification. Therefore, the text material was initially analysed roughly along the so-called 
guiding questions (Kempf 2008). A more detailed category system according to the guiding 
questions was then applied along the summarised text material. If required and appropriate, the 
category system was adjusted during several examination runs (Kempf 2008; Mayring 2010). 
The smallest code unit in the text was one paragraph and the biggest code unit was one 
numbered text section. A text section consists of at least one or in some cases of several 
paragraphs, whereas one paragraph consists of several sentences. Coding each sentence seemed 
inappropriate, as the explanation of a particular subject is associated with at least one paragraph. 
The indications in the colour-coded boxes were also coded along the category system. In 
addition, the statistical information in the tables, the indications in the diagrammes and in the 
figures were considered too in the case the content contributed to the subject area.  
 
The basic guiding questions are presented in the subsequent table 31. 
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The guiding questions for the economic reports 
 
No. Guiding question Code 
   
1. Indications regarding European economic policy? 01 
2. Indications regarding economic policy in Germany? 02 
3. Indications regarding public funding in Germany? 03 
 
Table 31 The guiding questions for the economic reports (own development) 
 
Text sections which addressed the specific guiding question were coded and finally summarised 
under each subject. This procedure allowed for a further detailed classification of the text content 
along following category system (see subsequent table 32).  
 
The category system for the economic reports 
 
No. Examination category Code 
   
1. European economic policy. 01A 
2. European finance, conjuncture and monetary policy. 01B 
3. European innovation policy. 01C 
4. German economic policy. 02A 
5. German finance, conjuncture and monetary policy. 02B 
6. German innovation policy. 02C 
7. Public funding in Germany for SMEs. 03A 
8. Public funding in Germany for innovation projects. 03B 
9. Research subsidy ZIM. 03C 
10. Research subsidy KMU-innovativ. 03D 
11. Public funding in Germany for enterprise founding. 03E 
12. Public funding in Germany for equity investments. 03F 
 
Table 32 The category system for the economic reports (own development) 
 
The following examples (see subsequent table 33) describe the application of the category 
system along part one of the economic report 2011 (BMWi 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
Example I of category systems application 
 
Paragraph Subject of the numbered paragraph in part one Code 
   
23 Germany’s dynamic economic growth. - 
26 Germany’s dependence on the world economy. - 
28 Economic political strategies after the crisis. 02A 
46 Public household consolidation in Germany. 02B 
48 Germany’s future agreement. 02B 
50 Reorganisation of local districts financing. - 
 
Table 33 Example I of category systems application (own development) 
 
The more detailed coded text phrases were finally summarised under each category according to 
the summary procedure of Mayring (2010). This, inter alia, means that non relevant sentences or 
double indications were deleted and unclear text phrases were explicated. The category system 
was finally applied on the additional indications in the colour-coded boxes, the tables and the 
diagrammes. This process is described in the subsequent example (see subsequent table 34) 
which is based on the content of the economic report 2011 too (BMWi 2011). 
 
Example II of category systems application 
 
Box no. Subject of the text element Code 
   
2 Causes, effects and perspectives of Germany’s export. - 
4 Implementation of the future agreement in the public budget law 2011. 02B 
7 Core objectives of the European-2020-Strategy and national aims. 01A 
Core objectives of the European-2020-Strategy and national aims. 02A 
 
Table 34 Example II of category systems application (own development) 
 
The results of these analyses were integrated in the summary, in case this expanded the initial 
findings. Finally, the analysis was concerned with the governmental measures in the appendix of 
the economic reports. The measures are consecutively numbered and hence the smallest and also 
the biggest code unit were each one specific governmental measure. The measures were also 
coded along the category system in table 32. Governmental measures which are concerned with 
the development of Germany’s eastern part, development political measures, the funding of 
enterprise founding in the scientific environment and every type of advisory grant were overall 
not taken into account. The subsequent table 35 describes the application of the category system 
along the governmental measures in the appendix of the economic report 2011 (BMWi 2011). 
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Example III of category systems application 
 
No. Governmental measure Code 
   
2 Qualification during short-time employment. - 
7 Adjustment of the tobacco tax. - 
20 Adjustment of the company law. - 
25 European-2020-Strategy. 01A 
70 Prolongation of the agreement for research and innovation. 02C 
72 Modification of the research subsidy ZIM. 03C 
73 Modification of the research subsidy KMU-innovativ. 03D 
76 Germany’s digital strategy 2015. 02C 
88 Energy efficiency fund. RC 
98 Innovation alliance photovoltaic. 02C 
 
Table 35 Example III of category systems application (own development) 
 
The coded initiatives were finally summarised along the categories and integrated in the initial 
analysis of the economic reports. Governmental measures in the residual category, which were 
classified as RC, were reviewed in greater detail by means of explication (Mayring 2010). In 
case that their final classification was not possible or appropriate due to a minor relevance, these 
measures were excluded from the examination. The selected measures were scheduled, which 
included a brief description.  
 
The final results are presented for each economic report in an annual sequence. In order to 
achieve a fluent transition between the initial phase of the financial crisis and the post-crisis 
phase, the analysis started with the review of the economic report 2010 (BMWi 2010).  
 
5.6.4  The analysis of the research reports 
 
The analysis of the research reports 2012 (BMBF 2012) and 2014 (BMBF 2014) was focused on 
Germany’s research, education and innovation policy during the post-crisis phase. According to 
the literature review results, it seemed advisable to examine the research, the education and the 
innovation policy also in the context of European initiatives and long-term developments. The 
initial literature review in that context showed that one of the most important subjects of 
innovation policy in Germany is associated with the introduction of the so-called Hightech-
Strategy in 2006. This innovation strategy was modified in 2010, and thus at the beginning of the 
post-crisis phase (see section 4.5). This part of the text analysis was therefore focused on 
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changes in Germany’s innovation policy during the post-crisis phase, and the specification of the 
respective innovation policy.  
 
In order to classify the specific type of innovation policy, the literature refers to different 
innovation political concepts. In that context, the core concepts behind innovation policy are the 
so-called market-based innovation policy on the one hand and the intervention-based innovation 
policy on the other hand. The main difference of these concepts is the more restrained strategy in 
the case of market related policy and the more on influence and involvement focused strategy of 
intervention-based policy. The latter concept is based on the assumption that innovation 
processes would be variable and flexible. Therefore, innovation processes could be aligned on 
society’s needs by means of an active innovation policy. This concept applies both hard and soft 
instruments of innovation political measures to increase society’s welfare and to settle 
disadvantages. Moreover, this concept follows more long-term aims whose achievement are 
supported by methods of technical progress and effect analyses. The market related concept is 
based on the assumption that innovation processes would be dependent on market’s demand and 
profitability decisions. Therefore, innovation is regarded as not controllable and political 
instruments are applied to ensure a positive innovation climate, to support the technology 
transfer, and the expansion of both technical and scientific infrastructure. Even though this 
concept basically relies on market mechanisms, it is also concerned with the public support of 
basic research due to existing market gaps. Nevertheless, innovation political instruments (see 
glossary) are only applied from time to time and in dependence on market requirements. 
Therefore, technical progress and effect analyses are of rather no relevance, as is the 
achievement of consensus between policy decision makers and the society (Welsch 2005). 
 
The underlying research reports 2012 (BMBF 2012) and 2014 (BMBF 2014) are each structured 
in three different parts. Part two of the research reports is, moreover, divided into different sub-
parts (see table 27 in section 5.6.1). In order to examine the development and changes in 
Germany’s research and innovation policy, this part of the content analysis was each focused on 
part one regarding the innovation political aims and measures of the government. Moreover, the 
analysis was focused on part two and sub-part B regarding the research and innovation policy on 
the federal level. This sub-part B also includes a separate section regarding technology funding 
on the federal level. Hence, sub-part A, C and D in part two and also part three of the reports 
were not examined. The facts and figures in sub-part E of chapter two were taken into account in 
case the indications support the analysis process.  
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The analysis was initially based on the following guiding questions (see subsequent table 36) in 
order to structure the text in a first attempt (Kempf 2008).  
 
The guiding questions for the research reports 
 
No. Guiding question Code 
   
1. Indications regarding research, education and innovation policy? 01 
2. Indications regarding the Hightech-Strategy? 02 
3. Indications regarding public funding in Germany? 03 
 
Table 36 The guiding questions for the research reports (own development) 
 
This procedure initially structured the text along these main subjects. Due to the extent of the 
research reports, the analysis was supported by the application of Adobe reader’s search 
function. The more sophisticated search function of the Adobe reader was suitable to highlight 
the relevant text phrases in the context of each subject. These highlighted text phrases were 
coded along the guiding questions (see table 36) and summarised under each question. The 
smallest code unit was one paragraph and the biggest code unit was one text section. The initial 
summary was further reviewed along a more detailed category system (see subsequent table 37).    
 
The category system for the research reports 
 
No. Examination category Code 
   
1. Central research, education and innovation political measures. 01 
2. Priorities of Germany’s research, education and innovation policy. 02A 
3. Core elements of the Hightech-Strategy 2020. 02B 
 4. Public funding in Germany for SMEs. 03A 
5. Public funding in Germany for innovation projects. 03B 
6. Research subsidy ZIM. 03C 
7. Research subsidy KMU-innovativ. 03D 
5C 8. Public funding in Germany for enterprise founding. 03E 
9. Public funding in Germany for equity investments. 03F 
 
Table 37 The category system for the research reports (own development) 
 
The coded text phrases were summarised according to Mayring (2010) which means that double 
indications and meaningless text phrases were deleted. Unclear text phrases or particular terms 
were specified in greater detail by explication. The indications in the tables, the diagrammes, the 
figures and in the colour-coded boxes were also coded along the category system. These 
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indications were integrated in the summary, in case they supplemented the initial findings. 
Funding measures which are concerned with Germany’s eastern part, development political 
measures, the funding of enterprise founding in the scientific environment and every type of 
advisory grant were overall not taken into account. 
 
The subsequent table 38 describes the application of the category system on part one in the 
research report 2012 (BMBF 2012).  
 
Example IV of category systems application 
 
Section Extent Page Subject Code 
     
Section 1 Paragraph 5 22 Four research and innovation priorities. 02A 
Section 2 Figure 4 23 The Hightech-Strategy: Future projects and demand. 
areas. 
02B 
Section 2 Sub-heading 24 Future projects. 02B 
Section 2 Infobox 24+25 Future projects of the government. 02B 
Section 3 Section 32+34 Strengthening sciences. 02A 
Section 3 Infobox 33 The three reform initiatives. 02A 
 
Table 38 Example IV of category systems application (own development) 
 
5.6.5  The analysis of the reports from the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
 
The examination of the KfW reports 2010, 2011 and 2012 (KfW 2011; KfW 2012; KfW 2013) 
was carried out in connection with the KfW support reports 2010, 2011 and 2012 (KfW 2011a; 
KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a). The analysis was required in order to examine the progress of the 
funding programmes for enterprise financing, innovation financing, enterprise founding and 
equity financing on the federal level. The analysis of the KfW reports was focused on the 
business unit KfW-Mittelstandsbank which details the progress of funding programmes during 
the financial year. This section is structured in paragraphs which are each concerned with the 
progress of a specific programme. The section KfW-Mittelstandsbank also presents the funding 
volume of each programme in comparison to the preceding financial year. These tables contain a 
brief description of each funding programme (KfW 2011; KfW 2012; KfW 2013).  
 
The direct application of a category system was possible due to the rather small proportion of the 
underlying analysis pages and the clear structure of the content. The categories referred to 
funding of enterprises, innovation projects, enterprise founding and equity investments. An 
additional category is associated with KfW’s co-investments for enterprise financing, enterprise 
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founding and equity financing which are initiated outside the KfW business. The smallest code 
unit was one sentence and the biggest code unit was one paragraph. The subsequent table 39 
presents the category system for the analysis of the KfW annual reports.  
 
The category system for the KfW reports 
 
No. Examination category Code 
   
1. Public funding for enterprise financing. 03A 
2. Public funding for innovation projects. 03B 
3. Public funding for enterprise founding. 03E 
4. Public funding for equity investments. 03F 
5. Co-investments outside the KfW business. 03G 
 
Table 39 The category system for the KfW reports (own development) 
 
The text content of the business area KfW-Mittelstandsbank was coded along the category 
system in table 39. The coded text phrases were then summarised according to Mayring (2010). 
Specific terms or unclear text phrases were further specified by means of explication. This part 
of the KfW analysis was supported by the additional analysis of the KfW annual support reports 
(KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a).  
 
The volumes of the funding programmes which are provided by the KfW-Mittelstandsbank are 
presented along the following categories in the support reports: 
 
 enterprise founding and SME financing; 
 innovation financing; 
 environmental project financing. 
 
In a first step and in order to supplement the results from the literature review (see table 18 in 
section 4.5.2), the KfW support reports were reclassified along the following categories: 
 
 enterprise founding and SME financing; 
 innovation financing; 
 equity financing; 
 financial crisis related measures. 
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This procedure finally delivered a detailed overview regarding the progress of the funding 
programmes between 2008 and 2012. In a second step, equity financing measures of the KfW 
were further specified and their structure and purpose was described for each programme. 
Funding measures on the federal level which were initiated outside the KfW business were 
integrated in that presentation. Hence, this examination detailed the funding volumes for both the 
standard and for the equity financing programmes. 
 
5.6.6  The content analysis of the BVK publications 
 
The analysis of the BVK publications was carried out in order to expand the results regarding the 
investment process, the AIFM-directive and Basel III (see table 25 in section 5.6.1). This 
examination based on the following category system (see subsequent table 40). 
 
The category system for the BVK publications 
 
No. Category Sub-category Code 
    
1. Financial market regulation AIFM-directive 01 01A 
  Basel III  01B 
2. Investment process Deal flow 02 02A 
  Deal screening  02B 
  Negotiation  02C 
  Contracting  02D 
  Monitoring  02E 
  Mentoring  02F 
  Exit  02G 
3. Residual category  03 - 
 
Table 40 The category system for the BVK publications (own development) 
 
The underlying text material (see appendix L.2) was available both in MS-Word and, in some 
cases, also in PDF-format. Therefore, the examination was supported by the search functions of 
the Adobe reader on the one hand and MS-Word on the other the hand. The highlighted sections 
were coded along the category system in table 40. Results outside this category system which 
stand in the context of the present research were summarised in the residual category. The 
smallest code unit was one sentence and the biggest code unit was one paragraph. The coded text 
phrases were summarised along the category system. Irrelevant text phrases and multiple 
indications were deleted. The results were regarded as an expansion of the survey outcomes and 
therefore are presented in the context of the survey results. The category system of each content 
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analysis was applied in several runs and modified in case that the individual results differed 
significantly. The repeated application of the category system was also required in order to 
determine the reliability of the examination. 
 
Nevertheless, smaller differences of the results which are achieved by the same encoder are 
regarded as normal. Objectivity on the other hand is determined by category system’s application 
from different encoders. The results are then compared regarding their correlation (Mayring 
2010). Objectivity is not guaranteed as the candidate had no additional researcher resources. 
Even though this part of the examination is surely rather subjective, the analysis processes and 
the results should be comprehensible. This part of the research should also be valid due to the 
scope of the analyses and the research objectives.  
 
5.7  The validation study and research timeframe 
 
Two validation studies were finally carried out in order to verify the results from the structured 
survey. Both validation studies focused on the developments along the investment process and 
were concerned with the deal flow, the screening of business plans, the due diligence, and 
monitoring and mentoring. The validation studies were also concerned with the results regarding 
Basel III and the AIFM-directive (see main study questionnaire part III and part IV in appendix 
F.1). The validation studies each based on structured questionnaires. In the first validation study, 
the questionnaire was sent both by mail and by e-mail to a purposive selection of sample 
members. This sample frame was derived from the main study sample frame (see section 5.5.2 
and appendix L.1) without those sample members who refused to participate in surveys during 
the main study or already participated in the main study. This sample selection resulted in a 
purposive selection of 37 PE and VC firms in Germany. The subsequent table 41 details the 
sample frame of the validation study in comparison to the main study sample frame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157 
The sample frame compositions 
 
Type of sample Main study Validation study 
Type of investor Number Proportion Number Proportion 
     
Independent investor 39 37% 10 27% 
Corporate Venture Capitalist 8 7% 3 8% 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 15 14% 7 19% 
Savings/Cooperative/Public bank daughter 39 36% 14 38% 
Public investor 6 6% 3 8% 
     
Total sample 107 100% 37 100% 
  
Table 41 The sample frame compositions (own development) 
 
This selection represents a proportion of approx. 35% of the main study sample frame. 
Independent investors are underrepresented in the validation study sample frame as this type of 
investor disproportionately often refused to participate on surveys during the main study.  
 
In the second validation study, the questionnaire was sent by e-mail and the data was finally 
collected by telephone interviews. This second validation study based on a purposive selection of 
four so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften in order to validate the results from 
the MBGs.  
 
The validation study results were analysed by means of descriptive statistics in order to calculate 
the frequencies and proportions of confirmation, disagreement and of no assessments. 
 
The whole research progress is presented in the subsequent figure three. 
 
09 – 10/2013    10/2013 – 04/2014   10/2014 – 01/2015   03/2015 – 10/2015   12/2015 + 08/2017 
 
 
      Pretest              Main study              Text analyses            Data analysis      Validation studies           
 
Figure 3 The research progress of the present thesis (own development) 
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Chapter 6 The results and conclusions 
 
This chapter presents the examination results. The present study was carried out to examine 
Germany’s economic and innovation political strategy, to examine the progress of public funding 
on the federal level and to examine the German PE and VC market with respect to investors' 
investment strategy, investment behaviour and investment process (see also section 4.6.4). The 
first part of this chapter is concerned with the examination results from the economic reports, the 
federal research reports and from the KfW reports. Part two is then concerned with the 
examination results from the survey and from the BVK publications. Finally, this chapter 
presents the validation study results. 
 
6.1  The results of the content analyses 
 
The analyses were carried out between October 2014 and January 2015. A recheck for validation 
purposes was subsequently carried out in November 2015 and December 2015. The subsequent 
presentation starts with the results for the economic report 2010 (BMWi 2010). 
 
6.1.1  The analysis results of the economic report 2010 
 
The analysis of the economic report 2010 (BMWi 2010) showed that the government was 
concerned with the economy’s recovery and the consolidation of public households. The German 
government launched two conjuncture programmes to relieve both private households and 
enterprises. In addition, two laws came into force to stabilise the financial sector by public equity 
investments and bad bank solutions. The government was concerned with the significantly 
increasing public indebtedness due to the extent of the public stabilisation measures and 
therefore adopted a constitutional debt rule in 2009. This debt rule limits public borrowing to 
0.35% of the annual GDP from 2011 on.  
 
Overall, the government emphasised the exit from the public stabilisation measures on the one 
hand and economic growth perspectives by structural reforms on the other hand. In order to fulfil 
the requirements of the debt rule, the government was focused on efficiency gains in the existing 
system rather than on credit financed tax reductions and public expenses. Despite the strong 
budget consolidation requirements due to the future debt rule, the review showed that the 
government emphasised education, research and innovation as central prerequisites for economic 
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growth. This national perspective was implemented in accordance with the European stability 
and growth act, the European resolutions regarding the exit from the public stabilisation 
measures and the European Lisbon strategy (BMWi 2010). This European strategy ran over a 
period of ten years and was launched in 2000. The strategy was focused on research and 
development and on the attempt to increase investments for research and development up to 3% 
of European Union’s annual GDP. This strategy was also focused on the liberalisation of 
national labour and service markets, the reduction of bureaucracy costs and on environmentalism 
(Bundesregierung 2015).  
 
According to innovation political measures, the review showed that the government intended to 
increase the expenses for education and research up to 10% of the GDP until 2015. Therefore 
and in order to improve the education and research conditions in Germany, the government 
launched a so-called qualification initiative already in 2008. As a result, the government 
approved additional 12 billion euros for education and research during the political session. The 
government also decided to increase the expenses for the German research organisations by 5% 
annually from 2011 on. With regard to the relaunch of the Hightech-Strategy 2006 in 2010, the 
government emphasised the importance of the health care sector due to its stabilisation 
contribution during the financial crisis. Therefore, this sector from the future on will not be 
regarded under a cost point of view but as important for economic growth and employment.  
 
The review of the appendix from the economic report 2010 (BMWi 2010) is summarised in the 
subsequent table 42. 
 
The selected measures from economic report 2010 
 
Economic, finance, innovation political measures 
No. Programme title and description Since 
   
1.  
 
Financial market stabilisation law: 
 Public equity investments on distressed banks. 
2009 
2. 
Improvement of financial market stabilisation: 
 Bad bank solutions for distressed banks.  
2009 
3. 
Conjuncture programme II: 
 Economical stabilisation. 
2009 
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9. 
Economic fund Germany: 
 Credit improvements for SMEs and bigger-sized enterprises. 
2009 
16. 
Masterplan environmental technology:  
 Market development for environmental technologies. 
2008/ 
2009 
17. 
Economic acceleration law: 
 Conjuncture stabilisation by tax reductions. 
2010 
18. 
Second reform of Germany’s federal system: 
 Implementation of a constitutional debt rule from 2011 on.  
2009 
44. 
High-Tech Gründerfund: 
 Prolongation of fund’s investment period until 2011. 
2010 
45. 
Mobilisation of PE and VC: 
 Additional 220 MEUR for KfW’s so-called ERP-Startfund 
 . 
2009 
59. 
Qualification initiative: 
 Increase of public expenses for education and research. 
2008 
64. 
Prolongation of the university agreement 2020: 
 Improvement of research and study conditions. 
2009 
65. 
Progress report Hightech-Strategy 2006: 
 Decision making regarding strategy’s relaunch. 
2006/ 
2009 
66. 
Energy research: 
 Prolongation of the 5th energy research programme until 2010. 
2009 
67. 
Climate research: 
 Strategy to improve the competitiveness of climate technologies.  
2007/ 
2010 
68. 
Research for sustainable development: 
 Research support for climate, energy, environmental technologies. 
2009 
69. 
Health research programme: 
 Development of new research approaches, research support, etc. 
2009 
71.  
Biotechnology support programme: 
 Development of a research strategy. 
2009 
72. 
Aviation research programme: 
 To improve the innovation capacity of the aviation industry. 
2007/ 
2010 
73. 
Space programme: 
 To improve the innovation capacity of the space industry. 
2010 
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74. 
Integrated energy and climate programme electric mobility: 
 Development of a research strategy for electric mobility. 
2009 
75. 
Information and communication technological strategy: 
 Development of a digital strategy for Germany. 
2009 
78. 
Programme ICT 2020: 
 Research support for information and communication technologies. 
2009 
79. 
Central innovation programme (ZIM): 
 Additional funds in the amount of 900 MEUR. 
2009 
82. 
Prolongation of the research and innovation agreement: 
 Additional funds for the leading research institutions in Germany. 
2009 
 
Table 42 The selected measures from economic report 2010 (derived from BMWi 2010) 
 
6.1.2  The analysis results of the economic report 2011 
 
The review of the economic report 2011 (BMWi 2011) showed that the European Union member 
states adopted a follow-up strategy for the Lisbon strategy in 2010. This new European-wide 
strategy, the so-called Europe 2020, was adopted to improve Europe’s competitiveness, to 
increase productivity and economic growth, and to improve social integration. These central 
elements were associated with specific national aims which, in the case of Germany, were 
employment support, the implementation of climate and energy related aims, the improvement of 
the educational standard and finally the strengthening of social integration.  
 
In the beginning of the post-crisis phase, the government was focused on public budget 
consolidation and the recirculation of the governmental measures. The government appointed an 
expert panel to find exit solutions regarding the public equity investments in the bank sector. In 
order to fulfil the future debt rule, the government reduced public investments and shortened 
public subsidies. The consolidation measures were implemented by the so-called future package 
which was associated with public household consolidation in the volume of approx. 80 billion 
euros until 2014. The government argued that household consolidation would be compulsory as 
solid public households would result in smaller taxes and levy. As a consequence, consumption, 
investments and employment would increase. The government also mentioned the risk of 
initially decreasing economical activity due to the consolidation measures with both decreasing 
public support and additional tax burdens. The government in that context argued along the so-
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called non-Keynesian effect which assumes that both investments and consumption would 
increase at the moment of the consolidation. The society would expect to benefit from public 
reliefs in the future due to the consolidation efforts (BMWi 2011). On the other hand, the review 
showed that the expenses for education and research were excluded from the consolidation 
measures due to the qualification initiative (BMWi 2010, see consecutive number 59, in table 42 
in section 6.1.1). In addition, the government adopted an economic acceleration law with smaller 
tax reliefs for both families and enterprises. The related law was already adopted in 2010 (BMWi 
2010, see consecutive number 17, in table 42 in section 6.1.1).  
 
With regard to innovation political measures, the review showed that the adjusted HTS was still 
focused on climate and energy, health and nutrition, mobility, safety and communication. These 
research areas were addressed by the implementation of future projects which are part of the 
modified Hightech-Strategy 2020. The review, furthermore, showed that the government 
emphasised the economic potential of the information and communication technologies and the 
new medias. In order to support the technology transfer of the IT sector and to integrate the 
internet in the society, the government launched the so-called Digital Agenda in 2010. This 
strategy, with a duration until 2015, has been supported from an annual IT summit on the level of 
the government. The review showed that a research priority of the government was still on 
energy and climate research. In that respect, the government focused on research support 
regarding the efficient use of natural resources and energy, the use of biomass, sustainable water 
management systems and the use of photovoltaic. These areas were regarded as very important 
due to their growth potential and economic contribution (BMWi 2011).    
 
The analysis of the appendix from the economic report 2011 (BMWi 2011) delivered the 
following result (see subsequent table 43). 
 
The selected measures from economic report 2011 
 
Economic, finance, innovation political measures 
No. Programme title and description Since 
   
3. 
Expert panel: 
 Development of exit strategies in the financial sector. 
2010 
39. 
Programme bureaucracy reduction: 
 To boost economy’s activity and innovation investments. 
2010/ 
2011 
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68. 
Hightech-Strategy 2020: 
 Relaunch of the HTS to improve the innovation conditions in Germany. 
2010 
72. 
Central innovation programme (ZIM): 
 Modification regarding the application on individual research projects. 
2010 
73. 
KMU-innovativ: 
 Modification regarding programme’s application. 
2010 
76. 
Digital Agenda 2015: 
 Strategy regarding the economical use of ICTs and the new medias. 
2010 
77. 
National IT summit: 
 Dialogue platform to implement the ICT strategy until 2013. 
2010 
78. 
Programme cloud computing: 
 Coordination platform regarding the use of cloud computing. 
2010 
80. 
Research for sustainable development: 
 Research support for resources management, energy technologies, etc. 
2010 
81. 
National research strategy bio economy 2030: 
 Support regarding the application of bio-technologies. 
2010 
82. 
Research programme health care: 
 Realignment of health research on specific areas. 
2010 
83. 
Research and innovation programme climate protection: 
 Alignment of climate protection on specific future projects. 
2007/ 
2011 
98. 
Innovation alliance photovoltaic: 
 To improve the competitiveness of the photovoltaic industry. 
2010 
102. 
Energy research programme: 
 Additional funds for energy research. 
2010/ 
2011 
 
Table 43 The selected measures from economic report 2011 (derived from BMWi 2011) 
 
6.1.3  The analysis results of the economic report 2012 
 
The review of the economic report for 2012 showed that the core elements of European’s 
economic and finance policy were basically concerned with the reduction of public’s 
indebtedness, economic growth, competitiveness and financial market’s stabilisation. In that 
context, the European Union agreed on the modification of the stability and growth pact which is 
concerned with minimum budget requirements for EU member states and stronger deficit 
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criteria. In order to avoid future economic imbalances, the EU recommended specific national 
aims which might result in sanctions from future on in the case of their disregard. In addition, the 
EU launched a permanent bailout fund to avoid member state’s insolvencies. The EU also 
introduced the so-called European semester as a monitoring period regarding the transformation 
of economic and finance political measures of the member states (BMWi 2012).  
 
The review, furthermore, showed that the government in Germany followed a course of strict 
household consolidation to fulfil the debt rule. As a consequence, the public budget deficit fell 
below the 3% barrier in 2011. The government still underlined the importance of education and 
research and from now on also of public infrastructure investments. Therefore, the government 
intended to provide additional funds.  
 
With regard to the national innovation policy, the review showed that the government still 
emphasised energy research. This was, inter alia, underlined by the introduction of an individual 
programme for research regarding electric mobility and the launch of a new energy research 
programme with additional funds. This programme was focused on research in the field of 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy storing and network technologies. These research 
areas are aimed to support the integration of renewable energy in the energy system of Germany. 
The review also showed that the government was focused on health research to improve the 
research result transformation into medical care and on the support of the medical technical 
sector. The government also underlined the requirement of enterprise founding and therefore, 
inter alia, introduced the so-called German Silicon Valley initiative in 2011. This initiative 
attempts to establish a network in the US for enterprise founders. In addition, the government 
launched the second High-Tech Gründerfund in 2011. The analysis of the appendix from the 
economic report 2012 (BMWi 2012) delivered the following result (see subsequent table 44). 
 
The selected measures from economic report 2012 
 
Economic, finance, innovation political measures 
No. Programme title and description Since 
   
28. 
Research agenda demographic change: 
 Fundamentals regarding product and service innovation. 
2011 
69. 
National masterplan maritime technologies: 
 Strategy process regarding the support of maritime technologies. 
2011 
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70. 
Call for proposals in the aviation research programme: 
 Funding of research cooperation.  
2011 
73. 
Research campus: 
 Funding of research cooperation to boost the technology transfer. 
2011 
75. 
German Silicon Valley Accelerator: 
 Network support for IT-based start-ups in the US. 
2011 
76. 
High-Tech Gründerfund: 
 Launch of a second High-Tech Gründerfund. 
2011 
78. 
Modification of the programme ZIM: 
 Funds in the amount of annually 500 MEUR for 2012 to 2014. 
2011 
79. 
Modification of the programme KMU-innovativ: 
 Application on every technology funding area of the BMBF. 
2011 
80. 
New initiatives in the health research programme: 
 Strategy process innovation in medicine technologies.  
2011 
81. 
Governmental programme electric mobility: 
 Research support regarding electric mobility. 
2011 
102. 
6
th
 energy research programme: 
 Budget increase to approx. 3.5 billion euros for 2011 to 2014. 
2011 
 
Table 44 The selected measures from economic report 2012 (derived from BMWi 2012) 
 
6.1.4  The analysis results of the economic report 2013 
 
With regard to European policy, the review of the economic report 2013 (BMWi 2013) showed 
that the EU member states adopted a growth and employment treaty in June 2012. This 
agreement underlined the requirement of collective European initiatives for future growth and 
the improvement of competitiveness in the European Union. In that context, the EU member 
states signed the so-called fiscal agreement in 2012, which is focused on stability, coordination 
and the regulation of the member states. By signing the fiscal agreement, the member states 
agreed on future national budget discipline, the improvement of economic political coordination 
and obliged themselves to adopt national debt rules until 2014. This objective was associated 
with the introduction of the so-called Twopack regulation which strengthened the monitoring 
rights of the EU with regard to the national budgets and possible budget adjustments (BMWi 
2013).  
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The review also showed that the German government still emphasised a course of strong 
household consolidation. On the other hand, the government underlined the importance of SMEs 
for the economy and, moreover, open markets with flexible price systems. Therefore, the 
government modified the competition law in 2012. With regard to innovation policy, the review 
basically showed that the HTS 2020 was supplemented by a so-called action plan in 2012. The 
action plan contains ten different future projects along the demand areas of climate and energy, 
health and nutrition, communication, mobility and safety. These future projects follow detailed 
scientific and technological aims whose achievement is based on cooperation between the 
private economy, the sciences and the politics (BMWi 2013).  
 
According to the European-Plus-Act and Germany’s self-commitments for 2012, the 
government, inter alia, intended to improve the financing conditions for enterprise founding and 
for enterprise financing. Therefore, the German government launched the so-called European 
Angels Fund (see glossary) in 2012. Moreover, the government decided to subsidise business 
angels investments from 2013 on and launched a venture capital investment grant (see glossary) 
in order to improve the entrepreneurial activity in Germany. In addition, the government 
launched the so-called Mezzanine Fund for Germany (see glossary), increased the guarantee 
amounts of the public-owned guarantee banks for SME financing, and also increased the 
investment amounts of the MBGs (BMWi 2013). 
 
The analysis of the appendix from the economic report 2013 (BMWi 2013) delivered the 
following result (see subsequent table 45). 
 
The selected measures from economic report 2013 
 
Economic, finance, innovation political measures 
No. Programme title and description Since 
 
76. 
Action plan: 
 Specification of ten future projects in the HTS 2020. 
2012 
77. 
Innovation concept passion for technology: 
 Concept to increase the proportion of research active enterprises. 
2012 
83. 
Central innovation programme (ZIM): 
 Modification regarding the application on bigger-sized enterprises. 
2012 
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84. 
KMU-innovativ: 
 Adjustments regarding the programme application. 
2012 
86. 
Venture capital investment grant: 
 To boost private investors' investments. 
2013 
87. 
European Angels Fund: 
 To boost business angels' investments. 
2012 
90. 
Programme for the public guarantee banks and the MBGs: 
 Increase of the guarantee and of the investment amounts. 
2013 
121. 
R&D programme economic important resources for Germany: 
 Research funding regarding economical relevant resources. 
2012 
 
Table 45 The selected measures from economic report 2013 (derived from BMWi 2013) 
 
6.2  The analysis results of the research reports 
 
6.2.1  The analysis results of the research report 2012 
 
With regard to the central education, research and innovation political objectives, measures and 
priorities on the federal level, the review lead to the following results. The review showed that 
Germany’s growth strategy attempted to address an increased global research and innovation 
competition, the limitations on resources and the acceleration of the climate change. The German 
government emphasised the interaction of environmentalism, economic strength and social 
responsibility in order to keep pace with these developments. This basic strategy of the 
government resulted in the following four research, educational and innovation political 
priorities: 
 
1. Intensification of international cooperation. 
2. Expansion of educational measures. 
3. Strengthening of sciences. 
4. Modification of the Hightech-Strategy 2006. 
 
Internationalisation of research and sciences is one of the core elements of Germany’s research 
policy. This strategy is focused on the identification of the most successful science structures in 
the world and their utilisation for Germany’s scientific area. The review also showed that the 
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government intended to improve international research cooperation in order to address the future 
challenges of climate change, food crises and limitations of resources.  
 
The review, furthermore, showed that the basic element behind Germany’s education and 
innovation policy was embedded in the so-called qualification initiative from 2008. This 
initiative was launched in order to achieve an increase of expenses for education and research up 
to 10% of the GDP until 2015. Central aspects in that respect were an increasing population of 
students, less early-school leavers and an increasing proportion of adult qualification. These 
educational aims were required due to the demand on skilled employees and to preserve the 
innovation capacity and thus the competitiveness of the country. 
 
With regard to the scientific system, the government was focused on the intensification of 
research cooperation between scientific institutions, research organisations and the private 
economy. The review also showed that the government prolonged the three scientific reform 
initiatives. The first was the so-called quality agreement for the improvement of universities. The 
second was the so-called excellence initiative to boost cutting-edge research and the third was 
the agreement for research and innovation to support the leading research organisations in 
Germany until 2015. 
 
With regard to the governmental innovation policy, the review showed that the priority in that 
respect was on the acceleration of the technology transfer, the improvement of financing 
conditions for technology-based enterprise founding and for innovation projects. In addition, the 
government was concerned with business model innovations as important drivers for the change 
of whole industry sectors. The governmental innovation policy was also focused on 
standardisation measures to ensure easier product launches and intended to align the public 
procurement on the purchase of innovative products and processes. The government was also 
concerned with the promotion of the most successful technology clusters in Germany and 
established an innovation dialogue on the level of the chancellor in 2010. This dialogue forum 
was aimed to discuss innovation financing, network support and technological areas with 
representatives of the economy and the sciences.  
 
According to the HTS 2020, the government established a detailed action plan with future 
projects. These future projects are associated with support-worthy research areas due to their 
economical relevance. They are subsequently described in greater detail and in the context of 
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governmental research priorities. In terms of economical relevance and research funding, the 
review showed that the government prioritised the following research areas: 
 
1. Health care and medical technology. 
2. Provision, agriculture and consumer protection. 
3. Climate, energy and environmentalism. 
4. Energy research and energy technologies. 
5. Urban development, habitation and construction research. 
6. Mobility, traffic and maritime technologies. 
7. Information and communication technologies. 
8. Security, peace and conflict research. 
9. Military research. 
10. Key technologies. 
11. Working conditions and the service sector. 
12. Educational innovations. 
13. Humanities, social sciences and economics. 
 
The first research priority health care and medical technology is based on a programme that was 
launched in 2010. Due to the increasing number of chronic diseases and due to the demographic 
change, the government attempted to improve the innovation capacity of the health sector and to 
accelerate the research transfer in patients care. In addition, the government launched the so-
called strategy process innovation in the medical-technical sector to boost the technology 
transfer. This research focus is associated with two future projects. First, the project 
individualised medical care which is focused on the assessment of disease risks. Second, the 
project self-determined life of elderly citizens which is focused on integration and elderly 
citizens care. The research focus provision, agriculture and consumer protection is concerned 
with the global challenges of food supply, climate change and the preservation of natural 
resources. As a consequence of food demand’s doubling until 2050, this research area is focused 
on the increase of agricultural productivity, quality assurance in the food sector and the reduction 
of animal diseases. The future project prevention and nutrition in that respect is focused on 
research regarding the effects of ingredients in nutrition. The third research priority climate, 
energy and environmentalism is based on the governmental sustainability strategy and on 
government’s decision to give up nuclear energy production until 2022. In order to intensify this 
so-called energy turn, the research support is focused on new energy resources, energy storage, 
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energy grids and energy efficiency. Three individual future projects in the HTS 2020 are 
concerned with energy research. The first project is energy efficient cities which is focused on 
research regarding mobility systems, energy efficient housings and the expansion of energy 
grids. The second future project is renewable raw materials as oil alternatives. This project is 
focused on the use of biomass. The third project is concerned with the modification of the energy 
system in order to support the energy turn. Therefore, the government launched the so-called 
sixth energy research programme for the funding period between 2011 and 2014. The fifth 
research focus is concerned with urban development and construction research to improve the 
energy efficiency of existing buildings, to ensure age-appropriate buildings and to boost 
innovations in the construction sector. The research focus mobility, traffic and maritime 
technologies is, inter alia, concerned with research support regarding traffic infrastructure 
systems, the use of electric mobility and of environmental friendly maritime technologies. The 
future project sustainable mobility in the HTS 2020 is focused on electric mobility and the 
application of both hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. In that respect, the government attempts 
to achieve the reduction of traffic sector’s energy consumption by approx. 40% until 2050 in 
comparison to 2005. The seventh research priority is information and communication 
technologies. This research area is associated with two future projects. The first is the project 
industry 4.0 which is focused on the so-called cyber-physical systems and smart factoring. 
Research in that respect is required to address more individualised product development as a 
consequence of open innovation. The future project internet-based systems for the economy is 
focused on business models in the internet. The research focus security, peace and conflict 
research is focused on both the prevention and handling of crises. The future project of the HTS 
2020, the so-called project safe identities in the internet, is concerned with privacy and safety in 
the internet. The government attempts to ensure a safe environment for successful business 
applications in the World Wide Web and tries to improve the growth of internet-based business 
models. These future projects have each individual budgets which are summarised in the 
subsequent table 46. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 171 
The budgets of the future projects 
 
Rank Project specification Budget in MEUR Share in % 
    
1. Modification of the energy system 3,700 44.34 
2. Sustainable mobility 2,190 26.24 
3. Renewable raw materials as oil alternative 570 6.83 
4. Energy efficient cities 560 6.71 
5. Individualised medical care 370 4.43 
6. Self-determined life of elderly citizens 305 3.66 
7. Internet-based systems for the economy 300 3.59 
8. Industry 4.0 200 2.40 
9. Prevention and nutrition 90 1.08 
10. Safe identities in the internet 60 0.72 
    
 Total budget 8,345 100.00 
 
Table 46 The budgets of the future projects (derived from BMBF 2012) 
 
The subsequent table 47 summarises the project budgets along main subjects. This shows that 
approx. 58% of research funding is directly associated with energy research and a comparatively 
smaller proportion with mobility research, internet research, medical care research and research 
regarding the demographic change. 
 
The summarised budgets of the future projects 
 
Rank Project area Budget in MEUR Share in % 
    
1. Energy 4,830 57.88 
2. Mobility 2,190 26.24 
3. Internet 560 6.71 
4. Medical care and health research 460 5.51 
5. Demographic change 305 3.66 
    
 Total budget 8,345 100.00 
 
Table 47 The summarised budgets of the future projects (derived from BMBF 2012) 
 
The review, moreover, showed that additional research priorities were in the field of military 
research, key technologies, working conditions, education innovations, the humanities, 
economics and the social sciences. Finally, the review of the present research report (BMBF 
2012) confirmed and expanded the review results of the economic reports with regard to the: 
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 launch of a second High-Tech Gründerfund by the KfW in 2011; volume 291 MEUR;  
 launch of a second ERP-Startfund by the KfW in 2011; fund volume 250 MEUR; 
 application of the programme KMU-innovativ for medical technological research. 
 
6.2.2  The analysis results of the research report 2014 
 
According to the European policy, the review initially showed that innovation policy was a core 
element to preserve the competitiveness of the EU. The European strategy 2020 in that respect is 
associated with three political strategies: 
 
1. The innovation union. 
2. The European research area (BMBF 2014). 
3. The framework programme Horizon 2020. 
 
The innovation union is the central European initiative and is concerned with the improvements 
of the conditions for research and innovation. This initiative is aimed to establish the so-called 
European research area, to coordinate public funding measures and to support the whole 
innovation chain from basic research to product launches (BMBF 2015a). The European research 
area on the other hand is aimed to achieve equal research and innovation conditions in Europe. 
The implementation of the European research area is supported by the perennial funding 
programmes of the European Union. The current programme so-called Horizon 2020 has a total 
budget of 75 billion euros for the period between 2014 and 2020. Horizon 2020 is focused on the 
intensification of research cooperation on the one hand and research funding of key technologies 
on the other hand (BMBF 2015b). This programme also attempts to boost the technology transfer 
and to increase private economy investments for research and innovation (BMBF 2014).  
 
The review showed that in the context of this European innovation policy, the German 
government still focused on education, research and innovation to withstand the competitive 
global environment. With regard to educational political objectives, measures and priorities, the 
review showed that the government still emphasised the significance of education to ensure a 
skilled-worker basis in the economy. In order to avoid a skilled-worker constraint as a 
consequence of the demographic change, the government builds on early childhood education 
and long life learning (BMBF 2014).  
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With regard to the scientific environment in Germany, the review showed that the government 
adopted a so-called scientific liberty act in late 2012. This act allows the public funded research 
organisations more flexibility regarding their budgets (BMBF 2015c). A core objective of the 
government is the strengthening of universities, the support of research organisations, the further 
expansion of networks and the support of cooperation in the research environment (BMBF 
2014). 
 
The review, furthermore, showed that the innovation policy was still aligned on the adjusted 
HTS 2020. As in the research report 2012 (BMBF 2012), the review of the report 2014 (BMBF 
2014) showed that the government was focused on the improvement of the technology transfer, 
the public procurement of innovative products and services, and on product standardisation. The 
government still emphasised the significance of research support regarding key technologies and 
their earlier application in products, processes and services.  
 
In the context of research funding, the review showed that the government intended to improve 
the quality assurance system by additional impact analyses (BMBF 2014). 
 
The further review of the present research report 2014 (BMBF 2014) confirmed and expanded 
the results of the economic report review with regard to the: 
  
 increase of High-Tech Gründerfund’s fund volume to 304 MEUR: 
a) public investment 260 MEUR;  
b) private investors' investment 44 MEUR; 
 launch of a venture capital investment grant in 2013. 
    
6.2.3  The analysis results regarding the federal research subsidies 
 
The analysis regarding the research grant ZIM showed that the government expanded the budget 
significantly in the amount of 900 million euros in 2009. This additional budget was part of the 
conjuncture programme II (see section 4.5.2). The further review showed that the central 
innovation programme was budgeted with annual amounts of 500 million euros each for 2012, 
2013 and 2014 (BMWi 2012, see consecutive number 78, in table 44 in section 6.1.3). 
Additional funds were also provided for the programme KMU-innovativ without detailed 
specification in the literature. Both programmes were significantly improved regarding their 
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application during the post-crisis phase. This applies in terms of enterprise sizes and for the 
application on specific research areas (BMWi 2011; BMWi 2012; BMWi 2013).  
 
Belitz et al. (2012) calculated disbursed funds of the ZIM in the amount of four million euros in 
2008 and 155 million euros in 2009 (see also section 4.5.2). During the post-crisis phase, the 
volumes of the ZIM reached 652 million euros in 2010, 712 million euros in 2011 and 445 
million euros in 2012 (BMWi 2015). Rammer et al. (2011), with regard to the progress of the 
disbursed funds for KMU-innovativ, calculated eight million euros for 2008 and 45 million euros 
for 2009 (see also section 4.5.2). They also calculated disbursed funds of 78 million euros for 
2010 and estimated a payment of at least 75 million euros in 2011 (Rammer et al. 2011). The 
review of the research report 2014 (BMBF 2014) showed that in 2013, an amount of approx. 100 
million euros was paid out for the programme KMU-innovativ. The further review, moreover, 
showed that there was no reliable data regarding the progress of funds for the programme KMU-
innovativ. Therefore, the values for 2011 and 2012 were estimated in the amount of 90 million 
euros and 100 million euros respectively. The subsequent table 48 summarises the progress of 
the programmes ZIM and KMU-innovativ for both the initial and the post-crisis phase. 
 
The disbursed grants of the federal research subsidies 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Programme in MEUR 
       
ZIM 4 155 652 712 445 1,968 
KMU-innovativ 8 45 78 90 100 321 
       
Total  12 200 730 802 545 2,289 
 
Table 48 The disbursed grants of the federal research subsidies 
(derived from Rammer et al. 2011; Belitz et al. 2012; BMWi 2015; own estimation) 
 
6.3  The initial analysis results of the KfW reports 
 
The funding and equity financing programmes of the KfW each have specific German terms 
which describe the funding purpose of each programme. In order to ensure the traceability of the 
results, the subsequent clarifications in the tables are associated with the original German term 
and an additional clarification in English. Furthermore, each equity financing programme is 
clarified in greater detail in order to comprehend their specific purpose. The co-investments of 
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the KfW are clarified in greater detail in the glossary. The KfW provides a larger number of 
credit programmes for enterprise financing and enterprise founding (see also section 4.5.1). 
Therefore, the subsequent clarifications concentrate on the most important programmes.  
 
The funding programmes for enterprise founding are issued for succession solutions, for business 
creation or for growth purposes. The credit programmes vary in their specific credit amounts and 
periods. In some cases, the credits do not cover the full project costs so that an own contribution 
usually in the proportion of 20% is required. The credits for enterprise founding are redemption 
free in the beginning and the credit conditions are subsidised by the so-called European 
Recovery Programme or by funds from the European Union. A direct credit request is not 
possible and therefore a private bank is interposed between the KfW and the borrower. The 
private bank is responsible for the credit monitoring but not liable for the credit default in the 
case of credits for enterprise founding (KfW 2015). The review also showed that the most 
important credit programme of the KfW for enterprise financing is the so-called KfW-
Unternehmerkredit (KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a). This KfW credit is concerned with 
both investment and inventory financing of enterprises with annual turnovers of maximum 500 
million euros. The lending rates are comparatively small and a credit request requires the 
interposition of a private bank too. The private bank is responsible for the credit monitoring and 
free from default liabilities. This applies for a proportion of 50% from the credit amount. 
Additional KfW programmes are concerned with the funding of projects in the less structured 
regions or the eastern part of Germany (KfW 2015). On certain occasions, KfW funding is also 
concerned with special purpose financing, as in the case of the so-called KfW-Sonderprogramm 
(see also section 4.5.2) to stabilise the economy (KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a). 
 
6.3.1  The analysis results of the KfW annual support reports 
 
The business volume of the so-called KfW-Mittelstandsbank in the annual support reports (KfW 
2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a) is summarised along the basic subjects: 
 
 enterprise founding and SME financing;  
 innovation financing; 
 environmental projects (see also section 5.6.5). 
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This presentation encompasses each funding programme which is issued by the KfW-
Mittelstandsbank. Financial crisis related financing measures are not separately listed. This 
required the reclassification of the annual support reports in order to comprehend the progress of 
KfW’s funding measures. The reclassified examination areas were: 
 
 enterprise founding and SME financing;  
 innovation financing; 
 equity financing; 
 financial crisis related measures (see also section 5.6.5). 
 
The results of the initial reclassification are presented in table 49 (see appendix N.1). This 
presentation initially separated the equity funding programmes, the financial crisis related 
measures and excluded advisory grants. A more compromised summary of the business volume 
is then presented in table 50 (see appendix N.2). The aggregated business volume of the KfW 
Mittelstandsbank is presented in the subsequent table 51. This summary shows that the entire 
business volume of the KfW was distorted by financial crisis related financing measures in the 
amount of approx. 14.8 billion euros between 2009 and 2011. Without these financial crisis 
related measures, the business volume of the KfW would have declined significantly between 
2008 and 2009. This applies both for enterprise financing and enterprise founding but also for 
the equity funding programmes. Overall, the business volume of the KfW-Mittelstandsbank 
increased between 2010 and 2012, even though only slightly due to the significant decrease of 
the innovation and equity financing programmes. 
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The aggregated business volume of the KfW 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Programme purpose in MEUR 
      
Enterprise founding and SME financing 10,212 7,400 8,950 8,416 10,859 
Innovation financing 888 1,220 2,039 2,144 901 
Equity financing 261 201 225 201 171 
      
Subtotal 11,361 8,821 11,214 10,761 11,931 
      
Financial crisis related measures - 7,948 6,176 691 - 
      
Total 11,361 16,769 17,390 11,452 11,931 
 
Table 51 The aggregated business volume of the KfW  
(derived from KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a) 
 
In 2014, the KfW issued four different equity financing programmes. These were, according to 
their original terms, the so-called ERP-Startfund, the ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm, the KfW-
Risikokapitalprogramm and the KfW-Programm Beteiligung Sozialunternehmen (KfW 2015). 
The so-called ERP-Startfund was launched in early 2005 due to the decreasing number of 
enterprise founders and the market gap in early-stage financing (Renz 2014a). The ERP-
Startfund is focused on equity investments in technological enterprises which may not be older 
than ten years, may not employ more than 50 employees and whose annual turnover may not 
exceed ten million euros (KfW 2015). According to the responsible investment director, the fund 
is focused on equity investments in the IT, the internet, the environmental protection sector and 
in addition with energy storing technologies in order to support the energy turn (Renz 2014b). 
The ERP-Startfund is a co-financing fund which requires the co-investment of a KfW accredited 
lead investor (KfW 2015). This fund meanwhile co-financed almost every venture capital firm in 
Germany (Renz 2014c). The investment conditions of the ERP-Startfund are the same as of the 
lead investor, who is responsible for the portfolio company and obliged to report regularly (KfW 
2015).  
 
The so-called ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm on the other hand is a 100% refinancing measure for 
investments of PE and VC firms. The underlying investment must be concerned with enterprise 
founding, restructuring, shareholder’s compensation or the financing of innovative projects. The 
equity investor receives an investment credit from the KfW in the amount of 1.25 to 2.5 million 
euros for an investment period up to twelve and a half years. The ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm 
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requires the guarantee from a public guarantee bank to protect the KfW from the default risk. 
The equity investor takes the full risk as additional collateralisation is not possible. The 
programme is focused on equity investments in enterprises with at most 75 million euros on 
annual turnovers (KfW 2015).  
 
The so-called KfW-Risikokapitalprogramm is concerned with direct guarantees of the KfW for 
equity investments of independent PE and VC firms. In that case, the investment is guaranteed in 
a proportion of 40% to 50% from a maximum investment of five million euros per deal. 
Additional guarantees are not possible and the programme is focused on investments in 
enterprises with no more than 500 million euros on annual turnovers. This programme is applied 
for succession solutions, shareholder’s compensation or for growth purposes (KfW 2015). 
 
The programme so-called Beteiligung Sozialunternehmen is concerned with equity investments 
in social enterprises. This programme, which is not applicable for enterprise founding, requires 
the co-investment of a lead investor. The KfW participates to equal conditions with investment 
amounts between 50,000 euros and 200,000 euros per deal (KfW 2015).  
 
The subsequent table 52 details the progress of KfW’s equity financing programmes, whose 
volumes decreased significantly by approx. 23% between 2008 and 2009. During the post-crisis 
phase, the volumes initially recovered in 2010 but subsequently decreased both in 2011 and 
2012. This progress stands for a decline of approx. 35% between 2008 and 2012. In that respect, 
almost every programme suffered from decreasing investment volumes (KfW 2011a; KfW 
2012a; KfW 2013a). With regard to the decrease of the ERP-Startfund, the responsible 
investment director from the KfW points out that lead investors, which in their majority would 
be VC investors, were decrementally withdrawing from the PE and VC market during the post-
crisis phase. He supplements that the venture capital firms were not able to realise successful 
exits and hence did not achieve the proposed investment returns. Consequently, investors denied 
to reinvest in subsequent venture capital funds, which resulted in the declining demand for both 
co- or refinancing measures of the KfW (Renz 2014b).     
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The investment volumes of KfW’s equity financing programmes 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Equity financing programmes in MEUR 
            
ERP-Startfund 63 71 80 70 58 
(Co-financing measure for equity investments) 
     
ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm 65 66 90 83 69 
(Refinancing measure for PE and VC firms) 
     
KfW-Risikokapitalprogramm 114 61 50 29 26 
(Refinancing measure for PE and VC firms) 
     
Programm Beteiligung Sozialunternehmen - - - - 0 
(Co-financing measure for equity investments) 
     
Sonstige Beteiligungsprogramme 19 3 5 19 18 
(Various equity financing measures; ns)           
      
Total 261 201 225 201 171 
            
Total number of investments 614 560 614 541 464 
Average investment volume in MEUR 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 
 
Table 52 The investment volumes of KfW’s equity financing programmes (own development) 
 
6.3.2  The analysis results of the KfW report 2010 
 
With regard to the funding programmes for enterprise financing, the review showed that the 
entire volume of the so-called KfW-Sonderprogramm decreased significantly due to economy’s 
recovery in 2010. This credit financing programme was launched during the initial phase of the 
financial crisis to support the credit provision of the economy and to boost investments of 
enterprises (see also section 4.5.2). The review showed that the KfW improved the financing 
conditions of the so-called KfW-Sonderprogramm, prolonged the credit durations and also 
prolonged the fixed interest periods. With regard to innovation financing, the review showed that 
the progress in that respect was distorted by a specific research and development measure in the 
amount of approx. 1.2 billion euros in 2010 (KfW 2011). The recourse to the appendices of the 
economic reports showed that the government adopted a special aviation financing programme 
in 2010 (BMWi 2011). This programme was concerned with the funding of research cooperation 
between the aviation industry and research organisations, and was phased out in 2012 (BMWi 
2011). With regard to funding measures for enterprise founding, the KfW emphasised this 
funding area as the most important area of the KfW-Mittelstandsbank. The KfW also underlined 
the requirement of public funding for enterprise founding due to an existing financing gap, the 
lack of securities and the negation of private banks to provide founder loans. With regard to 
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equity financing and KfW’s co-investments, the review showed that the KfW improved the 
conditions for the so-called ERP-Startfund and increased the co-investment proportion from 50% 
to 70% and the co-investment amount from five to six million euros. The review, furthermore, 
showed that the KfW co-financed an equity financing fund, the so-called Eigenkapitalfund for 
the German Mittelstand (see glossary). This externally managed fund was launched in 2010 due 
to the decreasing equity proportions of enterprises during the financial crisis. The KfW initially 
co-financed 100 million euros in 2010 (KfW 2011).       
 
6.3.3  The analysis results of the KfW report 2011 
 
With regard to enterprise financing, the review initially showed that the KfW emphasised the 
importance of the so-called KfW-Unternehmerkredit. This credit programme was regarded as the 
central KfW financing measure for SME funding. The review in that context also showed that 
the KfW discontinued the KfW-Sonderprogramm in 2011 as Germany’s economy has recovered 
significantly. In the context of enterprise financing, the review showed that the KfW launched a 
new financing programme for film producing enterprises. These enterprises, which are part of 
the creativity and cultural sector, are regarded as promising and therefore as support-worthy. The 
review did not result in important clarifications regarding innovation financing. With regard to 
enterprise founding, the review showed that the KfW launched an additional programme with 
very small lending rates. In addition, the KfW improved the existing programme structure, inter 
alia, by doubling the credit amounts in some of the programmes. On the level of equity financing 
measures, the review showed that the KfW increased the fund volume of the so-called ERP-
Startfund in the amount of 250 million euros in 2011. The total fund volume meanwhile reached 
720 million euros. Furthermore, the KfW participated in the second High-Tech Gründerfund and 
co-invested 40 million euros. The fund volume of the HTGF reached 289 million euros in 2011 
(KfW 2012). 
 
6.3.4  The analysis results of the KfW report 2012 
 
The review of the annual report 2012 showed that the KfW further improved the programme 
conditions for enterprise financing. In that respect, the KfW more than doubled the credit 
amounts from ten to 25 million euros and prolonged the fixed interest periods from the KfW-
Unternehmerkredit. The KfW clarified that this significant improvement was required to support 
the middle-sized enterprises due to an increasing global competition. With regard to the decline 
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of innovation financing in 2012, the KfW pointed out that several larger credits were already 
issued in 2011. On the level of enterprise founding, the review showed that the KfW further 
improved the programme conditions by extending the fixed interest periods. In that respect, the 
KfW passed the cheap refinancing conditions from the capital market to the borrowers. With 
regard to equity financing programmes, the review showed that the KfW launched an additional 
equity funding programme for social enterprises in early 2012. This programme was launched to 
establish a PE and VC market for social enterprises in Germany. First investments were realised 
in 2012. In the context of the equity financing measures, the review also showed that the fund 
volume of the second High-Tech Gründerfund meanwhile increased to 294 million euros in 2012 
(KfW 2013).  
 
The analysis also showed that within the selected examination areas, namely credit programmes 
for enterprise founding and SME financing, innovation financing and equity financing (see 
section 5.6.5), the area of enterprise founding and SME financing was the predominating funding 
area. During 2008 until 2012, the proportion of credits for enterprise founding and SME 
financing on the entire programme volume varied between approx. 78% and 91% (see 
subsequent table 53). Within the credit programmes for enterprise founding and SME financing, 
the so-called Unternehmerkredit was the predominating type of credit both during the initial and 
the post-crisis phase. The proportion of the so-called Unternehmerkredit on credits for enterprise 
founding and SME financing decreased from 88.2% in 2008 to 71.9% in 2012 due to the 
significant increase of credits for enterprise founding. This proportion of credits for enterprise 
founding on credits for enterprise founding and SME financing increased from 2.9% in 2008 to 
22.8% in 2012 (see subsequent table 53). With regard to equity financing measures, this part of 
the analysis showed that despite their significant expansion and improvement during the post-
crisis phase (see sections 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4), their proportion on the entire programme 
volume, nevertheless, declined from 2.3% in 2008 to 1.4% in 2012 (see subsequent table 53).  
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KfW’s programme proportions 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Programme volumes in MEUR 
      
Enterprise founding and SME financing 10,212 7,400 8,950 8,416 10,859 
(Unternehmerkredit) (9,010) (6,365) (8,006) (6,338) (7,811) 
(Enterprise founding) (297) (341) (399) (1,111) (2,472) 
Innovation financing 888 1,220 2,039 2,144 901 
Equity financing 261 201 225 201 171 
      
Total I 11,361 8,821 11,214 10,761 11,931 
 
Programme proportion in per cent of total I 
      
Enterprise founding and SME financing 89.9% 83.9% 79.8% 78.2% 91.0% 
Innovation financing 7.8% 13.8% 18.2% 19.9% 7.6% 
Equity financing 2.3% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.4% 
      
Total  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Proportion of the Unternehmerkredit on enterprise founding and SME financing 
      
Proportion  88.2% 86.0% 89.5% 75.3% 71.9% 
 
Proportion of the credits for enterprise founding on enterprise founding and SME financing 
      
Proportion  2.9% 4.6% 4.5% 13.2% 22.8% 
 
Table 53 KfW’s programme proportions (own development) 
 
The analysis has, furthermore, shown that the proportion of KfW’s equity financing measures on 
the entire PE and VC investments in Germany was on average 3.9% for the period between 2008 
to 2012, approx. 4.7% for the period of the initial crisis phase in 2008 and 2009, and approx. 
3.4% for the post-crisis phase respectively. Under the assumption that KfW’s equity funding in 
its vast majority was associated with venture capital and hence early-stage financing (see also 
section 6.3.1), the proportion of KfW’s equity financing measures on venture capital investments 
in Germany was on average approx. 28.9% for the period of 2008 to 2012, approx. 27.2% on 
average during the initial crisis phase of 2008 and 2009, and on average 30% during the post-
crisis phase respectively. These analysis results are summarised in the subsequent table 54.  
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KfW’s PE and VC proportions 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
PE and VC financing in MEUR 
      
KfW equity financing volumes 261 201 225 201 171 
      
PE and VC investments in Germany
1)
  9,584 3,024 4,895 6,667 6,455 
VC investments in Germany
1)
 1,094 659 729 717 549 
      
KfW proportion on PE and VC investments in Germany 
      
From total PE and VC investments  2.7% 6.7% 4.6% 3.0% 2.7% 
From VC investments  23.9% 30.5% 30.9% 28.0% 31.2% 
 
1) EVCA data (see table 11 in appendix G.2). 
Table 54 KfW’s PE and VC proportions (own development) 
 
Beside the direct funding of the KfW, the analysis results have also shown that the KfW was 
active as a co-investor. During the post-crisis phase, the KfW invested in total 140 MEUR for 
equity funding measures outside the own business. The KfW paid 100 MEUR in the so-called 
Eigenkapitalfund for Germany in 2010 and 40 MEUR in the so-called second High-Tech 
Gründerfund (see subsequent table 55). 
 
The co-investments of the KfW 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
Type of fund in MEUR 
    
Eigenkapitalfund for Germany 100     
(Equity fund for growth purposes) 
   
High-Tech Gründerfund II 
 
 40   
(Seed- and start-up financing fund)       
    
Total 100 40 0  
 
Table 55 The co-investments of the KfW (own development) 
 
The subsequent section summarises the equity funding measures which were launched and 
funded by the BMWi and the KfW. 
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6.4  The analysis summary 
 
The subsequent table 56 summarises the progress of equity measures on the federal level 
between 2009 and 2013. This shows that the number of equity financing measures significantly 
increased during the post-crisis phase and that this phase was also associated with decisions 
regarding equity funding measures in the future.  
 
The progress of the equity measures from the BMWi and the KfW 
 
 Period Year Measure 
   
Financial crisis 2009 Additional deposits for the ERP-Startfund.  
  Prolongation of High-Tech Gründerfund’s investment period. 
   
Post-crisis phase 2010 Launch of the Eigenkapitalfund for Germany. 
 2011 Launch of the 2. High-Tech Gründerfund. 
  Additional deposits for the ERP-Startfund.  
 2012 Launch of the European Angels Fund. 
  Launch of the equity financing programme social enterprises. 
 
 
  
Subsequent phase 2013 Launch of the Venture Capital Investment Grant. 
  Launch of the Mezzanine Fund for Germany. 
 
 Table 56 The progress of the equity measures from the BMWi and the KfW (own development) 
 
The volumes of the equity financing funds are summarised in the subsequent table 57. This 
shows that 200 million euros on additional equity financing capital was provided in the initial 
phase of the crisis and approx. 1.1 billion euros in the post-crisis phase. During the phase of 
2010, 2011 and 2012, the government also decided on additional equity financing measures in 
the volume of 350 million euros for the subsequent periods. 
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The equity financing contribution of the KfW and the BMWi 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 2013 
Fund name/initiative in MEUR 
        
ERP Startfund
1)
  200  250  450  
Eigenkapitalfund for Germany   500   500  
Hightech-Gründerfund II    289 4 293  
European Angels Fund     60 60  
Equity fund for social enterprises     ns 0  
 
 
       
Venture Capital Investment Grant       150 
Mezzanine Fund for Germany       200 
        
Total 0 200 500 539 64 1,303 350 
 
1) Deposits. 
Table 57 The equity financing contribution of the KfW and the BMWi (own development) 
 
6.5  The main study survey 
 
6.5.1  The survey progress 
 
The survey was carried out immediately after the pilot study in order to reduce the risk of post-
hoc recall biases (see section 5.5.1). The survey of the present thesis started on 13 October 2013 
and altogether 107 PE and VC firms were invited (see section 5.5.2 and table 22 in section 
5.5.2). The sample members received an invitation letter, the questionnaire instructions and a 
confirmation letter from the university. The whole survey was sent by e-mail and by mail in the 
case of missing e-mail addresses. The sample members were requested to send their responses by 
10 November 2013. As in the case of the pilot study, the sample members were guaranteed 
absolute privacy and confidentiality. Due to the weak participation, sample members were 
reminded at altogether three occasions in November 2013, in January 2014 and in February 
2014. In the run up of the final reminder, the sample members were contacted by phone on 7 
February 2014. This showed that a remarkable proportion of sample members denied to 
participate not only due to time constraints but also due to language difficulties. Therefore, the 
questionnaire was translated into German and was finally sent to the sample members. The 
online data base was closed on 10 April 2014 and at that point the main study was finalised.  
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The majority of respondents processed the questionnaire via the online link. Those 
questionnaires which were sent back by fax, e-mail or mail were processed manually. One 
sample member participated in a telephone interview during the telephone calls on 7 February 
2014. The enterprise characteristics of this sample member were stored in the data base for 
statistic purposes. Due to the semi-structured progress of this interview, it was not possible to 
consider the content in the online data base. Therefore, the interview results are presented 
separately in the context of the main study results. The online data base was stored in MS-Excel 
format which ensured a straightforward data analysis.  
 
During the main study, 30 PE and VC firms indicated that they do not participate on surveys in 
general due to time constraints and confidentiality concerns. At the end, 25 PE and VC investors 
participated on the survey. At first, the responses were checked regarding errors, plausibility and 
completeness. As a result, one questionnaire was not processed due to both plausibility concerns 
and incompleteness. Finally, 24 questionnaires were considered for the data analysis. This 
corresponds to a response proportion of 31.2% from the final sample size of 77 enterprises and 
22.4% from the initial sample size of 107 enterprises. These results met the earlier expectations 
(see section 5.5.1) but were clearly under the response rate of the studies from Zimmermann and 
Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). Nevertheless, the response 
of 22.4% is still within the response proportions of doctoral studies in PE and VC research 
(Röper 2004; Pankotsch 2005; Sobczak 2007; Kranz 2008; Hoffelner 2010; Wahrenberger 2011; 
Wexlberger 2011). In that respect, researchers achieved response rates between 18% (Hoffelner 
2010) and 31% (Wexlberger 2011).  
 
The subsequent table 58 details the survey response. 
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The survey statistics 
 
Status per 10 April 2014 Number 
  
Initial sample  107 
Rejections -30 
Final sample 77 
  
Respondents 25 
Not processable -1 
Processable 24 
    
Proportion from final total 31.2% 
Proportion from earlier total 22.4% 
Proportion of rejections 28.0% 
 
Table 58 The survey statistics (own development) 
 
6.5.2  The survey characteristics, the representativity and the biases  
 
Altogether, five independent investors, seven corporate venture capital firms, six public investors 
and six Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften participated in the survey. Hence, the 
responses could be divided in two groups. One group might be classified as more support-
oriented and is composed of the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften and of the public 
investors, whereas the remaining group might be classified as more profit and strategic oriented. 
This group is composed of the independent investors and the corporate venture capitalists (see 
subsequent table 59).  
 
The main study response statistics 
 
Type of investor Respondents Proportion in % 
 
    
Independent investor 5 21% 
Corporate Venture Capital firm 7 29% 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 6 25% 
Public investor 6 25% 
      
Number of participants 24 100% 
 
Table 59 The main study response statistics (own development) 
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In their majority, the questionnaires were processed from the middle or the top management of 
the sample members. This employment level, in connection with the employment duration, 
supported the assumption that the survey results did not suffer from a key informant bias (see 
subsequent table 60). This type of bias is based on the assumption that respondents have to be 
experienced and hence be able to provide reliable indications. Assessments in that respect might 
differ due to the employment level and thus the different perspectives and experiences 
(Wahrenberger 2011). Even though the invitations of the survey were sent to the top 
management of the sample members, the questionnaires could have been processed from a lower 
employment level. In particular, the research area regarding the investment process required 
sufficient experience and the right perspective. This should be guaranteed as 50% of the 
respondents belong to the middle management and 45% to the top management of the sample 
members (see subsequent table 60).    
 
The employment status of the survey respondents 
 
Status 
 
Lower Middle Top Total 
 
(Associate) (Investmentmanager) (Director, CEO) 
 
          
n 1 10 9 20 
Proportion 5% 50% 45% 100% 
     
Duration 
    
Mean 1.0 6.6 15.8 10.2 
Median 1.0 5.5 14.5 12.0 
Variance #DIV/0! 19.6 27.1 45.9 
Deviation #DIV/0! 4.4 5.2 6.8 
 
Table 60 The employment status of the survey respondents (own development) 
 
At first, the results showed that the participating firms were founded between 1971 and 2012, 
and hence seemed suitable to contribute in accordance with the research timeframe. At the time 
of the survey in 2013, the average age of the sample frame was approx. 18 years. The CVC firms 
with an average age of approx. 11 years represented the youngest group of investors and the 
MBGs with an average age of approx. 35 years represented the oldest group of investors (see 
subsequent table 61).  
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The age structure of the sample 
n=21 
Type of investor Independent CVC MBG Public Total 
            
Respondents 4 6 5 6 21 
Median 2002 2004 1972 1998 1998 
Max 2012 2012 2002 1999 2012 
Min 1989 1990 1971 1990 1971 
Range 23 22 31 9 41 
Average age at survey moment  12.0 10.7 35.4 16.3 18.4 
 
Table 61 The age structure of the sample (own development) 
 
In their majority, the respondents were focused on investments in Germany and thus the 
underlying regional focus of the present survey. Only a minor proportion of investors were also 
concerned with worldwide or investments in Europe. The MBGs and the public investors were 
exclusively operating in Germany (see subsequent table 62).  
 
The regional investment focus 
n=24 (multiple selection) 
Regional focus Germany Europe World Total 
Type of investor     
     
Independent 2 3 0 5 
CVC 5 0 2 7 
MBG 6 0 0 6 
Public 6 0 0 6 
Responses 19 3 2 24 
Proportion 79% 13% 8% 100% 
 
Table 62 The regional investment focus (own development) 
 
Furthermore, the survey respondents were focused on early-stage investments in the seed, the 
start-up and the expansion phase. Only a minor proportion of investors were also concerned with 
bridge, replacement and turnaround investments. These financing purposes were either provided 
by the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften or the public PE and VC firms, which were 
also concerned with MBO and MBI investments (see subsequent table 63). 
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The financing purpose 
n=23 (multiple selection) 
Type of investor Independent CVC MBG Public Responses In % 
Financing purpose             
              
Expansion 4 4 6 5 19 83% 
Start-up 5 5 5 3 18 78% 
Seed 3 4 2 3 12 52% 
MBO/MBI 0 1 6 5 12 52% 
Bridge/Replacement 0 0 3 2 5 22% 
Turnaround 0 0 2 1 3 13% 
 
Table 63 The financing purpose (own development) 
 
At survey moment in 2013, the majority of respondents preferred minority and silent 
investments. Every participating MBG realised silent investments according to their central 
business model (see subsequent table 64). Beside this concentration on minority and silent 
investments, the majority of respondents were also focused on smaller volume investments. In 
that respect, approx. 65% of the respondents indicated that their investment volumes were not 
bigger than 1.5 million euros per deal at survey moment. The remaining third of the respondents 
were focused on medium-sized investments between 1.5 and 25 million euros per deal. No 
investor realised investments which were bigger than 25 million euros per deal (see table 65). In 
that context, research results showed that the majority of respondents kept these basic investment 
classes overall unchanged (see table 66). 
 
The type of investment at survey moment 
n=23 (multiple selection) 
Type of investor Independent CVC MBG Public Responses In % 
Type of investment             
              
Minority investments 4 6 3 6 19 83% 
Silent investments 1 3 6 4 14 61% 
Open investments 2 3 1 2 8 35% 
Majority investments 2 1 0 1 4 17% 
 
Table 64 The type of investment at survey moment (own development) 
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The investment classes at survey moment 
 
Classification From  To  Responses Proportion Cumulated 
  in TEUR       
1 100 499 4 17% 17% 
2 500 1,500 11 48% 65% 
3 1,501 4,999 5 22% 87% 
4 5,000 14,999 2 9% 96% 
5 15,000 25,000 1 4% 100% 
6 25,001   0 0% 
 
            
n     23 100%   
 
Table 65 The investment classes at survey moment (own development) 
 
The progress of investment classes between 2010 and 2012 
 
 
Responses Proportion 
Progress     
      
Unchanged 13 65% 
Increased 4 20% 
Decreased 3 15% 
      
n 20 100% 
 
Table 66 The progress of investment classes between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
The survey respondents also indicated that they were focused on investments in enterprises 
between seven million euros and approx. 176 million euros on annual turnovers at the moment of 
the survey in 2013. Even though these average results have a strong deviation at the maximum 
boarder, the median results underline the focus of the sample respondents on SME investments 
(see subsequent table 67). The results for the MBGs were quite similar. Turnovers of their 
portfolio varied between nine million euros and 185 million euros with a large deviation at the 
maximum boarder too. The median on the other hand also underlined the basic orientation of the 
MBGs on SME investments (see table 89 in appendix O). In that context, the majority of 
respondents indicated that the turnover requirements of potential investments neither decreased 
nor increased during the post-crisis phase. This basically applied for the minimum and maximum 
turnover thresholds even though approx. one third of the respondents indicated increasing 
turnover requirements on the maximum boarder (see table 68). The results for the MBGs in that 
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respect showed increasing turnover thresholds at the maximum level, which applied at least for 
the half of the respondents (see table 90 in appendix O). 
 
The turnover thresholds of investment targets 
Total sample 
 
n=19 Minimum Maximum 
  turnover in MEUR 
   
Max 17 643 
Min 1 3 
Range 16 640 
Median 6.5 50.0 
Mean 7.0 175.9 
Variance 41.2 51,543.6 
Deviation 6.4 227.0 
Responses 6 13 
 
Table 67 The turnover thresholds of investment targets (own development) 
 
The development of turnover thresholds between 2010 and 2012 
Total sample 
 n=17 Minimum turnover 
  Decreased Increased Unchanged 
Responses 2 1 14 
Proportion  12% 6% 82% 
        
 
Maximum turnover 
  Decreased Increased Unchanged 
Responses 1 5 11 
Proportion  6% 29% 65% 
 
Table 68 The development of turnover thresholds between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
At the moment of the survey in 2013, the participating investors were focused on investments in 
the mechanical and industry automation sector, the information technology and software sector, 
and on investments in the area of electronics. On the other hand, investments in the logistics 
sector, the service sector and in enterprises of the financial services sector were of minor 
relevance (see subsequent table 69).    
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The selection of industry branches 
n=23 (multiple selection) 
Type of industry branch Responses Proportion 
   
Mechanics/Industry automation 18 78% 
Software/IT 18 78% 
Electronics 16 70% 
Pharmacy/Medicine/Biotech 14 61% 
Telco/Internet 14 61% 
Energy/Water/Environment 13 57% 
Chemistry 12 52% 
Consumer goods and retail 9 39% 
Logistics 7 30% 
Services including consulting 7 30% 
Financial Services 5 22% 
Other (advanced materials) 1 4% 
 
Table 69 The selection of industry branches (own development) 
 
With regard to the representativity of the results, at this point it is clarified again that this survey 
was carried out in order to examine the developments in Germany’s PE and VC market during 
the post-crisis phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012. The sample frame based on a purposive selection 
of early-stage and of public investors without family offices and business angels. Due to the lack 
of complete and comprehensive directories regarding market members in Germany, a complete 
description of early-stage and of public investors could not be ensured. Thus, the survey results 
could neither claim to be representative for the entire PE and VC market nor regarding early-
stage investments (see section 5.5.2). In that respect, the results showed that the average 
proportion of survey respondents total investment volume for 2010 to 2012 (see table 73 in 
section 6.5.3) in relation to the entire market in Germany (InvestEurope 2016) was 7.1% and 
thus surely not representative. This assumption was underlined by the average proportion of 
sample respondents total number of investments (see table 71 in section 6.5.3) which on average 
was 34.5% in relation to the entire market in Germany during 2010, 2011 and 2012 
(InvestEurope 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, the initial description of the survey respondents regarding their regional 
investment focus (see table 62), their financing purposes (see table 63), the type of equity 
investment (see table 64), the investment classes (see table 65) and the turnover thresholds of 
investment targets (see table 67) supported the assumption that the results were suitable to 
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describe the developments in early-stage and smaller volume financing from public investors, 
semi-public investors and from VC firms in Germany during 2010 to 2012.  
 
6.5.3  The survey results  
 
At first, the survey results showed that both the number of portfolio companies and the number 
of investments were decreasing between 2010 and 2012 (see subsequent tables 70 and 71). On 
the other hand, the total fund volumes were increasing significantly (see table 72), while the 
investment volume was increasing only slightly between 2010 and 2012 (see table 73). On the 
level of the MBGs, the number of portfolio companies was increasing between 2010 and 2012 
(see table 91 in appendix O), while the number of investments was decreasing (see table 92 in 
appendix O). On the other hand, both their fund volume and investment volume (see tables 93 
and 94 in appendix O) remained rather stable during 2010 to 2012. The main difference between 
the entire responses and the MBGs were there significantly smaller investment amounts (see 
table 95 in appendix O and table 74 in section 6.5.3). 
 
The number of portfolio companies 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 2,727 2,779 2,836 
Max 1,101 1,109 1,095 
Min 7 7 7 
Range 1,094 1,102 1,088 
Median 31.0 34.0 26.5 
Mean 143.5 146.3 128.9 
Variance 73,714.7 74,980.6 65,724.2 
Deviation 271.5 273.8 256.4 
n 19 19 22 
 
Table 70 The number of portfolio companies (own development) 
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The number of investments 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 471 442 445 
Max 151 156 127 
Min 1 1 0 
Range 150 155 127 
Median 6.0 5.0 7.0 
Mean 24.8 23.3 21.2 
Variance 1,974.5 1,883.8 1,345.2 
Deviation 44.4 43.4 36.7 
n 19 19 21 
 
Table 71 The number of investments (own development) 
 
The total fund volume in MEUR 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 1,560 1,662 2,390 
Max 600 600 600 
Min 10 10 10 
Range 590 590 590 
Median 75.0 97.0 100.5 
Mean 104.0 110.8 132.8 
Variance 20,735.8 20,773.7 22,327.2 
Deviation 144.0 144.1 149.4 
n 15 15 18 
 
Table 72 The total fund volume in MEUR (own development) 
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The total investment volume in MEUR 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 387 431 459 
Max 80 80 100 
Min 2 1 2 
Range 78 79 98 
Median 14.7 14.0 9.9 
Mean 24.2 26.9 25.5 
Variance 607.9 796.2 913.6 
Deviation 24.7 28.2 30.2 
n 16 16 18 
 
Table 73 The total investment volume in MEUR (own development) 
 
The results, moreover, showed that these average investment volumes were increasing both on 
the level of the MBGs (see table 95 in appendix O) and on the level of the entire sample (see 
subsequent table 74) during the post-crisis phase. Investment volumes increased by 17.11% on 
the level of the entire sample and by 9.1% on the level of the MBGs respectively.  
 
The average investment volume per deal in MEUR 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Average investment volume 24.2 26.9 25.5 
Average number of investments 24.8 23.3 21.2 
    
Average investment volume per deal 0.976 1.155 1.203 
 
Table 74 The average investment volume per deal in MEUR (own development) 
 
The survey results also showed that 50% of the respondents considered public funding for their 
investments during the post-crisis phase, whereas the remaining 50% did not (see subsequent 
table 75).  
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The application of public funding between 2010 and 2012 
Total sample 
 
 
Responses Proportion 
Frequency      
   
Never 10 50% 
Sometimes 5 25% 
Often 3 15% 
Seldom 2 10% 
Always 0 0% 
n 20 100% 
 
Table 75 The application of public funding between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
Furthermore, the survey participants indicated that parts of their investments were syndicated. In 
relation to the number of investments, this syndication proportion was slightly increasing from 
58.1% in 2010 to 61.1% in 2012 (see subsequent table 76). 
     
The proportion of syndicated investments 
Total sample 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
 
      
Max 100 100 100 
Min 20 20 17 
Range 80 80 83 
Median 50.0 50.0 55.0 
Mean 58.1 56.8 61.1 
Variance 906.3 913.6 994.1 
Deviation 30.1 30.2 31.5 
n 15 15 16 
 
Table 76 The proportion of syndicated investments (own development) 
 
The syndication proportion on the level of the MBGs on the other hand resulted in on average 
42.5% each in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (see table 96 in appendix O). 
 
With regard to the number of received business proposals, survey results showed an increasing 
number from on average 304 proposals in 2010 to approx. 342 proposals in 2012. This was an 
increase of approx. 12.3% during the post-crisis phase. The detailed analysis in that respect 
showed that this number was biggest on the level of the corporate venture capitalists and on the 
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level of the independent investors. On the other hand, this number was significantly smaller on 
the level of the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften and smallest on the level of the 
public investors. The increase in the amount of business proposals on the other hand, was largest 
on the level of the public investors with an increase of approx. 38.1% and smallest on the level 
of the MBGs with an increase of approx. 8.1% during the post-crisis phase (see subsequent table 
77).  
 
The results, moreover, showed that the investment proportion of investors was increasing from 
on average 5.5% in 2010 to on average 6.6% in 2012. This corresponds with an increase of 
approx. 20% during the post-crisis phase. The detailed view showed that the increase was largest 
on the level of the MBGs with approx. 55.9%, smallest on the level of the public investors with 
an increase of approx. 16.7% and a decreasing investment proportion of approx. 23.8% on the 
level of the corporate venture capitalists. By dividing the sample in two groups, namely more 
support-oriented on the one hand and more strategic and profit-oriented on the other hand (see 
section 6.5.2), the group of supporters with the MBGs and the public investors realised 
significantly larger investment proportions in comparison to the remaining group. Nevertheless, 
the general interpretation of increasing investment proportions during the post-crisis phase was 
difficult in accordance with the median results. The deeper analysis showed that the significant 
increase of the mean values between 2011 and 2012, was caused from extreme values in 2012 
(see subsequent table 77).  
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The business plan statistics 
 
 
Total number received Proportion on investments 
    
   
Year 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Type of investor 
   
   
    
   
Total sample  
   
   
    
   
Median 235.0 248.5 195.0 5.0 4.5 5.0 
Mean 304.2 323.1 341.5 5.5 5.6 6.6 
Deviation 259.1 286.2 323.5 3.7 4.8 6.5 
n 18 18 20 18 18 19 
    
   
Independent             
              
Median 400.0 450.0 500.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 
Mean 352.5 377.5 403.8 2.3 1.3 3.3 
Deviation 260.2 258.2 263.4 1.5 0.6 4.6 
n 4 4 4 3 3 4 
              
CVC             
              
Median 600.0 600.0 500.0 4.5 3.0 3.5 
Mean 554.0 601.4 607.5 4.2 3.3 3.2 
Deviation 217.0 272.0 378.1 1.2 1.5 1.9 
n 5 5 6 6 6 6 
              
MBGs             
              
Median 176.0 160.5 158.5 10.5 11.5 15.5 
Mean 250.3 250.0 270.5 9.3 10.8 14.5 
Deviation 188.7 201.3 240.1 2.9 4.2 7.9 
n 4 4 4 4 4 4 
              
Public investors             
              
Median 45.0 54.0 52.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Mean 58.8 59.6 81.2 6.0 6.8 7.0 
Deviation 48.0 41.9 72.2 5.0 5.8 5.6 
n 5 5 6 5 5 5 
 
 Table 77 The business plan statistics (own development) 
 
With regard to the acquisition of deals, the survey results showed that banks and the network of 
PE and VC firms were the most important deal sources during the post-crisis phase. On the other 
hand, chambers of commerce, federations and auctions were of minor relevance. Results also 
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showed a strikingly declining trend of universities as an acquisition channel during the post-
crisis phase (see subsequent table 78). 
 
The ranks of deal sources 
 
Rank/Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
1 Bank Bank Bank 
2 Network Network Network 
3 Other source Other source Other source 
4 University Consultant PE/VC-firm 
5 Consultant University Consultant 
6 Auction PE/VC-firm University 
7 PE/VC-firm Auction Auction 
8 CoC/federation CoC/federation CoC/federation 
n 14 15 19 
 
Table 78 The ranks of deal sources (own development) 
 
Moreover, the survey results showed that at the moment of the survey in 2013, the management 
team, the strategy, the market and competition, and the product and service were the most 
important review fields in the initial screening of business proposals. On the other hand, the 
organisation of the enterprise was of minor importance at that step in the decision making 
process (see subsequent table 79). The results of the MBGs were rather identical with a larger 
relevance of the market and the competition (see table 97 in appendix O). 
 
In that context, the survey results also showed that this basic review orientation at the moment of 
the survey in 2013, also applied for the post-crisis phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012. The survey 
respondents indicated that they had not changed their emphasis regarding the review fields 
during the initial screening. Although, 42% of the respondents indicated a stronger emphasis on 
the management team, the majority of respondents kept their basic orientation unchanged during 
the post-crisis phase (see table 80).  
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The business plan components' relevance at survey moment 
Total sample 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
Review field n Rank Mean Deviation 
          
Management team 22 1 4.8 0.7 
Strategy 22 2 4.3 1.1 
Market & Competition 22 2 4.3 0.7 
Product & Service 22 3 4.2 0.7 
Marketing & Sales 22 4 3.8 0.8 
Financial forecast 22 5 3.7 0.9 
Research & Development 22 6 3.6 0.7 
Human resources 22 6 3.6 0.9 
Finance & Controlling 22 6 3.6 1.1 
Completeness & Coherence 21 6 3.6 0.8 
Organisation 22 7 3.4 0.8 
 
Table 79 The business plan components' relevance at survey moment (own development) 
 
The business plan components' development between 2010 and 2012 
Total sample 
 
Review field’s importance n Decreased Increased Unchanged 
     
Management team 19 0% 42% 58% 
Marketing & Sales 19 5% 26% 68% 
Strategy 19 0% 21% 79% 
Product & Service 19 0% 21% 79% 
Human resources 19 0% 21% 79% 
Financial forecast 19 5% 16% 79% 
Finance & Controlling 19 5% 16% 79% 
Market & Competition 19 0% 11% 89% 
Research & Development 19 0% 11% 89% 
Completeness & Coherence 19 5% 5% 89% 
Organisation 19 11% 0% 89% 
 
Table 80 The business plan components' development between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
The MBGs in their majority indicated an unchanged assessment of components significance too. 
Interestingly enough, some of the participating MBGs strengthened their reviews regarding 
human resources, and finance and controlling (see table 98 in appendix O). These review 
priorities during the initial screening were identical with the results for the due diligence. At the 
time of the survey in 2013, the management team, the strategy, and the product and service were 
the most important review fields during the due diligence. As in the case of the business plan 
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screening, the organisation of the enterprise was of minor interest during the due diligence too 
(see subsequent table 81). This entire perspective of the survey results also applied for the MBGs 
(see table 99 in appendix O). 
 
The due diligence components' relevance at survey moment 
Total sample 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
 Review field n Rank Mean Deviation 
          
Management team 21 1 4.7 0.7 
Strategy 21 2 4.4 0.7 
Product & Service 21 3 4.3 0.9 
Marketing & Sales 21 4 3.9 0.8 
Finance & Controlling 21 5 3.8 0.8 
Research & Development 21 6 3.4 0.8 
Human resources 21 6 3.4 1.2 
Organisation 21 7 3.3 0.8 
 
Table 81 The due diligence components' relevance at survey moment (own development) 
 
The majority of survey respondents did not indicate changes regarding the review fields on the 
level of the due diligence during the post-crisis phase. Nevertheless, 44% of the respondents 
mentioned a stronger emphasis on the management team and 28% on marketing and sales (see 
subsequent table 82). On the level of the MBGs, 40% of the survey respondents indicated a 
stronger emphasis on the management team, and on finance and controlling (see table 100 in 
appendix O).  
 
The survey results also showed that in the case that negotiations were broken off, particular 
contract rights were of minor importance. The most important reason was that finally no investor 
realised the deal, with a slightly decreasing proportion between 2010 and 2012. On the other 
hand, the proportion of deals which were finally realised by a competitor was increasing between 
2010 and 2012 (see table 83). 
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The DD components' development between 2010 and 2012 
Total sample 
 
Review field’s importance n Decreased Increased Unchanged 
          
Management team 18 0% 44% 56% 
Marketing & Sales 18 0% 28% 72% 
Product & Service  18 0% 22% 78% 
Strategy 18 0% 17% 83% 
Finance & Controlling  18 6% 17% 78% 
Research & Development 18 0% 11% 89% 
Organisation 18 11% 6% 83% 
Human resources 18 11% 0% 89% 
 
Table 82 The DD components' development between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
The proportion of break-off reasons in 2010, 2011 and 2012 
 
Proportions 
in % 
No investor 
realised the deal 
Other reasons 
not specified 
Deal finalised 
by competitor 
Particular 
contract right 
     
Year 2010     
Responses 12 10 8 8 
Mean 51.3 31.5 23.8 22.5 
Median 47.5 30.0 12.5 10.0 
Deviation 26.9 18.3 20.8 25.9 
n=13     
     
Year 2011     
Responses 12 10 8 8 
Mean 47.5 34.8 24.6 23.1 
Median 45.0 41.5 12.5 10.0 
Deviation 25.0 18.0 22.6 25.9 
n=13     
     
Year 2012     
Responses 15 13 10 10 
Mean 48.7 29.2 28.5 20.5 
Median 50.0 25.0 22.5 10.0 
Deviation 25.5 16.9 22.5 23.5 
n=16     
 
Table 83 The proportion of break-off reasons in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (own development) 
 
With regard to the post-investment phase, the results showed that investors at the moment of the 
survey in 2013, were most often involved in board establishment, finance and controlling, and 
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strategy development (see subsequent table 84). The differences in the degree of involvement 
between each of these areas were rather small. In that respect, the results on the level of the 
MBGs showed that this type of investor was overall less often involved in portfolio company’s 
mentoring and monitoring (see table 101 in appendix O). This should be considered in the 
context of their smaller investment volumes per deal (see table 95 in appendix O) and their focus 
on minority and silent investments (see table 64 in section 6.5.2). In the case of their 
involvement, the results showed that they were focused on finance and controlling rather than on 
board establishment or strategy development. In that respect, there was an obvious difference in 
the degree of involvement between the first and the subsequent monitoring and mentoring areas 
on the level of the MBGs (see table 101 in appendix O). Even though the majority of 
respondents indicated that their involvement was not increasing during 2010 to 2012, anyhow 
approx. one third of the respondents indicated an increasing involvement during the post-crisis 
phase. This applied for the entire survey respondents and for the MBGs. On the other hand, no 
sample member indicated a decreasing involvement (see table 85). 
 
The monitoring and mentoring in 2013 
Total sample 
 
(Scale: 1 not involved to 5 always involved) 
Monitoring/Mentoring area n Rank Mean Deviation 
          
Board establishment 21 1 3.6 1.2 
Finance & Controlling 21 2 3.5 0.7 
Strategy development 21 3 3.4 1.0 
Management recruitment 21 4 3.1 1.2 
Management coaching 21 5 2.7 1.2 
Marketing & Sales 21 6 2.6 1.1 
Human resources 21 6 2.6 1.2 
Strategy implementation 21 6 2.6 0.9 
Procurement & Production 21 7 2.0 0.9 
 
Table 84 The monitoring and mentoring in 2013 (own development)
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Investors involvement between 2010 and 2012 
Total sample 
 
Involvement: Decreased Increased Unchanged 
 
        
n 20 0 6 14 
Proportion 
 
0% 30% 70% 
MBGs 
     
n 6 0 2 4 
Proportion 
 
0% 33% 67% 
 
Table 85 Investors involvement between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
The results with regard to investor’s exit, moreover, showed that buy-backs by investors was the 
most important exit channel each in 2010, 2011 and 2012. This proportion of buy-backs 
considers the repayments of silent investments. Therefore, this result was distorted due to the 
large proportion of repayments of the silent investments on the level of the MBGs and the public 
investors. On the other hand, trade sales were an important exit channel for the survey 
respondents in each year of the post-crisis phase too. This proportion was decreasing between 
2010 and 2012, whereas the proportion of total losses was significantly increasing in accordance 
with the economic development. IPOs on the other hand played a minor role during the entire 
post-crisis phase (see subsequent table 86). These results should be considered in the context of 
the economic development during the post-crisis phase, with the significant increases of 4.2% in 
2010 and 3% in 2011, and the small increase of 0.7% in 2012 (Destatis 2013). 
 
The survey results finally showed that the implementation of Basel III had no effect on the 
selection of industry sectors. Particular industry sectors were neither preferred nor disadvantaged 
during the selection process. However, one MBG indicated that the implementation of Basel III 
resulted in the consideration of additional industry sectors (see table 87). With regard to the 
effects of the AIFM-directive, the majority of survey respondents indicated that the 
transformation of the directive in national law had no influence on the initial screening, the due 
diligence or the monitoring of the portfolio companies (see table 88). 
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The proportions of exit channels 
 
Exit channel 
 
Trade sale 
 
Secondary 
purchase 
IPO 
 
Buy-back 
 
Total loss 
 
            
Year 2010           
Responses 10 3 2 12 11 
Mean 41.0 5.3 50.0 55.3 19.1 
Median 30.0 5.0 50.0 60.0 10.0 
Deviation 34.8 4.5 35.4 37.4 19.2 
n=14           
 
          
Year 2011           
Responses 9 2 0 12 10 
Mean 45.6 7.5 #DIV/0! 65.8 18.5 
Median 35.0 7.5 #Number! 80.5 10.0 
Deviation 38.9 3.5 #DIV/0! 32.5 20.9 
n=14           
 
          
Year 2012           
Responses 8 4 1 13 13 
Mean 33.8 31.3 30.0 53.4 29.3 
Median 27.5 30.0 30.0 50.0 10.0 
Deviation 25.2 27.8 #DIV/0! 32.9 35.5 
n=15 
 
        
 
Table 86 The proportions of exit channels (own development) 
 
The effects of the Basel III implementation 
n=18 
Effect 
 
Additional sectors 
are considered 
Specific sectors 
are disregarded 
Overall no effect 
 
        
Responses 1 0 17 
Proportions 6% 0% 94% 
 
Table 87 The effects of the Basel III implementation (own development) 
 
The impacts of the AIFM transformation 
n=14 (multiple selection) 
Process step Deal selection Due Diligence Monitoring Open category 
 
 
        
Impact no 14 14 13   
Impact yes 0 0 1 reporting 
obligations  
Table 88 The impacts of the AIFM transformation (own development) 
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6.5.4  The comparison analysis for the public and the semi-public investors 
 
By dividing the survey responses into two groups, namely public and semi-public investors on 
the one hand and more strategic and profit-oriented investors on the other hand (see table 59 in 
section 6.5.2) the survey delivered the following results. 
 
Initially, the results showed that both groups of investors preferred minority investments at the 
moment of the survey in 2013. In addition, these results showed that public and semi-public 
investors were focused on silent investments rather than on open investments (see table 64 in 
section 6.5.2 and table 102 in appendix P).  
 
With regard to investors' investment classes, the results showed that 58% of the participating 
public and semi-public investors were focused on investments between 500 TEUR and 1.5 
MEUR per deal. On the other hand, the results showed that the more strategic and on profit-
oriented investors were either focused on investments between 500 TEUR and 1.5 MEUR per 
deal or on investments between 1,501 TEUR and 4,999 TEUR per deal (see table 103 in 
appendix P). 
 
The results, furthermore, showed that public investors were focused on the mechanics and the 
industry automation sector, the software and the IT sector and also on the electronics sector. The 
MBGs on the other hand virtually covered almost every type of industry branch. With regard to 
the remaining group of more strategic and profit-oriented investors, the results so far showed a 
relative specialisation rather than a focus on a specific industry branch (see table 104 in appendix 
P). 
 
The results also showed that the portfolio on the level of the public and semi-public investors 
was significantly larger compared to the remaining group of investors. The portfolio counted on 
average 227 enterprises per year during the post-crisis phase in comparison to an average of 32 
enterprises per year on the level of the more strategic and profit-oriented investors (see table 105 
in appendix P). In that context, the results showed that the number of investments on the level of 
the public and semi-public investors in comparison to the remaining sample group was 
significantly larger during the post-crisis phase too. The results showed that this type of investor 
realised an average of 39 investments per year in comparison to an average of seven investments 
per year on the level of the more strategic and profit-oriented investors (see table 106 in 
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appendix P). Both differences were due to the significantly larger number of portfolio companies 
and investments from the MBGs.  
 
With regard to investors' fund volumes, the results showed that the funds of the public and semi-
public investors with an average volume of 88 MEUR per year were significantly smaller in 
comparison to the fund volumes of the more strategic and profit-oriented investors with on 
average 147 MEUR per year during the post-crisis phase (see table 107 in appendix P). The 
investment volumes between both sample groups differed significantly too. The results in that 
respect showed that the public and the semi-public investors invested on average 16 MEUR per 
year during the post-crisis phase, whereas the remaining group invested on average 45 MEUR 
per year during the same period (see table 108 in appendix P).  
 
With regard to the syndication behaviour, the results showed that the public and semi-public 
investors syndicated on average 43% of their investments per year in comparison to an average 
proportion of 76% per year on the level of the remaining sample group. These proportions were 
slightly increasing between 2010 and 2012 (see table 109 in appendix P).     
 
As already indicated in section 6.5.3, the number of received business proposals was 
significantly larger on the level of the more strategic and profit-oriented investors, whereas their 
investment proportion was significantly smaller in comparison to the public and semi-public 
investors (see table 77 in section 6.5.3). 
 
The results, moreover, showed that the management team, the strategy, the market and 
competition, and the product and service were the most important review fields during the initial 
screening. This applied for both sample groups (see table 110 in appendix P). With regard to the 
detailed screening, the management team, the strategy and the product and service were the most 
important review fields at the moment of the survey in 2013. This applied for both sample 
groups too (see table 111 in appendix P). 
 
On the level of the negotiation phase, the results showed that particular contract rights as a 
break-off reason were of minor relevance for the public and semi-public investors in comparison 
to the remaining sample group. This applied to every year during the post-crisis phase (see table 
112 in appendix P). 
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With regard to monitoring and mentoring, the results initially showed that the group of public 
investors were most often concerned with finance and controlling rather than with board 
establishment as in the case of the more strategic and on profit-oriented investors. On the other 
hand, both sample groups indicated a strong focus on strategy’s development regarding their 
portfolio companies (see table 113 in appendix P). 
 
With regard to the exit phase, the results showed that differences between the sample groups 
were associated with the larger proportion of buy-backs and repayments of the silent investments 
on the level of the public and semi-public investors. On the other hand, trade sales were of 
importance for the remaining sample group, whereas secondary purchases were of the least 
importance for the entire survey respondents (see table 114 in appendix P).   
 
6.5.5  The interview result 
 
The interview was carried out on 7 February 2014 with the chief executive officer of the firm. 
The interview content is not completely reproduced as some indications were outside the 
subjects of the present thesis. 
 
This investor was mainly focused on silent investments in order to improve the equity basis of 
enterprises. The interviewee in that context mentioned that they were not exclusively focused on 
technology-based investments, as a so-called Bill Gates investment strategy alone would not 
guarantee sufficient profits for the investor. On the other hand, the importance of silent 
investments was increasing during the past periods which would underline the stronger profit 
orientation of the firm. This investor was not solely refinanced by equity of the mother company 
and the accumulation of capital gains but also by mother company loans. In that context, the 
interviewee pointed out that nowadays it has become very difficult to receive public guarantees 
for PE and VC investments. This would explain why the solvency and hence the repayment 
ability of enterprises would have an absolute priority in the selection of portfolio companies. 
Therefore, this investor was much more focused on future cash-flows than on the earlier profit 
and loss statements. This sample member also underlined the relevance of the management team 
both during the initial and the detailed screening. The interviewee emphasised his indication 
when he stated that an investor is financing the three m, namely the management team, the 
management team and the management team. On some occasions, this investor also appointed 
additional management audits during the decision making process. In that context, the 
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interviewee explained that the relevance of the commercial management stepped back since the 
financial crisis. The emphasis now would be on the operational management due to its 
responsibility for innovation and revenues. Furthermore, a stronger emphasis would also be on 
the market and the technology. With regard to monitoring and mentoring, the interviewee finally 
stated that the reporting is requested half yearly and that the financial crisis had no impact 
regarding this reporting periods.  
 
At this point, the presentation of the survey results is finalised. The subsequent sections are 
initially concerned with the analysis results of the BVK publications, the validation study and 
finally with the conclusions. 
 
6.6  The analysis results of the BVK publications 
 
The analysis of the BVK publications was initially carried out between October 2014 and 
January 2015. A final recheck was then carried out during December 2015. The examination was 
focused on the AIFM-directive, Basel III and the investment process in order to expand the 
survey results. Additional findings were considered in a residual category (see table 40 in section 
5.6.6). Altogether, 40 publications from Germany’s PE and VC association (see table 30 in 
appendix L.2) were reviewed. These publications are classified in the subsequent table 115. The 
final review showed that eight of the 40 publications did overall not contribute to the 
examination in any way.  
 
The classification of the BVK publications 
 
Type of publication/Year 2010 2011 2012 Total 
    
 
Annual report 1 1 1 3 
Investor information 1 1 1 3 
Private-Equity letter 4 3 3 10 
Press releases 9 6 9 24 
    
 
Total publications 15 11 14 40 
Proportion  37.5% 27.5% 35.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 115 The classification of the BVK publications (own development) 
 
The review, furthermore, showed that the AIFM-directive was mentioned in 17 publications, the 
issue of Basel III in three publications and the components of the investment process in seven 
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publications. In that respect, the issue of deal acquisition was mentioned in one publication and 
the issue of the exit in six publications. There were no additional indications regarding the 
remaining components of the investment process. With regard to the residual category and in 
terms of a quantification, the review also showed that the issue of fundraising was mentioned in 
14 publications. The subsequent table 116 details the number of publications in relation to the 
examination categories. 
 
The frequencies of the examination categories 
 
Examination category Frequency  
  
Financial market regulation:  
AIFM-directive 17 
Basel III 3 
  
Investment process:  
Deal acquisition 1 
Deal screening 0 
Negotiation and contracting 0 
Monitoring and mentoring 0 
Exit 6 
  
Residual category:  
Fundraising 14 
 
Table 116 The frequencies of the examination categories (own development) 
 
6.6.1  The analysis results regarding the AIFM-directive and Basel III 
 
With regard to the AIFM-directive, the subsequent figure four initially presents the progress 
from an AIFM proposal until the transformation into a national law in Germany.  
 
        2009            2010             2011                        2012                               2013 
        
 
     Proposal      Adoption      Legislation           Legislation proposals         KAGB’s introduction 
     on EU’s level                                  in Germany                     in Germany 
                                                     
Figure 4 The implementation of the AIFM-directive 
(derived from BVK 2010a; BVK 2011a; BVK 2012a; BVK 2013a) 
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The German term of the AIFM-directive in that context is the so-called Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch. 
The review showed that the transformation of the AIFM-directive into a national law, out of 
federations point of view, was regarded as a chance to create an international competitive legal 
framework for equity investors in Germany. The federation in that context criticised the lack of a 
specific PE and VC law in Germany on the one hand and the regulation of the market by several 
individual laws on the other hand. The review showed that the AIFM-directive was assessed 
positively on 14 different occasions in the text material. This basic assessment was associated 
with reference to the establishment of a competition framework on ten occasions and with 
reference to an appropriate tax regulation on two occasions. The review also showed that the 
transformation of the AIFM-directive into national law during the post-crisis phase was assessed 
negatively on seven occasions. These negative assessments referred to the possibility of 
overregulation, the disproportionate burden of smaller PE and VC firms, the disadvantage of PE 
and VC firms due to reporting requirements, and the introduction of a product regulation. This 
product regulation was concerned with the prohibition for parts of the investors to invest in PE 
and VC funds. The German legislation proposal regarding AIFM related tax adjustments was 
assessed overall negatively on two occasions due to additional tax burdens. The subsequent table 
117 summarises the assessments regarding the transformation of the AIFM-directive. 
 
The assessment of the AIFM-directive 
 
Context Assessment Frequency 
   
AIFM-directive positive 14 
 negative 7  
   
German legal framework positive 10 
German tax framework positive 2 
   
German AIFM related tax law  positive 0 
 negative 2 
 
Table 117 The assessment of the AIFM-directive (own development) 
 
The review also showed that the AIFM-directive was discussed in one of four BVK working 
groups, across working group meetings and in federation’s legal advisory board during 2010. In 
2011, the AIFM-directive was discussed in three of four working groups and also across the 
working group meetings. In 2012, the AIFM-directive was discussed in three of four working 
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groups. The review did not result in additional findings regarding the effect of the AIFM-
directive on the selection, the due diligence and the monitoring process of PE and VC investors. 
 
With regard to Basel III, the review showed that this issue was picked out as a central theme 
during the federation’s so-called equity-day in 2011. Future predictions regarding effects of the 
Basel III transformation resulted in the assumption of a larger number of bank syndication 
partners and smaller credit amounts for PE buy-outs. Furthermore, it was also supposed that PE 
investments which are co-financed by banks would require a stronger collateralisation. It was, 
furthermore, assumed that Basel III would intensify the process of capital acquisition due to 
investor’s risk awareness and smaller investment proportions. Out of a federations point of view, 
Basel III and Solvency II would also disadvantage VC investments due to the payment of risk 
premiums. In that context, it was criticised that state financing by banks would not result in risk 
premiums due to Basel III. The review did not result in findings regarding the effect of Basel III 
on the consideration of industry branches. The issue of Basel III was not discussed in any of the 
federation’s working groups during the post-crisis phase. 
 
6.6.2  The analysis results regarding the investment process 
 
The review did not result in significant findings regarding the investment process. The 
indications in the publications regarding the deal acquisition referred to an event which was 
organised by the BVK to support the deal acquisition of VC investors. PE and VC firms 
investment process was not discussed in any of the BVK working groups. Exits, on the other 
hand, were discussed across working group meetings regarding exit chances in 2010. 
 
6.6.3  The analysis results in the residual category 
 
With regard to the issue of fundraising, the review showed that the fundraising success during 
each year of the post-crisis phase was accessed negatively six times and positively four times. 
The publications in that respect showed that the market suffered from declining fundraising 
volumes in 2010 compared to 2009. In 2011, the market benefited from increasing fundraising 
volumes which declined significantly in 2012 again. The review in terms of a quantification did 
not result in additional worth mentioning subjects which should be considered in the residual 
category. 
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6.7  The validation study 
 
A validation study was finally carried out in order to verify the results of the survey. This 
validation study was focused on the investment process, Basel III and the AIFM-directive. 
 
6.7.1  The validation study procedure 
 
The validation study started on 4 November 2015 and altogether 37 PE and VC investors (see 
table 41 in section 5.7) were invited to participate. The sample frame of the validation study was 
based on a purposive selection of sample members from the main study sample frame (see 
section 5.5.2 and appendix L.1). Sample members received an invitation letter (see appendix 
Q.1), the main study results (see appendix Q.2) and a confirmation letter from the university. 
Due to the experiences regarding the use of English during the main study (see section 6.5.1), 
both the results and the invitation letter were sent in German. In order to achieve a large response 
rate, the validation study was sent by mail including a stamped return envelope. The main study 
in that respect had shown that it is rather difficult to achieve a sufficient response rate by an 
exclusively online-based survey. In total, 84 investment managers, investment directors and 
chief executive officers from 37 PE and VC firms were contacted in order to receive a 
coordinated response. In the case that a sample member maintained different investment 
divisions for early-stage and for the remaining investment purposes, the responsible investment 
managers in these different divisions were invited separately. Two reminders, one per e-mail and 
one by phone were carried out during the validation study. Five investors denied to participate 
due to time constraints and an overload of surveys. Finally, 21 responses from 19 investors 
returned until 31 December 2015. Four of these responses belonged to two investors with 
separate divisions and hence separate invitations.  
 
The responses were consecutively numbered and checked regarding errors, plausibility and 
completeness. This showed that two responses from one sample member could not be processed 
due to inconsistent answers. These two questionnaires were excluded from the further analysis 
and from the response statistics. On the other hand, the remaining double indication was counted 
twice in the response statistics, as the responses belonged to two different departments of one 
investor. This corresponded with a response proportion of 59.4% from the final sample frame 
and a proportion of 51.4% from the initial sample frame. The validation survey statistic is 
summarised in the subsequent table 118. 
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The response statistics of the validation study 
 Status per 31 December 2015 Number 
  Initial sample 37 
Rejections -5 
  
Final sample 32 
  
Responses 21 
Not processable -2 
  
Processable 19 
    
Proportion from final total 59.4% 
Proportion from earlier total 51.4% 
Proportion of rejections 13.5% 
 
Table 118 The response statistics of the validation study (own development) 
 
This survey was completely paper-based and did without an online tool for data collection 
purposes. Therefore, each questionnaire was manually recorded in MS-Excel tables for the 
further analysis. 
 
6.7.2  The characteristics of the validation study 
 
The largest group of respondents was represented by the public investors and by the MBGs. This 
part of the sample, which could be classified as more support-oriented, represented 74% of the 
entire responses. This was an obvious overrepresentation in comparison to the more strategic and 
profit-oriented investors which represented the remaining 26% (see subsequent table 119).  
 
The validation study respondents 
 Type of investor Responses Proportion 
   Independent investor 4 21% 
Corporate Venture Capital firm  1 5% 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 6 32% 
Public investor 8 42% 
      
Total respondents 19 100% 
    
Table 119 The validation study respondents (own development) 
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This response proportion was also an overrepresentation of the public and of the semi-public 
investors in relation to the main study responses (see table 59 in section 6.5.2). 
 
In order to receive rather unbiased validation study results, an appropriate response level was 
required. The subsequent table 120 shows that 74% of the participants belonged to the top-
management and the remaining 26% to the middle-management of the respective enterprise. 
These employment levels were regarded as suitable to validate the main study results. 
 
The employment level of the validation study respondents 
n=19 
Status 
 
Lower Middle Top Total 
 
(Associate) (Investmentmanager) (Director, CEO) 
 
          
n 0 5 14 19 
Proportion 0% 26% 74% 100% 
 
Table 120 The employment level of the validation study respondents (own development) 
 
In addition, the participating enterprises were able to contribute regarding the examination 
timeframe of 2010, 2011 and 2012. The subsequent table 121 shows that the participating 
enterprises were founded between 1969 and 2007, and hence were suitable for validation 
purposes. 
 
The age structure of the validation sample 
n=19 
Type of investor Independent CVC MBG Public Total 
            
Responses 4 1 6 8 19 
Median 2002 2007 1992 1999 1997 
Max 2007 2007 1993 2005 2007 
Min 1990 2007 1970 1969 1969 
Range 17 0 23 36 38 
Average age at survey moment  14.8 8.0 29.5 19.6 21.1 
 
Table 121 The age structure of the validation sample (own development) 
 
With regard to the respective financing phase of the participating investors, the subsequent table 
122 shows that the majority of investors were concerned with expansion and start-up financing. 
Only one investor in the sample was concerned with seed financing purposes, which in 
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comparison to the main study survey was a clear underrepresentation (see table 63 in section 
6.5.2). 
 
The financing focus of the validation sample 
n=19 (multiple selection) 
Type of investor Independent CVC MBG Public Responses In % 
Financing purpose            
      
 
Expansion 3 1 6 6 16 84% 
Start-up 2 0 4 5 11 58% 
MBO/MBI 1 0 3 5 9 47% 
Seed 1 0 0 0 1 5% 
Bridge/Replacement 0 0 0 1 1 5% 
Turnaround 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
 
Table 122 The financing focus of the validation sample (own development) 
 
Unfortunately, the validation study did not reflect the main study in terms of financing focus and 
type of investor. In addition, this validation study might have suffered from post-hoc recall 
biases due to the time gap between the main study timeframe of 2010, 2011 and 2012, and the 
moment of the validation study in 2015 (see figure three in section 5.7). In order to keep the risk 
of post-hoc recall biases as small as possible, the validation study therefore concentrated on the 
most important research results.  
 
6.7.3  The validation study results 
 
This validation study was focused on the main study with regard to: 
 
1. Dealflow: 
a) most important deal sources during 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
b) less important deal sources during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
2. Business plan screening: 
a) most important review fields in 2013; 
b) most important review fields during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
3. Due Diligence: 
a) most important review fields in 2013; 
b) most important review fields during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
4. Monitoring and mentoring: 
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a) areas of most frequent involvement in 2013; 
b) monitoring and mentoring extent during the post-crisis phase. 
5. Basel III: Impacts on the selection of industry branches.  
6. AIFM-directive: Impacts on BP screening, the DD and the post-investment phase. 
 
With regard to the acquisition of deals, the main study results had shown that banks and the 
network of the investors were the most important deal sources during the post-crisis phase (see 
table 78 in section 6.5.3). This result was confirmed by 11 out of 19 responses and not confirmed 
by six responses, which corresponded to the proportions of 58% and 32% respectively. The main 
study results, moreover, had shown that auctions, chambers of commerce and federations only 
played a minor or absolutely no role in the acquisition of deals. This result was confirmed by 14 
out of 19 responses and hence 74%, whereas four participants and hence 21% disagreed. 
 
With regard to the screening of business plans, the main study results had shown that the 
management team, the strategy, and the product and service were the most important review 
fields at the main study moment in 2013 (see table 79 in section 6.5.3). This result was 
confirmed by 14 out of 19 responses and hence a proportion of 74%, whereas four respondents 
and hence a proportion of 21% contradicted. In the context of business plan evaluations, the 
results had also shown that the management team, the strategy, and the product and service were 
the most important review fields during the post-crisis phase too (see table 80 in section 6.5.3). 
This main study result was confirmed by 15 out of 19 participating enterprises and not confirmed 
by three respondents, which corresponded to proportions of 79% and 16% respectively.  
 
With regard to the due diligence, the main study results had shown that the management team, 
the strategy, and the product and service were the most important review fields at the moment of 
the survey in 2013 (see table 81 in section 6.5.3). This result was confirmed by 14 out of 19 
responses and hence a proportion of 74%, whereas four respondents and hence 21% disagreed. 
The management team, followed from the strategy, and the product and service were the most 
important review fields during the post-crisis phase too (see table 82 in section 6.5.3). This main 
study result was confirmed by 15 out of 19 responses and hence a proportion of 79%, whereas 
three and hence 16% of the respondents contradicted. The subsequent table 123 summarises the 
validation study results regarding the pre-investment phase. 
 
 
 219 
The validation study results part I 
 
Result Confirmed Not confirmed No indication Total 
Category n Share n Share n Share n Share 
 
Deal acquisition         
1 a) 11 58% 6 32% 2 10% 19 100% 
1 b) 14 74% 4 21% 1 5% 19 100% 
 
BP screening         
2 a) 14 74% 4 21% 1 5% 19 100% 
2 b) 15 79% 3 16% 1 5% 19 100% 
 
DD          
3 a) 14 74% 4 21% 1 5% 19 100% 
3 b) 15 79% 3 16% 1 5% 19 100% 
 
Table 123 The validation study results part I (own development) 
 
With regard to the phase of monitoring and mentoring, the main study results had shown that at 
the moment of the survey in 2013, investors were most often involved in board establishment, in 
finance and controlling, and in strategy development (see table 84 in section 6.5.3). This main 
study result was confirmed by ten out of 19 responses and hence a proportion of 53%, whereas 
eight respondents and hence 42% contradicted. The more detailed view showed that four of the 
eight participating public investors and the majority of the participating MBGs disagreed in that 
respect. These results were not comprehensible, as the MBGs in their separated calculation (see 
table 101 in appendix O) and the group of the public and the semi-public investors (see table 113 
in appendix P) indicated that board establishment, finance and controlling, and strategy 
development were the most important mentoring areas at the moment of the survey in 2013. 
These different assessments should have been a result of the different rank orders in accordance 
with the different examination perspectives. In that respect, the main study results had shown 
that the MBGs and the group of the public and the semi-public investors were most often 
concerned with finance and controlling which took the first rank, rather than with board 
establishment or strategy development which took the second and the third rank respectively. 
Therefore, participants of the validation study might have thought that they should confirm the 
results in accordance with a specific rank order rather than confirming the most important areas 
regardless of their specific rank. 
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In the context of monitoring and mentoring, the results had also shown that approx. two-thirds of 
the survey respondents kept their degree of involvement unchanged during the post-crisis phase, 
whereas the remaining one third indicated and increasing involvement (see table 85 in section 
6.5.3). Therefore, the validation study requested the confirmation that PE and VC investors had 
kept their degree of involvement stable during the post-crisis phase (see appendix Q.2). The 
main study results in that respect were confirmed by 12 out of 19 responses and hence a 
proportion of 63%, whereas six respondents and hence 32% disagreed (see subsequent table 
124). These proportions in direct comparison with the main study results should be regarded as 
an overall confirmation that the majority of PE and VC investors had kept their involvement 
unchanged during the post-crisis phase. 
 
The validation study results part II 
 
Result Confirmed Not confirmed No indication Total 
Category n Share n Share n Share n Share 
 
Monitoring         
4 a) 10 53% 8 42% 1 5% 19 100% 
4 b) 12 63% 6 32% 1 5% 19 100% 
 
Table 124 The validation study results part II (own development) 
 
With regard to Basel III, the main study results had shown that the implementation didn’t 
influence the selection of industry branches by PE and VC investors (see table 87 in section 
6.5.3). This result was confirmed by 18 out of 19 responses and hence a proportion of 95%, 
whereas one participant and hence 5% of the respondents disagreed. Finally, the validation study 
was concerned with the implementation of the AIFM-directive. In that respect, the main study 
results had shown that this implementation had no effect on business plan screening, on the due 
diligence or on monitoring and mentoring (see table 88 in section 6.5.3). This main study result 
was confirmed by 14 out of 19 responses and hence a proportion of 74%, whereas one 
respondent and hence a proportion of 5% contradicted. Interestingly enough, four participants 
and hence a proportion of 21% indicated that an assessment in that respect would not be possible 
(see subsequent table 125).  
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The validation study results part III 
 
Result Confirmed Not confirmed No indication Total 
Category n Share n Share n Share n Share 
 
Basel III         
5. 18 95% 1 5% 0 0% 19 100% 
 
AIFM-directive         
6. 14 74% 1 5% 4 21% 19 100% 
 
Table 125 The validation study results part III (own development) 
 
The validation study also asked for additional indications in an open category. Altogether, 15 
additional indications were associated with the validation subjects (see subsequent table 126). 
 
The results of the open category in the validation study 
 
Examination areas Number of indications 
    
Dealflow 4 
Business plan 3 
Due Diligence 3 
Monitoring and mentoring 3 
Basel III 1 
AIFM-directive 1 
  
 
Total indications 15 
 
Table 126 The results of the open category in the validation study (own development) 
 
The additional clarifications were indicated from four public investors, two independent 
investors and from one corporate venture capitalist. These additional indications specified the 
opinion of the respondent in the case of a different assessment. In that respect, two investors, 
which were focused on expansion financing, and MBO and MBI investments, indicated that 
auctions were also of importance in the acquisition of deals during the post-crisis phase. One 
investor mentioned that banks would not play any role in the acquisition of deals for venture 
capitalists. These additional indications regarding the deal flow should also explain the 
comparatively large proportion of disagreement regarding the relevance of deal channels during 
the post-crisis phase (see table 123 in section 6.7.3). The further indications did not contribute to 
the present study in any way. Therefore, their further presentation was omitted at that point.  
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The validation study results underlined the assumption that the main study results were 
consistent, at least regarding the screening of business plans, the due diligence and both Basel III 
and the AIFM-directive. The remaining inconsistencies might have been, inter alia, the result of 
the time gap between the examination timeframe and the moment of the validation study on the 
one hand and due to the different sample structures on the other hand. With regard to the sample 
structures, public and semi-public investors with a proportion of 74% in the validation study (see 
table 119 in section 6.7.2) were clearly overrepresented in comparison to their main study 
proportion of 50% (see table 59 in section 6.5.2). Moreover, PE and VC investors which were 
concerned with seed, bridge and replacement, or with turnaround financing were clearly under- 
or not all represented in the validation study (see table 122 in section 6.7.2 and table 63 in 
section 6.5.2). These reasons might have caused the divergent results regarding deal acquisition 
and monitoring. Nevertheless, it seemed reasonable to carry out an additional validation study to 
clear up the inconsistencies and to minimise the risk of a wrong result interpretation. 
 
6.7.4  The validation study of the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
 
The initial validation study had shown that there remained some open questions in particular on 
the level of the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften. Therefore, a separated validation 
study on the level of the MBGs was carried out during July and August 2017. In that regard, the 
MBGs of Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Saxony were purposively 
selected for two reasons. First, these MBGs maintained separate divisions for venture capital 
financing beside their basic business and second, these MBGs were the biggest within their 
specific group. In order to receive a more detailed response, the responsible division managers of 
the venture capital divisions were considered in the sample frame too. In total, seven investment 
managers on the senior level were contacted by e-mail on 24 July 2017, and were invited to 
comment on the most important main study results for the MBGs. These MBGs received a study 
certificate and the results (see appendix Q.3) in German language. In order to arrange an 
appointment for a telephone interview, the selected MBGs were contacted during the first week 
of August 2017. Two investment managers denied to participate due to time constraints. Finally, 
five interviews were carried out until 9 August 2017. One investment manager was exclusively 
involved in venture capital activities and another investment manager was busy with both early-
stage and later-stage investments. The remaining participants were exclusively busy with later-
stage investments. The interviews took between ten and twenty minutes and were each manually 
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recorded. Even though this validation study was completely structured too, the participants were 
requested to detail their opinion during the telephone interview.           
 
6.7.5  The results of the second validation study 
 
This validation study was focused on the main study results with regard to: 
 
1. Dealflow: 
a) most important deal sources during 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
b) less important deal sources during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
2. Business plan screening: 
a) most important review fields in 2013; 
b) changes on the level of the most important review fields. 
3. Due Diligence: 
a) most important review fields in 2013; 
b) changes on the level of the most important review fields. 
4. Monitoring and mentoring: 
 most important monitoring and mentoring areas in 2013. 
5. Basel III: Impacts on the selection of industry branches.  
6. AIFM-directive: Impacts on BP screening, the DD and the post-investment phase. 
 
Due to the meanwhile larger time gap between the post-crisis phase and the moment of the 
second validation study, it was not expected to receive comprehensible responses regarding 
mentoring’s extent between 2010 and 2012. Therefore, the point number 4 b) regarding the 
monitoring and mentoring extent during the post-crisis phase (see section 6.7.3) was left out in 
this validation study. 
 
With regard to the acquisition of deals, the main study results had shown that banks, consultants 
and the network of the MBGs were the most important deal sources during the post-crisis phase. 
This result was confirmed by five out of five responses and hence a proportion of 100%. The 
main study results had also shown that auctions, chambers of commerce, federations and 
universities played a minor or absolutely no role in the acquisition of deals. This main study 
result of the MBGs was confirmed by 100% of the respondents too. 
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With regard to the screening of business plans, the main study results had shown that the 
management team, the market and the competition, the strategy, and the product or service were 
the most important review fields at the moment of the main study in 2013 (see table 97 in 
appendix O). This result was confirmed by five out of five responses and hence a proportion of 
100%. The entire sample also confirmed that the importance of these most important review 
fields has not changed during the past years.  
 
With regard to the due diligence, the main study results had shown that the management team, 
the strategy, and the product or service were the most important review fields at the moment of 
the main study in 2013 (see table 99 in appendix O). This result was confirmed by four out of 
five responses and hence a proportion of 80%, whereas one respondent and hence a proportion of 
20% contradicted. Four respondents and thus 80% of the sample members also confirmed that 
the importance of the most important review fields has not changed during the past years either. 
 
These results are summarised in the subsequent table 127. 
 
The validation study results of the MBGs part I 
 
Result Confirmed Not confirmed No indication Total 
Category n Share n Share n Share n Share 
 
Deal acquisition         
1 a) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
1 b) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
BP screening         
2 a) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
2 b) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
DD          
3 a) 4 80% 1 20% 0 0% 5 100% 
3 b) 4 80% 1 20% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
Table 127 The validation study results of the MBGs part I (own development) 
 
With regard to the phase of monitoring and mentoring, the main study results had shown that the 
MBGs were most busy with finance and controlling, board establishment and strategy 
development at the moment of the survey in 2013 (see table 101 in appendix O). This result was 
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confirmed by four out of five responses and hence a proportion of 80%, whereas one respondent 
and hence a proportion of 20% contradicted.  
 
The main study results had, moreover, shown that the implementation of Basel III has not 
influenced the selection of specific industry branches. Furthermore, the main study results had 
shown that the implementation of the AIFM-directive has not influenced the processes of 
business plan screening, the due diligence or the monitoring and mentoring of the portfolio 
companies. These both main study results were each confirmed by 100% of the responses.  
 
This part of the results are summarised in the subsequent table 128. 
 
The validation study results of the MBGs part II 
 
Result Confirmed Not confirmed No indication Total 
Category n Share n Share n Share n Share 
 
Monitoring         
4) 4 80% 1 20% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
Basel III         
5) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
AIFM-directive         
6) 5 100% 0 0% 0 0% 5 100% 
 
Table 128 The validation study results of the MBGs part II (own development) 
 
The main study results had, moreover, shown that the MBGs were clearly focused on finance 
and controlling during the phase of monitoring and mentoring (see table 101 in appendix O and 
table 84 in section 6.5.3). The MBGs were therefore requested to substantiate their monitoring 
and mentoring behaviour regarding that specific aspect. Three of the participating MBGs pointed 
out that this kind of investor would not be focused on a specific industry sector. Instead, they 
would be industry sector open and would therefore not employ specialists. The majority of 
investment managers would have a finance or bank related educational background. Thus, the 
core competence would be the financial aspect rather than branch or market competences.  
 
All other indications seemed very subjective and obviously also dependent on regional 
particularities. A further and detailed presentation was therefore omitted at that point. 
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Nevertheless, these additional indications showed that the VC and PE business seems to be very 
subjectively driven. In that regard, one investment manager for example argued that both the 
profit and loss statement, and the balance sheet would be most important during the monitoring 
and mentoring process, whereas another investment manager clearly contradicted. This 
respondent argued that he would be focused on market’s future development rather than on past 
results and thus not really interested in the cashflow or the profit and loss statement. 
Furthermore, one investment manager argued that chambers of commerce would be relevant for 
the acquisition of deals, at least from time to time, whereas other investment managers argued 
that a cooperation would not be possible or that investment requests from this deal channel 
would always be poor. These subjective assessments might be one reason for the inconsistencies 
in the initial validation study. Moreover, this validation study showed that the inconsistencies in 
the initial validation study, at least along the results of the MBGs, were obviously also caused by 
the lack of detail in the questionnaire.  
 
As a result of this validation study, it was surely possible to conclude that the main study results 
were finally consistent. 
  
6.8  The conclusions 
 
The aim of the present examination was to examine the developments of Germany’s economic, 
innovation and public funding policy, and the development in Germany’s PE and VC market 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
The objectives of the present examination were: 
 
1. To examine Germany’s economic and innovation policy during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 
2. To examine the progress of public funding on the federal level for SME investments, 
innovation projects, enterprise founding and equity investments. 
 
3. To examine the German PE and VC market on the level of early stage, public and semi-
public investors, and on the level of their: 
a) investment strategy; 
b) investment behaviour; 
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c) investment process. 
 
The aim and objectives were associated with a research question which was: 
 
How did Germany’s equity market and public funding policy develop during the post-crisis 
phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012? 
 
The research question, the aim and objectives (see section 4.6.4) were basically associated with 
five presumptions (see section 4.6.3). These presumptions, rather than a set of detailed and 
testable hypotheses, were derived from the literature review (see section 4.6.1) and defined a 
skeletal theory with regard to the underlying examination areas. This skeletal theory was 
associated with broad understandings of relationships (Laughlin 1995) in the field of economic, 
innovation and public funding policy on the one hand and Germany’s equity market on the other 
hand.  
 
The first presumption supposed that in response to the financial crisis, the German government 
adjusted the economic, the innovation and hence the public funding policy in order to support 
SMEs, innovation, enterprise founding and the technology transfer. The second presumption 
supposed that the financial crisis caused an increasing risk awareness of PE and VC investors 
and that, therefore, investors changed their investment strategy and investment behaviour. The 
third presumption supposed that the indicators along the components of the investment process 
changed their respective weight during the post-crisis phase. The fourth presumption supposed 
that the implementation of the AIFM-directive affected PE and VC investors' processes of deal 
selection, deal screening and monitoring. The fifth presumption supposed that PE and VC 
investors preferred or avoided investments in specific industry branches due to the 
implementation of Basel III (see section 4.6.3). 
 
These presumptions, as a skeletal theory in accordance with Laughlin’s approach of so-called 
middle-range thinking, might or might not be enriched during the research process (see section 
5.3). Even though the underlying examination was derived from a comprehensive and detailed 
research methodology (see chapter five), the research strategy of the present examination (see 
section 5.4 and figure one in section 5.4) was also regarded as skeletal in accordance with 
Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking. This procedure ensured the possibility of the 
future adjustment of the research strategy in order to possibly expand the skeletal theory and, 
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moreover, to realise a comprehensive understanding of the earlier broad relationships (Laughlin 
1995). This initial research perspective in context to Laughlin’s approach of middle-range 
thinking (Laughlin 1995) is presented in the subsequent figure five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Middle-range thinking and the research perspective (own development) 
 
With regard to the initial presumption, the results showed that the post-crisis phase was 
associated with a rather supply-driven economic policy and public household’s consolidation. 
With regard to the innovation policy, the government followed a course of intervention-based 
policy to support research in specific areas of economical relevance and to align the structural 
change in desired directions (see sections 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 6.1.4). With regard to Germany’s 
public funding policy, the post-crisis phase was associated with a significant improvement and 
expansion. The government not only improved and expanded the research subsidies ZIM and 
KMU-innovativ (see table 42 in section 6.1.1, table 43 in section 6.1.2, table 44 in section 6.1.3 
and table 45 in section 6.1.4) but, moreover, ensured the launch and the expansion of equity 
financing funds on the federal level (see tables 56 and 57 in section 6.4). Finally, the KfW 
improved and expanded the financing measures for SME investments and enterprise foundings 
(see sections 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4). This initial presumption was therefore regarded as 
supported.  
 
With regard to the second presumption, the results showed that the financial crisis was neither 
associated with PE and VC investors' shift in larger investment classes (see tables 65 and 66 in 
section 6.5.2) nor with PE and VC investors' focus on larger enterprises (see tables 67 and 68 in 
                   Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995) 
 
Skeletal theory                    Skeletal research methodology              Change requirement 
 
  Presumptions: 
  Development of Germany’s economic, innovation, public funding policy. 
  Investment strategy and investment behaviour of PE/VC investors. 
  Changes along the investment process. 
  Impacts of the AIFM-directive. 
  Impacts of Basel III. 
 229 
section 6.5.2). Even though the syndication proportion in the present sample was slightly 
increasing between 2010 and 2012 (see table 76 in section 6.5.3), this weak increase was not 
interpreted as an extraordinary development in the context of the financial crisis. With regard to 
the application of public funding, the results showed that the proportion of PE and VC firms 
which applied for public subsidisation between 2010 and 2012, in comparison to the initial crisis 
phase was comparatively large (see table 75 in section 6.5.3 and table 14 in section 4.3). This 
progress in context to long-term developments since the millennium turn was interpreted as a 
trend to normalisation rather than a result of crisis' impacts. Results, furthermore, showed that 
investors did not reduce their investment proportion in relation to the number of received 
business plans (see table 77 in section 6.5.3). The progress in both the number of investments 
(see table 71 in section 6.5.3) and portfolio companies (see table 70 in section 6.5.3) was not 
interpreted as a basic change of investors investment behaviour due to crisis' effects either. This 
applied both for an entire market perspective and more detailed for the support-oriented investors 
on the one hand and the more strategic and on profit-oriented investors on the other hand (see 
section 6.5.4 and appendix P). Finally, this applied also for the investment strategy and the 
investment behaviour of the so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften (see sections 
6.5.2, 6.5.3 and appendix O). The second presumption was therefore not supported from the 
research results. 
 
The third presumption was only partly supported by the research findings. On the one hand, the 
results showed that the management team was held to be of increasing importance during the 
post-crisis phase. This applied both for the phases of the initial screening (see table 80 in section 
6.5.3) and of the detailed screening (see table 82 in section 6.5.3). On the other hand, the post-
crisis phase of 2010 to 2012 was neither associated with an increasing involvement of investors 
in the majority of cases (see table 85 in section 6.5.3) nor with a change in the relevance of 
monitoring areas (see table 84 in section 6.5.3). Finally, the results showed that the post-crisis 
phase was neither associated with an increasingly nor a comparatively large proportion of failed 
contract negotiations due to a particular contract right (see table 83 in section 6.5.3).  
 
The fourth presumption was not supported by the research results. The results showed that the 
transformation of the AIFM-directive has no effect on the deal selection, the deal screening or 
the monitoring of the portfolio companies (see table 88 in section 6.5.3). 
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The final presumption was not supported by the research results either as the results showed that 
the implementation of Basel III neither prompted PE and VC investors to prefer nor to avoid 
investments in specific industry sectors (see table 87 in section 6.5.3).   
 
The application of Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995) finally did not 
result in a substantial enrichment of the initial skeletal theory. Nevertheless, this flexible 
procedure supported the deeper analysis of the examination areas due to a more integrating 
rather than separating perspective. This more integrating perspective changed the initial research 
focus from the entire PE and VC market on the role of the public and the semi-public investors. 
This changed perspective underlined the differences between this type of investor with the 
remaining market members. In that context, the results also underlined the exceptional role of the 
so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften, which did not only differ within their 
group of public and semi-public investors but also in comparison with the remaining market 
members (see section 7.2.5).  
 
In addition, the further procedure in context to Germany’s public funding policy underlined the 
central role of the KfW-Mittelstandsbank for the financing of SMEs and the support of 
Germany’s PE and VC market (see sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.3.4 and 6.4). Beside the initial 
research perspective and the initial presumptions, the results, moreover, showed that a major 
concern in the German PE and VC market during the post-crisis phase was associated with 
fundraising and exit options. Moreover, the market members were concerned due to the lack of 
an all-encompassing venture capital and private equity law (see sections 6.6, 6.6.1, 6.6.2 and 
6.6.3).  
 
The initial perspective on developments in Germany was finally expanded on interrelationships 
with European policy and strategy. Hence, by starting from a broader perspective, the 
examination finally resulted in a more integrative view which detailed the interaction between 
public decision makers, public bodies and private institutions to support the economy and 
innovation processes. The subsequent figure six presents the final examination subjects and their 
relationships as a result of Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995). 
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Figure 6 The final examination perspective and relationships (own development) 
 
The subsequent discussion chapter is concerned with the detailed debate of these conclusions in 
context with Laughlin’s approach of middle-range thinking (Laughlin 1995). The discussion 
takes a critical perspective in accordance with the Habermasion tradition (Laughlin 1995 and 
section 5.3) and is focused on the long-term innovation political aspects, the public and the semi-
public investors, and finally on the critical evaluation of public funding initiatives in Germany.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic policy                          Innovation policy                           Public funding policy 
 
 
        MBGs               Innovation/Economic growth/Public welfare                KfW 
 
 
                VC/PE-market: public/semi-public/CVC/independent investors 
 
 
Investment behaviour                   Investment strategy                       Investment process 
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Chapter 7 The discussion of the results 
 
This chapter is initially concerned with the economic, the innovation and the public funding 
policy in Germany. Subsequently, this chapter details the developments regarding the German 
PE and VC market, the investment process and the public and semi-public investors. The chapter 
is finalised by implications for theory and practice, limitations and recommendations for further 
research. 
 
7.1  The economic, the innovation and the public funding policy 
 
7.1.1  The discussion regarding the economic and the innovation policy 
 
With regard to the innovation policy in Germany, the literature showed that the millennium turn 
has introduced a phase of more integrated and surely more strategic innovation policy in 
comparison to the previous periods (see section 4.5.1). In that respect, the period between 1973 
an 1982 was associated with a more intervention-based innovation policy in order to support the 
structural change (Welsch 2005) and to address the consequences of the oil crisis in 1973 and 
1974 (Müller and Sturm 2010). The subsequent period until the year 2000 was associated with a 
more market-based innovation policy and the specification of new key technologies for future 
economic growth (Welsch 2005). This innovation political strategy was embedded in a more 
supply-driven economic policy until 1998 (Müller and Sturm 2010). The millennium turn was 
associated with economy’s slow-down (Destatis 2013) and the subsequent crash of Germany’s 
technological stock market segment, the so-called Neue Markt in 2002 (Ehren 2013). This 
development prompted the government to leave the path of more demand-driven economic 
policy which was briefly applied around the millennium turn as a consequence of the 
governmental change. Furthermore, the government was required to push significant social 
reforms through (Müller and Sturm 2010). In this context, the government was also prompted to 
realign the innovation policy in order to address an increasing globalisation and competition, the 
increasing importance of networks for technical progress and to intensify the technology transfer 
(Welsch 2005). The government finally launched the so-called HTS 2010 in 2006 in order to 
bundle the public research and education policy on the one hand and to align public research 
efforts on future demand areas on the other hand. These areas were climate and energy, health 
and nutrition, mobility and safety, and communication. These fields were regarded as support-
worthy due to their future economic relevance (BMBF 2010). It is exactly this focus on long-
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term demand areas, the attempt to increase innovation system’s flexibility and its expansion 
(Welsch 2005) which supported the classification of the innovation policy as more integrative 
and strategic after the millennium turn.  
 
With regard to the economic policy, the initial crisis phase was surely associated with typical 
Keynesian incentives and hence with a more demand-driven economic policy to relieve the 
entire economy, the private households and to stabilise the financial sector (see consecutive no. 
one, two, three, nine and 17, in table 42 in section 6.1.1). Nevertheless, the research results, 
moreover, showed that the government left the path of strong public involvement already in 
2010, inter alia, by appointing an expert panel regarding exit strategies from public investments 
(see consecutive no. three, in table 43 in section 6.1.2). 
 
With regard to the innovation policy during the post-crisis phase, the government relaunched the 
HTS from 2006 already in 2010 (see consecutive no. 68, in table 43 in section 6.1.2), improved 
the federal research funding significantly (see consecutive no. 79, in table 42 in section 6.1.1; 
consecutive no. 72 and 73, in table 43 in section 6.1.2; consecutive no. 78 and 79, in table 44 in 
section 6.1.3 and consecutive no. 83 and 84, in table 45 in section 6.1.4) and, furthermore, 
improved the public funding for equity, start-up and SME financing (see consecutive no. 44 and 
45, in table 42 in section 6.1.1; see consecutive no. 76, in table 44 in section 6.1.3 and 
consecutive no. 86, 87 and 90, in table 45 in section 6.1.4 and with regard to SME financing see 
also section 4.5.2). This development both in the initial and during the post-crisis phase 
supported innovation policy’s classification as intervention-based.  
 
7.1.2  The discussion regarding innovation related developments 
 
The literature review in section 2.6.2 initially showed that the innovation related developments in 
Germany were associated with several particularities. At first, research data showed that the 
proportion of research active enterprises and the proportion of both product and process 
innovators were not only increasing in relation to the enterprise size but were also bigger in the 
industry than in the service sector (see table six in section 2.6.2). In addition, research data 
showed that the profit contribution of both product and process innovations increased in relation 
to the enterprise size too and that their profit contribution was bigger in the industry than in the 
service sector (see table seven in section 2.6.2). Moreover, research data showed that the major 
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stake of new products revenues came from product imitations rather than real product inventions 
(Rammer et al. 2014).  
 
In 2012, approx. 64% of the total research expenses were realised in the chemistry, the 
pharmaceutical, the electronics, the automotive and the mechanical engineering sector. These 
industry branches increased their research expenses between 2008 and 2012. In terms of an 
enterprise-size related perspective, approx. 76% of these research expenses were realised in 
enterprises with more than 500 employees (see section 2.6.2 and Rammer et al. 2014). As a 
result, Germany’s innovation capacity seemed one-sided and limited to specific branches and 
enterprises-sizes. 
 
Even though the government expanded the public support for innovation purposes significantly 
(see consecutive no. 79, in table 42 in section 6.1.1; consecutive no. 72 and 73, in table 43 in 
section 6.1.2; consecutive no. 78 and 79, in table 44 in section 6.1.3; consecutive no. 83 and 84, 
in table 45 in section 6.1.4), the further progress was not associated with positive developments. 
On the one hand, the data show that the expenses for innovation purposes increased from approx. 
128 billion euros in 2008 to approx. 145 billion euros in 2014. This was an increase of approx. 
13.2%. On the other hand, the innovation expenses of the SMEs decreased from approx. 27 
billion euros in 2008 to approx. 22 billion euros in 2014, while these expenses on the level of the 
bigger-sized enterprises increased from 101 billion euros in 2008 to 123 billion euros in 2014, 
and hence by 21.8% (see subsequent table 129).    
 
The innovation expenses in the industry and service sector in BEUR 
Year 
Number of  2008 2012 2014 
employees Expenses Proportion Expenses Proportion Expenses Proportion 
       
5 – 249 27.08 21% 24.19 18% 21.56 15% 
249 < 101.00 79% 113.23 82% 123.47 85% 
       
Total 128.08 100% 137.42 100% 145.03 100% 
 
Table 129 The innovation expenses in the industry and service sector in BEUR; extrapolations for the 
population of enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer 
 et al. 2010, p. 17; Rammer et al. 2014, p. 16; Rammer et al. 2016, p. 15) 
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The innovation statistics also show that the proportion of enterprises which were classified as 
innovation active was decreasing decrementally between 2008 and 2014. This applies both for 
the industry and the service sector, and for every enterprise-size class. In that context, the data 
also show a significant decline in the proportion of both product and process innovators between 
2008 and 2014 (see subsequent table 130). Moreover, the data show that the revenue proportions 
of product innovations were declining from 16.6% in 2008 to 12.6% in 2012, but subsequently 
improved albeit slightly to 12.8% in 2014 (see table 131). This progress of the innovation 
activities, of the proportion of product and process innovators (see subsequent table 130), and of 
the innovation success (see table 131) surely contradicts a desired state and might explain 
government’s strong focus on technology transfer’s acceleration (see section 6.2.1).  
 
The innovation statistics for the industry and service sector 
 
Number of Innovation activities Product innovators Process innovators 
employees Year 
 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008
7 
2012 2014 
Industry 
sector 
         
5 – 49 63% 53% 48% 38% 34% 30% 31% 22% 21% 
50 – 249 79% 72% 68% 57% 50% 47% 49% 39% 34% 
250 – 999 90% 83% 84% 71% 68% 67% 67% 57% 58% 
1,000 < 97% 95% 95% 89% 87% 86% 87% 83% 83% 
          
Services 
sector 
         
5 – 49 48% 46% 40% 28% 25% 25% 26% 18% 16% 
50 – 249 54% 47% 50% 35% 27% 28% 41% 27% 30% 
250 – 999 72% 62% 65% 48% 35% 36% 50% 44% 42% 
1,000 < 87% 79% 76% 72% 61% 61% 75% 68% 63% 
          
Total 56% 51% 46% 34% 30% 29% 31% 22% 20% 
 
Table 130 The innovation statistics for the industry and service sector; extrapolations for the population 
of enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2010, p. 15; 
Rammer et al. 2014, p. 14; Rammer et al. 2016, p. 13) 
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The innovation success of the industry and service sector 
 
Number of Product innovations Process innovations 
employees Revenue proportions Proportion on cost Revenue proportion of 
  reductions quality improvements 
Year 
 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 
Industry 
sector 
         
5 – 49 10.2% 7.5% 8.0% 1.9% 1.1% 1.0% 2.2% 1.1% 0.9% 
50 – 249 13.7% 9.2% 8.1% 2.7% 1.8% 1.5% 2.0% 1.4% 1.1% 
250 – 999 13.5% 10.7%
% 
9.9% 3.8% 2.8% 3.1% 2.2% 1.4% 1.3% 
1,000 < 33.4% 27.4% 26.5% 5.2% 4.8% 4.2% 3.8% 2.4% 1.8% 
          
Services 
sector 
         
5 – 49 6.4% 6.0% 5.1% 1.9% 1.9% 0.3% 2.1% 0.9% 0.6% 
50 – 249 9.8% 4.7% 3.1% 1.5% 1.1% 1.2% 2.3% 0.8% 0.8% 
250 – 999 6.9% 3.8% 6.0% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7% 1.2% 0.7% 1.0% 
1,000 < 14.9% 9.6% 12.4% 5.6% 4.4% 3.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.4% 
          
Total 16.6% 12.6%
% 
12.8%
% 
3.9% 3.3%
% 
2.8% 2.6% 1.7% 1.4% 
 
Table 131 The innovation success of the industry and service sector; extrapolations for the population of 
enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2010, p. 18; Rammer 
et al. 2014, p. 17; Rammer et al. 2016, p. 16) 
 
These developments basically raise the question of whether the public funding policy was 
effective. The attempt to boost the innovation activity at least on the level of these enterprises 
which are regarded as support-worthy, namely the SMEs, obviously did not cause the desired 
state. This issue of public funding’s effectiveness is discussed in greater detail in section 7.3.3. In 
addition, it was not possible to stop the declining innovation activity either (see table 130). This 
development, moreover, raises the question of whether the declining trend was caused by 
financial crisis related impacts or associated with more long-term related effects.  
 
In that respect, research data support the conclusion that the innovation related developments in 
Germany seem to be a long-term rather than a financial crisis related and thus short-term 
phenomenon. The research data show that out of an industry sector related perspective, only the 
so-called research-intensive industry with the chemistry, the pharmaceutical, the electronics, the 
mechanical engineering and the automotive sector were able to keep the proportion of both 
product and process innovators at least stable between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the 
subsequent period until 2014, show a declining trend on the level of the research-intensive 
industry too even though their research expenses were increasing during this period. These 
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proportions in the remaining industry sectors, e. g. mining, energy or recycling, and in the 
service sector were decreasing during the same period of 2000 until 2014. This decline already 
started in 1998, after an initial increase on the level of the entire industry and the service sectors, 
approx. from the middle of the nineties on (Rammer et al. 2016). This development should also 
be considered in context to these enterprises which carried out research and development 
continuously. This proportion of continuously research active enterprises in Germany was only 
increasing on the level of the research-intensive industry between 1993 and 2014, while the 
remaining industry sectors and the service sector kept this proportion at least stable (Rammer et 
al. 2016). With regard to the research and development expenses, research data show that the 
expenses on the level of the research-intensive industry were increasing from approx. 42 billion 
euros in 2000 to approx. 75 billion euros in 2008. These research expenses were not only 
comparatively smaller both in the remaining industry sectors and the service sector but 
developed rather unchanged on that level between 2000 and 2008. The further development until 
2014, show an increase up to approx. 93.4 billion euros on the level of the research-intensive 
industry but only a slight increase on the level of the remaining industry and the service sectors. 
The earlier development between the middle of the nineties and the millennium turn was 
associated with an increase on the level of the research-intensive industry too and only a very 
slight increase on the level of the remaining industry and the service sectors (Rammer et al. 
2016).  
 
With regard to an enterprise-size related perspective, the data show that the research expenses on 
the level of the bigger-sized enterprises were increasing, whereas these amounts developed 
unchanged on the level of the SMEs between 2000 and 2008. The period between the middle of 
the nineties and the millennium turn was associated with an increase on the level of the bigger-
sized enterprises and a comparatively stable development on the level of the SMEs (Rammer et 
al. 2014). The entire development of the research expenses between 1995 until 2014, for both the 
smaller and the bigger-sized enterprises, is summarised in the subsequent table 132. 
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The progress of the innovation expenses in BEUR 
Year 
Number of 1995 2012 2014
1) 
employees    
    
500 < 35.1 104.8 115.1 
499 > 25.7 32.6 31.7 
    
Total 60.8 137.4 146.8 
 
1) Estimation. 
Table 132 The progress of the innovation expenses in BEUR; extrapolations for the population of 
enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2014, p. 13) 
 
This progress on the level of the bigger-sized enterprises stands for an increase of approx. 328% 
in comparison to an increase of 23.5% on the level of the smaller enterprises between 1995 and 
2014 (see table 132). 
 
As a result of these long-term developments, the declining profit contributions of product and 
process innovations, which were already shown for the timeframe between 2008 and 2014 (see 
table 131), were not a short-term phenomenon either. In that respect and out of an industry sector 
related perspective, the revenue proportions of product innovations were declining on the level 
of the industry and the service sector between 2000 and 2014. These developments are 
summarised in the subsequent table 133.  
 
The revenue proportions of the product innovations
1)
 
Year 
Type of industry/service sector 2000 2014
 
   
Research-intensive industry  42% 33% 
Remaining industry sectors 16% 7% 
Knowledge-intensive services 15% 10% 
Remaining services 9% 6% 
 
1) Including product inventions, product improvements, product imitations. 
Table 133 The revenue proportions of the product innovations; extrapolations for the population of 
enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2016, p. 8) 
 
More detailed data show that this decline of the revenue proportions also applies for these 
products which are separately classified as completely new or significantly improved. This more 
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detailed result applies for every industry and service sector, and at least for the period between 
2000 and 2008. The subsequent period until 2014, was associated with quite stable and so far 
improved developments (Rammer et al. 2016).  
 
Finally, data show that the contribution of process innovations on cost reductions declined out of 
an industry sector related perspective between 2000 and 2014 too. This development is 
summarised in the subsequent table 134.   
  
The contribution of the process innovations on cost reductions 
Year 
Type of industry/service sector 2000 2014
 
   
Research-intensive industry  7.7% 3.9% 
Remaining industry sectors 5.3% 2.8% 
Knowledge-intensive services 4.0% 3.3% 
Remaining services 2.0% 1.3% 
 
Table 134 The contribution of the process innovations on cost reductions; extrapolations for the 
population of enterprises in Germany with more than five employees (derived from Rammer 
 et al. 2016, p. 9) 
 
Therefore, innovation related developments in Germany are surely not a short-term phenomenon 
which should be regarded in the context of the financial crisis alone. The long-term perspective 
rather showed that even the research-intensive industry sectors, despite their increasing amount 
of research expenses seemed not to be able to stop the declining trend either. Hence, financing 
capital alone seemed obviously not the only, if at all, the core problem field. Furthermore, next 
to the fact that it was obviously not possible to improve the research contribution of the smaller 
enterprises, seems to be that Germany’s economy depends on specific sectors. In that regard, 
automotive, electronics and mechanical engineering were the most successful industry sectors in 
terms of revenue proportions of product innovations in 2014 (Rammer et al. 2016). With some 
minor changes, this was already the case approx. one decade ago (Rammer et al. 2005). The 
subsequent table 135 summarises the most important industry sectors with regard to their 
proportion on product and process innovators, continuously research active enterprises and 
revenue proportions of product innovations. 
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The industry sectors' importance 
 
 Continuously research active industry branches
 
Rank/Year 2003 2014 
1. Chemistry/Pharmacy Chemistry/Pharmacy 
2. Electronics  Electronics  
3. Mechanical engineering Mechanical engineering 
4. Automotive IT/Telco 
 
 Product and process innovators
 
Rank/Year 2003 2014 
1. Chemistry/Pharmacy Chemistry/Pharmacy 
2. Mechanical engineering Mechanical engineering 
3. Electronics  Electronics  
4. IT/Telco IT/Telco 
 
 Revenue proportions of product innovations
1) 
Rank/Year 2003 2014 
1. Automotive  Automotive  
2. Electronics  Electronics  
3. IT/Telco Mechanical engineering 
4. Furniture/Sports/Recycling Textile/Leather 
 
1) Including product inventions, product improvements, product imitations. 
Table 135 The industry sectors' importance; extrapolations for the population of enterprises in Germany 
with more than five employees (derived from Rammer et al. 2005, p. 9; Rammer et al. 2016, pp. 3, 8, 9) 
 
Surely worth mentioning in that context is the dominance of the automotive sector which is 
expressed by a comparatively larger profit contribution of product innovations on the one hand 
and the obviously minor success of the information and telecommunication sector in 2014. 
Nevertheless and as already indicated, the profit contributions of product innovations were 
dominated from product imitations rather than product inventions. This applies for every 
industry and service sector (Rammer et al. 2005; Rammer et al. 2016) and underlines the 
conclusion of Welsch (2005) who already argued that Germany would be concerned with the 
improvement of products rather than the development of radical innovations. Thus, Germany 
would not be able to develop new markets and new industry sectors under the given 
circumstances (Welsch 2005). Therefore, it seems questionable if the bulk of public funding 
finally results in positive outcomes and thus an increasing innovation activity and success. What 
in this context underlines the doubtfulness of the public funding’s increase, is the development of 
Germany’s number of so-called world-market relevant patents. These patents, which are either 
registered in Europe or at the World Intellectual Property Organization, are important for an 
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export-oriented economy as in the case of Germany (BMBF 2016). In that regard, it was 
obviously not possible to increase the output on world-market relevant patents substantially. The 
subsequent table 136 shows that this number of patents increased only slightly in Germany 
between 2003 and 2013, while other countries both in Europe and in particular in Asia were 
surely more successful.  
 
The development of the world-market relevant patents
1)
 
 
Year 2000 2003 2009 2013 Progress  
Country Annual number of patents 2003 – 2013 
      
South Korea 61 120 226 308 156.7% 
Japan 214 247 293 375 51.8% 
Sweden 407 323 398 435 34.7% 
Finland  383 327 372 423 29.4% 
Switzerland 520 533 584 604 13.3% 
Germany 332 341 376 372 9.1% 
 
1) Per million inhabitants. 
Table 136 The development of the world-market relevant patents;  
(derived from table 1.8.4 on www.datenportal.bmbf.de, accessed July 2017) 
 
Despite the fact that the innovation statistics do not consider every enterprise size and industry 
branch, and might also suffer from biases due to a flexible interpretation of the innovation term 
(see section 2.6.2), they surely provided a basic orientation on innovation related developments 
in Germany. In the context with these long-term developments, the subsequent section details the 
public funding aspects in Germany. 
   
7.1.3  The discussion regarding the public funding related developments 
 
With regard to the public funding of PE and VC investments, and the additional measures which 
were launched both during the post-crisis and the subsequent phase (see tables 56 and 57 in 
section 6.4), an assessment may be too early. Nevertheless, an initial look on Germany’s PE and 
VC market shows that the absolute investment amounts were decreasing between 2007 and 
2015, while the relative proportion of VC investments on total investments was considerably 
increasing from 8% in 2007 to 13% in 2015. On the other hand, the proportion of total PE and 
VC investments in relation to Germany’s GDP was decreasing between 2007 and 2015, as did 
the proportion of VC investments during the same period (see subsequent table 137).  
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The indications for the German PE and VC market 
 
Year 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
 in MEUR 
Total investments  10,448 3,024 6,667 5,055 6,599 
VC investments  817 659 717 716 837 
Proportion of VC 8% 22% 11% 14% 13% 
PE/VC as of GDP 
 
0.42% 0.12% 0.25% 0.18% 0.22% 
VC as of GDP 0.032% 0.027% 0.027% 0.025% 0.028% 
 
Table 137 The indications for the German PE and VC market; 
based on market statistics (derived from InvestEurope 2016) 
 
Interestingly enough, the decline of venture capital investments in any of the periods in table 138 
was not as strong as in the case of the remaining types of equity investments. In that respect, the 
calculations show that the total amount of PE investments in Germany was declining by approx. 
40.2% between 2007 and 2015, while the venture capital investments were increasing, albeit 
slightly, by approx. 2.5% during the same period (see subsequent table 138).  
 
The percentage developments in Germany’s PE and VC market 
 
Period 2007 – 2009 2007 – 2011 2007 – 2015 
    
Total investments
1)
 -71.1% -36.2% -36.8% 
    
Total investments without VC -75.5% -38.2% -40.2% 
    
VC investments -19.3% -12.1% 2.5% 
 
1) Market statistics (including the investments of investors from outside Germany). 
Table 138 The percentage developments in Germany’s PE and VC market 
(derived from InvestEurope 2016) 
 
In the context of the public funding initiatives on the federal level, the research results showed 
that within the selected funding areas of the so-called KfW-Mittelstandsbank, the credit 
programmes for enterprise founding and SME financing were the dominating types of funding. 
Their proportion on the entire programme volume varied between 78% and 91% during 2008 
and 2012 (see table 53 in section 6.3.4). Within this programme line of enterprise founding and 
SME financing, the so-called Unternehmerkredit was the most important type of credit. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of the so-called Unternehmerkredit on credits for enterprise 
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founding and SME investments was decreasing from approx. 88.2% in 2008 to approx. 71.9% in 
2012, due to the significant increase of credits for enterprise founding. This proportion was 
increasing from 2.9% in 2008 to approx. 22.8% in 2012 (see table 53 in section 6.3.4). The 
proportion of equity financing on the entire programme volume was comparatively small and, 
moreover, was decreasing from 2.3% in 2008 to 1.4% in 2012 (see table 53 in section 6.3.4). On 
the other hand, the analysis showed that the funding proportion of the KfW on the entire PE and 
VC market was on average 4% between 2008 and 2012. On the level of the venture capital 
investments this proportion of the KfW was on average 29% during the same period (see table 
54 in section 6.3.4). KfW’s importance in that respect is also underlined by KfW’s proportion on 
the number of venture capital investments. Even though KfW’s number of equity investments 
declined, KfW’s proportion on the entire VC investments in Germany was on average 61% for 
the period of 2008 until 2012 (see subsequent table 139). This proportion should be larger in the 
case that the statistic would consider the indirect involvement of the KfW in Germany’s venture 
capital market (see table 55 in section 6.3.4). 
    
KfW’s proportion on PE and VC investments in Germany 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  
Total number of KfW’s equity investments1) 614 560 614 541 464 
      
Total number of VC investments in Germany 1,044 929 966 884 768 
Total number of PE/VC investments in Germany 1,342 1,216 1,359 1,291 1,272 
      
KfW’s proportion on VC investments 
 
58.8% 60.3% 63.6% 61.2% 60.4% 
KfW’s proportion on total PE/VC investments 45.8% 46.1% 45.2% 41.9% 36.5% 
 
1) KfW data (see table 52 in section 6.3.1). 
Table 139 KfW’s proportion on PE and VC investments in Germany; 
based on EVCA market statistics (derived from EVCA 2013) 
 
This development surely underlines the relevance of the KfW as a funding provider in general 
and in the PE and VC market in particular. The relevance of the KfW during earlier periods was 
already mentioned by Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner 
et al. (2010). Interestingly enough, the expansion of ERP-Startfund’s fund volume both during 
the initial and the post-crisis phase (see table 57 in section 6.4) did not result in an increasing 
investment activity (see table 54 in section 6.3.4). This development in the context of the 
undiminished large number of investment requests (see table 77 in section 6.5.3) might be a sign 
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for a strictly qualitative orientation of the KfW regarding equity investments. This assumption is 
also underlined by the interview results which made it clear that it was more difficult to receive 
public co- or refinancing measures for equity investments (see section 6.5.5). 
 
In this context of public funding initiatives for equity financing, the subsequent sections are now 
concerned with the progress of Germany’s PE and VC market. 
 
7.2  The discussion regarding the equity market in Germany 
 
The subsequent clarifications initially present the research results out of an entire sample 
perspective. In a second step, the results are presented with regard to the group of public and 
semi-public investors on the one hand and the profit-oriented and strategic investors on the other 
hand. Finally, the results regarding the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften are presented 
separately and in comparison to the sample groups of the public and the semi-public investors on 
the one hand and the profit-oriented and strategic investors on the other hand. This presentation 
considers earlier research results for comparison purposes. 
 
7.2.1  The discussion regarding the equity market’s development 
 
With regard to the developments out of an entire sample perspective and thus developments on 
the level of the early-stage investors, of the public investors and of the semi-public investors, the 
results initially showed that the mechanics and industry automation, the software and IT, the 
electronics, the life science, the telecommunication and the internet sector were still the 
dominating industry branches (see table 69 in section 6.5.2). According to long-term 
developments since the millennium turn (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010), investors obviously did not change their investment strategy in that 
respect. Furthermore, the present examination showed that the preferred types of equity 
investments were minority and silent investments at the moment of the survey in 2013 (see table 
64 in section 6.5.2). The focus on minority investments in the present examination agrees with 
the research results of Achleitner et al. (2010) for the initial phase of the financial crisis. In both 
cases, the overwhelming majority of corporate venture capitalists, of Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften and of public investors was each focused on minority rather than on 
majority investments. Independent investors on the other hand also realised majority investments 
in a comparatively larger proportion of cases (see table 64 in section 6.5.2). 
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The results also showed that both the fund volumes (see table 72 in section 6.5.3) and the 
investment volumes (see table 73 in section 6.5.3) were increasing during the post-crisis phase of 
2010, 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, the number of portfolio companies (see table 70 in 
section 6.5.3) and the number of investments (see table 71 in section 6.5.3) were both decreasing 
between 2010 and 2012. This investment behaviour resulted in increasing investment volumes 
per deal from approx. 976 TEUR in 2010 to 1.2 MEUR in 2012 (see table 74 in section 6.5.3). In 
that context, the major proportion of investments were realised in a range up to 1.5 MEUR per 
deal, with a concentration of the investors on deal sizes between 500 TEUR and 1.5 MEUR per 
deal (see table 65 in section 6.5.2). This corresponds with earlier research results for the period 
of 1999 until 2009, regarding the dominance of specific investment classes (Zimmermann and 
Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). Hence, investors did not change 
their investment strategy in that respect either. 
 
The results, furthermore, showed that the investment proportion in the German PE and VC 
market did not considerably change and remained stable by approx. 6% during 2010, 2011 and 
2012 (see table 77 in section 6.5.3). This means that according to a total market perspective, the 
investment proportion in relation to the number of received business plans had not fundamentally 
changed since the millennium turn either (see table 17 in appendix D). The results also showed 
that the majority of investors syndicated their investments. The syndication proportion for the 
entire sample was on average 59% per year during the post-crisis phase (see table 76 in section 
6.5.3). This result corresponds with earlier research results which already showed that the 
majority of equity investments in Germany were syndicated (Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et 
al. 2010). This syndication proportion differs only slightly from earlier syndication proportions 
both in 2005 and in 2010 (see table 15 in section 4.3). In addition, 50% of the survey participants 
considered public funding measures for their equity investments (see table 75 in section 6.5.3). 
This result underlines the importance of public funding in Germany’s equity market which was 
already shown by the research results of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. 
(2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). Hence, investors neither changed their investment behaviour 
with regard to the investment proportion, the syndication of investments nor with regard to the 
consideration of public funding measures. 
 
 
 
 
 246 
7.2.2  The discussion regarding the pre-investment phase 
 
In the context of the acquisition of deals, the results of the present thesis showed that banks and 
networks were the most important deal sources during the post-crisis phase (see table 78 in 
section 6.5.3). This continues earlier assessments regarding the importance of banks and 
networks for the acquisition of deals (Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). On the other 
hand, it was initially expected that chambers of commerce and federations would be important 
for the acquisition of deals too. This was not the case and the results in that respect showed that 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012, chambers of commerce and federations were each classified on the 
lowest ranks. On the other hand, results also showed that investors still avoided the acquisition of 
deals from consultants, over auctions or PE and VC firms (see table 78 in section 6.5.3), 
obviously as a consequence of cost disadvantages.  
 
With regard to the screening of business plans, the results showed that the management team was 
still held to be the most important review field in 2013 (see table 79 in section 6.5.3). Even 
though a remarkable proportion of investors indicated a stronger emphasis on the management 
team and a minor proportion of the respondents also on additional review fields, the initial phase 
of the crisis did not cause a fundamental change in each review fields earlier relevance (see 
section 4.4.2 and table 80 in section 6.5.3). A rather equal assessment applies for the results on 
the level of the due diligence (see section 4.4.3 and tables 81 and 82 in section 6.5.3). Thus, 
these results confirm the unchanged importance of the management team during the entire 
decision making process (see sections 4.4.2. and 4.4.3). 
  
With regard to the proportion of break-off reasons, the studies of Achleitner et al. (2006 and 
2010) showed that the proportion of deals which were broken off due to a particular contract 
right were increasing between 2004 (Achleitner et al. 2006), and the initial phase of the crisis 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). Achleitner et al. (2010) in that respect point out that decision making 
rights, investors' liquidation rights and in particular the enterprise value were the most important 
reasons for breaking off negotiations in 2009. These were surely comprehensible results as the 
PE and VC firms obviously tried to compensate the larger investment risk with more investment 
flexibility and price deductions. The present study in that respect showed that the proportion of 
deals which were broken off due to contract clauses improved during the post-crisis phase (see 
table 83 in section 6.5.3), obviously as a consequence of the comparatively stable economic 
development (Destatis 2013). Nevertheless, the most important reason for breaking of 
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negotiations during the post-crisis phase was that no investor realised the deal (see table 83 in 
section 6.5.3). This might have had its reason in the possibility that enterprises finally decided 
for alternative types of financing, for credit financing due to cost advantages or that the 
investment reason finally fell away, as already mentioned by Achleitner et al. (2006) and 
Achleitner et al. (2010). 
 
7.2.3  The discussion regarding the post-investment phase 
 
With regard to the post-investment phase, the results showed that the investors were most often 
involved in board establishment, finance and controlling, and strategy development at the 
moment of the survey in 2013 (see table 84 in section 6.5.3). These results correspond with 
earlier research results regarding the overwhelming importance of the board for the interaction 
between the investors and their portfolio companies and, furthermore, regarding the importance 
of finance and controlling and portfolio company’s strategy (see section 4.4.6).  
 
In terms of investor’s involvement, the results showed that the majority of respondents kept their 
degree of involvement stable, whereas anyhow one third of the respondents indicated an 
increasing involvement during the post-crisis phase (see table 85 in section 6.5.3). Hummel 
(2011b) in that context argues that the monitoring and mentoring extent, which is expressed in 
hours and personal contacts in his research examination, was increasing in the German PE and 
VC market between 2007 and 2009. This supports the assumption that in comparison to these 
results, the German PE and VC market followed a trend of normalisation rather than a further 
increasing hands-on activity during the post-crisis phase. 
 
With regard to investor’s exit, the results showed that the preferred type of exit route, namely 
initial public offerings, were very difficult to realise during the post-crisis phase (see table 86 in 
section 6.5.3). Therefore, investors alternatively tended to trade sales rather than secondary 
purchases which would have been associated with smaller investment returns (see section 4.4.7). 
This conclusion agrees with earlier research results for the initial crisis phase and with regard to 
the importance of trade sales and a minor relevance of both IPOs and secondary purchases 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). The research results of the present study, moreover, agree with long-
term developments which showed both a smaller proportion of IPOs and of secondary purchases 
in comparison to the predominating proportions of trade sales and of total losses (Hummel 
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2011b). The subsequent table 140 summarises the results regarding the entire sample 
perspective. 
  
The summary of the main study results 
 
Examination area Examination result for the post-crisis phase 
  
Investment proportion
1)
: 6% on average per year. 
Syndication proportion
2)
: 59% on average per year. 
Public funding proportion: 50% of the respondents at least sometimes. 
Average investment volumes per deal: 0.976 MEUR to 1.203 MEUR. 
Preferred type of investments: Minority and silent investments. 
Dominating industry branches: Mechanics/industry automation, software/IT, 
electronics, life science, telco, internet. 
Deal sources: 
a) most important: 
b) least important: 
 
Banks and networks. 
Chambers of commerce and federations. 
Review areas (initial and detailed screening): 
a) most important: 
b) least important: 
 
Management team. 
Organisation. 
Break-off reasons: 
a) most important: 
b) least important: 
 
No investor realised the deal. 
Particular contract right. 
Mentoring areas: 
a) most important: 
 
b) least important: 
 
Board establishment, finance & controlling, 
strategy development. 
Procurement & production. 
Investor’s involvement: Two thirds of the respondents kept their 
involvement unchanged; 
One third of the respondents increased their 
involvement during the post-crisis phase. 
Most important exit channels: Buy backs/repayment of silent investments, 
trade sales. 
Effects of the Basel III implementation: No effects on the consideration of industry 
branches. 
Effects of the AIFM implementation: No effects on the selection, the screening and 
the monitoring process. 
 
1) From the number of received business plans. 
2) From the total number of investments. 
Table 140 The summary of the main study results (own development) 
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These research outcomes for the entire sample show that the market participants neither changed 
their basic investment strategy nor their investment behaviour in comparison to the earlier 
developments since the millennium turn. Moreover, the research outcomes show that the 
financial crisis did not cause changes along the investment process. 
 
The subsequent section steps into a more detailed interpretation of the examination results and 
therefore distinguishes between the public and the semi-public investors on the one hand and the 
group of more strategic and profit-oriented investors on the other hand. 
 
7.2.4  The discussion regarding the public and the semi-public investors 
 
The survey results also showed that the group of public and semi-public investors and the group 
of more strategic and on profit-oriented investors, were focused on minority rather than on 
majority investments at the moment of the survey in 2013. Moreover, the results support the 
assumption that the public and the semi-public investors were clearly focused on silent 
investments (see table 102 in appendix P). These results agree both with the research findings of 
Schilder (2006), who was earlier research active regarding public venture capital in Germany, 
and the results of Achleitner et al. (2006). In addition, the results showed that the majority of the 
public and of the semi-public investors were focused on investments up to 1.5 MEUR per deal, 
whereas the remaining sample group also realised deals in larger investment classes (see table 
103 in appendix P). This agrees with earlier research studies of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), 
Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). According to their research results, on 
average approx. 90% of the investments from the public and the semi-public investors were 
associated with deal sizes up to 1.5 MEUR per deal in comparison to an average proportion of 
approx. 45% on the level of the independent investors and the CVCs (Zimmermann and Fischer 
2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010).  
 
With regard to the consideration of industry branches, the results showed that the group of the 
public and the semi-public investors either considered every kind of industry branch or tended to 
be focused on specific industry branches. On the other hand, the results also showed that the 
group of more strategic and profit-oriented investors tended to be specialised on specific industry 
branches (see table 104 in appendix P).  
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Furthermore, the results showed that both the fund and the investment volumes of the public and 
the semi-public investors were smaller (see tables 107 and 108 in appendix P), whereas both 
their number of portfolio companies and investments were larger (see tables 105 and 106 in 
appendix P). As a result, the deal sizes on the level of the public and the semi-public investors 
were smaller in comparison to the remaining group of more strategic and profit-oriented 
investors. This result agrees with the research results of Tykvová (2004) who, inter alia, argues 
that public investors would take a lower equity position due to their focus on silent investments. 
With regard to the syndication of deals during the post-crisis phase, the results showed that this 
proportion was smaller on the level of the public and the semi-public investors with on average 
43% per year in comparison to the remaining sample group with on average 76% per year (see 
table 109 in appendix P). These results agree with earlier research results too which already 
showed that the syndication proportion of the public and the semi-public investors was smaller in 
comparison to the profit-oriented and more strategic investors (Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner 
et al. 2010; see also table 15 in section 4.3). This difference in the syndication proportion might 
be a consequence of the larger investment proportion of the public and the semi-public investors 
(see table 77 in section 6.5.3), which surely corresponds with their status as supporters but 
contradicts the risk orientation of their counterparts. Therefore, a major proportion of their 
investments might be unattractive or too risky for the remaining market members and hence 
possible syndication partners. 
 
On the level of the initial and the detailed screening, the research results underlined the 
overwhelming importance of the management team and of the strategy. This applies for the 
initial as well as for the detailed screening and for both sample groups (see tables 110 and 111 in 
appendix P). This research result agrees with the research findings of Schilder (2006) who points 
out that both groups in his sample, namely public venture capitalists as well as independent 
investors and CVCs, would expect a clear strategy and a very qualified management team. With 
regard to the phase of negotiation, interestingly enough, public and semi-public investors were 
less exposed to the termination of negotiations due to a particular contract right (see table 112 in 
appendix P). This might be a result of their focus on silent investments which in the normal case 
are not associated with particular investor rights or dilution protection clauses. Therefore, there 
should be less room for disagreement between the negotiation parties. On the other hand, these 
results showed that both sample groups were exposed to market competition because deals were 
finalised by competitors. This means that capital seeking firms obviously realised contacts with 
different investors during the capital acquisition process. This was already mentioned from 
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Achleitner et al. (2006). Beside this internal market competition, PE and VC investors obviously 
were also exposed to external market competition with the bank sector. The most important 
reason for breaking off negotiations was that finally no investor realised the deal. Presumably, as 
a consequence that the investment reason finally fell away (Achleitner et al. 2006) or that the 
capital seeking enterprises decided for bank loans. This assumption should be considered in the 
context with the significantly improved financing conditions on the credit market as a 
consequence of the current monetary policy.  
 
The research results of the present study also agree with earlier research results (Zimmermann 
and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010) regarding the number of 
received business plans. This number was larger on the level of the more strategic and on profit-
oriented investors in comparison to the public and the semi-public investors. On the other hand, 
the investment proportion of the latter group was larger (see table 77 in section 6.5.3), probably, 
as a consequence of their support-oriented investment strategy. This result regarding the larger 
investment proportion agrees with the examination results of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), 
Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010) too. 
 
With regard to the post-investment phase, the results showed that the public and the semi-public 
investors seemed overall less often involved in their portfolio in comparison to the remaining 
sample group. Moreover, they tended to be less concerned with board establishment and 
management recruitment which might be a consequence of their focus on minority investments. 
Nevertheless, both groups were surely concerned with portfolio companies' strategy and finances 
(see table 113 in appendix P). These results agree with the research findings of Schilder (2006) 
too. Finally, the results showed that buy-backs and the repayment of silent investments played a 
larger role during the exit phase for the public and the semi-public investors, whereas trade sales 
played a larger role for the more strategic and profit-oriented investors (see table 114 in appendix 
P). This was obviously a consequence of public and semi-public investors focus on silent 
investments with limited exit options. Overall, this result regarding exit routes agrees with earlier 
research findings of Achleitner et al. (2006 and 2010). These researchers already referred to the 
dominance of buy-backs and of repayments for the group of the public and the semi-public 
investors.  
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7.2.5  The discussion regarding the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
 
With regard to a further separation of the entire sample, the results of the present study showed 
that the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften differed regarding several aspects from the 
entire equity market. This was, inter alia, shown by their significantly larger number of 
investments (see table 92 in appendix O) and the incomparable larger number of portfolio 
companies (see table 91 in appendix O). Their obviously different investment behaviour was not 
only associated with smaller investment amounts per deal (see table 95 in appendix O) in 
comparison to the entire market (see table 74 in section 6.5.3) but also with significantly larger 
investment proportions (see table 77 in section 6.5.3). This investment proportion of the MBGs 
was on average 12% during the post-crisis phase of 2010 to 2012 (see table 77 in section 6.5.3). 
This research result regarding MBGs disproportionately larger investment proportion agrees with 
earlier research results of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and 
Achleitner et al. (2010). The average deal size of the MBGs in the amount of approx. 260 TEUR 
during the post-crisis phase (see table 95 in appendix O) on the other hand shows that the MBGs 
still operated in smaller investment classes. This was already shown by the research results of 
Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et al. (2010). With their 
average investment amount per deal, the MBGs exactly matched the indicated investment gap in 
Germany’s PE and VC market (see table 16 in appendix G.3). In addition, the research results 
showed that the MBGs in general considered every kind of financing purpose but that they, 
nevertheless, seemed to be focused on expansion, MBO and MBI, and also on start-up financing 
(see table 63 in section 6.5.2). This corresponds with earlier research results too. These earlier 
research results already showed that the MBGs were not only focused on expansion financing 
but that MBO and MBI investments stepwise replaced the start-up and seed financing activities 
of the MBGs during 1999 until 2009 (Zimmerman and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; 
Achleitner et al. 2010). Moreover, the MBGs considered almost every industry branch rather 
than being focused on a specific industry sector (see table 104 in appendix P). Thus, they 
obviously took an exceptional role in Germany’s equity market in order to fulfil a status of self-
helping institutions for SMEs (see section 4.2). This type of investor was virtually uninfluenced 
from financial crisis related impacts in comparison to their earlier investment behaviour and 
strategy (Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010). The 
subsequent table 141 summarises the present research results regarding the MBGs, the public 
and the semi-public investors and finally the CVCs and the independent investors. 
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The comparison of the sample sub-groups 
 
Type of investor MBGs Public/Semi-public 
investors 
CVC/Independent 
Examination area Average results for 2010 to 2012 based on mean values 
    
Received business plans: 260 162 483 
Investment proportion in %
1)
: 12 9 3 
Syndication proportion in %
2)
: 43 43 76 
Fund volume in MEUR: 63 88 147 
Investment volume in MEUR: 
 
19 16 45 
Number of portfolio companies: 378 227 32 
Number of investments: 73 39 7 
Deal size in TEUR: 260 410 6,428 
Investment classes: < 1.5 < 1.5 < 5 
Type of equity investment: Silent Silent Silent 
Type of equity investment: Minority Minority Minority + open 
Industry branches: 
 
 
 
Every sector 
 
 
 
Mechanics/Industry 
automation; IT, 
software, 
electronics. 
Specialised 
 
 
 
Most important review field: 
 
 
 
Management team 
 
. 
Most important break-off reason: No investor realised the deal 
Most important mentoring area: Finance & controlling Board establishment 
Most important exit channel: Buy-backs/repayment Trade sales 
 
1) From the number of received business plans. 
2) From the total number of investments. 
Table 141 The comparison of the sample sub-groups (own development) 
 
Even though the financial crisis was associated with significant impacts on the German PE and 
VC market (Achleitner et al. 2010; Hummel 2011b and table 11 in appendix G.2), it could not be 
confirmed that market members adjusted their earlier investment strategy and their investment 
behaviour (see section 4.6.4). Since the public and the semi-public investors were still focused 
on smaller deal sizes in combination with a comparatively larger investment proportion, they 
obviously still fulfilled their role as supporters in the German PE and VC market. This 
conclusion is underlined by their smaller syndication proportion which might be a result of their 
less profitable and hence support-worthy investment targets. The so-called Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften in particular still met the requirements of self-helping institutions for 
SMEs. The larger risk aversion of the profit-oriented and more strategic investors on the other 
hand was not only expressed by their smaller investment proportion but also by their larger 
syndication proportion. In addition, the profit-oriented and more strategic investors concentrated 
on specific industry branches in order to achieve specialisation advantages. This means that 
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neither the group of the profit-oriented and more strategic investors nor the group of the public 
and the semi-public investors, and the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften changed their 
earlier investment strategy and investment behaviour. 
 
On the basis of these considerations, the subsequent sections are concerned with the implications 
for theory and practice. The focus in that regard is on the public funding initiatives and their 
effectiveness. 
 
7.3  The implications for theory and practice 
 
The subsequent sections critically evaluate the governmental funding initiatives which were 
introduced as a consequence of the financial crisis. At first, the focus is on the public funding for 
enterprise founding, which is followed from a critical look on the funding for both equity and 
innovation financing. This procedure considers recommendations for public decision makers out 
of a supply and demand-side perspective.  
 
7.3.1  The entrepreneurial debate and the demand-side perspective 
 
Overall, the present study showed that the German government expanded the public funding 
initiatives for enterprise founding, equity financing and for innovation projects. This applies both 
for the initial phase of the financial crisis and for the post-crisis phase of 2010 to 2012 (see table 
48 in section 6.2.3; table 55 in section 6.3.4; tables 56 and 57 in section 6.4). Nevertheless, the 
questions still remain if this expansion of the public funding measures was appropriate and if 
these governmental initiatives addressed the underlying market gaps.  
 
In context to enterprise foundings, data initially show that the annual proportion of enterprise 
founders from the entire population in the age of 18 to 64, declined from 2.8% in 2002 to 1.5% 
in 2015. This declining proportion, which considers enterprise foundings, enterprise takeovers 
and shareholdings, counted for both fulltime and sideline enterprise foundings (Metzger 2016). 
Additional data regarding the entrepreneurial activity not only correspond with these results but, 
moreover, put these developments in an international perspective. In that context, the so-called 
total-early-stage entrepreneurial activity considers both the number of so-called nascent 
entrepreneurs and of young entrepreneurs in different countries. This proportion of nascent and 
of young entrepreneurs, which may not be confused with the proportion of enterprise foundings, 
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from the population in the age of 18 to 64 was 4.7% in Germany in 2015. Thus, Germany took 
the final rank out of 23 so-called innovation-based economies in 2015. This TEA ratio for 
example was approx. three times bigger in Canada, approx. two and a half times bigger in the US 
and still one and a half times bigger each in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In 
addition, this ratio not only declined in Germany since 2011 but, moreover, also represents the 
long-term mean of the TEA ratio in Germany for the period of 1999 until 2015 (Sternberg et al. 
2016). It is therefore concluded that the entrepreneurial activity is not a short-term problem field 
in Germany even though it is argued that the overall declining ratios in that respect would be due 
to the positive economic climate and the robust labour market (Metzger 2016; Sternberg et al. 
2016). Surely more critical in that context was the development of the balance of enterprise 
foundings and of liquidations (see subsequent table 142). On the level of the so-called 
commercial enterprise foundings, data show that the balance of enterprise foundings and of 
liquidations on the level of the fulltime foundations improved between 2007 and 2011, but 
finally resulted in negative balances in each year between 2012 and 2016. Hence, the number of 
liquidations without the number of insolvencies outweighed the number of enterprise foundings 
(IfM 2017a; IfM 2017b; see also section 2.6.3). On the other hand, the balance of sideline 
enterprise foundings and of liquidations declined between 2007 and 2016, while the number of 
freelancers increased by approx. 390,000 during the same period (see subsequent table 142). 
Thus, the future potential for additional fulltime enterprise foundings, as a result of earlier 
sideline enterprise foundings, seems to be limited too.  
 
The enterprise statistics 
 
Year 
 
Fulltime enterprise 
foundings minus 
liquidations
1)
 
Sideline enterprise 
foundings minus 
liquidations
1)
 
Number of liberal 
professions 
 
Number of 
insolvencies 
 
     
2007 10,770 125,257 954,000 29,160 
2009 19,176 123,678 1,053,000 32,687 
2011 18,151 89,515 1,143,000 30,099 
2012 -24,135 83,640 1,192,000 28,297 
2013 -15,744 82,952 1,229,000 25,995 
2014 -38,237 77,879 1,265,000 24,085 
2015 -29,406 69,239 1,309,000 23,123 
2016 -28,508 67,923 1,344,000 - 
 
1) Without liberal professions. 
Table 142 The enterprise statistics (derived from IfM 2017a; IfM 2017b; IfM 2017c; IfM 2017d) 
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In context to a liberal market economy this alone, beside the declining innovation activity and 
the innovation success (see tables 130 and 131 in section 7.1.2), is surely a serious development 
and should therefore be immediately put on top of politicians' agenda. To what extent the 
significantly increasing number of freelancers might have compensated for the decreasing 
amount of commercial enterprise foundings is surely questionable (see also section 2.6.3). How 
far freelancers at the end contribute to the technology transfer in order to increase economy’s 
competitiveness remains an open question too due to the blind spot in the innovation statistics 
(see section 2.6.2).  
 
These entrepreneurial related long-term developments were surely not solely caused by the 
positive condition of the labour market and the lack of financing measures respectively but might 
have other fundamental reasons. In that context, Sternberg et al. (2016), as a result of national 
and international expert interviews, argue that Germany would lack a fundamental 
entrepreneurial education. Moreover, surely more important, Sternberg et al. (2016) point out 
that Germany’s society would suffer from a negative attitude regarding entrepreneurs. Even 
though these assessments are rather subjective due to the so-called expert opinions and the 
limited number of interviews, this result surely stresses an interesting problem field in 
Germany’s society. As a result of their research study, Sternberg et al. (2016) finally conclude 
and argue that self-employment in Germany would not have a real value as an employment 
alternative and that failed enterprise foundings would be assessed as a personal failure rather 
than an additional life experience. This would be complemented from a lack of entrepreneurial 
education. Therefore, it seems questionable if more financial resources in a risk adverse society 
will cause a rethinking and will stimulate more enterprise foundings. As a result, rather than 
focusing on the supply-side of public funding measures, it seems surely advisable to focus on the 
demand-side of the market too. A possible starting point might be to change society’s attitude on 
the one hand and to improve the entrepreneurial qualification on the other hand. Such a 
procedure should not be limited to schools and universities but should also consider a 
professional environment too. An already established mean in the US and the UK in that respect 
are the so-called entrepreneurs in residence. In order to qualify future entrepreneurs, established 
enterprises offer contracts for a limited qualification period. During this time, future 
entrepreneurs gather experience in order to successfully run their own business later on 
(Hoffmann 2012). Such a kind of entrepreneurial qualification is still in its infancy in Germany 
(Hoffmann 2012) but might be helpful to create more entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurial 
ability and acceptance.    
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Nevertheless, these developments should not be considered in isolation but also in context to 
Schumpeter’s assumptions regarding the relevance of innovative entrepreneurs (Schumpeter 
1985; Schumpeter 1987; see also section 2.6.1). Metzger (2016) in that context argues that 
despite the overall negative development of enterprise foundings in Germany, their structural 
quality would have improved. He (Metzger 2016) points out that the number of so-called 
opportunity founders was increasing, while the number of so-called necessity founders was 
decreasing between 2008 and 2015. Moreover, the proportion of enterprise founders who were 
unemployed before starting their own business declined from approx. 21% in 2008 to approx. 
10% in 2015. In economic terms, opportunity founders would be associated with a minor loss 
probability, a larger employment probability and would also introduce innovations more often 
(Metzger 2016). Sternberg et al. (2016) agree with this assumption of structural quality’s 
improvement. In that regard, they base their conclusion on the necessity/opportunity ratio which 
increased from 1.62 in 2006 to 4.68 in 2015. Interestingly enough, the ratio’s increase was not 
caused by a declining proportion of necessity founders but rather from an increasing proportion 
of opportunity founders since 2011 on. As a result, Sternberg et al. (2016) see an improvement of 
enterprise foundings structural quality too (Sternberg et al. 2016). 
 
As a result, it is recommended to consider alternative and more effective approaches of 
governmental support to stimulate the entrepreneurial activity in Germany. This should surely 
not be associated with a one-sided increase of public funds but rather with the attempt to 
carefully address both supply and demand-side factors.  
 
The subsequent section now steps into the debate regarding the public equity funding measures. 
 
7.3.2  The equity funding debate and the demand-side perspective 
 
The clarifications in section 4.3 have already shown that between 1999 and 2009, a major stake 
of PE and VC investors in Germany applied for public funding measures (see table 14 in section 
4.3). The importance of public funding was confirmed in the present study for the post-crisis 
phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012 (see table 75 in section 6.5.3). In addition, it became clear that the 
public funding initiatives for equity financing purposes were significantly expanded during the 
post-crisis phase (see tables 56 and 57 in section 6.4). In context to the present study, market 
failure due to information asymmetry and transaction costs (see table nine in section 3.3.2 and 
figure eight in appendix I) might justify public funding measures. This applies in particular in the 
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field of early-stage financing (Neck and Schneider 2013). With regard to the German PE and VC 
market it is argued that the German equity market and in particular the segment of early-stage 
financing would be comparatively small and that therefore, more support would be required 
(Metzger and Bauer 2015). Without detailed empirical evidence, Metzger and Bauer (2015) for 
example argue that demand for equity financing measures would generally exist but that the 
equity market in Germany would suffer from a supply-side bottleneck. This would be expressed 
by a lack of exit perspectives and due to both legal and tax constraints. How far in that 
connection self assessments of the market participants regarding market gaps, as in the case of 
the KfW studies of Zimmermann and Fischer (2003), Achleitner et al. (2006) and Achleitner et 
al. (2010) (see also table 16 in appendix G.3), were helpful to determine market gaps in 
Germany’s PE and VC market seems overall questionable. Such blanket assumptions should be 
basically considered with great care. As earlier calculations have already shown, it is surely true 
that the German PE and VC market is comparatively small (see table 12 and table 13 in section 
4.1). On the other hand, aggregated calculations for 2007 until 2015, showed that the proportion 
of venture capital in Germany’s market was more robust as it initially seemed (see table 138 in 
section 7.1.3). In addition, data show that the proportion of raised funds for venture capital, the 
proportion of venture capital investments and the number of venture capital investments each 
outweighed the comparative results at least for the timeframe 2007 until 2015. These aggregated 
results in comparison to the results of the UK and France are summarised in the subsequent table 
143. 
 
The equity markets' aggregated values for 2007 until 2015 
 
Country UK France Germany 
Funds raised in MEUR 219,971 56,833 20,418 
VC funds raised in MEUR 10,028 9,654 7,488 
VC proportion in % 5.0 17.0 37.0 
    
Total investments in MEUR 102,643 68,672 60,031 
VC investments in MEUR 8,322 6,896 6,807 
VC proportion in % 8.0 10.0 11.0 
    
Number of investments 6,441 7,234 11,638 
Number of VC investments 3,539 3,394 7,726 
VC proportion in % 55.0 47.0 66.0 
VC average investment volume in MEUR 2.352 2.032 0.881 
 
Table 143 The equity markets' aggregated values for 2007 until 2015 
(InvestEurope 2016; own calculations) 
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Under the assumption that the additional public funding measures which were introduced both in 
the initial and the post-crisis phase (see tables 56 and 57 in section 6.4) were not completely 
exhausted due to time lags, the German venture capital proportion should in reality be larger than 
calculated. It seems therefore questionable to argue that the German equity market in the field of 
early-stage financing would be too small.  
 
Nevertheless, Metzger and Bauer (2015) point out that the provision of public equity funding 
would crowd in private investment capital on the one hand and would stimulate more enterprise 
foundings as a result of the improved financing conditions on the other hand. Against this 
crowding-in argument for public funding measures, Plagge (2006) argues that a major problem 
of every kind of governmental venture capital funding would be an adverse selection problem. 
He (Plagge 2006) points out that only less qualified and less successful investment managers 
would request public support, whereas the most successful PE and VC firms would be able to 
collect the investment capital on the private market. As a result, the management assistance of 
the publicly refinanced VC and PE firms would be weak and would result in less successful 
portfolio companies. This seems to be a wrong interpretation of the adverse selection 
phenomenon and it is therefore concluded that Plagge (2006) instead believes that the public 
refinancing measures would reduce the profit expectations of the PE and VC firms. As a result, 
both publicly supported and public investors might not only focus on less profitable investments 
but would also attract most promising companies due to the lower cost burden. This might distort 
the entire market and would crowd out rather than stimulate private initiative. Overall, Plagge 
(2006) does not see a supply-side bottleneck in Germany’s PE and VC market and argues that 
the amount of raised funds would have outweighed the PE and VC investments in each year 
between 1980 until 1987. This might be a reasonable assumption but lacks detailed empirical 
evidence on the long run and is overall not possible due to secondary data difficulties. At first, 
the uncritical view on the BVK data would support such an assumption as in eight years of the 
period between 1994 and 2004, the fundraising volumes outweighed the investment volumes in 
Germany’s equity market (BVK 2004). By looking on the EVCA data, for example for the 
period between 2007 and 2015, this development turns into the opposite. In every of the years 
between 2007 and 2015, the investments were significantly larger in comparison to the 
fundraising volumes (InvestEurope 2016). As a result, it was surely a simplification of reality to 
conclude a supply-side overhang by the unquestioned comparison of the fundraising with the 
investment volumes. The difficulty in both the EVCA and the BVK data in that regard is that the 
investment amounts consider the entire market. This means that daughter companies in the PE 
 260 
and VC market which are not required to raise funds due the mother company’s funding are 
considered in the statistics too. As a result, direct comparisons between the fundraising and the 
investment volume are meaningless as long as the investments of the dependent PE and VC 
firms are considered without a fundraising equivalent. Nevertheless, Plagge (2006) argues that 
the German PE and VC market would not have suffered from a supply-side bottleneck but rather 
from demand-side constraints. In that regard, he (Plagge 2006) makes clear that the main point 
behind this kind of public funding is to ensure enterprise financing and not the development of 
the equity market per se. Such a public funding focus would, however, require enough 
interesting investment targets. This thought in turn is associated with a basic problem in 
Germany’s economy regarding enterprise financing. Earlier research regarding the application of 
equity financing in Germany has already shown that equity financing in general played a minor 
role for SMEs. Financing, so far, was dominated from self and from bank financing, and also 
from supplier credits (Hummel 2011a). Metzger and Bauer (2015) in that context argue that 
Germany’s PE and VC market represented approx. 1% of the entire credit volume for enterprise 
financing in 2014. Research results have shown that one major reason for this minor importance 
of equity measures was entrepreneurs' believe that an equity investment would be associated 
with a loss of autonomy and power (Hummel 2011a). This attitude of enterprise owners in 
Germany was and still might be an additional obstacle for the development of the equity market. 
In terms of a demand-side factor it seems reasonable to advertise for more acceptance of equity 
financing as an alternative for small and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
If public-owned institutions, as in the case of the KfW, argue that the comparatively smaller 
equity market in Germany would be, inter alia, a result of limited exit options and legal and tax 
constraints (Metzger and Bauer 2015), then public decision makers should consequently focus on 
these obstacles rather than providing additional public funds. The literature review in that regard 
has already shown that Germany has no comprehensive private equity and venture capital law 
and that the market members have seen the AIFM-directive as a possible chance to create an all 
encompassing legal framework (see section 6.6.1). The lack of such a comprehensive law should 
be regarded as a central point. Too many individual laws as a replacement for an all-
encompassing law not only contradict a reliable legal framework but cause legal uncertainty and 
hamper the aim of more private initiative. 
 
With regard to the development of Germany’s stock market it is surely correct that the number of 
IPOs declined from 142 in 2000 to zero in 2003 and that this number since then did not really 
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recover (Statista 2017a). The same development applies for the number of shareholders in 
Germany which initially increased from approx. 3.92 million in 1997 to 6.21 million in 2000, but 
finally declined to approx. 4.41 million in 2015 (Statista 2017b). These developments are 
summarised in the subsequent table 144.  
 
The number of IPOs and shareholders in Germany 
 
Year Initial public offerings Shareholders in million 
   
1997 36 3.92 
2000 142 6.21 
2003 0 5.05 
2006 32 4.24 
2009 1 3.62 
2012 8 4.53 
2015 15 4.41 
 
Table 144 The number of IPOs and shareholders in Germany 
(derived from Statista 2017a; Statista 2017b) 
 
Given that there is a correlation between a flourishing IPO market and the development of the 
equity market and that this condition in Germany would be unattractive, then it seems 
questionable why more regulation of Germany’s stock market was introduced and why private 
investors are excluded during IPOs (Blättchen 2015; see also section 2.6.3). As a result, 
comparisons between Germany’s IPO market and the market in the US, as carried out by 
Metzger and Bauer (2015), are surely interesting but meaningless.  
 
It may therefore be recommended that the governmental measures from a demand-side 
perspective should focus both on more entrepreneurial activity and the promotion of equity 
financing as a funding alternative. In terms of a supply-side perspective, the government should 
focus on the stimulation of more private initiative outside the formal PE and VC market. The 
governmental initiatives in order to support business angels' investments (see tables 56 and 57 in 
section 6.4) were surely a reasonable initial attempt. Thus, the application of a well-balanced mix 
of both supply and demand-side initiatives should surely be more appropriate rather than 
providing public money according to the watering can principle. In that context, a look on the 
proportion of venture capital write-offs shows that on average 30.1% of the divestments in 
Germany were written off between 2007 and 2015. This average proportion not only outweighs 
the European average result of 16.4% but, moreover, outweighs the average results of the UK 
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and France with 11.9% and 10% respectively (see table 145 in appendix R). Under these 
circumstances, a strong qualitative orientation of the public measures seems surely 
recommendable.    
 
7.3.3  The research funding debate and the demand-side perspective 
 
The statistics in section 7.1.2 already showed that the SMEs, despite their numerical dominance 
in Germany’s economy (Söllner 2011), unfolded less innovation activities (see table 130 in 
section 7.1.2), realised smaller innovation expenses (see table 132 in section 7.1.2) and finally 
realised smaller success contributions from both product and process innovations (see table 131 
in section 7.1.2). In economical terms, the R&D contribution of SMEs was insufficient and 
might be a result of market failure due to positive externalities.  
 
In that regard, the present research study showed that Germany’s government not only expanded 
the most prominent research subsidies on the federal level, both the ZIM and the so-called 
KMU-innovativ (see table 48 in section 6.2.3) but, furthermore, improved their application too 
(see table 43 in section 6.1.2; table 44 in section 6.1.3; table 45 in section 6.1.4). Nevertheless, 
data showed that the revenue proportions of product innovations were declining between 2000 
and 2014 (see table 133 in section 7.1.2) as did the contribution of process innovations on cost 
reductions (see table 134 in section 7.1.2). Moreover, data showed that the research contribution 
of the SMEs, out of an enterprise-size related perspective, and parts of the industry and the 
service sector, out of a sector related perspective, was partly too small and was overall 
decreasing since the millennium turn (see section 7.1.2). As a result, there appeared to be a 
research dominance of specific industry sectors and thus, a one-sided economical dependence 
(see table 135 in section 7.1.2).  
 
Even if possible time lag effects might have existed and the bulk of public measures were not 
considered in the ZEW statistics of Rammer et al. (2010), Rammer et al. (2014) and Rammer et 
al. (2016), the underlying development raises the question if the public efforts achieved the 
desired outcome. Under the assumption that the public efforts have slowed down the further 
decrease of R&D, which could not be realised in the underlying statistics, the risk of freeriding 
still remains. This means that in context to research subsidisation, enterprises consider the public 
funds as a welcomed contribution to their innovation expenses even though a real demand is not 
existing (Neck and Schneider 2013). In addition, less innovative and less hopeful projects might 
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be financed due to the bulk of public funds. Moreover, the research results of Hummel (2011b) 
raise the question regarding possible crowding-out effects due to the public subsidies. Even 
though more indicative rather than representative for the entire population of SMEs in Germany, 
Hummel’s (2011b) research results have shown that public funding overall played a minor role 
for the financing of smaller innovation projects. Even though public funding’s importance 
increased in relation to the project size, self-financing with capital gains was the most important 
financing channel for innovation projects on the level of the SMEs. This was at least the case at 
the moment of his research examination in 2010.  
 
As already mentioned, there seem to be long-term related problems rather than isolated effects as 
a consequence of the financial crisis. Thus, a policy in accordance with the watering can 
principle should be avoided on the level of the research subsidisation too. A major reason of the 
declining research and development efforts, in particular on the level of the SMEs, might be 
deficits in the property rights legislation. This assumption should apply in particular in a 
globalised environment which makes a final enforcement of property rights difficult. As a result, 
property rights and their enforcement might be an area for increased governmental attention.  
 
The subsequent section finally reappraises the public funding measures for innovation and equity 
financing purposes. This procedure also reconsiders the current innovation policy and presents 
the further developments of public funding until 2017.  
 
7.3.4  The reappraisal of the public funding policy 
 
This section reappraises the study outcomes regarding the public funding initiatives on the 
federal level for both innovation and equity financing purposes. Therefore, earlier developments 
since the millennium turn were reevaluated in connection to the further progress until 2017, the 
moment of the reappraisal. 
 
In accordance with the earlier discussion, it is surely possible to argue that following problem 
areas in Germany already existed earlier than the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. These 
problem fields are: 
 
a) a decreasing innovation activity and success (see section 7.1.2); 
b) a decreasing entrepreneurial activity (see section 7.3.1);  
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c) a comparatively smaller private equity market (see section 7.3.2). 
 
In addition, it is surely possible to argue that the innovation political strategy of the government 
was not only influenced by financial crisis related impacts but already due to the economical 
consolidation after the millennium turn. This earlier development required the government to 
ensure more competition and academic excellence within the public universities and public 
research organisations. In addition, this development moved the importance of technological 
enterprise foundings, the technology transfer from research organisations and the weak 
innovation contribution of SMEs in the limelight of the contemplation (BMBF 2004). In that 
respect, the financial crisis surely caused a further sensitisation of the political decision makers 
but did not cause a basic adjustment of the earlier innovation political strategy. The introduction 
of the Hightech-Strategy 2020 in 2010, stabilised the earlier political perspective regarding the 
innovation potential of the SMEs, the importance of enterprise foundings and, furthermore, 
underlined the requirement of industry’s digitalisation (BMBF 2016). In addition, the 
government was still concerned with the further increase of research expenses in order to reach 
the 3% aim of the European strategy 2020 (BMBF 2004; BMBF 2016; see also sections 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2).      
 
Nevertheless, the long-lasting innovation political strategy obviously did not achieve the desired 
results. Even though the federal level in Germany alone increased the public research expenses 
from annually approx. nine billion euros in 2005 to annually approx. 15.8 billion euros in 2016, 
and thus by approx. 75% (BMBF 2016), the demand-side of the market was obviously not 
addressed.  
 
Despite the expansive public measures, it was obviously neither possible to improve the 
innovation activity in general nor on the level of the SMEs in particular. In addition, it was not 
possible to prevent the significant decline of research activities during the financial crisis and the 
post-crisis phase (see table 130 in section 7.1.2).  
 
Nonetheless, the government still followed the earlier strategy. On the level of the research 
subsidy ZIM, the government not only prolonged its application in 2015 until 2019, but 
expanded the circle of eligible institutions and enterprises, increased the refundable cost basis 
and finally simplified the application procedure (BMBF 2016). To what extent such proceedings 
should have improved Germany’s innovation capacity (BMBF 2016) seems most questionable. 
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As in the case of the public research support, a quite similar governmental behaviour could be 
realised on the level of the equity financing measures. The reappraisal of the literature showed 
that the German government already launched a venture capital fund of fund in 2004, and hence 
in a situation of economical consolidation, equity market’s decline and Neue Market’s collapse. 
This public venture capital fund of fund, with a fund volume of 3.2 billion euros, was financed 
by the European Recovery Programme’s special assets and the European Investment Fund 
(BMBF 2016; EIF 2016; BMWi 2017a). Such a further governmental proceeding could then be 
realised both during the initial and the post-crisis phase of 2010, 2011 and 2012, and, moreover, 
for the period until 2017 (see table 56 in section 6.4). The total public funding measures for 
equity financing meanwhile reached an amount of approx. 5.84 billion euros for the period 
between 2004 and 2017 (see subsequent table 146). A detailed overview of the public funding 
measures' development is enclosed in the appendix (see table 147 in appendix S.1, table 148 in 
appendix S.2 and table 149 in appendix S.3). 
 
The periodical consolidation of the public venture capital measures 
 
Period Timeframe Fund volumes 
  in MEUR 
Pre-crisis phase 2004 – 2005 2.152 
Financial crisis 2008 – 2009 220 
Post-crisis phase 2010 – 2012 1.307 
Subsequent phase 2013 – 2017 2.160 
   
Total  5.839 
 
Table 146 The periodical consolidation of the public venture capital measures 
(own development; derived from table 147 in appendix S.1) 
 
The major stake of this funding volume refers to the phase of the financial crisis and the 
subsequent periods until 2017. Moreover, more than 80% of the public funding measures 
between 2004 and 2017, are associated with seed, start-up and expansion financing, whereas the 
remaining shares are concerned with growth financing and other financing purposes (see 
subsequent table 150).  
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The financing focus of the public equity measures 
 
Financing 
purpose 
 
Seed/Start- 
up/Expansion
, 
 
Growth 
 
 
Others 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Proportion 
 
 Period in MEUR 
      
Pre-crisis 2.152 0 0 2.152 36.8% 
Financial crisis 220 0 0 220 3.8% 
Post-crisis  805 500 2 1.307 22.4% 
Subsequent 1.560 600 0 2.160 37.0% 
      
Total 4.737 1.100 2 5.839 100.0% 
Proportion 81.1% 18.8% 0.1% 100.0%  
 
Table 150 The financing focus of the public equity measures 
(own development; derived from table 147 in appendix S.1) 
 
It seems doubtful if the earlier progress of Germany’s equity market has justified such a 
significant expansion of the public funding measures. Data show that Germany’s PE and VC 
market in terms of investment volumes increased since the middle of the nineties until the 
millennium turn. The subsequent periods show that the German PE and VC market, despite the 
consolidation phases of 2002 until 2003 (BVK 2004) and 2009 until 2010 (EVCA 2013), not 
only recovered quite quickly but further increased and finally consolidated on a comparatively 
higher investment level (BVK 2004; InvestEurope 2016).  
 
Yet, the government obviously neglected the demand-side of the market again. In doing so, the 
risk of crowding-out and of free riding still exists. In order to avoid such developments, the 
qualitative orientation may not be lost in the light of the public funding initiatives. Rather than 
expanding the public funds during unstable economic conditions in order to support for example 
specific enterprise sizes, as in the case of the research subsidisation, the government should be 
rather concerned with Germany’s dependence on specific industry sectors. This means that an 
additional governmental aim should be to support the creation of a wider industrial basis. The 
earlier dominating industry sectors after the millennium turn were quite the same approx. one 
decade later (see table 135 in section 7.1.2). Quite problematic in that regard seems to be the 
dominance of the automotive sector. The current diesel debate shows what might happen in the 
case that dominating industry sectors fail. Presumably, the basis for a further expansion of the 
public funding measures?  
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Chapter 8 The limitations and recommendations for further research 
 
8.1  The limitations of the present research study 
 
The most important aspect is surely the explorative and descriptive nature of the present study. 
This research study could be criticised due to the accumulation of facts and the purposive sample 
selection which did not allow for general conclusions. Moreover, this study with regard to public 
funding programmes was exclusively focused on the federal level. Funding programmes on the 
local district level, the federal state level and programmes which were explicitly launched for the 
development of Germany’s eastern part were not considered. Therefore, this study did not allow 
for conclusions regarding the progress of the entire programmes in the present research area. 
 
8.2  The recommendations for further research 
 
The present research study has, inter alia, shown that the so-called Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften differed in several aspects from the remaining market members (see 
section 7.2.5). In the context of these so-called Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften in 
Germany, the present study also showed that there was a comparatively smaller proportion of 
separated research regarding this kind of equity investor. This might be a consequence of their 
more support-oriented investment strategy on the one hand and their regional investment focus 
on the other hand. Due to their support function and their focus on the financing of SMEs, it 
would be interesting to examine the MBGs in greater detail. Regarding the current 
developments, such an examination might consider MBGs role in the technology transfer process 
on the one hand and the importance of innovative aspects in their decision making process on the 
other hand. Moreover, it might be worth knowing to what extent the MBGs are meanwhile 
operating in the venture capital scene and in this case to examine how successfully they are. 
 
According to the present study results, which showed a significant expansion of the public 
funding for VC investments (see table 146 in section 7.3.4), an examination regarding their final 
success contribution is surely of interest. Such a research perspective might be concerned with 
private investors' involvement on the one hand (see consecutive no. 86 and 87, in table 45 in 
section 6.1.4) and the attempt to develop a market for the financing of social enterprises on the 
other hand (see table 56 in section 6.4). The question would be whether the additional funds have 
stimulated additional financing capital or caused a declining amount of private investments. In 
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that context, it would be advisable to examine if the significant expansion of the federal research 
subsidies ZIM and KMU-innovativ and the improvement of their application (see consecutive 
no. 79, in table 42 in section 6.1.1; see consecutive no. 72 and 73, in table 43 in section 6.1.2; see 
consecutive no. 78 and 79, in table 44 in section 6.1.3; see consecutive no. 83 and 84, in table 45 
in section 6.1.4 and table 48 in section 6.2.3; see also section 7.3.4) have caused additional 
innovation activities. This question would be particularly interesting with regard to ZIM’s further 
adjustment (see section 7.3.4) and whether this procedure has either caused successful 
innovation projects or freeloading.  
 
Due to the blind spot in the innovation statistics of the ZEW (Rammer et al. 2005; Rammer et al. 
2010; Rammer et al. 2014; Rammer et al. 2016) and the significantly increasing number of 
freelancers (see table 142 in section 7.3.1), it would be surely worth knowing in which way 
freelancers contribute to the diffusion of innovation and how far they are involved in research 
and development activities. In addition, more research would be helpful regarding the restrained 
research behaviour of the SMEs and regarding the possible influence of the property rights 
legislation and the effects of the globalisation.  
 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine if and to which extent the public support of research 
organisations (see consecutive no. 82, in table 42 in section 6.1.1) and of the technology transfer 
(see consecutive no. 73, in table 44 in section 6.1.3) has caused additional enterprise foundings 
in university settings. Such a research perspective might also be concerned with the direct 
interaction of the research organisations with the financial sector. A more detailed view might be 
focused on the direct contribution of the public and the semi-public PE and VC investors in order 
to support the technology transfer from universities and research organisations. Moreover, such 
an examination might be focused on additional activities of the public and the semi-public 
investors outside their financing business. For example, regarding their involvement in the 
entrepreneurial qualification, in business plan competitions or the advisory of enterprise 
founders. Such an examination should be based on a comparative study with foreign countries. 
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Appendix A: The glossary 
 
AIFM-directive: The Alternative Investment Fund Manager directive, which was first 
introduced in 2009, is concerned with the regulation and supervision of alternative investment 
funds. The directive is not focused on the fund but instead regulates the legal framework behind 
the fund structure. The fund management is obliged to structure the fund management 
accordingly and to implement a risk management system. If necessary, the risk management 
system has to be adjusted and the fund’s investments must be subject to regular stress tests. 
Additional obligations are associated with the introduction of a cash-management system for 
debt financed funds and minimum equity requirements for the fund management (Optegra 2013).  
 
Asset Backed Securities: Banks credit portfolios are bundled and finally sold over the capital 
market to private and institutional investors. Therefore, special purpose vehicles are founded in 
order to transform the credit portfolio from the bank. The ABS, which are bundled in the SPVs, 
are finally sold over the market. By selling the credit portfolio to the SPV, banks receive liquid 
assets, improve their equity ratio and reduce credit risks in their balance sheets. Thus, banks are 
able to finance new credit portfolios (Serfling 2009). 
 
Basel I – III: In 1975, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established at the Bank 
for International Settlements in Basel/Switzerland. The committee agreed on particular equity 
regulations for banks in relation to their credit volume. The first agreement Basel I was 
introduced in 1988, and since then banks were obliged to save 8% of their credit volume as liable 
funds for possible default risks. There was no differentiation with respect to individual credit 
standings of the borrowers. In 2007, the committee agreed on the new regulation Basel II. 
Although, the proportion of 8% for liable funds was still valid, banks were obliged to consider 
the default probability of each borrower. Thus, the amounts of liable funds differ due to the 
different default probabilities of the borrowers (EFH ns). In January 2013, Basel II was replaced 
by Basel III. This latest agreement obliged banks to increase their liable funds incrementally to 
10.5% until the year 2019. An additional capital conservation buffer must be introduced by 
banks in 2016 at the latest. The buffer in the proportion of finally 2.5% is introduced to 
compensate for possible losses during future economic downturns. Finally, a so-called counter-
cyclical buffer in the proportion of up to 2.5%, which depends on national circumstances, has to 
be introduced too. This latter measure should protect the banking sector from excessive credit 
growth (BIS 2010).  
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Bretton-Woods: The agreement of Bretton-Woods was signed in 1944 as the institutional 
framework behind the system of fixed exchange rates. The agreement guaranteed the free 
conversion of currencies between the member countries. The currencies were allowed to vary by 
1% from their fixed value and the central banks were obliged to intervene at the range boarders 
in order to fix the currencies again. In the case of economic imbalances between the member 
states, it was possible to devalue or revalue the individual currency in a range of 10%. In 1973, 
the agreement finally failed due to several crises and the abolition of the US-Dollar gold link 
(Bartling and Lucius 1993). 
 
Business angel: Private investor who is directly investing in start-ups or established enterprises 
(Frommann 2004).  
 
Capital-Asset-Pricing-Model: The weighted-average-cost-of-capital requires both the 
calculation of debt capital costs r(FK) and investor’s return expectations r(EK)v. These return 
expectations are calculated by the so-called CAPM. The model takes a capital market 
perspective and is based on the equation: 
 
r(EK)v = ir + z = ir +   [ (rm) - ir]. 
 
The risk premium z by definition is the sum of safe investments expressed by ir and the factor of 
systematic risks expressed by  and the market risk premiums expressed by (rm) - ir. Market 
risk premiums are the difference between stock market returns expressed by (rm) and safe 
investment returns expressed by ir. The so-called beta-factor expresses both systematic risks in 
the business model and financial risks. The financial risks are derived from the capital structure 
of the enterprise and the debt ratio. An increasing debt ratio is associated with increased investor 
return expectations and vice versa (Mandl and Rabel 2002). The beta-factor on average is one. 
Values above one are associated with increased investment risks and values below one are 
associated with smaller investment risks (Hommel and Grass 2008).  
 
Cash-flow: The cash-flow expresses the self-financing ability and future profitability of 
enterprises. This ratio is required in order to calculate the real financial flow which could be 
distorted due to the application of different balance sheet methods. Different types of 
depreciation and reserve valuation methods could falsify the results (Baetge et al. 2001).  
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Cloud Computing: Stands for the flexible provision of IT resources and services over the 
internet. Enterprises are able to reduce their expenses for IT structures due to the demand-
oriented use of cloud computing (Fehling and Leymann 2015). 
 
Community development venture capital: Type of venture capital which is issued on the 
regional level in order to stimulate entrepreneurship and business growth (Achleitner et al. 
2008).  
 
Control premium and minority discount: In order to compensate for the information 
asymmetries between majority and minority investors, each equity proportion is valued 
separately and thus is resulting in different amounts. Control premium and minority discounts 
could be considered irrespective of the specific valuation procedure. The total value of the firm 
is not influenced by the application of control premium and minority discounts because of their 
mutual compensation (Natusch 2002). 
 
Cooperative bank: The business model of cooperative banks is based on a German law, the so-
called Genossenschaftsgesetz. In their beginning, these banks operated as self-helping institution 
for their members, the so-called comrades. Nowadays, cooperative banks are classified as 
universal banks with a clear profit orientation (Ueberschär 2007).  
 
Corporate Venture Capital: This type of VC and PE refers to equity financing measures from 
corporations which attempt to realise additional returns or try to achieve the access to 
innovations. Therefore, they maintain separate divisions or daughter companies for equity 
investments (Krumnow et al. 2002).  
 
Critical rationalism: The basis of critical rationalism is associated with the work of Karl 
Popper. This scientific approach is based on the possibility of error and incompleteness in the 
epistemological process. The knowledge progress is regarded as an ongoing process which is 
associated with the assumption that all-encompassing knowledge is not accessible. Rationalist 
researchers contradict every type of inductive reasoning to develop theories. On the contrary, 
critical rationalism is based on deductive reasoning to falsify existing theories as they are always 
called into question (Engler 2010).  
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Cyber-Physical Systems: Describe the connection of information technologies with the physical 
world. CPS are applied in areas such as the automotive, the energy or the health care sector. IT 
systems which are embedded in specific products or processes are combined to exchange 
information among themselves and with external resources. Cyber-Physical Systems enable 
additional functions or improve processes which would not be possible in isolat ion (Krauß 
2015). 
 
Deficit spending: Credit financed public consumption in order to stabilise the economy during 
recessions (Eggert and Minter 2016). 
 
Demand-oriented innovation policy: This type of innovation policy is concerned with the 
identification of future demand areas. In order to avoid resources constraints in the future or to 
satisfy possible demand areas due to the demographic change, the public innovation policy is 
focused on the support of such demand areas (Welsch 2005). 
 
Diffusion-oriented innovation policy: This type of innovation policy is concerned with the 
diffusion of new technologies in as much different industry branches as possible. The focus is on 
the support of SMEs to stimulate their research efforts and to preserve their employment 
contribution. The strategy is overall focused on the efficient application of the knowledge base to 
resolve both economic and social problems rather than increasing the entire knowledge base 
(Welsch 2005). 
 
Discounted Cash-Flow: In comparison to the earnings value method, which is concerned with 
discounting future earnings, the DCF method is discounting future cash-flows (Hommel and 
Grass 2008). The advantage of the DCF-method is the capital market view even though the 
application for the valuation of SMEs and non-listed enterprises has its difficulties (Behringer 
2009).  
 
Earn-out approach: In the case of an earn-out agreement between the company owner and the 
successor, the purchase price of the enterprise is based on a fixed and additional profit-dependent 
payments in future. The earn-out approach is based on the assumption of instable future 
developments regarding the enterprise, the specific industry branch and the economy. The period 
of future instalments is running over three to five years after signing the contract. Therefore, the 
earlier company owner partly participates on future risks. Hence, the earn-out approach partly 
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compensates for the information advantage of the company owner and the investment risk of the 
investor (Helbling 2002b). The development of profits in the future is prone to manipulation. As 
a result, the previous owner obtains control rights during the earn-out period (Behringer 2009). 
 
Earnings value method: In that case, the firm value is calculated by discounting future 
enterprise earnings. This valuation method also considers the present value of liquidation results 
from unnecessary assets. The discount rate is composed of the base rate, the risk premium, the 
trade tax rate, and the growth and inflation discount respectively. Base rates are calculated on the 
basis of future public loan returns. Risk premiums are calculated to compensate uncertainties 
regarding firm’s earnings and thus compensate companies operational, market and financial risks 
(Mandl and Rabel 2001). 
 
Economic policy: A supply-oriented economic policy is focused on the reduction of public 
expenses, of employment costs, of public social payments, of public employment and also 
concerned with a more flexible employment policy. Moreover, this type of economic policy 
follows the path of less bureaucracy to relieve the private economy and to allow for additional 
privately financed investments. Overall, governmental and public actors are more restrained. A 
demand-oriented economic policy on the other hand is associated with a stronger public 
involvement in order to stabilise and to support the economy’s development. In that respect, the 
economic policy is characterised from public financed investment programmes to stabilise the 
economy during economic downturns. Such programmes could be financed by additional public 
borrowing, as the additional credits will be repaid during economic upturns and additional tax 
income. This procedure is defined as the so-called deficit spending. A demand-oriented 
economic policy is also associated with tax reliefs for the lower and middle income classes in 
order to improve their purchasing power. In addition, this type of economic policy is also 
associated with the expansion of social transfer payments, an active governmental employment 
policy and the payment of investment subsidies to stimulate investments of the private economy 
(Rogall 2013).   
 
Eigenkapitalfund for Germany: The fund was launched in cooperation between the KfW and a 
private bank in Germany in 2010 with a final fund volume of 500 million euros. The fund is 
focused on equity investments between ten and 30 million euros per deal and in enterprises with 
annual turnovers of maximum 500 million euros (Innovations-Report.de 2010). 
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Empiricism: This paradigm bases the epistemological process on impressions and every kind of 
knowledge is based on these impressions. Human senses capture data for the epistemological 
process by observation and experiments (Leerhoff et al. 2009). From an empirical researcher’s 
point of view, good sense and mind alone are unable to produce knowledge (Liesen 2010). 
Therefore, knowledge is based on impressions, impression related thoughts or the interpretations 
of impressions and thoughts (Leerhoff et al. 2009). 
 
European Angels Fund: The fund was launched in 2012 to boost business angels investments. 
The fund in the volume of 60 million euros participates on business angels investments to equal 
conditions. Investment amounts vary between 250,000 euros and five million euros per 
investment (Foerderdatenbank.de 2015).  
 
European Investment Fund: Investment vehicle of the European Union to support the 
financing of SMEs, innovations and the technology transfer. Equity, debt and mezzanine 
products of the EIF are provided by intermediaries in the whole of Europe (EIF 2015).    
 
European Recovery Programme: The so-called ERP was launched after the Second World 
War in order to rebuild Germany’s economy. The repayment of the programme was financed by 
the federal budget which means that the backflow of the earlier ERP investments was preserved 
in a separate fund. This separated funding in the so-called ERP-Sondervermögen conserved the 
funds for future investments. The volume of the ERP-Sondervermögen increased significantly 
during the post-war periods and made it possible to launch additional funding programmes, inter 
alia, for regional development, small and medium-sized enterprises or for environmental 
protection (KfW 2015a).       
 
Family office: The so-called family offices are busy with the management of assets from high 
net worth individuals (Hellenkamp 2015).  
 
Federal Reserve Board: Central bank system in the US (Krumnow et al. 2002). 
 
Federal State Bank: Eight so-called Landesbanken are located in different federal states of 
Germany. Shareholders are federal states, larger cities and different savings bank federations 
(VOEB 2012). The Landesbanken are classified as universal banks and embedded in Germany’s 
savings bank system. The federal state banks are operating worldwide (Helaba 2013).    
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Federal State Guarantee Bank: 17 different guarantee banks are operating in each federal state 
of Germany. This number of federal state guarantee banks includes the two institutions which are 
located in Bavaria. Their business is focused on the federal state of their location and limited to 
guarantees of maximum 1.25 million euros per case. They are classified as self-helping 
institutions for the small and medium-sized enterprises. Typically, their shareholders are 
chambers of commerce, savings and cooperative banks, private banks and economic federations 
in the region of their location. They provide guarantees for investments of SMEs and for the 
equity investments of the MBGs (VDB 2013). 
 
Free cash-flow: The free cash-flow is the total cash surplus of the enterprise (Mandl and Rabel 
2002). 
 
Fundraising: Fundraising is the process of collecting investment capital from both private and 
institutional investors (Frommann 2004).    
 
Gross Domestic Product: The GDP expresses the total value of goods and services which are 
produced within one period and one geographic region. The output of the economy is valued on 
the basis of the market prices for goods and services (Dornbusch et al. 2008). Nevertheless, the 
GDP as a measure of welfare does not consider particular services such as childhood care or 
voluntary services (Mankiw and Taylor 2012). 
 
Gross value added: The term expresses the total value of goods and services of one production 
process reduced by the value of goods and services which are processed within this production 
process. Thus, the value of the production process is reduced by the preliminary work (Söllner 
2011).  
 
Hands-off: The PE and VC firms are just occasionally involved in their portfolio companies 
(Frommann 2004).  
 
Hands-on management on the contrary describes the active and regular involvement of the PE 
and VC investor (Frommann 2004). 
 
Hermeneutic circle: The hermeneutic circle describes a particular method of text interpretation 
which assumes that thorough text understanding requires in-depth text analysis. Due to the 
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process of the hermeneutic circle, text interpretation should result in more findings as initially 
assumed. This requires an ongoing analysis process by considering specific text contents in the 
light of the whole text and the external research context. This mutual process of text 
interpretation is defined as the hermeneutic circle (Kempf 2009). In the context of the present 
thesis, the hermeneutic circle might be applied as described in figure 11 (see appendix K). 
 
High-Tech Gründerfund: Public private partnership in Germany for seed investments. The first 
fund was introduced in 2005 by the federal department for economic affairs and energy, the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, and several multinational groups in Germany. A second fund 
was launched in 2011. In a first financing round, the fund is investing up to 500,000 euros and 
reserves additional 1.5 million euros for a second financing round. Side investors are invited and 
the consideration of public support programmes is also possible (High-Tech Gründerfund 2013). 
 
Immanent: The term specifies that particular boarders of definitions are not exceeded. For 
instance, immanent text interpretation is solely concerned with the text content and does not 
consider additional external information. According to Kant, immanent is everything that is 
realised within possible experiences in the type of opinion and thinking. The opposite term of 
immanent is transcendent (Blume 2003). 
 
Imperfect capital market: On the one hand, weak imperfect markets are classified as the so-
called limited capital markets. In that case, interest rates for savings are smaller than interest 
rates for credits and loans. This difference might be regarded as bank costs. Capital rationing on 
the other hand is an extreme type of market’s imperfectness. In this case, the credit capability of 
the market participants is limited to a specific amount. This limitation is associated with a fixed 
interest rate. A weak type of capital rationing refers to increasing financing costs in relation to 
the capital demand (Schmidt and Terberger 1997). 
 
Induction: Science theory distinguishes between individual and general statements. The latter 
are regarded as the scientific aim in order to describe regularities in reality. Individual statements 
are limited, whereas general statements are overall valid. According to empiricism, singular 
events are generalised by the principle of induction. Popper criticised that it is neither possible to 
generalise singular events nor to prove their evidence by simple inductive reasoning. He pointed 
out that the process of induction lacks logic. Therefore, induction is rather considered as an 
exploratory approach for theory building than as a scientific approach for theory testing. Popper 
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argued that generalisations which are based on induction must be further tested by deductive 
reasoning (Chmielewicz 1979). The deductive model of explanation is concerned with the causes 
behind a particular effect. This deductive model is based on Newton’s conclusions regarding 
mechanics which explains movement from natural laws and side conditions. Due to the 
deductive model of explanation it is possible, for instance, to calculate the flying course of a 
canon ball. The inductive model of explanation on the contrary is based on the assumptions that 
it is impossible to determine regularities due to the data base. In that case, effects are derived 
from probability assumptions and the consideration of side effects (Kempf 2009). 
 
Industry 4.0: Industry 4.0 describes more flexible product development and production 
processes due to the integration of both customers and suppliers. This is encompassed from the 
development of the so-called hybrid products as a combination of products and services. 
Industry 4.0 is based on the so-called smart factoring and smart production. Production in that 
respect is based on robots and cyber-physical systems to ensure self-controlling and 
communication with the internet and the real world (Bendel 2015). 
 
Innovation-based economies: The study of Sternberg et al. (2016) distinguishes between so-
called innovation-based economies, efficiency-based economies and factor-based economies. 
Innovation-based economies, for example Australia, the US and the UK, realise significant 
investments in education and research and development. Efficiency-based economies, for 
example China, Croatia and Mexico, are on their way to innovation-based economies. Factor-
based economies' industry structure is dominated from the primary production sector. Egypt, 
India or Tunisia for example belong to that group of factor-based economies (Sternberg et al. 
2016). 
 
Innovation expenses: The statistic of Rammer et al. (2014) includes expenses for ongoing, for 
finalised and also for innovation projects which were broken off. Expenses are associated with 
investments in human resources, staff qualification, intangible assets as patents or other 
proprietary rights and tangible assets as machinery (Rammer et al. 2014, p. 5).  
 
Innovation intensity: Is the proportion of innovation expenses on revenues (Rammer et al. 
2014). The statistic of Rammer et al. (2014) presents the innovation intensity of German 
enterprises with more than five employees.    
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Innovation political instruments: These are instruments that align the society and the economy 
on a desired direction of the innovation process. Instruments which directly intervene in the 
innovation process by means of subsidisation, standards and prohibitions are classified as hard 
instruments. Soft instruments on the other hand are associated with dialogues, concepts or 
interactive learning (Welsch 2005).    
 
Innovation success: The success of product innovations is measured by their contribution on 
total revenues. The success of process innovations on the other hand is determined by their 
contribution on cost reductions per unit in the production process. Furthermore, process 
innovations might result in quality improvements of products and services. This improvement is 
expressed and measured by additional revenues (Rammer et al. 2014, p. 11–12).  
 
Innovation system: According to the definition of Welsch (2005), an innovation system is an 
efficient framework for the production of new knowledge. Research and development divisions, 
universities and research institutions are classified as innovation systems. Schools, federations 
and investment banks belong to the innovation system too as they support the production of new 
knowledge (Welsch 2005).  
 
Intentionality: In terms of avoiding both metaphysical assumptions and speculation, 
phenomenology is concerned with the description and analysis of subjects. The approach 
concentrates on particular experiences to analyse the awareness process. These experiences are 
based on a specific awareness by concentrating on a specific subject. This whole awareness 
process is defined as the so-called intentionality. The process of intentionality is rather 
concerned with individual processes than with the basic conditions of the awareness process. 
From a phenomenological point of view, both the subject and the results of the awareness 
process are regarded as one unit (Zahavi 2009).  
 
Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch: The German version of the AIFM-directive, the so-called 
Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch came into force in July 2013. According to the KAGB, the fund 
management requires an official accreditation which depends on a suitable organisational 
structure, a minimum stock on equity, a risk management system and regular reporting. At the 
time of KAGB’s implementation, the German government also adopted the European Venture 
Capital regulation. Venture capital funds according to this regulation have to be focused on 
specific investments and may not be credit financed (Lohmann et al. 2014).    
 308 
Key technologies: Technologies in the area of microelectronics, information and 
communication, photonic, optoelectronics, biotechnology, genetic engineering, advanced 
materials and advanced production systems (Welsch 2005).  
 
KMU-innovativ: This research funding programme is issued by the German department for 
education and research. Beside the funding measures in the high-technology area, which are 
issued by different federal departments, the programme KMU-innovativ is bundling support 
measures for SMEs in specific research areas. The programme KMU-innovativ subsidises the 
total research expenses up to 50% and also supports research cooperation between the sciences 
and the private economy (Belitz et al. 2012).  
 
Lead investor: In the case of syndicated investments, the lead investor is responsible for the 
structuring and for the organisation of the syndication. In the normal case, the lead investor pays 
the major investment stake and is also responsible for the monitoring and the mentoring of the 
portfolio company (Frommann 2004).  
 
Lead market innovation policy: Lead markets are regional markets with product and/or process 
applications of international relevance. Enterprises which are based in lead markets have 
competitive advantages and set standards for future applications in specific areas. A lead market-
oriented innovation policy is focused on the support and the development of demand areas. 
These areas have significant export potential (Welsch 2005).    
 
Letter of Intent: The LoI is a written agreement between the entrepreneur and the PE investor. 
This agreement depends on the positive evaluation of the investment proposal (Nathusius 2001). 
Usually, the LoI is concerned with the negotiating parties, the investment target, the basic 
contract framework, due diligence milestones and confidentiality agreements. The letter of intent 
expresses the intention on a final investment and therefore determines exclusive negotiations for 
a limited period (Picot 2008a).  
 
Living dead investment: Röper (2004, p. 167) in that respect explains that: “Venture capital 
investments which neither realise sufficient profits nor need to be written off are classified as 
living dead investments”.  
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Management-Buy-In/Management-Buy-Out: In the case of a MBI, the enterprise takeover is 
realised by an outside management team and in the case of a MBO by the present management 
team (Lucks 2001).  
 
Marketability discount: Discount on the enterprise value which depends on business line’s and 
market’s attractiveness, firm’s brand name or exit possibilities (Natusch 2002). 
 
Material-Adverse-Change-Clauses: Are concerned with contract adjustments in the case that 
important circumstances have changed after the moment of contract signing. Under this 
perspective, the contract wouldn’t have been signed if the circumstances would have been 
obvious. MAC clauses also allow for contract adjustments in the case that important information 
were completely missing. In the case of failed contract adjustments due to the application of 
MAC clauses, contract parties may withdraw from the contract (Picot 2008b). 
 
Mergers & Acquisition: Basic term for enterprise transactions which are associated with 
enterprise purchases, enterprise sales and the integration of portfolio companies. Furthermore, 
the term stands for consultancy services in the field of enterprise transactions (Krumnow et al. 
2002). 
 
Mezzanine financing: Financing measure in a type of a loan that does not require securities and 
is therefore positioned between equity and secured loans. This so-called hybrid financing is 
based on fixed interest rates and sometimes also on the so-called equity kickers. Regarding the 
latter, the mezzanine capital investor benefits from the increase of enterprise’s value and hence 
performance (Krumnow et al. 2002). Mezzanine capital strengthens the equity basis even though 
classified as outside capital according to German tax law. Therefore, paid interests are treated as 
expenditures and reduces the tax amount. On the other hand, mezzanine financing is regarded as 
equity out of bank’s perspective and therefore improves the credit standing (Bankenverband 
2005).  
 
Mezzanine Fund for Germany: The fund was launched in 2013, in cooperation between the 
BMWi, the EIF and the federal state investment banks of North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria. 
The fund in the volume of 200 million euros is under EIF’s management and focused on 
mezzanine capital investments in SMEs (BMWi 2013a). 
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Monetarism: This economic theory assumes that inflation is completely explained by money 
supply. Monetarists argue that on the short-run an increase of the money supply would have a 
positive effect on production and employment, whereas in the long-run would cause inflation. 
Monetarism denies the suitability of deficit spending and is rather focused on price stability as a 
prerequisite for economy’s further development. Since free markets would always move towards 
equilibrium, free market mechanisms are able to compensate for shocks. Therefore, monetarism 
postulates low governmental intervention in order to guarantee both flexible markets and price 
mechanisms. Rather than being concerned with deficit spending, monetarism is focused on a 
monetary policy with clear money supply targets to ensure economy’s progress (Wohltmann 
2016).    
 
Multipliers method: Is an enterprise valuation method which in particular is applied for SME 
valuation purposes. The firm value is calculated by multiplying enterprise’s returns, cash-flows 
or revenues with specific multipliers. These multipliers are derived from comparable prices and 
past developments (Mandl and Rabel 2001).  
 
Nascent entrepreneur: The step into self-employment is in the decision phase but currently not 
realised (Sternberg et al. 2016). 
 
Necessity founders: The enterprise founding is realised due to missing employment alternatives 
(Sternberg et al. 2016).  
 
Open innovation: The product development process considers the opinion of customers in order 
to improve products and processes (Markgraf 2015).  
 
Opportunity founders: “The enterprise founding is based on a specific business idea.” (Metzger 
2016, p. 2). 
 
Phenomenological perception: Is defined as a world view within which the sphere is not simply 
accepted as it is. A particular perception and interpretation of the world is realised by excluding 
present conclusions behind reality. Phenomenological perception is concerned with the so-called 
first and second epoch. The first epoch is doing without ontological assumptions and is the self-
reflection of phenomenon’s awareness. In that respect, the process of intentionality itself is 
regarded as a research subject which is examined on a second observation level. Different types 
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of thoughts are based on the analysis and description of awareness processes, namely the initial 
and the subsequent level of self-reflection. This means that the process of the first epoch is 
concerned with describing the particular process of intentionality. These descriptions of the 
intentionality process could be different themselves and therefore result in different 
interpretations and assumptions regarding the research subject. The second epoch is concerned 
with the development of a new philosophy to substantiate the world’s existence (Godina 2012).     
 
Positive externalities: Mean that an inventor is not able to internalise the profits of an invention 
completely (Neck and Schneider 2013). Due to spillover effects, foreign enterprises benefit from 
the research and development effort of the inventor, without any risk and cost contribution 
(Plagge 2006). Positive externalities in type of an undersupply of research and development 
might also caused by incomplete property rights (Neck and Schneider 2013). 
 
Prisoner dilemma: Is part of the game theory and tries to explain social interactions. From the 
theory’s point of view, the decision making process in interactions also depends on foreign 
decisions. Therefore, the theory tries to find solutions in the decision making process under 
different circumstances. The prisoner dilemma argues that due to information and incentive 
problems, a cooperation is less successful. Results could be improved if participants would 
behave cooperative rather than rational. The problem of non-cooperation is described by the 
prisoner dilemma in which two prisoners are captured. Both prisoners are suspected the same 
criminal offence. They have the chance to obtain a minor penalty in the case they act in 
cooperation. Due to the lack of both binding contracts and monitoring institutions, the prisoners 
are incapable to achieve the best possible solution and hence obtain a larger penalty than in the 
case of cooperation (Leininger and Amann 2007; Münch 2012).  
 
Product innovators/Process innovators: Enterprises which transfer scientific knowledge in 
marketable products or processes are classified as product or process innovators. Beside the 
development of new products or processes, innovators could also be concerned with the 
introduction of product or process imitations. The introduction of imitations is also part of 
Germany’s innovation statistics (BMBF 2010). 
 
Public Investment Bank: In total, 19 different public investment banks are operating in the 
German financial market. Two public investment banks, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and 
the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank are operating nationwide, whereas the remaining 17 public 
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investment banks which are located in the federal states of Germany are operating within the 
region of their home state. Two public investment banks are located in the free-state of Bavaria 
which explains the number of 17 public investment banks in the federal states. Public investment 
banks are concerned with supplementing incomplete markets. Therefore, public investments 
banks are focused on the financing of SMEs, the agriculture sector, the urban development and 
of both innovation and environmental projects. They offer subsidised credits, guarantees and 
equity investments and are refinanced over the capital market or by direct state financing. Public 
investment banks are obliged to cooperate with the private bank sector in a competitive neutral 
manner (VOEB 2013).  
 
Rationalism: Rationalism assumes that knowledge is based either on good sense or on intellect 
(Ruffing 2006; Leerhoff et al. 2009). Knowledge according to rationalism is either based on 
inductive or deductive reasoning and therefore denies conclusions which are based on 
impressions and experiences. Nevertheless, knowledge that is derived from impressions might 
stimulate the knowledge process (Liesen 2010). 
  
Savings banks: Savings banks were already established at the end of the 18
th
 century in order to 
support the poorer society classes. Savings banks are based on federal state laws. Their business 
focus is limited to the region of their location and the shareholder basis are the county or the city 
of their regional focus. Nowadays, savings banks are operating as universal banks in direct 
competition with private bank institutions (Ueberschär 2007). 
 
Silent investment/silent partnership: This type of business partnership does not require 
partnership assets, trade register entries or publications. Direct investments are based on 
contracts between the silent investor and the target firm. Even though it is possible to exclude the 
loss liability of the silent investor, this investor in principle participates on enterprise’s profits. 
According to the German law, the silent partnership is not liable for the debts of the target firm 
and, moreover, could not go into receivership due to the lack of assets. Silent partnerships are 
based on cash investments or the transfer of goods and services (Krumnow et al. 2002).  
 
Solvency II: This European regulation sets standards for Europe’s insurance companies 
regarding minimum capital requirements and organisational structures. The regulation already 
passed the European Parliament in 2009, but was subsequently adjusted due to financial crisis 
related requirements (Bafin 2014). 
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Syndication: In order to minimise the investment risk, several investors are financing the 
investment amount (Frommann 2004).  
 
Transcendental philosophy: Due to the boundaries of knowledge, human beings do only 
comprehend parts of reality. Transcendence, as the opposite of immanence, therefore tries to 
overcome the immanent reality of existence. The core thinking behind transcendental reasoning 
are reality limitations and the step into a transcendent area which is required to understand 
reality. According to Kant, transcendent knowledge is concerned with the so-called a priori, non-
empirical based knowledge. Transcendental knowledge does not immediately describe the 
subjects but rather tries to clarify the way in which human beings capture reality. According to 
Kant’s epistemology, transcendental reasoning is incapable to define objective knowledge. He 
pointed out that only objective knowledge could be classified as universal knowledge (Zwenger 
2003). 
 
Venture capital investment grant: The programme was launched in May 2013 to boost private 
investments of both business angels and non-institutional investors in technological enterprises 
in Germany. Investors receive a non-refundable public grant in the proportion of 20% of the 
investment amount, which has to be at least 10,000 euros and may not exceed 250,000 euros 
(Bafa 2014). The government budgeted 150 million for the period 2013 to 2017 (BMWi 2013). 
 
Verification: In the case of empirical research, the validity of statements could be proved by 
verification or falsification. A logical evidence in that case is not possible. Verification is 
concerned with the empirical confirmation of theories. A theory according to the principle of 
verification is regarded as valid in relation to the number of positive empirical observations. 
Popper criticised that the number of possible confirmations is unlimited and therefore concluded 
that a confirmation by verification is impossible. Such a procedure would result in an unending 
regress. Thus, Popper applied an approach of falsification in order to test existing theories. This 
principle is concerned with the final falsification of present conclusions. Hence, verification is 
concerned with temporary theories which are regarded as valid until they are finally falsified 
(Chmielewicz 1979). 
 
Weighted-Average-Cost-of-Capital: The WACC is one method to calculate enterprise values 
by discounting future cash-flows. This calculation is based on the so-called free cash-flows 
which represent firm’s cash surplus under the assumption of a debt free company. As a result, 
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this type of cash-flow neither considers debts, interest costs nor their tax contribution. Tax 
charges are considered without any interest contribution. The free cash-flow solely expresses the 
cash surpluses which are based on firm’s operations without external financing contributions of 
both investors and creditors. The free cash-flow is discounted by the WACC which also 
considers the financing structure and the tax contribution of interest expenses (Mandl and Rabel 
2002).  
 
Working capital: Is the difference between current assets and current liabilities. A negative 
working capital might be associated with liquidity constraints as current liabilities are not 
refinanced by current assets (Brauner and Lescher 2002). 
 
Young entrepreneur: The step into self-employment is not older than three and a half years at 
research moment (Sternberg et al. 2016). 
 
ZIM: The research funding measures of Germany’s department for economic and energy were 
bundled in the so-called central innovation programme for SMEs. This programme so-called 
ZIM is not focused on particular technological areas and classified as technology open. The 
programme subsidises research projects, innovation networks and consulting services in order to 
transfer research results in economic contributions. The ZIM is a non-refundable subsidy for 
parts of the research expenses (Belitz et al. 2012). 
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Appendix B: The SME definition of the European Commission 
 
Definition of the European Commission: 
 
The SME definition of the European Commission 
 
SME 
category 
 
Number of 
employees 
 
+ 
Yearly 
turnover 
in MEUR 
or 
Balance sheet 
total in 
MEUR 
+ 
Shareholder 
proportion in 
per cent 
   
     
Small < 9 
 
< 2  < 2  < 25 
Medium 9 < 49 
 
2 < 10  2 < 10  < 25 
Large 49 < 249 
 
10 < 50  10 < 43  < 25 
 
Table 2 The SME definition of the European Commission (EC 2003, pp. 124/36–124/41) 
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Appendix C: Private equity and venture capital definitions 
 
Private equity: The term stands for equity-financing of non-listed enterprises for a limited 
period in which PE investors try to increase the value of the portfolio company. Venture capital 
on the other hand refers to equity-financing in the early-stage phase. This encompasses seed and 
start-up financing. Public equity, the opposite of private equity, is concerned with financing 
measures over the stock market (Thum et al. 2008). PE and VC firms fulfil several functions. 
First, they are focused on the best possible investment decision. Second, they are concerned with 
the diversification and limitation of investors risks. Third, they fulfil a support function in the 
capital allocation process. Fourth, they are concerned with the lot size transformation between 
investors and entrepreneurs. Fifth, they transform information during the pre-investment and 
post-investment phase. Finally, they balance the different investment horizons of investors and 
entrepreneurs (Schefczyk 2004). 
 
According to PE firm’s shareholder structure, the PE and VC market could be classified into 
independent investors, dependent investors and the so-called promoters. Independent investors 
receive investment capital from family offices, insurance companies, banks and foundations. 
Dependent PE firms are daughter companies of banks, insurance companies or industry firms. 
The group of promoters follow particular investment strategies in order to compensate for market 
deficits. The MBGs are representing a typical case of promoter on the federal states level (BVK 
2009b).  
 
PE in its majority is structured as a limited partnership for approx. ten years and investment 
periods between five and six years. The PE investment fund is managed by PE professionals, the 
so-called general partners. Usually, general partners are committed in the fund with a proportion 
of 1% to 10% of the fund volume. Beside an annual management fee between 1% and 3%, the 
general partner receives an additional carried interest. This on top payment in the amount of 
approx. 20% requires a minimum return success. PE investors are strategic investors and 
represented in the supervisory boards of their portfolio companies (Moon 2006). The aim of the 
PE and VC investor to increase the value of the portfolio company is associated with four 
different value levers. The first lever, the so-called operational performance, is associated with 
improving firm’s expansion and returns. The second lever, the so-called financial engineering, is 
associated with working capital and debt ratio optimisations. The third lever, is associated with 
external growth contributions due to acquisition and integration. These so-called mergers & 
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acquisition strategies could result in positive synergy effects due to firms integration. The final 
lever is the so-called multiple expansion which is based on the principle of cheap purchase and 
expensive sale (Thum et al. 2008).          
 
The respective financing focus of an investor is derived from the enterprise lifecycle. According 
to Matz (2002), the enterprise lifecycle is characterised by the phases of conception, founding, 
market entrance, expansion and consolidation. Early-stage financing is associated with the 
phases of conception, founding and market entrance. Expansion financing refers to the phase of 
expansion and later-stage financing to the phase of consolidation. The latter is associated with 
management-buy-outs, management-buy-ins and turnaround financing (Matz 2002; Natusch 
2002). In addition, PE is concerned with the so-called replacement financing for shareholder pay 
outs. In that case, the shareholder is replaced by the PE investor. Bridge financing supports both 
the process of IPOs and the improvement of the equity basis. Finally, financing measures for a 
so-called going private are associated with enterprise’s retreat from the stock market (Feldmann 
et al. 2007).  
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Appendix D: The business plan, the due diligence and the investment proportions 
 
The business plan, the due diligence and the investment proportions 
 
Perspective/Year 2001 2004 2007 – 09 
   
 
Total market in Germany 
  
 
   
 
Average number of received BPs per investor 490 268 220 
Due Diligence proportion from received BPs    20% 16% 21% 
Investment proportion 6% 6% 6% 
   
 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
  
 
   
 
Average number of received BPs per investor 263 202 190 
Due Diligence proportion from received BPs 
Due Diligence proportion from received BP 
47% 51% 55% 
Investment proportion 23% 27% 29% 
   
 
Early-stage investors 
  
 
   
 
Average number of received BPs per investor 550 324 335 
Due diligence proportion from received BPs 18% 11% 15% 
Investment proportion 4% 1% 4% 
   
 
Later-stage investors 
  
 
   
 
Average number of received BPs per investor 308 229 160 
Due Diligence proportion from received BPs 26% 21% 24% 
Investment proportion 10% 10% 9% 
 
Table 17 The business plan, the due diligence and the investment proportions 
(derived from Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010) 
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Appendix E.1: The questionnaire content of the first KfW study 
  
I.  Sample members characteristics: 
 1. Type of investor (e.g. MBG, VC, CVC).  
 2. Investment fund volume (< 15 MEUR, 15 – 40 MEUR, > 40 MEUR). 
 3. Financing phase (later-stage, early-stage, universal investor). 
 4. Shareholder structures. 
 5. Specification of the biggest shareholder 
   (e.g. bank, insurance company, industry company, private investor). 
 6. Proportion of fundraising resources (e.g. banks, private investors, public sector, others). 
 
II. Investment process and strategy: 
 1. Return expectations in per cent classes (4 – 8%, 8 – 12%, 12 – 16%, ... > 28%). 
 2. Significance of investors reputation for the acquisition of deals 
  (based on investors' networks, track record, technological knowledge, etc.). 
 3. Number of received business proposals in 2001. 
 4. Proportion of business proposals for detailed analyses and for investments. 
 5. Proportion of hands-on investors. 
 6. Proportion of investors who apply a rating procedure. 
 7. Significance of rating procedures in the phases of screening and monitoring 
  (six point scale: very important – not important). 
 8. Deal size proportions  
  (deal size classes: < 150 TEUR, 150 – 375 TEUR, 375 – 750 TEUR, ... > 50 MEUR). 
 9. Investment proportions of financing phases (e.g. seed, start-up, expansion). 
 10. Investment proportions of industry sectors (e.g. IT, life science, services).  
 11. Loss proportions in per cent classes for 2001 (0 – 5%, 5 – 10%, … > 25%). 
 12. Final returns in per cent classes for 2001 (< 0%, 0 – 4%, 4 – 8%, … > 24%). 
 
III. Changes in the investment strategy: 
 1. Development of deal sizes between 1999 and 2001 (increase, decrease, unchanged). 
 2. Changes in the investment strategy during 1999 and 2001 
  (in terms of: financing phases, industry branches, enterprise sizes, regions). 
 
IV. Deficits in the German PE and VC market: 
 1. Proportion of investors who see fundamental market gaps. 
 2. Proportion of investors who see ongoing market gaps 
  (in terms of: industry branches, financing phases, investment amounts, enterprise sizes). 
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 3. Specification of investment obstacles  
  (e.g. weak deal flow, fundraising difficulties, lack of exit options).  
 
V. Public support measures: 
 1. Proportion of investors who see public funding demand  
  (in terms of: industry branches, financing phases or enterprise sizes). 
 2. Specification of public funding demand  
  (in: specific industry branches, financing phases or enterprise sizes). 
 3. Proportion of investors who applied for public funding between 1999 and 2001. 
 4. Proportion of public funding on the total investment volume of 1999, 2000, 2001.  
 5. Proportion of public funding channels (EU institutions, KfW, other sources in Germany). 
 6. Specification of the selected funding programme. 
 7. Reasons for the application of public funding 
  (e.g. risk-sharing, cost reduction, public co-investment). 
 
Table 19 The questionnaire content of the first KfW study (derived from Zimmermann and Fischer 2003) 
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Appendix E.2: The questionnaire content of the second KfW study 
 
I.  Sample members characteristics: 
 1. Type of investor (e.g. MBG, VC, CVC). 
 2. Investment fund volume (<= 25 MEUR, 25 – 100 MEUR, > 100 MEUR).  
 3. Financing phase (later-stage, early-stage, universal investor). 
 4. Shareholder structures. 
 5. Specification of the biggest shareholder 
  (e.g. bank, insurance company, industry company, public institutions). 
 6. Founding year of the sample member. 
 7. Average number of portfolio companies. 
 8. Average number of investment professionals and other employees. 
 9. Investment volume under management per investment professional. 
 
II. Investment process and strategy: 
 1. Return expectations in per cent classes (4 – 8%, 8 – 12%, … > 28%). 
 2. Minimum revenue requirements of investment targets  
  (no requirement, 0 – 1.5 MEUR, 1.5 – 5 MEUR, … > 50 MEUR). 
 3. Proportion of fundraising resources 
  (e.g. banks, pension funds, private investors, public sector). 
 4. Significance of investors reputation for the acquisition of deals 
  (based on investors' networks, track record, technological knowledge, etc.). 
 5. Proportion of deal sources 
  (e.g. banks, consultants, business plan competitions, investors' network). 
 6. Investment proportion of each deal source. 
 7. Proportion of investors who apply a rating procedure. 
  8. Number of business proposals in 2004. 
 9. Proportion of business proposals for detailed analyses and for investments. 
 10. Relevance of review fields in the due diligence process 
  (e.g. product and market, exit channel, management team). 
 11. Type of equity investment (e.g. silent investment, shareholder loan, etc.). 
 12. Investment proportions of industry sectors (e.g. IT, life science, medical care).  
 13. Investment proportions of financing phases (e.g. seed, start-up, expansion). 
 14. Proportion of different deal size classes (> 150 TEUR, 150 – 375 TEUR, … > 50 MEUR).  
 15. Minimum investment volume per deal in classes (e.g. 150 – 375 TEUR). 
 16. Standard investment size class per deal (e.g. 150 – 375 TEUR). 
 17. Average investment amount per deal. 
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 18. Break-off reasons (e.g. no investor realized the deal, price expectations). 
 19. Syndication proportions (lead, co-lead, co-investor, sole investor).  
 20. Proportion of hands-on investors. 
 21. Proportion of exit channels (e.g. IPO, buy-back, total loss). 
 22. Loss proportions from the fund volume in per cent classes 
  (0 – 5%, 5 – 10%, 10 – 15%, 15 – 25%, > 25%).  
  
III. Changes in the investment strategy: 
 1. Development of loss proportions between 2003 and 2004 
  (increase, decrease, unchanged). 
 2. Development of average deal sizes between 2002 and 2004 
  (increase, decrease, unchanged). 
 3. Changes in the investment activity between 2002 and 2004 
  (in terms of: industry branches, financing phase, type of investment, enterprise sizes). 
 4. Relevance of mezzanine financing products in the PE and VC market. 
  
IV. Deficits in the German PE and VC market: 
 1. Proportion of investors who see fundamental market gaps. 
 2. Proportion of investors who see ongoing market gaps 
  (in terms of: industry branches, financing phases, deal sizes, enterprise sizes). 
 3. Significance of investment obstacles in the PE and VC market 
  (e.g. weak deal flow, difficulties in fund raising, limited exit options).  
 
V. Public support measures: 
 1. Proportion of investors who applied at least once for public funding.  
 2. Public funding proportion from the investment volumes between 2002 and 2004 
  (each on the level of independent investors and every type of investor). 
 3. Proportion of public funding channels  
  ( e.g. EU institutions, KfW, other sources in Germany). 
 4. Reasons for the application of public funding  
  (e.g. risk-sharing, cost reduction, public co-investment). 
 
Table 20 The questionnaire content of the second KfW study (derived from Achleitner et al. 2006) 
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Appendix E.3: The questionnaire content of the third KfW study  
 
I.  Sample members characteristics: 
 1. Type of investor (e.g. MBG, VC, CVC). 
 2. Investment fund volume (< 25 MEUR, 25 – 100 MEUR, > 100 MEUR). 
 3. Financing phase (later-stage, early-stage, universal investor). 
 4. Shareholder structures.  
 5. Specification of the biggest shareholder  
  (e.g. private bank, savings bank, insurance company, industry company). 
 6. Founding year of the sample member. 
 7. Average number of portfolio companies. 
 8. Average number of portfolio companies without MBGs. 
 9. Average number of investment professionals and other employees. 
 10. Qualification background of the investment professionals. 
 11. Professional background of the investment professionals. 
 12. Investment volume under management per investment professional. 
 
II. Investment strategy and investment process: 
 1. Return expectations in per cent classes (0 – 10%, 10 – 20%, … > 50%). 
 2. Revenue requirements of investment targets  
  (no requirement, 0 – 1.5 MEUR, 1.5 – 5 MEUR, … > 50 MEUR). 
 3. Proportion of fundraising resources 
  (e.g. private banks, pension funds, private investors, public sector). 
 4. Proportion of deal sources  
  (e.g. banks, consultants, business plan competitions, network). 
 5. Investment proportion of each deal source. 
 6. Number of received business proposals. 
 7. Proportion of business proposals for detailed analyses and for investments. 
 8. Investment proportions from financing phases (e.g. seed, start-up, expansion). 
 9. Minimum investment volume per deal in classes (e.g. 150 – 750 TEUR). 
 10. Average investment amount per deal. 
 11. Proportion of deal size classes (e.g. 1.5 – 5 MEUR, 5 – 15 MEUR, 15 – 50 MEUR). 
 12. Equity proportion of the investor in per cent classes (< 25%, 25 – 50%, > 50%). 
 13. Break-off reasons (e.g. no investor realised the deal, contract clauses). 
 14. Syndication proportions (lead, co-lead, co-investor, sole investor).  
 15. Proportion of hands-on investors. 
 16. Monitoring and mentoring extent (in man-days). 
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 17. Proportion of exit channels (e.g. IPO, buy-back, total loss). 
   
III. Changes in the investment strategy: 
 1. Development of loss proportions between 2008 and 2009. 
 2. Development of portfolios net asset value in 2009 
  (proportion of investors in per cent classes of NAV’s development). 
 3. Development of the average investment amount per deal between 2008 and 2009 
  (increased, decreased, unchanged). 
 4. Changes in the investment activity between 2007 and 2009 
  (in terms of: financing phase, industry branches, enterprise sizes). 
 
IV. Deficits in the German PE and VC market: 
 1. Proportion of investors who see fundamental market gaps. 
 2. Proportion of investors who see ongoing market gaps 
  (in terms of: industry branches and financing phases). 
 3. Significance of investment obstacles in the PE and VC market 
  (e.g. weak deal flow, exit difficulties, level of valuation multiples).  
 
V. Public support measures: 
 1. Proportion of investors who applied for public funding between 2007 and 2009. 
 2. Proportion of public funding on investment volumes between 2007 and 2009. 
 3. Proportion of public funding channels between 2007 and 2009  
  ( e.g. EU institutions, KfW, other sources in Germany). 
 4. Reasons for the application of public funding 
  (e.g. risk-sharing, cost reduction, public co-investment). 
 
Table 21 The questionnaire content of the third KfW study (derived from Achleitner et al. 2010) 
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Appendix F.1: The main study questionnaire 
 
Research project on Germany’s Private-Equity market 
 
Part I: This part of the survey is focused on the characteristics of your firm. 
 
1. Please state your firm’s ownership structure? 
 Please choose one item. 
 
 Independent (diverse shareholder structure) 
 Captive (Corporate Venture Capital firm) 
 MBG (Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft) 
 Public (shareholders are: Federal States, Universities, Business 
Development Agencies, public banks) 
 
2. Founding year of your firm? 
 
     
 
3. Regional investment focus of your firm. 
 Please choose one item. 
 
 Germany 
 Europe (European Community member states) 
 World 
 
4. Number of portfolio companies: 
a) in 2012?   
b) in 2011?   
c) in 2010?   
 
5. Number of investments: 
a) in 2012?   
b) in 2011?   
c) in 2010?   
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6. Total fund volume in EUR: 
Figures in million. 
 
a) in 2012?  MEUR 
b) in 2011?  MEUR 
c) in 2010?  MEUR 
 
7. Total investment volume in EUR: 
Figures in million. 
 
a) in 2012?  MEUR 
b) in 2011?  MEUR 
c) in 2010?  MEUR 
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Part II: This part of the survey is focused on your firm’s investment strategy. 
 
8. Specify your firm’s financing focus. 
 Multiple selection is possible. 
 
 Seed  
 Start-up 
 Expansion 
 Bridge & Replacement 
 MBO/MBI 
 Turnaround 
 
9. Specify the sector of industry your firm is focused on.  
 Multiple selection is possible. 
 
 Mechanical and plant engineering, industry automation 
 Consumer goods and retail 
 Chemistry 
 Electronics 
 Software/IT 
 Energy/Water/Environment 
 Logistics 
 Pharmacy/Medicine/Biotech 
 Telco/Internet 
 Financial Services 
 Services (including consulting) 
 Other (please specify:                                 ) 
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10. State the preferred type of investment.  
Multiple selection is possible. 
 
 Minority investments 
 Majority investments 
 Silent investments 
 Open investments 
 
11. Did your firm apply for public funding during 2010 – 2012? 
 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
      
On the level of your firm      
      
On the level of your portfolio      
 
12. Specify the total proportion of public funding in relation to the annual investment volume.  
 
a) in 2012:  % 
b) in 2011:  % 
c) in 2010:  % 
 
13. Please state the proportion of syndicated investments. 
Independent if lead or non-lead investments. State the proportion in relation to the total number of 
investments. 
 
a) in 2012:  % 
b) in 2011:  % 
c) in 2010:  % 
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Part III: This part of the survey is focused on your firm’s investment process. 
 
14. Annual turnover thresholds of investment targets at the moment of the survey? 
Figures in million. 
 
 Minimum yearly turnover:  MEUR 
 Maximum yearly turnover:  MEUR 
 
15. Specify the development of annual turnover thresholds during 2010 – 2012. 
 
 Decreased Increased Unchanged 
    
Minimum yearly turnover     
    
Maximum yearly turnover    
 
16. Standard investment amount per deal at the moment of the survey?  
Consider only company’s proportion without syndication partner’s proportion. 
 
 
 
17. Please state the development of the standard investment amount per deal during 2010 – 2012. 
 
 Decreased Increased Unchanged 
    
Standard investment amount    
 
18. State the number of investment inquiries received. 
Consider every type of inquiry if possible: complete business plans, executive summaries, short requests. 
 
a) in 2012:   
b) in 2011:   
c) in 2010:   
 
 100 – 499 TEUR  5,000 – 14,999 TEUR 
 500 – 1,500 TEUR  15,000 – 25,000 TEUR 
 1.501 – 4,999 TEUR  > 25,001 TEUR 
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19. Specify the proportion of deal sources in per cent. 
 
Year 2012 2011 2010 
    
Bank    
Consultant (incl. Tax, Legal, Audit)    
Auction    
Chamber of commerce/federation    
Personal network    
PE-/VC-firm    
Universities    
Other    
    
Total  100% 100% 100% 
 
20. Business plan: Please determine the importance of each component at the moment of the 
survey. 
The last section refers to the quality of the business plan. 
 
 Less important    Very important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Strategy      
Market & Competition      
Product & Services      
Marketing & Sales      
Management team      
Human resources      
Organisation      
Research and development      
Financial forecast      
Finance & Controlling      
Completeness & Coherence      
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21. Please assess the relevance of business plan’s components during 2010 – 2012. 
 
 Decreased Increased Unchanged 
    
Strategy    
Market & Competition    
Product & Services    
Marketing & Sales    
Management team    
Human resources    
Organisation    
Research and development    
Financial forecast    
Finance & Controlling    
Completeness & Coherence    
 
22. Proportion of business plans finally considered for investments?  
 
a) in 2012:  % 
b) in 2011:  % 
c) in 2010:  % 
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23. Due Diligence: Please determine the importance of each component at the moment of the 
survey. 
 
 Less important    Very important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Strategy      
Product & Service      
Marketing & Sales      
Human resources      
Finance & Controlling      
Organisation      
Research & Develop.      
Management team      
 
 
24. Please assess the relevance of due diligence’s components during 2010 – 2012. 
 
 Decreased Increased Unchanged 
    
Strategy    
Product & Service    
Marketing & Sales    
Human resources    
Finance & Controlling    
Organisation    
Research & Develop.    
Management team    
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25. Specify the proportion of break-off reasons. 
 
Year 2012 2011 2010 
    
Deal finalised by competitor    
No investor realised the deal    
Particular contract rights    
Other    
    
Total  100% 100% 100% 
 
26. Mentoring: Specify your firm’s involvement in the portfolio at the moment of the survey. 
 
 Not involved Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
     
Strategy definition      
Strategy implementation      
Procurement & Production      
Marketing & Sales      
Finance & Controlling      
Human resources      
Board establishment      
Management recruitment      
Management coaching      
 
27. Please assess the overall involvement in your portfolio during 2010 – 2012. 
 
 Decreased Increased Unchanged 
    
The overall involvement:    
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28. Specify the proportion of exit channels. 
Buy-backs includes repayments for silent investments. 
 
Year 2012 2011 2010 
    
Trade sales    
Secondary purchases    
IPOs    
Buy-backs/Repayment    
Total losses    
    
Total  100% 100% 100% 
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Part IV: This part of the survey is focused on Basel III and the AIFM transformation law. 
 
29. Please specify the effects of Basel III in terms of industry branches.  
Multiple selection is possible. 
 
 Our firm is considering additional sectors of industry. 
 Our firm is disregarding particular sectors of industry. 
 Our firm neither considers nor disregards particular sectors. 
 
30. Does the Alternative-Investment-Fund-Manager transformation law (AIFM) has an impact on 
your firm’s investment process?  
Multiple selection is possible.    
 
 
 
Regarding the selection process. 
Please clarify: 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the due diligence process. 
Please clarify: 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the monitoring process. 
Please clarify: 
 
 
Last three questions: 
 
31. What is your current position in the firm? 
    
32. How long have you been employed? 
    
Anything else you would like to tell us? 
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Appendix F.2: The main study instructions 
 
Edinburgh Business School/ Heriot-Watt University 
Edinburgh, Scotland, EHI4 4AS 
 
Research project on Germany’s Private-Equity market 
 
The subsequent questionnaire is divided into four parts and the completion will take approx. 20 
minutes. 
 
Please be so kind and answer each question. In case you should not know the exact answer, 
please provide an estimation.  
 
A significant participation is essential to receive scientific meaningful results. Therefore, please 
return the questionnaire even if only partly completed. 
 
Please feel free to process the questionnaire on PC, paper-based or with the online version. 
Beside the online version link in the e-mail, the MS-Word file of the questionnaire is enclosed. 
 
Please contact Christian Schlamp on (0160) 98458358 or cschlamp@t-online.de for further 
information regarding this project. 
 
We would kindly ask you to return the questionnaire by e-mail, mail or fax until ________ to 
following contact address in Germany: 
 
Christian Schlamp 
Schwarzwaldstraße 20 
     D-65232 Taunusstein 
E-Mail: cschlamp@t-online.de 
Fax: (03222) 1427506 
 
If you want to receive the study results, please convey a contact address. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.
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Appendix G.1: The progress of the private equity market in Europe  
 
The progress of the private equity market in Europe 
 
Amounts in MEUR  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
       
New funds raised
1)
 79,587 80,475 18,914 21,797 41,604 23,608 
  
      
Number of funds 483 407 315 308 337 239 
Number of VC funds  196 165 148 134 152 102 
Proportion of VC funds 41% 41% 47% 44% 45% 43% 
  
      
Total investments
2)
 69,841 53,366 24,308 41,918 44,870 36,459 
Total VC investments 6,011 6,309 3,823 3,661 3,695 3,185 
Proportion of VC investments 9% 12% 16% 9% 8% 9% 
  
      
Number of portfolio companies 5,114 5,567 4,762 5,017 4,903 4,975 
Number of VC backed portfolio companies 3,339 3,667 3,155 3,039 2,965 2,923 
  
      
Total divestments in MEUR 26,456 14,081 11,543 19,230 30,329 21,642 
Divestment/investment relation 38% 26% 48% 46% 68% 59% 
Write-offs in MEUR 727 855 4,063 4,158 3,877 1,887 
Write-off/divestment relation 2.7% 6.1% 35.2% 21.6% 12.8% 8.7% 
 
1) Including capital gains. 
2) Market statistics (including the investments of investors from outside Europe). 
Table 10 The progress of the private equity market in Europe (derived from EVCA 2013) 
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Appendix G.2: The progress of the private equity market in Germany  
 
The progress of the private equity market in Germany 
 
Amounts in MEUR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
       
New funds raised
1)
 4,532 2,561 1,191 1,217 3,303 1,859 
       
Number of funds 77 47 23 30 35 25 
Number of VC funds 39 29 19 20 21 11 
Proportion of VC funds 51% 62% 83% 67% 60% 44% 
       
Total investments
2)
 10,448 9,584 3,024 4,895 6,667 6,455 
Total VC investments 817 1,094 659 729 717 549 
Proportion of VC investments 8% 11% 22% 15% 11% 9% 
       
Number of portfolio companies 1,105 1,342 1,216 1,359 1,291 1,272 
Number of VC backed portfolio companies 864 1,044 929 966 884 768 
       
Total divestments in MEUR 3,984 2,304 1,948 3,237 5,336 3,441 
Divestment/investment relation 38% 24% 64% 66% 80% 53% 
Write-offs in MEUR 130 137 898 633 954 429 
Write-off/divestment relation 3.3% 6.0% 46.1% 19.6% 17.9% 12.5% 
 
1) Including capital gains. 
2) Market statistics (including the investments of investors from outside Germany). 
Table 11 The progress of the private equity market in Germany (derived from EVCA 2013) 
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Appendix G.3: The development of Germany’s equity market from 1999 to 2009  
 
The development of Germany’s equity market from 1999 to 2009 
 
 Timeframe 1999 – 2001 2002 – 2004 2007 – 2009 
Average GDP in Germany: +2.2 % +0.3 % ./.0.2% 
Most important investment sectors: 
a) industry sector/production: 
b) IT/telco/media: 
c) life science: 
 
 
35% 
32% 
18% 
 
19% 
27% 
18% 
 
23% 
24% 
12% 
 
 
Proportion of financing phases  
from the investment volume: 
a) seed/start-up financing: 
b) expansion financing: 
c) MBI/MBO financing: 
 
 
43% 
38% 
13% 
 
 
34% 
39% 
20% 
 
 
31% 
31% 
27% 
Most important financing phase:  
(Total market perspective without 
seed financing. Proportion from the 
financing volume is indicated in 
brackets.) 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Expansion (38%) 
2. Start-up (32%) 
3. MBO/MBI (13%) 
 
 
 
 
1. Expansion (39%) 
2. Start-up (25%) 
3. MBO/MBI (20%) 
 
 
1. Expansion (31%) 
2. MBO/MBI (27%) 
3. Start-up (23%) 
Proportion of investment classes from 
the number of investments: 
a) < 1.5 MEUR: 
b) 1.5 – 5 MEUR: 
c) > 50 MEUR: 
 
 
53% 
31% 
5% 
 
 
59% 
21% 
9% 
 
 
46% 
20% 
14% 
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Table 16 The development of Germany’s equity market from 1999 to 2009 
(derived from Zimmermann and Fischer 2003; Achleitner et al. 2006; Achleitner et al. 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of survey participants who 
expect minimum returns of: 
a) 4% – 20%: 
b) > 20%: 
 
 
39% 
61% 
 
 
 
51% 
49% 
 
 
44% 
56% 
Proportion of survey participants who 
see a market gap in the area of: 
a) seed financing: 
b) start-up financing: 
c) expansion financing: 
d) turnaround financing: 
 
 
71% 
53% 
20% 
40% 
 
 
74% 
55% 
17% 
21% 
 
 
71% 
84% 
42% 
35% 
 Proportion of survey respondents who 
see a market gap in deals between: 
a) < 150 TEUR: 
b) 150 TEUR – 375 TEUR: 
c) 375 TEUR – 750 TEUR: 
d) 750 TEUR – 1,500 TEUR: 
 
 
54% 
61% 
34% 
17% 
 
 
55% 
62% 
45% 
27% 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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Appendix H: The investment process of private equity and venture capital firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 The investment process of private equity and venture capital firms 
(derived from Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Matz 2002; Feldmann et al. 2007) 
 
Acquisition  
of investment 
capital. 
Acquisition of deals 
(deal flow). 
Deal screening: 
1. Initial check. 
2. Due diligence. 
3. Firm valuation. 
Negotiation and 
contracting. 
Monitoring and 
mentoring. 
Divestment 
(exit). 
Capital gain’s 
reinvestment/ 
Repayment  
of investors. 
Core investment process 
Post-investment phase Pre-investment phase 
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Appendix I: The application of the neo-institutional financial theory 
 
 1. Examination basis: Neo-classical assumption of transactions without information and incentive problems:   first-best optimum 
 
 2. Institutional focus of the neo-institutional financial theory: What is the most efficient institution/organisation? 
 
asymmetric information 
 
                   pre-investment phase:                                   post-investment phase:                    
                                  adverse selection                                      moral hazard and hold up 
 
   addressed by: 
                     the institutional framework of PE/VC-firms: the investment process. 
./. agency costs 
  deal flow               screening                    negotiation and contracting             monitoring and mentoring     exit 
         information and search costs          decision making and (re-)negotiation costs       monitoring costs 
         (agency costs to avoid or to reduce the costs from quality uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty) 
 
3. Examination result: Most efficient institution or organisation for the improvement of the second-best optimum:    second-best optimum 
 
Figure 8 The application of the neo-institutional financial theory 
(derived from Schmidt and Terberger 1997; Rudolph 2006)
 343 
Appendix J.1: The research paradigms 
 
Positivism 
 
In its beginning, positivism was concerned with the development of a standard scientific 
language and method to integrate the different scientific orientations. Therefore, positivism tried 
to cope with the separate orientations of empiricism and rationalism by emphasising the 
advantages of both approaches. These paradigms dominated the philosophical schools in the 17
th
 
and the 18
th
 century (Liesen 2010). In the later-stage of the French reconnaissance, Comte 
criticised philosophy as being inappropriate as a leading knowledge base. He points out that 
philosophy lacks the connection to reality and ignores mathematical calculations. The 
metaphysical and all-encompassing thoughts behind philosophy are based on individual 
assumptions rather than on facts. Furthermore, positivist researchers argued that metaphysics 
would be unable to substantiate assumptions behind causes of reality. Moreover, they criticised 
the assumption of a basic reason behind existence. According to positivist reasoning, every 
assumption regarding reality must be proved by empirical observation. Hence, positivism does 
without transcendental assumptions to clarify phenomena and is solely concerned with the 
description of reality (Kanitscheider 2011). In that respect, positivism tries to separate 
meaningless from meaningful and real from translucent problems. Knowledge, according to a 
positivist researcher, is based on the combination of experience and logical reasoning. Results 
could be regarded as logical true or empirical true. Results which are achieved outside these 
perspectives are disregarded as metaphysical speculation (Liesen 2010). Overall, the objectives 
of positivism are focused on the elimination of both poetical and literary elements in philosophy. 
Thus, positivism tries to develop a kind of philosophy that is regarded as a strong scientific 
approach to deliver verifiable results (Kanitscheider 2011). 
 
The further development of positivism is associated with the so-called Circle of Vienna. These 
academicians focused on the development of a standard scientific approach (Ruffing 2006). The 
circle argued that theories regarding the believe in god or immortality are completely 
meaningless. Hence, questions regarding being and nothing are disregarded as philosophical 
issues (Geier 2004). The main effort of the circle referred to the development of criteria in order 
to distinguish between pure sciences and metaphysics (Kanitscheider 2011). Logical positivism 
postulated the further development of philosophy as the basic underpinning of sciences. 
Therefore, philosophy has to accept natural sciences and their methods (Leerhoff et al. 2009).  
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Popper shares the opinion of the Circle of Vienna regarding the importance of logical reasoning 
and the negation of metaphysical assumptions. However, he criticises that positivism is based on 
inductive reasoning which would contradict the human recognition process. According to 
Popper, induction is associated with an infinite process and, therefore, is unsuitable to describe 
the full reality (Walach 2009). In the case of inductive reasoning, Popper argues that regularities 
of cause and effect are solely based on individual assumptions rather than on the principle of 
causality. In addition, he criticises that earlier successful inductive reasoning does not 
automatically guarantee its successful application in future. Such an assumption would 
contradict logical reasoning as it would be possible to falsify the positive application of 
induction in future (Meidl 2009). It is impossible to prove the principle of inductive reasoning by 
logic as every attempt is resulting in an infinite regress (Engler 2010). Therefore, science 
according to Popper is a system of temporarily accepted hypotheses rather than a system of 
finally proved theories (Schülein and Reitze 2005). In the case of inductive reasoning, the 
empirical observations do not prove evidence of a final conclusion. Hypotheses which are based 
on inductive reasoning are regarded as quite but not definitely true. In that case, the risk of 
remaining error always exists (Leerhoff et al. 2009). Hence, a theory according to Popper creates 
conditions for possible future falsification (Ruffing 2006). Hypotheses are accepted as long as 
they prove themselves and not under the assumption of their permanent validity (Schülein and 
Reitze 2005). According to Popper’s point of view, one different observation immediately calls 
an existing theory into question. However, just one different observation is regarded as 
unsatisfactory for theory’s final falsification. Scientific theories should therefore produce 
different propositions in order to withstand several falsification attempts. A theory could then be 
regarded as confirmed after several unsuccessful falsification attempts (Leerhoff et al. 2009). 
This process of hypotheses testing and falsification is resulting in an ongoing knowledge 
process. A knowledge progress is then realised if new empirical facts are calling existing theories 
into question or require their further development (Schülein and Reitze 2005).  
 
Critical assumptions regarding positivism 
 
One part of criticism regarding positivist assumptions is associated with the so-called critical 
theory (Schülein and Reitze 2005). One representative, Horkheimer, argues that positivism 
follows the aim of controlling both the nature and the humans (Ruffing 2006). It is criticised that 
positivism claims to be the leading discipline in social sciences without the critical reflection of 
natural sciences. The supposed value freedom of positivism is called into question due to several 
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assumptions. First, society’s influence regarding the development of sciences. Second, industry 
sector’s influence regarding theory development and their further application. Finally, individual 
aims behind research and research results. It is argued that positivism does not consider these 
determinants which would influence the research results. Therefore, the representatives of the 
critical theory claim the critical reflection of research by observing the relationship between 
science and society. Adorno and Habermas pointed out that knowledge could not be exclusively 
based on quantitative methods which would narrow the reflection of reality (Schülein and Reitze 
2005). Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas based their overall reasoning on the interrelatedness 
of technology, politics and economy which would influence the research process. Out of their 
point of view, sciences could not claim to be unprejudiced or objective due to economy’s power 
(Walach 2009). 
  
Beside these rather political assumptions, Kuhn criticises Popper’s approach of falsification and 
points out that science is not concerned with the falsification of theories but rather with their 
clarification and expansion. According to Kuhn, existing theories should be stepwise refined 
rather than completely falsified (Leerhoff et al. 2009). Feyerabend on the other hand, criticises 
both positivism and rationalism due to their unquestioned application of systematic approaches. 
In that respect, he argues that such approaches are inappropriate to solve complex interactions. In 
order to avoid a simplification of reality, sciences require a dynamic epistemological approach 
(Schülein and Reitze 2005). Feyerabend argues that sciences are neither based on particular 
methodological approaches nor on logical reasoning. Therefore, he postulates scientific 
pluralism to avoid every type of strictness in sciences (Ruffing 2006). Feyerabend assumes that 
sciences would be more productive without methodological and theoretical regulation. Sciences 
should operate independently from both rationalist or critical-rationalist assumptions. His 
concept, even though not absolutely concept free, more likely tries to ensure several 
methodological approaches which are based on individual creativity (Walach 2009).  
 
Phenomenology 
 
The critical theory is based on the so-called phenomenological paradigm. This scientific 
discipline is concerned with the critical reflection of awareness processes. Phenomenology 
critically reflects the existing structures and considers the subject as the foundation in the 
epistemological process (Meidl 2009). Phenomenology could be regarded as a critical method in 
the social sciences which enables the researcher to evaluate both the core problem and the 
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structure of a phenomenon. This philosophical approach was developed by Husserl as a 
consequence of the increasing importance of natural sciences (Godina 2012). 
 
Phenomenology is focused on philosophical questions regarding the existence (Zahavi 2009). In 
addition, phenomenology accepts philosophy as the basic discipline for its own scientific rigor. 
Husserl criticises both the undoubted existence of god as the knowledge basis and the principle 
of causality (Meidl 2009). The basic principle of phenomenology is the original perspective 
which is regarded as the foundation of knowledge. The interrelation between individual 
perspectives and knowledge could not be called into question. Thus, positivist sciences are 
regarded as unsuitable to examine the existence of a subject. On the contrary, examinations 
should be critical and should avoid scientific prejudices (Zahavi 2009). Phenomenology is 
completely focused on individual assumptions which are regarded as the knowledge basis. 
Therefore, phenomenology is based on the so-called immanent analysis which rejects both 
inductive and deductive theories (Meidl 2009).  
 
The main point is the process of perception. This process distinguishes between human beings as 
subjects on the one hand and the research subject on the other hand. Strong connection between 
the researcher and the subject is required to receive in-depth knowledge (Godina 2012). 
Basically, Husserl’s phenomenology is concerned with thoughts regarding the object rather than 
the physical phenomenon (Ruffing 2006). Hence, phenomenology could be regarded as a further 
development of earlier epistemological approaches. Husserl argues that the existing paradigms 
would be unsuitable to clarify reality. He rejects every type of ontological based reasoning which 
could result in ontological prejudices (Hufnagel 2011). According to Husserl, it is completely 
irrelevant if an analysed object is existing in reality or not. In phenomenology, every object is 
given as perceived irrespective of whether it is realised in reality or in imagination. Hence, the 
core critic of Husserl refers to any kind of scientific model that draws definite conclusions 
regarding a particular object (Zahavi 2009). In that respect, a phenomenon is the appearance of 
an object which is based on a particular perceptual process. This perception process varies if 
both the perspective of the perception and the subject itself are changing. It is possible to receive 
a deeper understanding of the research subject due to these different perspectives. This 
perceptual process is defined as the so-called intentionality and each perceptual process as the 
so-called intentional act (Godina 2012). The process of perspective variation is resulting in a 
variety of phenomenon by disregarding ontological assumptions (Hufnagel 2011). The 
awareness process is divided into two pieces. The first is in the process of intentionality which 
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refers to the direct perception of the object out of different perspectives. The second is in the 
reflection of these perception processes (Godina 2012). This phenomenological awareness 
process is presented in the subsequent figure nine.  
   
                                                      Phenomenon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 The phenomenological awareness process (Godina 2012, p. 33) 
 
Independent from the rather complex process of phenomenology, every type of impression is 
considered as knowledge. Therefore, Husserl argues that it would be impossible to consider 
physical objects as being fully evident due to the ongoing perception process. The end of 
perspectives, perceptions and impressions is depending on themselves and not on the specificity 
of the physical object. In terms of avoiding dogmatic assumptions, every object must be 
considered in relation to the individual experiences (Zahavi 2009).  
 
The issue of hermeneutics 
 
Hermeneutics is defined as the theory of both understanding and interpretation, and focused on 
the analysis of: 
 
 scripts and linguistic utterances; 
Subject Awareness Correlation 
 
Process of intentionality 
Phenomenon as the 
appearance which is based 
on subjective awareness. 
Intentionality as the 
awareness process 
regarding the subject. 
Correlation as the kind of 
awareness process in the 
awareness process. 
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 pictures and dreams; 
 cultural utterances. 
 
Since linguistic material often lacks clear structures and the clarification of sense, the content 
interpretation could result in misunderstandings. In its beginning, hermeneutics was concerned 
with the elementary interpretation and understanding without any in-depth analysis (Walach 
2009). Hermeneutics was not regarded as important in the ancient application. Its importance 
increased in the subsequent phases due to both bible and legal interpretations. Understanding and 
interpretation of scripts were based on pure reading to grasp the text content rather than 
interpreting author’s thoughts and intentions. Schleiermacher introduced a phase of hermeneutics 
due to the possibility of text misinterpretations. His method of hermeneutics requires reader’s 
knowledge of the language, the meanings of words and the basic text context. Even though 
methodological rules are partly considered, the process of understanding is solely based on 
individual assumptions and interpretations (Brenner 2011).  
 
Moreover, Dilthey developed a hermeneutic approach which was initially focused on the 
integration of both natural and social sciences. His approach is the systematic interpretation of 
habits and correlations in reality (Schülein and Reitze 2005). According to Dilthey, the process 
of understanding is a universal problem of human beings. This process is associated with the 
possibility of misinterpretations. Dilthey’s approach is based on individual assumptions behind 
understanding and interpretation as it is impossible to develop methodological instructions 
(Brenner 2011). This type of hermeneutics is basically concerned with the understanding of 
foreign cultural aspects. A more recent approach of hermeneutics is associated with the concept 
of Gadamer. Gadamer assumes that knowledge is based on foreknowledge, which is associated 
with an ongoing process of both understanding and interpretation. Human beings are captured in 
this ongoing knowledge process and are obliged to participate (Ruffing 2006). Due to different 
educational backgrounds, experiences and the cultural environment, every text content is viewed, 
captured and interpreted differently. The process of understanding requires a minimum fore-
knowledge which has to be integrated in the understanding process. In order to expand the 
individual knowledge basis, it is essential to accept individual knowledge gaps on the one hand 
and knowledge adjustments on the other hand. The process of understanding is regarded as an 
ongoing revision of the individual knowledge to comprehend the script content. This process is 
finalised at a point where the individual understanding melts together with the text content 
(Walach 2009). In that respect, Gadamer compares the process of understanding with a 
 349 
conversation that should be based on mutual interest to understand the foreign perspective 
(Ruffing 2006). Gadamer follows the basic argumentation line of individual assumptions in the 
interpretation process but points out that earlier traditional interpretations are reconsidered 
(Brenner 2011). This smoothing process is defined as an infinite process, the so-called 
hermeneutic circle (Walach 2009). This core element of hermeneutics (Brenner 2011) is based 
on the interdependence of initial assumptions and final results (Schülein and Reitze 2005). This 
mutual justification is unending under the aspect of hermeneutics (Walach 2009). An applied 
hermeneutic circle is shown in figure 11 (see appendix K). 
 
Even though hermeneutics lacks empirical evidence and is subject to individual interpretations, 
the approach is regarded as suitable to clarify correlations in reality (Schülein and Reitze 2005). 
Hermeneutics is applied in qualitative sciences and associated with several kinds of methods. 
These could be associated with in-depth text analyses on the one hand, text structuring on the 
other hand or the evaluation of particular human behaviour by narrative analysis (Walach 2009).  
 
At this point, the clarifications regarding the research paradigms show basic differences in the 
conclusion process. The literature in that respect shows that Popper’s approach is focused on 
selected items and concerned with hypotheses testing rather than the individual perspective as in 
the case of phenomenology. Nevertheless, neither Popper’s approach of falsification, nor 
Husserl’s phenomenology or Gadamer’s approach of hermeneutics are resulting in final and 
definite conclusions. On the contrary, these approaches are each concerned with the further 
development of the knowledge base even though each is different in their procedure. In that 
respect, they are narrowed and logical on the one hand and more individual and open on the 
other hand.  
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Appendix J.2: The qualitative and quantitative research 
 
Qualitative research methods are focused on the examination of complex relationships in reality. 
This requires the examination of subjective behaviour and its controlled interpretation in order to 
understand the behavioural effects in reality (Kempf 2009). The interpretative character of 
qualitative research is associated with the following particularities. The first is the assumption 
that society lacks clear structures. The second is that reality is interpreted subjectively according 
to individual experiences. The third is that qualitative research is neither concerned with the 
determination nor the examination of cause and effect relationships. The final one is that 
qualitative research is focused on new discoveries and the understanding of typical cases rather 
than with large sample sizes, hypotheses testing and generalisations. Qualitative research is 
based on inductive procedures to infer from the particular to the general. Hence, this type of 
research is regarded as truth expanding (Häder 2010).     
 
The process of qualitative examinations is based on following principles: 
 
 the principle of communication which requires basic knowledge in the research area; 
 the principle of unselfconsciousness regarding the examination field;    
 the principle of presumptions reflection (Kempf 2009). 
 
Thus, the mission of qualitative research is the examination of subjective interpretations of 
reality on the one hand and the further development of these subjective assumptions on the other 
hand. In order to interpret subjective considerations, qualitative research methods are associated 
with observations, qualitative interviews and focus groups (Kempf 2008). On the other hand, 
quantitative research is concerned with the calculation of frequencies, distributions, probabilities 
and correlations. This type of research is also concerned with the clarification of regularities, and 
cause and effect relationships. Quantitative research is suitable to collect a representative 
proportion of data by structured text analyses, observations, structured interviews and surveys. 
Further research methods are tests and experiments, both in laboratory settings and fields 
(Silkenbeumer 2010). Quantitative research is based on the assumption that societies are 
structured in order to determine regularities and rules in reality. This requires structured research 
methods to avoid subjective influences during the examination process. This type of research is 
based on deductive reasoning to infer from the general to the particular (Häder 2010).  
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Appendix J.3: The issue of triangulation 
 
The application of a quantitative or qualitative research method cannot be recommended as this 
decision depends on the respective research question, the research aim and the existing 
knowledge base (Silkenbeumer 2010). Nevertheless, there is a strong orientation in the 
application of quantitative methods, not only in the field of SME, innovation and public funding 
research, but also in the field of PE and VC. This is shown by the research results from Suman et 
al. (2012) who found out that the proportion of empirical-quantitative examinations in PE 
research increased significantly between 2005 and 2011.  
 
Even though qualitative research is criticised due to the lack of rigidness and structure, Miles and 
Huberman (1994, p. 40) conclude: “But at bottom, we have to face the fact that numbers and 
words are both needed if we are to understand the world”. Hence, the combination of qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches by mixed-method designs is suitable to cope with 
methodological limitations (Kuß 2010). Hanson et al. (2005, p. 233) observe the following 
regarding the suitability of mixed-method designs and supplement: “Despite numerous 
challenges and obstacles, it has emerged as a viable alternative to purely quantitative or 
qualitative methods and designs”.  
 
In the case of triangulation, the researcher examines the research object with different 
methodological approaches, theoretical underpinnings or by combining different types of data. 
The combination of different data analysis methods or the implementation of pretests to compose 
questionnaires is not classified as triangulation. Methodological triangulation on the one hand is 
applied to cope with the limitations of one method. Nevertheless, researchers must critically 
evaluate the suitability of each method in relation to the research field, the basic research 
question and the expected results. Methodological triangulation is then resulting in following 
compositions: 
 
 the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods; 
 the combination of different quantitative methods;    
 the combination of different qualitative methods. 
 
The chosen methods are applied concurrently or in sequence. In addition, it is possible to 
consider different data bases in order to address the research question. Methodological 
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triangulation should not only be applied to validate the research results but also for the expansion 
of the knowledge base (Flick 2008). As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 41) point out: “The 
question, then, is not whether the two sorts of data and associated methods can be linked during 
the study design, but whether it should be done, how it will be done and for what purpose”. If the 
results due to the application of several methods are different, further theoretical and empirical 
explanation is required (Flick 2008).  
 
The subsequent figure ten shows several types of research designs according to Miles and 
Huberman (1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Linking qualitative and quantitative data (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 41) 
Figure 1 Linking qualitative and quantitative data (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 41) 
 
 
Figure 10 Linking qualitative and quantitative data (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 41) 
 
In the first design, the process of data collection is carried out concurrently. In the second design, 
both quantitative and qualitative research is concurrently carried out in waves. Such a process 
could be concerned with several in-depth qualitative examinations in the field which validate or 
expand the findings from a structured questionnaire. The structured questionnaire is adjusted and 
applied again. In the third design, the qualitative examination is the basis for the structured 
questionnaire. The questionnaire results are validated or further strengthened by additional 
qualitative research, for instance a focus group (Miles and Huberman 1994). Such a research 
design was applied successfully both by Brinkrolf (2002) regarding management support of VC 
1. Qualitative     (continuous, integrated collection 
                      of both       
    Quantitative                  kind of data) 
 
2. Quantitative             wave 1                           wave 2                          wave 3 
 
    Qualitative                           continuous fieldwork     
 
3. Qualitative                               Quantitative                                Qualitative  
   (exploration)                           (questionnaire)                      (deepening and testing) 
 
4. Quantitative                              Qualitative                                 Quantitative 
       (survey)                                  (fieldwork)                                (experiment)  
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firms and Grethe (2010) regarding turnaround investments of PE firms. In the final design, a 
quantitative survey is carried out and followed by qualitative research for deeper examinations in 
the field. The final quantitative experiment could be concerned with hypotheses testing. These 
hypotheses might be derived from earlier study results (Miles and Huberman 1994). Concurrent 
research designs are also concerned with the validation of research results. Therefore, it is 
recommended to apply different research methods in order to prove the independence of the 
results from a specific research method. Sequential research designs on the other hand, in the 
case that quantitative research is followed by a qualitative approach, are also concerned with 
results expansion. Furthermore, a qualitative orientation which is applied beside a quantitative 
section might be applied to explore the research area, to develop hypotheses or to determine 
suitable instruments for the qualitative part (Kuß 2010). 
 
Triangulation is based on the assumption that by combining several methods, the weaknesses of 
each method are overcompensated by the accumulation of advantages. Nevertheless, mixed-
method designs are concerned with the risk of losing specialisation advantages in the case of 
their superficial application (Wrona and Fandel 2010).  
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Appendix K: The applied hermeneutic circle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
                   Internal text context                                      External text context 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 The applied hermeneutic circle (own development) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific text section: 
e.g. deal flow. 
Internal text content: 
e.g. investment process. 
External text context: 
1. Financial crisis. 
2. PE and VC.  
3. Investment process.  
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Appendix L.1: The sample frame of private equity and venture capital investors 
 
The sample frame of private equity and venture capital investors 
 
Independent investor Federal state Location 
   
Kizoo Technology Ventures  Baden-Wurttemberg Karlsruhe 
Leonardo Venture Baden-Wurttemberg Mannheim 
Triangle Venture Capital Baden-Wurttemberg St. Leon-Rot 
ZFHN Zukunftsfonds Heilbronn Baden-Wurttemberg Heilbronn 
Bon Venture Management  Bavaria Munich 
Fidura Private Equity Fonds Bavaria Munich 
Global Life Science Ventures Bavaria Munich 
IT-Adventure  Bavaria Starnberg 
MIC AG Bavaria Munich 
MIG Verwaltung Bavaria Munich 
PolyTechnos Venture-Partners Bavaria Munich 
Seventure Partners  Bavaria Munich 
SMAC Partners  Bavaria Unterhaching 
Target Partners Bavaria Munich 
TVM Capital Bavaria Munich 
Unternehmer TUM-Fonds Management  Bavaria Garching 
VNT Management Bavaria Munich 
Wellington Partners Bavaria Munich 
X Ange Private Equity  Bavaria Munich 
BMP  Berlin Berlin  
Catagonia Capital  Berlin Berlin 
Earlybird Venture Capital  Berlin Berlin 
Peppermint Venture Partners  Berlin Berlin 
Ventegis-Capital  Berlin Berlin 
BAG AG für Industriebeteiligungen Hamburg Hamburg 
Neuhaus Partners Hamburg Hamburg 
Pricap Venture Partners AG Hamburg Hamburg 
Creathor Venture Management Hesse Bad Homburg  
IDP Industrial Development Partners Hesse Königstein 
IVC Venture Capital Hesse Bad Homburg 
Sirius Venture Partners Hesse Wiesbaden 
Enjoy Venture North Rhine-Westphalia Dusseldorf 
Fundamenta Capital  North Rhine-Westphalia Erkrath 
Genes  North Rhine-Westphalia Frechen 
Glotec Ventures  North Rhine-Westphalia Neuss 
Innogy Venture Capital North Rhine-Westphalia Essen 
Media Ventures  North Rhine-Westphalia Cologne 
T-Venture Holding  North Rhine-Westphalia Bonn 
bfu AG Rhineland-Palatinate Koblenz 
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Corporate Venture Capitalists Federal state Location 
   
Bilfinger Venture Capital Baden-Wurttemberg Mannheim 
Freudenberg Venture Capital Baden-Wurttemberg Weinheim 
HV Holtzbrinck Ventures Adviser Bavaria Munich 
Axel Springer Venture GmbH Berlin Berlin 
Hasso Plattner Ventures Management Brandenburg Potsdam 
Evonik Industries  Hesse Hanau 
DuMont Venture (Capnamic) North Rhine-Westphalia Cologne 
BASF Venture Capital Rhineland-Palatinate Ludwigshafen 
 
Savings/Cooperative/Public Federal state Location 
bank daughter 
  
   
LBBW Venture Capital  Baden-Wurttemberg Stuttgart 
Wagniskapitalgesellschaft KSK  Baden-Wurttemberg Reutlingen 
Beteiligungsges. Sparkasse Freiburg Baden-Wurttemberg Freiburg 
BWK Baden-Wurttemberg Stuttgart 
Chancenkapitalfonds KSK Biberach  Baden-Wurttemberg Biberach 
L-EA Private Equity GmbH Baden-Wurttemberg Karlsruhe 
S Wagnis- und Beteiligungskapital Baden-Wurttemberg Ludwigsburg 
S-Kap Unternehmensbeteiligung Baden-Wurttemberg Pforzheim 
Sparkassenbeteiligungsgesellschaft  Baden-Wurttemberg Heilbronn 
Süd Beteiligungen (SüdBG)  Baden-Wurttemberg Stuttgart 
Bayern Kapital Bavaria Landshut 
BayernLB Capital Partner Bavaria Munich 
S-Partner Kapital Bavaria Munich 
S-Refit Bavaria Regensburg 
IBB Beteiligungsgesellschaft Berlin Berlin 
nwk nordwest (Spk. Bremen) Bremen Bremen 
BC Brandenburg Capital (ILB) Brandenburg Potsdam 
Haspa BGM (Spk. Hamburg) Hamburg Hamburg 
VR Equitypartner Hesse Frankfurt/Main 
Beteiligungskapital Hannover  Lower Saxony Hannover 
Nord Holding  Lower Saxony Hannover 
Equity Partners (Spk. Dusseldorf) North Rhine-Westphalia Dusseldorf 
Kreissparkasse Köln Beteiligungen  North Rhine-Westphalia Cologne 
NRW.Bank North Rhine-Westphalia Dusseldorf 
S VentureCapital GmbH North Rhine-Westphalia Dortmund 
S-Siegerlandfonds North Rhine-Westphalia Siegen 
S-UBG + S-VC North Rhine-Westphalia Aachen 
Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft  Rhineland-Palatinate Mainz 
Saarländische Wagnisfinanzierung Saarland Saarbrucken 
SBG Sparkassenbeteiligung Saxony-Anhalt Barleben 
GoodVent (Investitionsbank SH) Saxony-Anhalt Magdeburg 
BSV-Beteiligungsgesellschaft  Saxony Oelsnitz 
CFH Beteiligungsgesellschaft Saxony Leipzig 
RBB Management (Spk. Bautzen) Saxony Bautzen 
S-Beteiligung Leipzig GmbH Saxony Leipzig 
SBG-Sächsische Beteiligungen GmbH Saxony Dresden 
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SC-Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaft 
mbH 
Saxony Chemnitz 
SIB (Spk. Dresden) Saxony Dresden 
bm-t Thüringen (Aufbaubank) Thuringia Erfurt 
 
MBG Federal state Location 
   
MBG Baden-Wurttemberg Stuttgart 
BayBG Bavaria Munich 
MBG Berlin and Brandenburg Berlin and Potsdam 
BUG Bremen Bremen 
BTG  Hamburg Hamburg 
MBG Hesse Frankfurt/Main 
MBG Lower Saxony Hannover 
MBMV Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Schwerin 
KBG North Rhine-Westphalia Neuss 
MBG Rhineland-Palatinate Mainz 
SKG Saarland Saarbrucken 
MBG Saxony-Anhalt Magdeburg 
MBG Saxony Dresden 
MBG Schleswig-Holstein Kiel 
MBG Thuringia Erfurt 
 
Public investor Federal state Location 
   
MicroMountains Venture Baden-Wurttemberg Villingen-Schwenningen 
Fraunhofer Venture Bavaria Munich 
Innovationsstarter Hamburg GmbH Hamburg Hamburg 
Innovations-Capital Göttingen Lower Saxony Göttingen 
Genius Venture Capital Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Schwerin 
High-Tech Gründerfund North Rhine-Westphalia Bonn 
 
Table 23 The sample frame of private equity and venture capital investors (own development)
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Appendix L.2: The sample frame of the BVK publications 
 
The sample frame of the BVK publications 
Sample frame BVK publications 
 
 
 
Sub-category Publication title Published 
      
Annual report Annual report 2010. 2011 
  
 
Annual report 2011. 2012 
  Annual report 2012. 2013 
      
Market information  Private Equity Investor letter December 2010/January 2011. 29.12.2010 
for investors  Private Equity Investor letter December 2011/January 2012. 02.01.2012 
  Private Equity Investor letter December 2012/January 2013. 04.04.2013 
      
Archives 2010 Deutsche Unternehmen setzen auch in der Krise auf Beteiligungskapital.  08.03.2010 
  MBGen beweisen Stabilität in der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise. 12.03.2010 
  Kräftiger Stimmungsaufschwung am Beteiligungsmarkt. 26.05.2010 
  Deutscher Private Equity-Markt setzt Erholung fort. 27.05.2010 
  Beteiligungsgesellschaften können derzeit fast 33 Mrd. Euro in mittelständische Unternehmen investieren. 11.06.2010 
  Stimmung am Beteiligungsmarkt erholt sich weiter kräftig. 19.08.2010 
  AIFM-Regulierung kann Finanzierung für KMUs und Innovationen erschweren.  11.11.2010 
  Private Equity-Aktivitäten stabilisieren sich. 11.11.2010 
  Atempause auf dem deutschen Beteiligungsmarkt.  16.11.2010 
      
Archives 2011 Mehr als 200 Mio. EUR Beteiligungskapital der MBGen für den Mittelstand. 15.02.2011 
  Deutlich mehr Private Equity-Investitionen im Jahr 2010. 02.03.2011 
  12. Deutscher Eigenkapitaltag des BVK: Press release.  12.05.2011 
  12. Deutscher Eigenkapitaltag des BVK: Key-Note speech Dr. Dombret: Private Equity and Basel III. 12.05.2011 
  Stimmungshoch auf dem Beteiligungsmarkt. ns 
  Deutscher PE-Markt behauptet sich trotz Euro-Krise.  21.11.2011 
   
 359 
Archives 2012 Erneut deutlich mehr Private Equity-Investitionen im Jahr 2011. 27.02.2012 
  BVK begrüßt Initiative der Bundeskanzlerin zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für VC. 01.03.2012 
  Erholung am Beteiligungsmarkt setzt sich fort. 02.05.2012 
  AIFM-Gesetzesentwurf für Deutschland vom BMF vorgelegt - BVK begrüßt Diskussionsentwurf. 20.07.2012 
  Beteiligungsmarkt in Deutschland: Starker Stimmungseinbruch im 2. Quartal.  31.07.2012 
  Stimmung am Beteiligungsmarkt erholt sich. 12.11.2012 
  Deutlich mehr Investitionen im deutschen Private Equity-Markt. 12.11.2012 
  Anhörung im Finanzausschuss: BVK begrüßt Initiative der Regierungsfraktionen.  19.11.2012 
  AIFM-Umsetzung in Deutschland: BVK begrüßt Kabinettsentwurf. 12.12.2012 
      
PE letter 2010  Private Equity letter February/March 2010. 05.03.2010 
 
Private Equity letter June/July 2010. 07.07.2010 
  Private Equity letter September/October 2010. 24.09.2010 
  Private Equity letter December 2010. 04.01.2011 
      
PE letter 2011  Private Equity letter April/May 2011. 16.05.2011 
 
Private Equity letter September/October 2011. 10.10.2011 
  Private Equity letter December 2011/January 2012. 10.01.2012 
      
PE letter 2012 Private Equity letter March 2012/April 2012. 04.04.2012 
  Private Equity letter September 2012. 17.09.2012 
  Private Equity letter December 2012.  19.12.2012 
 
Table 30 The sample frame of the BVK publications (own development)
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Appendix M: Additional clarifications regarding public funding 
 
According to a European perspective, the institutions for public funding are structured on three 
levels. First, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development as multilateral development banks on the European level. Second, the Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau and the Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank as public investment banks on the 
federal level in Germany. Third, the public investment banks on the regional state level in 
Germany, which are concerned with the regional development of their home state (Keuper and 
Puchta 2008). These institutions are cooperating, for instance, by risk-sharing between the EIB 
and the KfW. Public support measures from the EU and Germany’s federal level are additionally 
subsidised and issued by third level institutions. The regional focused institutions of this third 
level fulfil a leading through function for KfW programmes, issue own types of credits according 
to regional requirements and, moreover, issue guarantees. Hence, the public investment banks on 
the regional level close the gap in economic support measures due to their regional focus and 
competence (Asmussen 2008). 
 
The existence of the public banks on these different levels is based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. This principle clarifies that public issues have to be solved by subordinate levels, 
whereas the superordinate levels step back. Nevertheless, this procedure does not exclude the 
support of the higher levels in principle which depends on local authorities competence. The 
principle of subsidiarity explains the three levels of economic and structural development and 
their mutual supplement. Different political objectives are concerned with different economic 
strategies and thus different types and volumes of public funding measures. Irrespective of 
different political objectives, public funding measures should only be applied in the case of sub-
optimal market developments (Weber 2008). Therefore, in terms of avoiding distortions of 
competition, the legal and business framework of Germany’s public investment banks was 
negotiated with the EC. As a result of the so-called agreement I in July 2001, it was agreed that 
public banks in Germany will lose their state guarantees from July 2005 on. In the aftermath of 
the initial agreement, the so-called agreement II was concerned with state guarantees for public 
banks in case that they operate in a competitively neutral manner. These agreements, inter alia, 
explain the consolidation of Germany’s federal state banks, the so-called Landesbanken (see 
glossary), which lost their state guarantees from 2005 on.  
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According to the agreements I and II, public funding is limited to such areas in which market 
mechanisms fail and funding measures are supporting the overall economic welfare (Keuper and 
Puchta 2008). This official definition allows the following support measures. First, public 
funding for enterprise founding. In that case, promising and desirable enterprises are not founded 
due to information asymmetries and the lack of securities. This market gap justifies public 
support for enterprise founding. Second, support measures for innovation financing which are 
required due to pronounced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors. 
Third, support measures regarding environmental investments. In that case, investments are 
omitted as entrepreneurs do not consider the welfare effects as a result of their environmental 
investments. Such investments are not resulting in additional revenues which would bear the 
investment costs. Fourth, public funding for research and development. Finally, public support 
for SME financing, as these enterprises are overall disadvantaged due to weak equity ratios and 
smaller financing volumes (Weber 2008). Furthermore, public investment banks are enabled to 
finance infrastructure projects, the public housing sector, social measures and in some cases 
exports (Keuper and Puchta 2008).  
 
Weiland (2008) in that respect points out that basically every type of financing could be obtained 
over the capital market. Nevertheless, the risk tolerance of market participants vary from time to 
time, in relation to market’s condition, which explains the demand and scope of public 
guarantees, risk capital or public mezzanine financing. Weiland (2008), furthermore, clarifies 
that it would be possible to refinance risky credits over the capital market too. He argues that 
market participants nowadays are able to evaluate the loss risk by state of the art IT systems. 
However, the financing of risky credits is limited at a point on which interest rates exceed the 
usual rate. In that case, the refinancing over the capital market is impossible and requires the 
intervention of public investment banks (Weiland 2008).  
 
Schäfer and Zimmermann (2008) mention several possibilities to avoid financial constraints. The 
first possibility is the reduction of information asymmetries by means of rating and observation. 
The second is the investment in long-term relationships between entrepreneurs and banks to 
strengthen the trust basis. The third is adjusting credit contracts in order to sell the secured good 
in the case of unexpected developments. Nevertheless, Schäfer and Zimmermann (2008) also 
explain that these strategies have their limitations in the case of start-up and innovative 
companies due to the lack of historical data and securities. In addition, they clarify that banks in 
more recent times are exposed to increased market competition. This would explain the 
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importance of risk evaluation rather than the focus on customer relationships. As a result, the 
transformation of these measures seems rather limited. 
 
Irrespective of the conclusions regarding capital market’s ability and additional strategies to 
avoid financing constraints, the market of public funding was limited itself. Until 2005, it was 
rather unattractive for private banks to provide public subsidised loans due to a standard margin 
of 1%. This margin did neither bear the costs of credit risks nor of credit monitoring in the case 
of an average credit portfolio. As a result, private banks avoided the distribution of public credits 
so that in particular SMEs, start-up companies and innovative enterprises neither received private 
bank loans nor public credits. On the other hand, good debtors rejected public credits in the case 
that public conditions exceeded the market conditions. In that case, public funding measures 
could not fulfil their stimulating role for environmental or research and development 
investments. Therefore, the KfW introduced a system of risk-adjusted interest rates to boost the 
provision of public credits. This risk-adjusted interest rate system is associated with different 
margins which depend on debtor’s credit standing and the scope of securities (Weiland 2008). 
The introduction of the interest rate system and the transformation of the so-called agreement II 
explain the future risk-orientation of the public investment banks. This progress was also 
accompanied by the launch of revolving funds to save the public resources for future generations 
(Keuper and Puchta 2008). Nevertheless, the introduction of risk-adjusted interest rates and the 
launch of revolving funds contradict the objective of public banks to settle both incomplete and 
imperfect markets. On the other hand, this development shows that public banks could not 
completely disregard market developments in order to maintain their business model. It could be, 
moreover, concluded that public investment banks are now more focused on qualitative 
investments rather than closing market gaps at any rate. 
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Appendix N.1: The credit and equity financing programmes of the KfW 
 
The credit and equity financing programmes of the KfW 
 
Programmes 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  in MEUR 
Enterprise founding and SME financing: 
     
      
Unternehmerkredit 9,010 6,365 8,006 6,338 7,811 
(Enterprise financing credit) 
     
Regionalförderprogramm 438 351 473 597 426 
(Regional focused support credit for SMEs) 
     
Kapital für Arbeit und Investition 210 110 72 31 - 
(Credit for employment and investment) 
     
Kapital für Gründung 138 176 179 168 138 
(Enterprise founding credit) 
     
Kapital für Wachstum 15 4 - - - 
(Growth credit) 
     
KfW Start-Geld 159 165 220 943 373 
(Enterprise founding credit) 
     
ERP-Gründerkredit - - - - 1,961 
(Enterprise founding credit) 
     
Filmfinanzierung - - - - 5 
(Credit for film financing) 
     
Darlehen Bürgschaftsbanken 53 - - - - 
(Refinancing credit for public guarantee banks) 
     
Akquisitionsfinanzierung 189 229 - 89 145 
(Credit for acquisition financing) 
     
Globaldarlehen gewerbliche Wirtschaft - - - 250 - 
(Refinancing measure for private banks) 
     
      
Subtotal 10,212 7,400 8,950 8,416 10,859 
      
Equity financing programmes:           
            
ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm 65 66 90 83 69 
(Refinancing measure for PE and VC firms) 
     
KfW-Risikokapitalprogramm 114 61 50 29 26 
(Refinancing measure for PE and VC firms) 
     
KfW-Programm Beteiligung Sozialunternehmen - - - - 0 
(Co-financing measure for equity investments) 
     
ERP-Startfund 63 71 80 70 58 
(Co-financing measure for equity investments) 
     
Sonstige Beteiligungsprogramme 19 3 5 19 18 
(Unspecified equity financing programmes) 
     
      
Subtotal 261 201 225 201 171 
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Innovation financing: 
     
      
ERP-Innovationsprogramm 888 1,220 814 1,309 879 
(Credit for innovation projects) 
     
Sonderfinanzierungen F&E Luftfahrt - - 1,225 835 22 
(R&D financing measure in the aviation sector)           
      
Subtotal  888 1,220 2,039 2,144 901 
            
Financial crisis related measures: 
     
      
KfW Sonderprogramm - 7,162 6,176 691 - 
(Financial crisis related credit programme) 
     
Sonderfinanzierungen Maßnahmepaket - 786 - - - 
(Special purpose financing) 
     
      
Subtotal  0 7,948 6,176 691 0 
      
Total 11,361 16,769 17,390 11,452 11,931 
 
Table 49 The credit and equity financing programmes of the KfW 
(derived from KfW 2010a; KfW 2011a; KfW 2012a; KfW 2013a) 
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Appendix N.2: The summary of the KfW annual reports 
 
The summary of the KfW annual reports 
 
Programmes 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  in MEUR 
Enterprise founding and SME financing:  
     
      
Investitions- und Gründungskredite 9,970 7,171 8,950 8,077 10,714 
(Investment and enterprise founding credits) 
     
Sonder- und Einzelfinanzierungen  242 229 0 339 145 
(Special purpose financing measures) 
     
      
Subtotal 10,212 7,400 8,950 8,416 10,859 
      
Innovation financing:           
            
ERP-Innovationsprogramm 888 1,220 814 1,309 879 
(Credit for innovation projects) 
     
Sonderfinanzierungen F&E Luftfahrt - -  1,225 835  22 
(R&D financing measure in the aviation sector) 
     
      
Subtotal 888 1,220 2,039 2,144 901 
      
Equity financing programmes 261 201 225 201 171 
            
Subtotal  261 201 225 201 171 
            
Total I 11,361 8,821 11,214 10,761 11,931 
      
Financial crisis related measures - 7,948 6,176 691 - 
            
Total II 11,361 16,769 17,390 11,452 11,931 
 
Table 50 The summary of the KfW annual reports (own development)
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Appendix O: The results for the Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
 
The turnover thresholds of MBGs investment targets 
 
n=5 Minimum Maximum 
 
turnover in MEUR 
   
Max 17 500 
Min 1 25 
Range 
 
Range 
16 475 
Median 10 50 
Mean 9.3 185.0 
Variance 64.3 43,625.0 
Deviation 8.0 208.9 
Responses 3 5 
 
Table 89 The turnover thresholds of MBGs investment targets (own development) 
 
The progress of turnover thresholds between 2010 and 2012 
 n=6 
 
Minimum turnover 
  Decreased Increased Unchanged 
Responses 1 1 4 
Proportion 17% 17% 67% 
  Maximum turnover 
  
  
Responses 0 3 3 
Proportion 0% 50% 50% 
 
Table 90 The progress of turnover thresholds between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
 
The number of MBGs portfolio companies 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    Total 2,245 2,277 2,282 
Max 1,101 1,109 1,095 
Min 19 20 18 
Range 1,082 1,089 1,077 
Median 275.0 282.5 294.5 
Mean 374.2 379.5 380.3 
Variance 169,576.6 172,134.7 169,149.9 
Deviation 411.8 414.9 411.3 
n 6 6 6 
 
Table 91 The number of MBGs portfolio companies (own development) 
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The number of MBGs investments 
 Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Total 382 366 341 
Max 151 156 127 
Min 3 3 2 
Range 148 153 125 
Median 80.0 80.0 80.0 
Mean 76.4 73.2 68.2 
Variance 4,256.8 4,180.7 3,009.7 
Deviation 65.2 64.7 54.9 
n 5 5 5 
 
Table 92 The number of MBGs investments (own development) 
 
The fund volume of the MBGs in MEUR 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Total 189 192 188 
Max 102 105 101 
Min 37 37 37 
Range 65 68 64 
Median 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Mean 62.9 64.0 62.6 
Variance 1,188.2 1,303.0 1,152.1 
Deviation 34.5 36.1 33.9 
n 3 3 3 
 
Table 93 The fund volume of the MBGs in MEUR (own development) 
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The total investment volume of the MBGs in MEUR 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Total 116 120 113 
Max 51 52 45 
Min 2 2 2 
Range 49 50 43 
Median 12.3 10.5 13.7 
Mean 19.4 20.0 18.9 
Variance 422.3 495.4 344.1 
Deviation 20.5 22.3 18.5 
n 6 6 6 
 
Table 94 The total investment volume of the MBGs in MEUR (own development) 
 
The average investment volume of the MBGs in MEUR 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Average investment volume per MBG 19.4 20.0 18.9 
Average number of investments per MBG 76.4 73.2 68.2 
    
Average investment volume per deal 0.254 0.273 0.277 
 
Table 95 The average investment volume of the MBGs in MEUR (own development) 
 
The syndication proportion of the MBGs 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
 
      
Max 70 70 70 
Min 20 20 20 
Range 50 50 50 
Median 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Mean 42.5 42.5 42.5 
Variance 491.7 491.7 491.7 
Deviation 22.2 22.2 22.2 
n 4 4 4 
 
Table 96 The syndication proportion of the MBGs (own development) 
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The MBGs BP components' relevance at survey moment 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
 Review field n Rank Mean Deviation 
 
  
   
Management team 6 1 4.8 0.4 
Market & Competition 6 2 4.7 0.5 
Strategy 6 3 4.5 0.8 
Product & Service 6 3 4.5 0.5 
Financial forecast 6 4 4.2 0.4 
Marketing & Sales 6 5 4.0 0.6 
Finance & Controlling 6 5 4.0 0.0 
Human resources 6 6 3.8 0.4 
Research & Development 6 7 3.5 0.5 
Completeness & Coherence 6 7 3.5 0.5 
Organisation 6 8 3.3 0.8 
 
Table 97 The MBGs BP components' relevance at survey moment (own development) 
 
The MBGs BP components' development between 2010 and 2012 
 
Review field’s importance n Decreased Increased Unchanged 
     
Human resources 6 0% 33% 67% 
Finance & Controlling 6 0% 33% 67% 
Management team 6 0% 17% 83% 
Marketing & Sales 6 0% 17% 83% 
Strategy 6 0% 17% 83% 
Financial forecast 6 0% 17% 83% 
Product & Service 6 0% 0% 100% 
Market & Competition 6 0% 0% 100% 
Research & Development 6 0% 0% 100% 
Completeness & Coherence 6 0% 0% 100% 
Organisation 6 17% 0% 83% 
 
Table 98 The MBGs BP components' development between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
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The MBGs DD components' relevance at survey moment 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
 Review field n Rank Mean Deviation 
 
        
Management team 5 1 4.8 0.4 
Strategy 5 2 4.4 0.9 
Product & Service 5 2 4.4 0.5 
Marketing & Sales 5 3 4.0 0.7 
Finance & Controlling 5 3 4.0 0.0 
Human resources 5 4 3.8 0.8 
Research & Development 5 5 3.2 0.4 
Organisation 5 5 3.2 0.4 
 
Table 99 The MBGs DD components' relevance at survey moment (own development) 
 
The MBGs DD components' development between 2010 and 2012 
 
Review field’s importance n Decreased Increased Unchanged 
  
 
      
Management team 5 0% 40% 60% 
Finance & Controlling  5 0% 40% 60% 
Organisation 5 20% 20% 60% 
Marketing & Sales 5 0% 20% 80% 
Product & Service  5 0% 0% 100% 
Strategy 5 0% 0% 100% 
Research & Development 5 0% 0% 100% 
Human resources 5 0% 0% 100% 
 
Table 100 The MBGs DD components' development between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
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The monitoring and mentoring of the MBGs 
 
(Scale: 1 not involved to 5 always involved) 
 Monitoring/Mentoring area n Rank Mean Deviation 
 
        
Finance & Controlling 6 1 3.3 0.5 
Board establishment 6 2 2.5 1.0 
Strategy development 6 2 2.5 1.0 
Management recruitment 6 3 2.3 1.4 
Management coaching 6 4 2.2 0.8 
Strategy implementation 6 4 2.2 1.0 
Marketing & Sales 6 5 2.0 1.3 
Human resources 6 5 2.0 0.9 
Procurement & Production 6 6 1.5 0.8 
 
Table 101 The monitoring and mentoring of the MBGs (own development) 
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Appendix P: The results of the comparison analysis  
 
The investments of PSIs at survey moment 
  
Type of investor MBG Public Counts Proportion 
n=12 (multiple selection)         
     
Type of investment:          
Silent investments 6 4 10 83% 
Minority investments 3 6 9 75% 
Open investments 1 2 3 25% 
Majority investments 0 1 1 8% 
     
Type of investor Independent CVC Counts Proportion 
n=11 (multiple selection)         
          
Minority investments 4 6 10 91% 
Open investments 2 3 5 45% 
Silent investments 1 3 4 36% 
Majority investments 2 1 3 27% 
 
Table 102 The investments of PSIs at survey moment (own development) 
 
The investment classes of PSIs at survey moment 
  
Classification from to MBG Public Total Proportion Cumulated 
 
in TEUR 
     
1 100 499 1 2 3 25% 25% 
2 500 1,500 4 3 7 58% 83% 
3 1,501 4,999 1 0 1 8% 92% 
4 5,000 14,999 0 1 1 8% 100% 
5 15,000 25,000 0 0 0 0%   
6 25,001 
 
0 0 0 0%   
n     6 6 12 100%   
        
Classification from to Independent CVC Total Proportion Cumulated 
 
in TEUR 
     
1 100 499 1 0 1 9% 9% 
2 500 1,500 2 2 4 36% 45% 
3 1,501 4,999 0 4 4 36% 82% 
4 5,000 14,999 1 0 1 9% 91% 
5 15,000 25,000 1 0 1 9% 100% 
6 25,001   0 0 0 0%   
n     5 6 11 100%   
 
Table 103 The investment classes of PSIs at survey moment (own development)
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PSIs selection of industry branches 
 
Type of investor MBG Public Counts Proportion 
n=12 (multiple selection)         
     
Industry branches:          
Mechanics/Industry automation 6 6 12 100% 
Software/IT 6 6 12 100% 
Electronics 6 5 11 92% 
Pharma/Medicine/Biotech 6 3 9 75% 
Telco/Internet 5 4 9 75% 
Energy/Water/Environment 6 3 9 75% 
Chemistry 5 3 8 67% 
Consumer goods and retail 6 1 7 58% 
Logistics 5 2 7 58% 
Services including consulting 4 1 5 42% 
Financial Services 3 1 4 33% 
Other (advanced materials) 0 0 0 0% 
          
Type of investor Independent CVC Counts Proportion 
n=11 (multiple selection) 
    
          
Mechanics/Industry automation 3 3 6 55% 
Software/IT 4 2 6 55% 
Electronics 1 4 5 45% 
Pharma/Medicine/Biotech 2 3 5 45% 
Telco/Internet 3 2 5 45% 
Energy/Water/Environment 2 2 4 36% 
Chemistry 0 4 4 36% 
Consumer goods and retail 0 2 2 18% 
Services including consulting 1 1 2 18% 
Financial Services 0 1 1 9% 
Other (advanced materials) 0 1 1 9% 
Logistics 0 0 0 0% 
 
Table 104 PSIs selection of industry branches (own development)
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The number of PSIs portfolio companies 
MBG/Public investors 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 2,472 2,516 2,519 
Max 1,101 1,109 1,095 
Min 13 16 18 
Range 1,088 1,093 1,077 
Median 75.0 83.0 80.0 
Mean 224.7 228.7 229.0 
Variance 114,729.6 116,463.4 115,166.2 
Deviation 338.7 341.3 339.4 
n 11 11 11 
 
Independent/CVC 
  
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 255 263 304 
Max 100 100 100 
Min 7 7 7 
Range 93 93 93 
Median 20.0 20.0 19.5 
Mean 31.9 32.9 30.4 
Variance 1,044.4 1,051.3 874.5 
Deviation 32.3 32.4 29.6 
n 8 8 10 
 
Table 105 The number of PSIs portfolio companies (own development)
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The number of PSIs investments 
MBG/Public investors 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 406 387 373 
Max 151 156 127 
Min 2 2 2 
Range 149 154 125 
Median 7.0 6.0 11.0 
Mean 40.6 38.7 37.3 
Variance 3,318.3 3,182.7 2,406.9 
Deviation 57.6 56.4 49.1 
n 10 10 10 
 
Independent/CVC 
  
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 65 55 59 
Max 19 14 16 
Min 1 1 1 
Range 18 13 15 
Median 3.0 3.0 4.0 
Mean 7.2 6.1 6.6 
Variance 49.9 29.1 25.3 
Deviation 7.1 5.4 5.0 
n 9 9 9 
 
Table 106 The number of PSIs investments (own development)
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The fund volume of PSIs in MEUR 
MBG/Public investors 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 545 619 1,060 
Max 105 140 400 
Min 10 10 10 
Range 95 130 390 
Median 73.0 73.5 101.0 
Mean 68.1 77.4 117.7 
Variance 1,446.2 2,472.6 13,806.0 
Deviation 38.0 49.7 117.5 
n 8 8 9 
 
Independent/CVC 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
        
Total 1,015 1,043 1,330 
Max 600 600 600 
Min 15 15 15 
Range 585 585 585 
Median 75.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 145.0 149.0 147.8 
Variance 43,016.7 42,395.3 33,131.9 
Deviation 207.4 205.9 182.0 
n 7 7 9 
 
Table 107 The fund volume of PSIs in MEUR (own development)
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The investment volume of PSIs in MEUR 
MBG/Public investors 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Total 177 184 162 
Max 51 52 45 
Min 2 1 2 
Range 49 51 43 
Median 5.3 4.0 7.0 
Mean 16.1 16.7 14.7 
Variance 377.9 456.3 264.2 
Deviation 19.4 21.4 16.3 
n 11 11 11 
 
Independent/CVC 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
    
Total 210 247 297 
Max 80 80 100 
Min 10 11 5 
Range 70 69 95 
Median 50.0 62.8 25.0 
Mean 41.9 49.4 42.4 
Variance 761.9 928.2 1,603.1 
Deviation 27.6 30.5 40.0 
n 5 5 7 
 
Table 108 The investment volume of PSIs in MEUR (own development) 
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The syndication proportion of PSIs 
MBG/Public investors 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
 
      
Max 83 72 90 
Min 20 20 20 
Range 63 52 70 
Median 32.5 32.5 34.0 
Mean 42.9 40.9 45.1 
Variance 519.0 427.6 559.0 
Deviation 22.8 20.7 23.6 
n 8 8 8 
  
Independent/CVC 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
 
      
Max 100 100 100 
Min 29 25 17 
Range 71 75 83 
Median 90.0 90.0 95.0 
Mean 75.6 75.0 77.1 
Variance 844.0 908.3 986.1 
Deviation 29.1 30.1 31.4 
n 7 7 8 
 
Table 109 The syndication proportion of PSIs (own development) 
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The initial review areas of PSIs at survey moment 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
MBG/Public investors n Rank Mean Deviation 
Review fields:         
Management team 12 1 4.6 0.9 
Strategy 12 2 4.3 1.3 
Market & Competition 12 3 4.2 0.8 
Product & Service 12 3 4.2 0.8 
Marketing & Sales 12 4 3.7 0.9 
Finance & Controlling 12 4 3.7 0.9 
Financial forecast 12 4 3.7 1.1 
Research & Development 12 5 3.6 0.7 
Completeness & Coherence 12 6 3.4 0.7 
Human resources 12 6 3.4 0.8 
Organisation 12 7 3.3 0.9 
          
Independent/CVC 
    
Management team 10 1 5.0 0.0 
Market & Competition 10 2 4.5 0.5 
Strategy 10 3 4.3 0.8 
Product & Service 10 3 4.3 0.5 
Marketing & Sales 10 4 3.9 0.6 
Completeness & Coherence 9 5 3.8 1.0 
Human resources 10 5 3.8 0.9 
Financial forecast 10 6 3.7 0.7 
Research & Development 10 7 3.6 0.7 
Finance & Controlling 10 8 3.5 1.3 
Organisation 10 9 3.4 0.8 
 
Table 110 The initial review areas of PSIs at survey moment (own development) 
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The detailed analysis areas of PSIs at survey moment 
 
(Scale: 1 less important to 5 very important) 
MBG/Public investors n Rank Mean Deviation 
Review fields:         
Management team 11 1 4.5 0.9 
Strategy 11 2 4.3 0.9 
Product & Service 11 3 4.0 1.1 
Marketing & Sales 11 4 3.7 1.1 
Finance & Controlling 11 5 3.6 0.8 
Research & Development 11 6 3.3 0.9 
Human resources 11 7 3.2 1.3 
Organisation 11 8 3.1 0.9 
          
Independent/CVC 
    
Management team 10 1 4.9 0.3 
Product & Service 10 2 4.6 0.5 
Strategy 10 3 4.5 0.5 
Marketing & Sales 10 4 4.1 0.3 
Finance & Controlling 10 5 3.9 0.9 
Human resources 10 6 3.6 1.1 
Organisation 10 7 3.5 0.7 
Research & Development 10 7 3.5 0.7 
 
Table 111 The detailed analysis areas of PSIs at survey moment (own development) 
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The break-off reasons of PSIs between 2010 and 2012 
  
 
MBG/Public investors Independent/CVC 
Rank Year 2010 
1 No investor realised the deal No investor realised the deal 
2 Other reasons Particular contract right 
3 Deal finalised by competitor Deal finalised by competitor 
4 Particular contract right Other reasons 
n=13 
  
Rank Year 2011 
1 No investor realised the deal No investor realised the deal 
2 Other reasons Particular contract right 
3 Deal finalised by competitor Other reasons 
4 Particular contract right Deal finalised by competitor 
n=13     
Rank Year 2012 
1 No investor realised the deal No investor realised the deal 
2 Other reasons Particular contract right 
3 Deal finalised by competitor Deal finalised by competitor 
4 Particular contract right  Other reasons 
n=16 
  
 
Table 112 The break-off reasons of PSIs between 2010 and 2012 (own development)
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The monitoring and mentoring of PSIs 
 
(Scale: 1 not involved to 5 always involved) 
MBG/Public investors n Rank Mean Deviation 
Mentoring areas:         
Finance & Controlling 12 1 3.3 0.7 
Strategy development 12 2 3.1 1.1 
Board establishment 12 3 2.9 1.0 
Management recruitment 12 4 2.6 1.1 
Strategy implementation 12 5 2.5 1.1 
Management coaching 12 6 2.1 1.0 
Marketing & Sales 12 6 2.1 1.1 
Human resources 12 7 1.9 0.8 
Procurement & Production 12 8 1.7 0.9 
          
Independent/CVC 
    
Board establishment 9 1 4.4 0.9 
Strategy development 9 2 3.9 0.8 
Management recruitment 9 2 3.9 0.9 
Finance & Controlling 9 3 3.8 0.8 
Management coaching 9 4 3.6 1.0 
Human resources 9 5 3.4 1.1 
Marketing & Sales 9 6 3.2 0.8 
Strategy implementation 9 7 2.8 0.7 
Procurement & Production 9 8 2.4 0.9 
 
Table 113 The monitoring and mentoring of PSIs (own development)
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The exit channel proportions of PSIs between 2010 and 2012 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Exit channels 
 
Trade sales 
 
Secondary 
purchases 
 
IPOs 
 
Buy-backs 
 
Total losses 
 
            
Year 2010 
     
MBG/Public investors           
n 5 2 1 8 7 
Mean 24.0 3.0 75.0 60.5 16.4 
Median 10.0 3.0 75.0 85.0 10.0 
Deviation 31.9 2.8 #DIV/0! 38.8 19.5 
      
Independent/CVC           
n 5 1 1 4 4 
Mean 58.0 10.0 25.0 45.0 23.8 
Median 50.0 10.0 25.0 32.5 20.0 
Deviation 31.3 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 37.6 20.6 
      
Year 2011           
MBG/Public investors           
n 4 1 0 8 6 
Mean 11.3 5.0 #DIV/0! 82.5 15.0 
Median 10.0 5.0 #Number! 87.5 7.5 
Deviation 7.5 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 24.8 22.3 
      
Independent/CVC           
n 5 1 0 4 4 
Mean 73.0 10.0 #DIV/0! 32.5 23.8 
Median 80.0 10.0 #Number! 32.5 20.0 
Deviation 29.5 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 14.4 20.6 
      
Year 2012 
     
MBG/Public investors           
n 4 2 0 9 8 
Mean 13.8 32.5 #DIV/0! 62.7 27.0 
Median 15.0 32.5 #Number! 80.0 10.0 
Deviation 7.5 38.9 #DIV/0! 35.0 36.0 
      
Independent/CVC           
n 4 2 1 4 5 
Mean 53.8 30.0 30.0 32.5 33.0 
Median 50.0 30.0 30.0 32.5 20.0 
Deviation 18.9 28.3 #DIV/0! 14.4 38.7 
 
Table 114 The exit channel proportions of PSIs between 2010 and 2012 (own development) 
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Appendix Q.1: The validation study’s invitation letter 
 
Edinburgh Business School/ Heriot-Watt University 
Edinburgh, Scotland, EHI4 4AS 
 
Research findings on Germany’s PE and VC market 
 
A study has been conducted on developments in Germany’s PE and VC market during the post-
crisis phase in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The study was focused on small and medium-sized 
enterprise financing and venture capital investments. In that respect, the study was examining the 
investment behaviour, the investment activity and the changes along the investment process.  
 
The main results of this study are in the table enclosed. It would be of great help if you would be 
willing to indicate whether the findings of this study were congruent with your experience. So 
the table also forms a brief questionnaire and you are kindly asked to send your feedback by 
mail, e-mail or fax to: 
 
Christian Schlamp 
Schwarzwaldstraße 20 
D-65232 Taunusstein 
E-Mail: CSchlamp@T-Online.de 
Fax: (03222) 1427506 
 
In the case that you prefer an interview, please be so kind and indicate a specific time on which 
we may contact you. 
 
Please feel free to contact Christian Schlamp on 0160-98458358 or CSchlamp@T-Online.de for 
further information regarding this project. 
 
Your feedback is considered for scientific purposes only and the results are treated with absolute 
confidentiality.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
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Appendix Q.2: The validation study’s questionnaire 
 
Main study results on Germany’s PE and VC market 
 
The study results regarding the investment process of PE and VC firms are presented below. Please 
indicate whether these results are congruent with your experience. In the case that these findings do not 
apply for your company, you are kindly asked for a specification. There is additional space for your 
remarks at the end of the presentation. 
 
Research findings. Meets my 
experience. 
Experience 
differs. 
No indication 
possible. 
1. Dealflow. 
a)   Banks and the network of PE and VC firms were the 
most important deal sources during the post-crisis 
phase in 2010, 2011 and 2012; based on the 
following selection: bank, consultants, personal 
network, chamber of commerce/federation, PE/VC 
firms, universities, auctions, others not specified. 
  
 
 
 
b)   Auctions, chambers of commerce and federations 
were of minor or absolutely no importance in the 
acquisition of deals during 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
based on the following selection: please see 1a).  
   
2. Business plan screening. 
a)   The management team, the strategy and the product 
or service were the most important review fields 
during the initial screening at the moment of the 
main study in 2013; based on the following selection: 
strategy, market & competition, product & services, 
management team, human resources, organisation, 
research & development, finance & financial 
forecast, business plan’s completeness & 
coherence. 
   
 b)   The management team, the strategy and the product    
or service were also the most important review fields 
during the post-crisis phase in 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
based on the following selection: please see 2a). 
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Research findings. Meets my 
experience. 
Experience 
differs. 
No indication 
possible. 
3. Due Diligence. 
a)   The management team, the strategy and the product 
or service were the most important review fields at 
the moment of the main study in 2013; based on the 
following selection: strategy, product & service, 
marketing & sales, human resources, finance & 
financial forecast, organisation, research & 
development, management team. 
   
b)   The management team, the strategy and the product 
or service were also the most important review fields 
during the post-crisis phase in 2010, 2011 and 2012; 
based on the following selection: please see 3a). 
   
4. Monitoring and mentoring. 
a)  At the moment of the survey in 2013, PE and VC 
investors were most involved in board establishment, 
finance & controlling and strategy definition; based 
on the following selection: strategy definition, 
strategy implementation, procurement & production, 
marketing & sales, finance & controlling, human 
resources, board establishment, management 
recruiting, management coaching. 
   
b)   The mentoring extent of PE and VC investors during 
2010 to 2012 remained unchanged and hence 
investors neither increased nor decreased their 
overall involvement. 
   
5. Effects of the Basel III implementation.  
    The implementation of Basel III has no influence on 
the selection of portfolio companies due to a specific 
industry sector membership. Specific industry 
sectors are neither preferred, disadvantaged or 
completely excluded. 
   
6. Implementation of the AIFM-directive into national law.  
    The implementation of the AIFM-directive into 
national law in 2012, has no effect on the processes 
of business plan screening, the due diligence or the 
monitoring and mentoring of portfolio companies. 
   
 
Space for your comments: 
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7. Please state your ownership structure? 
 Please choose one item. 
 Independent (diverse shareholder structure) 
 Captive (Corporate Venture Capital firm) 
 MBG (Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaft) 
 Public (shareholders are: federal states, universities, public 
banks, etc.) 
 
8. Please indicate the founding year of your company. 
     
 
9. Please indicate the financing focus of your company. 
Multiple selection is possible. 
 Seed 
 Start-up 
 Expansion 
 Bridge & Replacement 
 MBI & MBO 
 Turnaround 
 
10. What is your current position in the firm? 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
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Appendix Q.3: The validation study questionnaire of the MBGs 
 
Main study results on Germany’s PE and VC market 
(The Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften in Germany’s federal states.) 
 
Research findings for the Mittelständische Beteiligungs- 
gesellschaften. 
Meets my 
experience. 
Experience 
differs. 
No indication 
possible. 
1. Dealflow. 
a)   Banks, consultants and the network of the MBGs 
were the most important deal sources during 2010, 
2011 and 2012; based on the following selection: 
banks, consultants, auctions, network, chambers of 
commerce/federations, PE/VC firms, universities, 
other resources not specified. 
  
 
 
 
b)   Auctions, chambers of commerce/federations and 
universities were of minor or absolutely no 
importance for the acquisition of deals in 2010, 2011 
and 2012; based on the following selection: please 
see 1a).  
   
2. Business plan screening. 
a)   At the moment of the main study in 2013, the 
management team, the market & competition, the 
strategy and the product/service were the most 
important review fields during the initial screening; 
based on the following selection: strategy, market & 
competition, product/service, marketing & sales, 
management team, human resources, organisation, 
research & development, financial forecast, finance 
& controlling, business plan’s completeness & 
coherence. 
   
 b)   The importance of these most important review fields 
remained unchanged during the past years. As a 
result, the rank order of the review fields did neither 
change in their entirety nor with regard to the most 
important review fields. 
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Research findings for the Mittelständische Beteiligungs- 
gesellschaften. 
Meets my 
experience. 
Experience 
differs. 
No indication 
possible. 
3. Due Diligence. 
a)   At the moment of the main study in 2013, the 
management team, the strategy and the 
product/service were the most important review 
fields of the due diligence; based on the following 
selection: strategy, product/service, marketing & 
sales, human resources, finance & controlling, 
financial forecast, organisation, research & 
development, management team. 
   
b)   The importance of these most important review fields 
remained unchanged during the past years. As a 
result, the rank order of the review fields did neither 
change in their entirety nor with regard to the most 
important review fields. 
   
4. Monitoring and mentoring. 
  At the moment of the main study in 2013, the most 
important mentoring areas of the MBGs were finance 
& controlling, board establishment and strategy 
development; based on the following selection: 
human resources, procurement, production, 
marketing & sales, strategy implementation, 
management recruitment, board establishment, 
strategy development and finance & controlling. 
   
5. Effects of Basel III.  
    The implementation of Basel III has no influence on 
the selection of portfolio companies due to a specific 
industry sector membership. Specific industry 
sectors are neither preferred, disadvantaged or 
completely excluded. 
   
6. Implementation of the AIFM-directive. 
    The implementation of the AIFM-directive into 
national law has no effect on the processes of 
business plan screening, the due diligence or the 
monitoring and mentoring of portfolio companies. 
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7. Founding year of the MBG: 
 
     
 
8. Current position in the firm: 
 
     
 
9. Interview date and interview duration: 
 
     
 
Room for additional indications: 
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Appendix R: The venture capital write-off proportions 
 
The venture capital write-off proportions
1)
 
  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average  
Country                     
                      
Germany 27.3% 21.2% 24.2% 31.6% 36.9% 52.5% 30.4% 27.6% 18.9% 30.1% 
UK 18.1% 8.9% 22.0% 14.4% 4.4% 12.5% 4.9% 12.4% 9.5% 11.9% 
France - 5.0% 5.9% 4.2% 6.1% 19.9% 20.2% 13.0% 5.4% 10.0% 
                      
Europe 12.3% 11.9% 19.1% 15.7% 13.7% 27.1% 16.0% 17.9% 143.0% 16.4% 
 
1) Based on market statistics. 
Table 145 The venture capital write-off proportions (derived from InvestEurope 2016) 
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Appendix S.1: The public venture capital measures on the federal level 
 
The public venture capital measures on the federal level 
  
No. 
 
 
Year of 
introduction 
 
Term of the funding 
measure 
 
 
Financing focus/ 
fund type 
 
Volume 
in MEUR 
 
 
Additional information 
 
 
     
 
1. 2004 ERP/EIF Fund of Fund Venture capital/ 1.700 1.700 MEUR on payments until 2016; fund volume 3.2 BEUR; 
   
fund of fund 
 
fund’s volume is partly reserved for additional funding measures. 
2. 2005 High-Tech Gründerfund I Seed, start-up/ 202 Public deposits; see calculation in table 149 (appendix S.3). 
   
direct investments, PPP 
 
 
3. 2005 ERP-Startfund Start-up, expansion/ 250 Fund’s introduction. 
   
co-investment fund 
 
 
 
Subtotal 
  
2.152  
4. 2009 ERP-Startfund Start-up, expansion/ 220 Additional public deposits. 
   
co-investment fund 
 
 
5. 2009 High-Tech Gründerfund I Seed, start-up - Prolongation of funds investment period. 
   
direct investment, PPP 
 
 
 
Subtotal 
  
220  
6. 2010 Equity fund for Germany Growth/ 500 KfW and Commerbank cooperation. 
   
direct investments, PPP 
 
 
7. 2011 High-Tech Gründerfund II Seed, start-up/ 285 Public deposits; see calculation in table 149 (appendix S.3). 
   
direct investments, PPP 
 
 
8. 2011 ERP-Startfund Start-up, expansion/ 250 Additional public deposits. 
   
co-investment fund 
 
 
9. 2012 European Angels Fund Start-up, expansion/ 270 Funding from the ERP/EIF Fund of Fund; see measure no. 1. 
   
co-investment fund 
 
 
10. 
 
2012 Equity financing fund 
 
Later-stage/ 
Co- 
2 
 
Estimation based on KfW support reports. 
 
  
for social enterprises co-investment fund 
 
 
 
Subtotal 
  
1.307  
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No. 
 
 
Year of 
introduction 
 
 
Term of the funding 
measure 
 
 
 
Financing focus/ 
fund type 
 
Volume 
in MEUR 
 
 
Additional information 
 
 11. 2013 Investment grant for BAs Start-up, expansion/ 150 Public subsidy for business angels. 
   
public subsidy 
 
 
12. 
 
2013 
 
ERP/EIF Mezzanine-Fund 
of Fund for Germany I 
Mezzanine financing/ 
fund of fund 
200 
 
Cooperation of the EIF, the BMWi and the public investment 
banks of Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. 
13. 2015 ERP-VC fund investment Expansion/ 400 KfW fund for investments in private venture capital funds. 
   
fund of fund 
 
 
14. 
 
2016 
 
ERP/EIF Mezzanine-Fund 
of Fund for Germany II 
Mezzanine financing/ 
fund of fund 
400 
 
Cooperation of the EIF, the BMWi and the public investment 
banks of Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. 
15. 2016 ERP/EIF growth facility Expansion/ 500 Public fund for co-investments in technological enterprises. 
   
co-investment fund 
 
 
16. 2016 Coparion Start-up, expansion/ 225 KfW daughter company; successor of the ERP-Startfund;  
   
co-investment fund 
 
additional public deposits. 
17. 
 
2017 
 
High-Tech Gründerfund 
III 
Seed, start-up, 
expansion/ 
285 
 
Public deposits; see calculation in table 149 (appendix S.3). 
 
   
direct investments, PPP 
 
 
18. 2017 Investment grant for BAs Start-up, expansion/ - Programme modification. 
   
public subsidy 
 
 
Subtotal 
  
2.160  
Total 
  
5.839  
 
Table 147 The public venture capital measures on the federal level 
(own development; derived from the literature in table 148 in appendix S.2) 
 394 
Appendix S.2: The literature base of the venture capital measures 
 
The literature base of the venture capital measures 
  
Measure number 
in table 147 
Information basis of the respective 
funding measure 
    
1. BMBF (2016)  
 
EIF (2016) 
2. High-Tech Gründerfund (2013) 
 
Geyer et al. (2016) 
 
High-Tech Gründerfund (2017) 
3. BMWi (2010) 
  BMBF (2012) 
  KfW (2012) 
4. BMWi (2010) 
5. BMWi (2010) 
6. Innovations-Report.de (2010) 
7. BMWi (2012) 
  BMBF (2014) 
8. KfW (2012) 
9. BMWi (2017a) 
10. 
 
KfW (2014) 
 
KfW (2015) 
  KfW (2016) 
  KfW (2017) 
11. BMWi (2013) 
12. BMWi (2017a) 
 
BMWi (2017b) 
13. KfW (2017a) 
14. BMWi (2017a)  
 
BMWi (2017b) 
15. BMWi (2017a) 
16. BMBF (2016)  
 
KfW (2017b) 
17. High-Tech Gründerfund (2017) 
18. Bafa (2017) 
   
Table 148 The literature base of the venture capital measures (own development)
 395 
Appendix S.3: The net volumes of the High-Tech Gründerfunds I, II, III 
 
The net volumes of the High-Tech Gründerfunds I, II, III 
 
Fund 
name 
 
 
 
 
Year of 
introduction 
 
 
Private 
deposits
1) 
 
Gross fund 
volume 
 
 
Private 
investments 
 
 
Net fund 
volume 
 
 
   in MEUR 
      
HTGF I 2005 
 
8% 220 17.6 202.4 
HTGF II 2011 5% 300 15.0 285.0 
HTGF III 2017 5% 300 15.0 285.0 
      
Total   820 47.6 772.4 
 
1) Derived from Geyer et al. (2016) and own estimations for HTGF II and HTGF III. 
Table 149 The net volumes of the High-Tech Gründerfunds I, II, III (derived from BMWi 2012; BMBF 
2014; Geyer et al. 2016; High-Tech Gründerfund 2017; own calculations) 
